Type | Book |
Title | An ethnohistorical dictionary of China |
Author(s) | |
Publication (Day/Month/Year) | 1998 |
Publisher | Greenwood Publishing Group |
URL | https://books.google.com/books?hl=ro&lr;=&id=IOM8qF34s4YC&oi=fnd&pg=PA131&dq=An+ethnohistorical+dictionary+of+China&ots=mWSExlM72_&sig=pggm_AbJKAZ6w4gfx_PbFWDllX8 |
Abstract | Putting together an ethnohistorical dictionary of China has proven to be a daunting task. Part of the problem, of course, is defining ethnicity. Most anthropologists argue that ethnicity is a sense of individual identity with a larger group based on any combination of racial, religious, linguistic, and class similarities. The possible number of permutations on these five factors can further be complicated by rates of acculturation and assimilation over time. At any given moment, ethnic loyalties tend to be dynamic rather than static, subject to infinite variety because of economic, demographic, political, and social change. No sooner do anthropologists publish their research than group circumstances change. This is particularly true in the case of Chinese ethnohistory. Discussing linguistic groups in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), for example, is particularly difficult because the government insists on maintaining the fiction that there is only one Chinese language, and that it is divided into a series of dialects. To argue otherwise would require government officials to recognize major ethnic divisions with the dominant Han people, something Chinese officials have been extremely reluctant to do. Most linguists argue, however, that the definition of ‘‘dialect’’ means that it is mutually intelligible by users of other ‘‘dialects’’ of the same language. The Chinese government claims that eight dialects of the language exist within the national boundaries: Mandarin, Wu, Jin, Gan, Xiang, Hakka, Yue, and Min. The problem with that definition, of course, is that none of these so-called dialects is mutually intelligible with the other. The people who speak them may very well be united by their Han* descent and their shared eclectic mix of Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian religious beliefs, but they cannot understand one another’s spoken languages, which should render them members of different ethnic groups. viii PREFACE Complicating the issue even more is the fact that each of the Chinese languages possesses many dialects, and some of those dialects are not mutually intelligible to speakers of related dialects. At the same time, however, all Chinese languages share an unusual linguistic similarity. They cannot be mutually understood by different speakers, but they all employ the same written script, which is mutually readable. Also, if an outsider asks a Wu or Mandarin speaker what language he or she speaks, the answer is invariably ‘‘Chinese.’’ Some linguists have begun employing the term ‘‘regionalect’’ to describe the Chinese languages. Whether or not Mandarin, Wu, Gan, Xian, Hakka, Jin, Yue, and Min are dialects, regionalects, or languages, they divide the more than 1.1 billion Han peoples into distinguishable, individual groups whose members share loyalty and a sense of identity with one another because of language. Political realities also complicate a description of ethnicity in China. I have endeavored here to include descriptions of all the major ethnic groups in China, but in doing so I must define just exactly what I mean by China. Is the People’s Republic of China really China, or must Taiwan be included, as the Chinese Communist party insists? Or is the Republic of Taiwan on Formosa the legitimate political representative of the Chinese people? Hong Kong became part of the People’s Republic of China on July 1, 1997, but Macao, until December 20, 1999, at least, will remain a part of the Portuguese empire. Tibet also poses a problem. Many Tibetan nationalists will certainly reject the notion that Tibet is part of the People’s Republic of China because they feel that the Chinese invasion and occupation of Tibet are illegitimate. Indian nationalists feel the same way about the Aksai Chin region of the Kashmir, which borders Tibet. Aksai Chin was clearly under Indian control until 1959, when Chinese armies moved in and claimed the region. India protests the claim, but the matter has not yet been settled. In an effort to be inclusive, I have therefore defined China very broadly. For the purposes of An Ethnohistorical Dictionary of China, China includes the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of China on Taiwan, Tibet, and the Aksai Chin region of Jammu and Kashmir. Such an approach will, no doubt, offend the political assumptions of many people, especially human rights activists interested in East and Central Asia, but I decided that being as inclusive as possible rather than as exclusive as possible was the lesser of two evils. Another problem with discussing ethnicity in China grows out of the country’s recent history. With the triumph of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist party in 1949, China all but closed itself off to the outside world. It became nearly impossible for foreign scholars to gain access to the People’s Republic of China, and opportunities to conduct fieldwork for anthropologists and archaeologists evaporated. Chinese scholars continued their work and published the results of their research in Mandarin-language journals, but access to them by Western scholars was limited by the language problem and by the all too frequent unwillingness of the central government to distribute information PREFACE ix abroad. In the paranoia of a totalitarian state, any and all information becomes grist for foreign espionage mills. The central government has rigidly controlled the flow of information in and out of the People’s Republic of China. As a result, major Western scholarly journals in anthropology, ethnology, sociology, linguistics, and archaeology carried few articles about contemporary Chinese society during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Even after the Cultural Revolution ended, when government censorship standards relaxed somewhat, it was still difficult, if not impossible, for social scientists to get into the PRC. Finally, certain political paradigms in the People’s Republic of China affect the ways in which social scientists approach the study of ethnicity. Although the vast majority of the people of the PRC and the Republic of China are of Han descent, there are tens of millions of minority peoples. Most ethnologists would agree that these minorities are divided into hundreds of ethnic groups. The central government, however, has refused to acknowledge such diversity. They have officially recognized only fifty-five minority ‘‘nationalities,’’ even though many of those minority groups have no general sense of nationalism and are divided into dozens of subgroups based on linguistic, religious, demographic, and social differences. An asterisk (*) in the text indicates a separate entry. I wish to express my appreciation to librarians at Sam Houston State University, Brigham Young University, Rice University, the University of Texas at Austin, the University of California at Los Angeles, and the University of California at Berkeley. I would also like to express my appreciation to Cynthia Harris, my editor at Greenwood, for her patience in seeing this project to its completion. |
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