This paper analyzes the effect of electoral rules, in particular the influence of reserved seats
in parliaments, on the quality of minority representation. I seek to answer the question as to
how the design of reserved seats influences representatives’ ability and motivation to
represent a particular group. I argue that we can distinguish varieties of reserved seats along
two key attributes: electorate and candidacy. Limiting the electorate means that only
minority members can vote for reserved seat representatives, so that representatives and
constituents are connected through electoral incentives. To optimize re-election chances
representatives should make an effort to represent minorities substantively, which
constitutes one dimension of minority representation. Limiting candidacy for reserved seats
to minority members obliges being a group member to all candidates for such mandates. In
this manner, the mechanism guarantees the inclusion of group members into parliamentary
decision making, which improves minority members’ acceptance of the political system they
live in – the second dimension of high quality minority representation. This paper examines
these hypotheses in detail through a case study. Observing indigenous people in New
Zealand, Venezuela and Taiwan points out that the design of electoral rules for reserved
seats indeed contributes to understanding variations in the quality of minority representation.
With these findings, the typology developed in this study is fruitful to approach the gap in
scientific knowledge concerning the relationship of electoral rules, descriptiveness, and
substantive representation.