In 2006, Timor-Leste was on the brink of collapse and its people were widely understood as divided
between those who identified with the =east‘ and those who identified with the =west. A division within
the military and between the military and the police, communal rioting, the rise of gang culture and,
importantly, a divide that occurred across approximate linguistic boundaries, all brought the state to the
brink of collapse. The linguistic division was identified as approximating to the broad distinction between
Papuan language group speakers (firaku) and Austronesian language speakers (kaladi)1 which, while
simplistic, quickly came to assume a reality that had not existed during the Indonesian occupation. This
division had serious implications for the fledgling country‘s attempts at building a cohesive national
identity, to serve as the basis for its future development.
Viqueque and Bobonaro exemplified Timor-Leste‘s claimed =east-west‘ divide. Viqueque is
arguably Timor-Leste‘s most =traditional‘ district, and identified with the =eastern‘ cause. Bobonaro is
arguably most externally exposed district (apart from the capital, Dili), and which most closely associated
with the =western‘ cause. It is from these case studies that this paper attempts to assess challenges to and
opportunities for national cohesion in Timor-Leste.
National identity in Timor-Leste began to form in response to Portugal‘s decolonisation and,
more importantly, resistance to Indonesia‘s occupation. Despite this resistance, the use of the Indonesian
language across the territory from 1975 allowed new opportunities for common communication. This
communication helped create new bonds and, ironically, enhanced resistance. From 1981, the use of the
previously somewhat limited Tetum in Catholic liturgy further enhanced common communication and
hence resistance (see Anderson 2001:238). Yet since 1999, Timor-Leste has not faced a common enemy,
language policy has become complex and divisive, and religious bonding has reduced relevance.