Who benefits from introducing competition in the setting of an ultimatum game? We introduce
a multiplayer version of the ultimatum game to subjects in Accra, Ghana, framed in a
labour market setting. In this version three Proposers (employers) can make offers to three
Responders (workers) at the same time. Subjects also participate in a treatment without
competition. In this treatment one Proposer faces one Responder, just as in the classical
ultimatum game. Even though in the competition treatment the number of Responders
and Proposers is equal, we find some evidence that the amounts proposed increase in the
treatment with competition. A potential explanation for this are bidding effects, where Proposers
bid offensively for the Responders with lower reservation payoffs, to increase their
chances of having this Responder accept their offer. This bidding increases the amounts
that Proposers propose to give to the Responders. This is in particular beneficial to the
Responders, who now capture a larger share of the surplus.