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HSRC National Survey, 1999

Human Sciences Research Council

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STUDY DESCRIPTION

SADA 0105

TITLE: HSRC National Survey, 1999

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR:

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KEYWORDS:

South Africa – Politics and government, Socio-political change, Political indicators, Public opinion.

ABSTRACT:

This study was undertaken to investigate public attitudes about national priorities, social issues, political parties and the government's service delivery programme. It also aimed to reflect the extent of and attitudes towards the transition from the previous apartheid system to a constitutional democracy. The aim of the HSRC's Public Opinion Analysis Programme was to provide regular and reliable data and analysis of various national social priority issues. This programme utilised longitudinal surveys to determine public attitudes to such issues, and to analyse and disseminate the research findings in the national interest. This was undertaken to help government, parliament, civil society and the various political parties in formulating policy priorities for the future.

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION:

South Africa

DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES:

Gender, age, highest educational qualification, employment status, marital status, population group, household income

IMPORTANT VARIABLES:

Trends in political affiliation, democratic development, national priorities, perceptions of economic issues, government performance and service delivery, gender issues and socio-political issues.

FIELDWORK:

Fieldwork was conducted by Markdata.

DATE OF DATA COLLECTION:

March 1999

METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION:

Survey questionnaires

UNIVERSE:

Members of the South African population, 18 years and older.

SAMPLE SIZE:

2 207 respondents were interviewed.

SAMPLING METHODOLOGY:

The population was stratified according to nine socio-economic area types. The allocation was roughly proportional to the adjusted 1991 population census figures. Multistage cluster (probability) sampling was used to draw the respondents, using the adjusted 1991 population census figures as a sampling frame. Census enumerator areas and similar areas were used as the clusters in the penultimate sampling stage, from which an equal number of households were drawn. All the clusters were drawn from the final clusters with equal probability (systematically). The respondents were drawn at random from qualifying household members.

UNITS OF OBSERVATION: Individuals**EXTENT OF DATA COLLECTION:**

1 data file in SPSS and hard-copy documentation and questionnaire.

FILE SPECIFICATIONS:

✍ Number of cases	: 2 207
✍ Number of records	: 13 242
✍ Number of records per case	: 6
✍ Logical record length	: 80
✍ Number of variables	: 161
✍ Number of kilobytes	: 424 KB

PUBLICATIONS:

Rule, S. (Ed) 1999. "Public Opinion on National Priority Issues Election '99." Pretoria: HSRC Publishers.

RESPONDENTS AGED 18 YEARS

Questionnaire no.

1-75

Card number

 1

Address of respondent
.....
.....
Tel. no.....

Substitute address.....
.....
.....
Tel. no.....

FIELDWORK CONTROL

FO control	Yes	No	Remarks
Personal			
Telephone			
Name	Signature		
.....	Date.....1999		

SUBSTITUTIONS	Reason for substitution	Number of times				
		Left	Right			
	Nobody home after 3 visits					
	Empty premises					
	Refusal					
	Nobody qualifies					
	Other					
	Total number of substitutes					

Name of interviewer

Number of interviewer							8-10
Fieldwork organizer number							11-12
Checked by							13-14
Socio-economic category							15
Province							16
Magisterial district							17-19
EA number							20-23
Project number	G	D	D	E	B	B	24-29
Visiting point number							30-31
Number of persons in this household							32-33
Number of persons 18 years and older in this household							34-35
Number of persons 18 years and older at visiting point							36-37

FEBRUARY 1999

The HSRC regularly undertake studies on a wide range of social matters amongst all population groups, for example research on family planning, education, unemployment, the problems of the aged and inter-group relations.

This questionnaire covers a variety of subjects, which are currently being investigated to obtain additional information. Apart from biographical data, subjects being covered are:

A variety of social issues

To obtain reliable, scientific information it is required that you answer the questions as honestly as possible. Your opinion is important in this research.

The area in which you live, as well as you personally have been selected randomly for the purpose of this survey. The fact that you have been chosen is thus quite coincidental. Your name will not be written anywhere on the questionnaire and you need not sign the questionnaire or any other documents. The information you provide will be treated as confidential. It will be processed by computer in such a way that no personal identification is possible.

