The conflict outbreak in Southern Thailand since 2004 has provoked a hot debate,
not only among the academicians and political practitioners, but surprisingly it also
involved a broad range of stakeholders in the conflict. Commentators provided a
range of explanations for the resurgence of the conflict in southern Thailand. These
include: misguidance from the radical religious leaders and Thai‟s government
continuous denial of Malay Muslims‟ ethno-religious identity. Missing from these
suite explanations is the asymmetry of power relations between the Thai‟s
government and the Malay Muslims and how this dimension added or contributed
further to the already tensed relations between the two warring groups. Thus, the
objective of this study is to examine and analyze the asymmetry of power relations
between the Thai‟s government and the Malay Muslims, with a particular focus on
its implications on the conflict in southern Thailand, using combined theories of
asymmetry. The theoretical frame work highlights strategic interactions of those
involved and attempts to provide an analytical framework in analyzing the imbalance
of power relations among those involved in the conflict. This study is divided into
three parts. The first part examines the political power relation between the Thai‟s
government and the Malay Muslims which includes peace-building policy of
southern administration and the Malay Muslims‟ political movements. The second
part explains the relation between the Thai government‟s military power and the
capability of the Malay Muslims militant movements. The last part discusses the
socio-economic power relation between the Bangkok government and the Malay
Muslims and how it contributes to the raging protracted conflict in the southern
Thailand. These include the central government power and the Malay Muslims‟
socio-economic capabilities. Data for this study were collected from both primary
and secondary sources. The primary sources include documents, reports, speeches,
royal government gazette, press releases and security policies. Interviews with
knowledgeable and prominent figures and those involved in the conflict were also
conducted. Secondary data include books, articles, journals, newspaper and
magazines. The study reveals the extreme asymmetry of power relations between the
Thai‟s strong government, and the weak and deprived Malay Muslims, has
contributed further to the intensity of the conflict in the region. It is discovered that
the insurgency is a result of the Malay Muslim militants‟ reaction to resist what they
considered as the state of violence against their very existence as people. Finally, it is
argued that Bangkok government‟s effort to manage the conflict was ineffective.