The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups
has created unprecedented challenges in Central America.
Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries
spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to
the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces
are frequently overwhelmed and at times coopted by the
criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter.
With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine
trafficked from South America to the United States passing
through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers
through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply
withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous.
These conditions raise the question: to what extent are
militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to
criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases:
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that:
? Although illicit ties between the military and criminal
groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these
countries are not yet “lost” to criminal groups.
? Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military
stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common.
? In general the less exposed services, the navies and air
forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their
roles in interdiction.
? Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military
is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context
where civilian corruption is extremely common, state
institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system
remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and
political will needed to make necessary reforms.
? Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain
less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the
police.