PARTICULARS OF VISITS

	Month	Date	Time	Response
First visit				
Second visit				
Third visit				
Substitute address				

Time	Response
	Interview completed = 01
Morning till 12:00 = 1	<u>Revisit</u>
12:00-13:59 = 2	Appointment made = 02
14:00-14:59 = 3	Selected respondent not at home = 03
15:00-15:59 = 4	No one home = 04
16:00-16:59 = 5	<u>Do not qualify</u>
17:00-17:59 = 6	Vacant house/flat/stand/not a house or flat = 05
18:00-18:59 = 7	No person qualifies according to specifications for the survey = 06
19:00-19:59 = 8	Respondent cannot communicate with interviewer because of
20:00-20:59 = 9	language = 07
21:00-24:00 = 0	Respondent is physically/mentally not fit to be interviewed = 08
	<u>Refusals</u>
	Contact person refused = 09
	Interview refused by selected respondent = 10
	Interview refused by parent = 11
	Office use
	Used wrong respondent/address

1. Interviewer	Identify number of households on premises		38
2. Use GRID	Use GRID to identify respondent		
3. Make a note of the selected household number			39

HOUSEHOLD SCHEDULE

INTERVIEWER: Please provide the details of everyone in this household who slept here last weekday night (Monday to Thursday only)

	Write in from oldest (top) to youngest (bottom)	Age	Male=1 Female=2	Employment status	Highest educational qualification	
Persons in household who qualify for this survey (persons who will be available for the duration of this survey.)		01				40-45
		02				46-51
		03				52-57
		04				58-63
		05				64-69
		06				70-75
		07				6-11, 22-5
		08				12-17
		09				18-23
		10				24-29
		11				30-35
		12				36-41
		13				42-47
		14				48-53
		15				54-59

		01					60-65
		02					66-71
		03					72-77
		04					6-11 3 2-5
		05					12-17
		06					18-23
		07					24-29
		08					30-35
		09					36-41
		10					42-47

Reasons why persons do not qualify or are not available.
1.....
2.....
3.....

Employment status codes	Highest educational qualification codes
1 = Unemployed (but looking for work)	00 = No school/Less than 1 year completed
2 = Not working (not looking for work)	01 = Up to Std 1 (grade 3)
3 = Pensioner/disabled	02 = Std 2 (grade 4)
4 = Housewife	03 = Std 3 (grade 5)
5 = Student/scholar	04 = Std 4 (grade 6)
6 = Employed (full-time)	05 = Std 5 (grade 7)
7 = Employed (part-time)	06 = Std 6 (grade 8)
0 = Pre-school	07 = Std 7 (grade 9)
	08 = Std 8 (grade 10)
	09 = Std 9 (grade 11)
	10 = Std 10 (grade 12)
	11 = Diploma. Other post school complete
	12 = Further degree complete
	13 = Don't know

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

1.

Interviewer: Do not ask, but please mark	
Black	1
Griqua	2
Bushmen	3
Coloured	4
Asian	5
White	6

48

2. Gender of respondent

Male	1
Female	2

49

3. What is your age in completed years?

.....Years		
------------	--	--

50-51

4. What is your current marital status?

Married	Civil (Church or magistrate)	With children	01
		Without children	02
	Traditional (Lobola/Bogadi)	With children	03
		Without children	04
	Civil and traditional	With children	05
		Without children	06
Betrothed and living together		With children	07
		Without children	08
Live together		With children	09
		Without children	10
Divorced/Estranged		With children	11
		Without children	12
Widower/Widow		With children	13
		Without children	14
Never married		With children	15
		Without children	16
Other (Please describe in the space provided)			17
.....			

52-53

5. What is your highest educational qualification?

None	01
Grade 1 and 2 (Sub A and B)	02
Std 1	03
Std 2	04
Std 3	05
Std 4	06
Std 5	07
Std 6 (Form I)	08
Std 7 (Form II)	09
Std 8 (Form III, NTC I)	10
Std 9 (Form IV, NTC II)	11
Std 10 (Form V, NTC III)	12
Std 10 + college diploma	13
Technikon diploma	14
Technikon higher diploma	15
B.Degree/Honours degree	16
Master's diploma in technology	17
Master's degree	18
Laureatus on technology	19
Doctor's degree (Academic)	20
Other (specify)	

54-55

6. What language do you speak mostly at home?

Afrikaans		01
English		02
Both Afrikaans and English		03
European language		04
Oriental language		05
Sotho	Southern Sotho	06
	Western Sotho	07
	Northern Sotho	08
Nguni	Swazi	09
	Ndebele	10
	Xhosa	11
	Zulu	12
Tsonga		13
Venda		14
Other African language		15
Other (specify)		
.....		

