Following over six years of international support toward social, political and economic development
in post-conflict Timor-Leste (TL), the country has found itself in the throes of a national crisis. This
crisis emerged, despite unprecedented international support per capita from contributing
governments and international agencies. This paper seeks to explore the contributions made by
governments and international agencies, including international financial institutions, United Nations
(UN) Agencies and international NGOs, toward the creation of a viable and stable state.
Information regarding the models employed by international actors toward the implementation of a
shared vision of development will be sought to inform on the direction of development and its
anticipated outcome.1

I suggest that while not primarily responsible for the current crisis, the international community
lacks coherence in its development approaches and that the inherent contradictions underpinning
development strategies ultimately undermines the potential for positive impact in realizing policy
objectives and contributes to the conflict dynamics within the state. Moreover, competition among
agencies for influence and funding further reduces possibilities for successful cooperation and
exacerbates tensions between government and civil society actors. Awareness of the overall
components and organization of development assistance does not exist.
Perhaps the greatest contributing factor to instability has been the lack of transition strategies to
support the country’s emergence from occupation, and to guide the socio-economic transitions
associated with independence. The international community’s lack of success in properly assisting
the government to address underlying grievances effectively and the structural constraints
encompassing development initiatives prevent a coherent and long-term response to challenges
associated with state building. Together, these factors contributed to the national crisis by creating
an enabling environment for dissent and manipulation of genuine grievances.
Failure in 2006 to prevent the near collapse of the state in Timor-Leste and the inability to provide a
sensible approach to the building of the institutions of the state and a vibrant civil society, are poor
indications of how the international community will manage in much larger and more complex
conflict environments. It is imperative that the international community not only learns the lessons
of post-conflict interventions in Timor-Leste but also applies these in ongoing and forthcoming
initiatives to prevent the collective failure of the development and peace building industries.
Realization of this objective will, in part, require systemic changes within bilateral and multilateral
donor institutions.