This paper explores the effects of different descent rules on human capital
accumulation. In a context where parents are constrained in the possibility
of bequeathing land to their children (e.g., because it is considered property
of the extended family, or clan), their investment in their children’s human
capital might not be optimal. We focus on matrilineal inheritance rules
and exploit a policy experiment in Ghana, the introduction of the 1985
Intestate Succession Law. The Law introduced minimum quotas for the
land that parents can bequeath to their children, substantially reducing the
share going to the matriclan. In our setting, the Law allowed parents to
move closer to the unconstrained optimum. We find evidence that after the
reform parents disinvested in the education of their children while increased
investments in their nutrition, likely due to complementarity with work on
the farm. This effect is specific to males for whom the matrilineal constraint
was binding, while there is no effect for females. This evidence suggests
that before the reform matrilineal groups in Ghana invested more in their
children’s education to substitute for land inheritance and more generally
that traditional norms are important in determining the intergenerational
accumulation of property and human capital investments.