Persuasion, Coercion, and Neglect: Understanding State Policy and the Mobilization of Muslim Minorities in Asia

Type Book
Title Persuasion, Coercion, and Neglect: Understanding State Policy and the Mobilization of Muslim Minorities in Asia
Author(s)
Publication (Day/Month/Year) 2007
Publisher ProQuest
URL https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr;=&id=Nqq9ZloK2B4C&
Abstract
This dissertation addresses two related questions: Why is it that some Muslim minorities in Asia have realized cooperative state-minority relations, others experienced mixed relations over time, and still others organized violent confrontation with the state? Why do some governments employ policies that appear costly to state-society relations, while others utilize policies that on balance have fostered cooperation with Muslim minorities? The primary argument of this study is that government policies---not minority characteristics, per se---are central to state-minority relations. State behavior significantly affects the grievances, resources, rhetorical frames and political opportunities of Muslim minorities that, in turn, contribute to their choice of social mobilization strategy. Policies involving coercion, neglect and uniculturalism have been most likely to generate conflict. However, how a policy is carried out---whether through persuasion, coercion or neglect---has had more influence than whether state policy objectives were unicultural or multicultural. This dissertation breaks ground by developing theory on neglect by state actors. Contrary to popular perception, Muslim minorities have not been inclined to engage in violent protest until after malign neglect had blocked nearly all other avenues for resolution, including engagement, opting out and nonviolent protest. Policy decisions that directly affect Muslim minorities have frequently been made as a result of state-majority concerns, intragovernmental contention and international relations---not appropriateness for the state-minority context as is regularly assumed. Related to this, government actors can have strong incentives to instigate, perpetuate or escalate conflict with Muslim minorities, in essence behaving as "spoilers," a term that has often been too narrowly applied to nonstate actors. This finding challenges social contract theories that depict the state as the provider of internal stability and security. Using qualitative methods, cases include eight communities in six countries: Uighur and Hui in China, Rohingya in Burma/Myanmar, Moro in the Philippines, Malay in Singapore, Moor and Eastern Muslims in Sri Lanka, and Malay-Muslims in Thailand.

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