56-57

7a. What is the average joint income for this household per month (Gross income from all sources)?

7b. What is the average joint income for this household per month (Netto income, after deductions)?

	7a	7b
No income	01	01
R1 – R39	02	02
R40 – R59	03	03
R60 – R79	04	04
R80 – R119	05	05
R120 – R159	06	06
R160 – R249	07	07
R250 – R419	08	08
R420 – R479	09	09
R480 – R829	10	10
R830 – R1249	11	11
R1250 – R1659	12	12
R1660 – R2499	13	13
R2500 – R4159	14	14
R4168 – R5829	15	15
R5830 – R8329	16	16
R8330 – R12 499	17	17
R12 500 – R16 659	18	18
R16 660 – R24 999	19	19
R25 000 – R41 659	20	20
R41 660 +	21	21
Refuse to answer	22	22
Uncertain/Don't know	23	23

58-61

Interviewer: Ask the respondent (Use the same codes as above for 7a)

7c. What is your average personal gross income per month?

7d. What is your average personal netto income, after deductions, per month?

7c.

7d.

62-63

64-65

8. What is your current employment status (Which of the following best describes your present work situation)?

Unemployed, not looking for work	01
Unemployed, looking for work	02
Work in informal sector, not looking for permanent work	03
Work in informal sector, looking for permanent work	04
Pensioner (Age/retired/sick/disabled, etc.)	05
Housewife, not working at all, not looking for work	06
Housewife, looking for work	07
Student/Scholar	08
Self-employed – Full time	09
Self-employed – Part time	10
Employed part time (If none of the above)	11
Employed full time	12
Doing national service	13
Other (specify)	

66-67

8a. What is your current occupation? (Detail please)

..... 68-69

8b. What is your current occupational level?

..... 70-71

If unemployed (Codes 01 or 02)

8c. Do you:

Have some regular earning activity?	1
Work for your family/Farm or someone else without pay (Payment in kind)?	2
Have no earning activity at all?	3

72

8d. Are you:

Looking for work?	1
Not looking for work?	2

73

9. Do you read a daily newspaper regularly, that is, at least four out of six issues a week?

Yes	1
No	2

74

3,4

10. Could you estimate how many hours on an average working day, that is from Monday to Friday, you spend watching TV?

Less than one hour	1
1 – 2 hours	2
2 – 3 hours	3
3 – 4 hours	4
More than four hours	5
Never watch TV	6
Don't have TV (No TV transmission in my area)	7

75

11. What television programme or type of programme do you enjoy watching most? You can mention a particular programme or a type of programme which is regularly or often broadcast.

.....

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 76-77

4

 2-5

12. Do you have a working telephone?

Yes	1
No	2

6

13. Do you have a computer for personal or business use?

Personal	1
Business	2
Both	3
None	4

7

14. Do you personally have a cell phone for personal or business use?

15. Does a member of your household have a cell phone for personal or business use?

	Question 14	Question 15
Personal	1	1
Business	2	2
Both	3	3
None	4	4

8-9

16. Which church do you belong to or which faith/religion do you subscribe?

Afrikaanse Protestante Kerk	01
AME	02
Anglican (Church of the Province of South Africa)	03
Church of England	04
Apostolic Faith Mission of South Africa (AFM)	05
Assemblies of God	06
Baptist Church	07
Buddhist	08
Ethiopian Churches	09
Full Gospel Church of God in South Africa	10
Reformed Churches of South Africa	11
Hindu	12
Islam/Muslim	13
Jehovah's Witnesses	14
Jewish	15
Lutheran & Evangelical Lutheran Church in SA	16
Methodist of SA/Wesleyan	17
Moravian Assemblies of God	18
Nederduitsch Gereformeerde Kerk	19
Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK)	20
New Apostolic Church	21
NG Kerk in Afrika	22
NG Sendingkerk/Verenigde Gereformeerde Kerk (VGK)	23
Old Apostolic Church	24
Orthodox (Greek, Serbian, Russian) Church	25
Presbyterian Church of South Africa	26
Pentecostal Church	27
Reformed Ecumenical Synod	28
Rhema Bible Church	29
Roman Catholic	30
Seventh Day Adventist Church	31
Shembe	32
International Fellowship of Christian Churches	33
Traditional African Belief	34
Union of Orthodox Synagogues in South Africa	35
United Congregational Church of South Africa	36
United Hebrew Congregation of Johannesburg	37
World Alliance of Reformed Churches	38
Zion Christian Church (ZCC)	39
Other Zionist Churches	40
Other Independent Black Churches	41
None	42
Refuse to answer	43
Uncertain/Don't know	00
Other (specify)	

