The central question of this article is: why is peripheral nationalism virtually non-existent
in Guangdong but has long been a problem in Xinjiang? Existing theories are inadequate
for answering this question. They are tailored to either wealthy or poor regions, but not
both. They also fail to explain the absence of nationalism in Guangdong and its presence
in Xinjiang. In this article, I propose a model that can explain peripheral nationalism in
both wealthy and poor regions. The model incorporates two key variables, elite status and
national identity. Speci? cally, I argue that if the elites from the peripheral region can hold
important positions in the central government and if the peripheral residents identify
themselves with the core nation, the probability of nationalist movements will be low. On
the other hand, if their elites are excluded from high of? ce in the central government and
if their people do not identity themselves with the core nation, the probability of nationalist
movements will be high. The model succeeds in explaining the cases of Xinjiang and
Guangdong.