This paper analyzes the relationship between land property rights and household labor allocation. It proposes a theoretical model in which land titling has two opposite effects on labor decisions. On one hand, enhancement of tenure security should lead to reductions in guarding requirements and to increases in the hours that households spend off their land (mFieldneffect). On the other hand, decreases in risk of expropriation should lead to higher parcel&attached; investments and to higher productivity of labor related to their land (mpro& ductivityneffect). To investigate this hypothesis, a massive land titling program in rural Peru (The Special Program of Rural Titling & PETT), is analyzed. Propensity score match& ing estimations suggest that the productivity effect is much larger than the mFieldneffect, leading to overall increases in household labor allocation to agricultural self&employed; activities. These estimations are robust to different specifications within a cross section and a four&round; panel dataset.