17. LSM (Living standard Measure)

Which of the following items, in working order, does your household have?				
Question	Yes	No		
A fridge or freezer	1	2		12
A polisher or vacuum cleaner	1	2		13
A TV	1	2		14
A Hi-Fi or music centre (Radio excluded)	1	2		15
A microwave oven	1	2		16
A washing machine	1	2		17
Do you have the following in your home?				
Electricity	1	2		18
Hot running water	1	2		19
A domestic servant	1	2		20
At least one car	1	2		21
A flush toilet	1	2		22
Do you personally...				
Do household shopping at supermarkets	1	2		23
Shop at supermarkets	1	2		24
Do you personally...				
Have any insurance policies	1	2		25
Use any financial services such as a bank account, ATM card or credit card	1	2		26
Have an account or credit card at a retail store	1	2		27
Buy dish washing liquid	1	2		28
Interviewer record				
Hut dweller	1	2		29
Rural dweller	1	2		30
Total of respondent				
Add constant		2.71683		
Grand total				

Note: A supermarket is for example Pick & Pay, OK, Checkers/Shoprite, Clicks, Diskom, Spar, Woolworths, (Includes both hypermarkets and supermarkets).

Respondent LSM.....

31

ECONOMIC SECTION

Next I will be asking a few questions about your perceptions of economic conditions and issues. The new few questions are about the financial situation of your household.

1. How has the financial situation of your household changed **during the past twelve months**, if at all? Would you say that it has ...

Got a lot worse	1
Got a little worse	2
<i>Stayed about the same</i>	3
Got a little better	4
Got a lot better	5
<i>Don't know</i>	6

32

2. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the financial situation of your household **at present**? Are you ...

Very dissatisfied	1
Dissatisfied	2
<i>Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied</i>	3
Satisfied	4
Very satisfied	5
<i>Don't know</i>	6

33

The next few questions are about the general economic situation in the country.

3. How do you think the general economic situation in the country has changed **during the past twelve months**.

Got a lot worse	1
Got a little worse	2
<i>Stayed about the same</i>	3
Got a little better	4
Got a lot better	5
<i>Don't know</i>	6

34

4. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the general economic situation in the country **at present**? Are you ...

Very dissatisfied	1
Dissatisfied	2
<i>Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied</i>	3
Satisfied	4
Very satisfied	5
<i>Don't know</i>	6

35

5. How do you think the general economic situation in the country will change **during the next twelve months**, if at all? Do you think that it will ...

Got a lot worse	1
Got a little worse	2
<i>Stayed about the same</i>	3
Got a little better	4
Got a lot better	5
<i>Don't know</i>	6

36

The next few questions are about the general economic situation of people like you.

6. How do you think the economic situation of people like you have changed **during the past twelve months**, if at all? Would you say that they have ...

Got a lot worse	1
Got a little worse	2
<i>Stayed about the same</i>	3
Got a little better	4
Got a lot better	5
<i>Don't know</i>	6

37

7. How do you think the economic situation of people like you compare with what they were **at the time of the April 1994 elections**? Would you say that they are ...

A lot better	1
A little better	2
<i>Stayed about the same</i>	3
A little worse	4
A lot worse	5
<i>Don't know</i>	6

38

8. How do you think the economic situation of people like you will change during the **next twelve months**, if at all? Do you think that they will ...

Got a lot worse	1
Got a little worse	2
<i>Stayed about the same</i>	3
Got a little better	4
Got a lot better	5
<i>Don't know</i>	6

39

9. How do you think the economic situation of people like you will change during the **next five years**, if at all? Do you think that they will ...

