Social Benefits, Job Security and Corruption: What'Fine'State Employees

Type Report
Title Social Benefits, Job Security and Corruption: What'Fine'State Employees
Author(s)
Publication (Day/Month/Year) 2016
URL https://ideas.repec.org/p/rnp/wpaper/3051.html
Abstract
In this study we use a panel micro data set from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey to investigate the reasons for the existence of the stable private sector wage “premium” in the Russian labor market for the period 1994-2014. We do not find support for significantly higher job security and flexibility in the public sector but we do establish that differences in fringe benefits could explain at least 50% of the wage gap. Furthermore, we find that households with workers in the public sector receive lower earnings but enjoy the same level of consumption expenditures. Differences in assets and precautionary motives of workers cannot reconcile these discrepancies. Unexplained differences are referred to unreported income in the public sector, or bribes.

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