This paper studies the effects of descent rules on human capital accumulation. We exploit a
policy experiment in Ghana that introduced minimum quotas for the land that parents should
devolve on their children. This policy differentially affected ethnic groups depending on their
descent rules: the matrilineal Akan saw a reduction in the share of land going to the matriclan
and an increase in the land going to male children (who could not inherit from their own fathers
before the reform). Patrilineal groups were instead less affected because sons could already
inherit from fathers before the reform. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, across cohorts
and ethnic groups, we estimate the impact of the reform on educational attainment. We find that
Akan boys exposed to the reform received on average 0.9 less years of education, a 10 percent
reduction. The effect is driven by landed households, for whom the reform did effectively bind,
while no effect is found for non-landed households. This evidence is consistent with the fact
that before the reform matrilineal groups in Ghana “over-invested” in education to substitute
for land inheritance. Our findings suggest that in the presence of customary norms, land reform
and the individualization of land rights may have implications that go beyond the agricultural
sector and affect human capital accumulation in the long run.