Got a lot worse	1
Got a little worse	2
<i>Stayed about the same</i>	3
Got a little better	4
Got a lot better	5
<i>Don't know</i>	6

40

Next I will be asking you a few questions about your thoughts on the government's handling of economic matters.

10. During the past twelve months, would you say that the government's policies have had a good effect, a bad effect, or that they have not made much difference with regard to the **financial situation of your household**?

Good	1
Not much difference	2
Bad	3
<i>Don't know</i>	4

41

11. During the **past twelve months**, would you say that the government's policies have had a good effect, a bad effect, or that they have not made much difference with regard to the **general economic situation in the country**?

Good	1
Not much difference	2
Bad	3
<i>Don't know</i>	4

42

12. During the **past twelve months**, would you say that the government's policies have had a good effect, a bad effect, or that they have not made much difference with regard to the **economic situation of people like you**?

Good	1
Not much difference	2
Bad	3
<i>Don't know</i>	4

43

13. During the **past twelve months**, would you say that the government's policies have had a good effect, a bad effect, or that they have not made much difference with regard to the **prospects of people like you getting or keeping a job?**

Good	1
Not much difference	2
Bad	3
<i>Don't know</i>	4

44

14. During the **past twelve months**, would you say that the government's policies have had a good effect, a bad effect, or that they have not made much difference with regard to the **prices people like you have to pay for the things you buy?**

Good	1
Not much difference	2
Bad	3
<i>Don't know</i>	4

45

15. During the **next twelve months**, do you think that the government's policies will have a good effect, a bad effect, or that they will not make much difference with regard to the general economic situation in the country?

Good	1
Not much difference	2
Bad	3
<i>Don't know</i>	4

46

Next I will ask your views about some economic issues facing the country. For each question, I will read two statements. I would like you to tell me which one comes closer to your opinion, even if you do not agree with either statement entirely.

Read out

16(A) The government should take a more active role in the economy, because the private sector and market forces are unlikely to solve the complex economic problems of the country.

(B) The government should allow the private sector and market forces to operate more freely, because government control only make the country's economic problems worse.

Statement A	1
Statement B	2
<i>Don't know</i>	3

47

Read out

17(A) I would be willing to pay more in taxes, if this would allow the government to improve the services that are important to me.

(B) I would not be willing to pay more in taxes, even if this meant that the government would not be able to improve the services that are important to me.

Statement A	1
Statement B	2
<i>Don't know</i>	3

48

Read out

18(A) A strong and active labour movement is necessary to defend the economic interests of the majority of South Africans.

(B) The activities of labour unions are an obstacle to the improvement of the economic well-being of most South Africans.

Statement A	1
Statement B	2
<i>Don't know</i>	3

49

I would like you to tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements.

19. People from previously disadvantaged groups should be given preferences by employers when they hire and promote workers.

Agree	1
Disagree	2
<i>No opinion/Don't know</i>	3

50

20. World markets are unpredictable and dangerous and the government should therefore restrict business dealings between South Africans and people in other parts of the world.

Agree	1
Disagree	2
<i>No opinion/Don't know</i>	3

51

Next I will ask you a range of questions about your views on some of the issues facing the country and the performance and priorities of the government.

Interviewer: Do not read out the following options: Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied and don't know.

21. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the general political situation **in South Africa** at present? Are you ...

Very satisfied	1
Satisfied	2
<i>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</i>	3
Dissatisfied	4
Very dissatisfied	5
<i>Don't know</i>	6

52

22. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way your **local area** is being governed at present?

Very satisfied	1
Satisfied	2
<i>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</i>	3
Dissatisfied	4
Very dissatisfied	5
<i>Don't know</i>	6

53

23. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way your **province** is being governed at present?

Very satisfied	1
Satisfied	2
<i>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</i>	3
Dissatisfied	4
Very dissatisfied	5
<i>Don't know</i>	6

54

24. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way **South Africa** is being governed at present?

