This Working Paper highlights the dimension of informal social norms in
institutional corruption by using Latin American judiciaries, collectively, as a test
case. Judicial independence is central to the integrity and trustworthiness of
judicial institutions worldwide. Billions of dollars in development assistance have
been invested in promoting judicial independence in Latin American and other
developing countries. Despite the institutional reforms sponsored by international
development organizations, judiciaries in Latin America remain dependent on
political and other inappropriate influences. This paper argues that addressing
judicial corruption in Latin America is not just a question of adopting the right
institutions and living “happily ever after.” The paper claims that informal social
norms are key factors underlying institutional corruption in the judicial systems in
Latin America. Further systematic study of such phenomena should be a central
focus of future anti-corruption reform efforts.
This Working Paper is part of a broader writing project on international
development assistance in promoting the rule of law and judicial independence.