Very satisfied	1
Satisfied	2
<i>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</i>	3
Dissatisfied	4
Very dissatisfied	5
<i>Don't know</i>	6

55

25. How much trust or distrust do you have in the following **institutions in South Africa at present?**

	Institutions	Strong trust	Trust	Neither trust nor distrust	Distrust	Strong distrust	Don't know	
A	National government	1	2	3	4	5	6	56
B	Courts	1	2	3	4	5	6	57
C	Labour unions	1	2	3	4	5	6	58
D	Your provincial government	1	2	3	4	5	6	59
E	The media	1	2	3	4	5	6	60
F	The Police	1	2	3	4	5	6	61
G	The Defence Force	1	2	3	4	5	6	62
H	Political parties	1	2	3	4	5	6	63
I	Your local government	1	2	3	4	5	6	64
J	Business	1	2	3	4	5	6	65
K	Churches	1	2	3	4	5	6	66
L	The IEC	1	2	3	4	5	6	67

26. How safe or unsafe do you feel personally on most days?

Read out

Very safe	1
Safe	2
<i>Neither safe no unsafe</i>	3
Unsafe	4
Very unsafe	5
<i>Don't know</i>	6

68

27. In your view, what measure of control does the government have over the crime situation **in South Africa at present?**

Read out

In full control	1
In control to a large extent	2
In control to a small extent	3
Not in control at all	4
<i>Don't know</i>	5

69

28. Do you think that race relations in the country have improved, remained the same, or deteriorated **since April 1994**?

Improved	1
Remained the same	2
Deteriorated	3
<i>Don't know</i>	4

70

29. Do you think racial tension against people like you has become worse, become better or has stayed about the same **since April 1994**?

Become better	1
Stayed about the same	2
Become worse	3
<i>Don't know</i>	4

71

30. How do you feel about the priority the government gives to ensuring clean and honest conduct by public officials? Would you say it is ...

Too high a priority	1
Sufficient priority	2
Too low a priority	3
<i>Don't know</i>	4

72

The next few questions are about your views about the ways different countries might be governed. I will read you a series of statements, and for each one I would like you to tell me whether you strongly agree, disagree or strongly disagree.

31.	Strongly agree	Agree	No opinion	Dis-agree	Strongly disagree	Don't know/ Don't understand the statement	
The government should have the authority to prevent citizens from expressing opinions that are negative or unpopular.	1	2	3	4	5	6	73
Citizens should have the right to form or join organizations freely, such as political parties, business associations, trade unions and other interest groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	74
The government should be allowed to ignore the constitution if a majority of citizens clearly supports their action.	1	2	3	4	5	6	75
Elected officials should bear ultimate responsibility for government decisions.	1	2	3	4	5	6	76
There should be at least two well-established parties for voters to choose from in elections.	1	2	3	4	5	6	77
The government should control the flow of information to the public about issues of major national importance.	1	2	3	4	5	6	78

Next I am going to ask you a few questions about what you think the priorities for the country should be.

32. If you ask the government to change **three** things to make the life of people like yourself better, which three things would be the most important to change?

1.....

2.....

3.....

.....

6-7

8-9

10-11

33. There is a lot of talk about what the government's priorities should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed several different priorities that different people would give priority. Which of these priorities would you consider the **most important** and which the **second most important**?

A	Giving people more influence over government decisions	1
B	Fighting crime	2
C	Creating more jobs	3
D	Eliminating political violence	4
E	Providing better services in the area where you live	5
F	Improving the educational system	6
G	Keeping prices from rising	7
H	Protecting the political rights of citizens	8
I	Provide more housing	9

First		12
Second		13

34. If you had to pick, which one would you say is the most important to you? And second most important?

Read

Running water	01
Electricity	02
Affordable housing	03
Water-borne sewage disposal	04
Local public libraries	05
Recreational facilities	06
Tarred roads and streets	07
Public transport	08
Local police stations	09
Health care	10
Rubbish removal	11

First		14-15
Second		16-17

35. How would you say your standard of living has changed, if at all, **over the past twelve months**? Would you say it has ...

Improved substantially	1
Improved	2
Stayed about the same	3
Worsened	4
Worsened substantially	5
Don't know	6

18

36a. If your standard of living has improved, what is the **single most important** reason for this?
(One response allowed)

..... 19-20

36b. If your standard of living has worsened, what is the **single most important** reason for this?
(One response allowed)

..... 21-22

37. How do you think your standard of living will change if at all during the next twelve months?
Do you think it will ...

Improve substantially	1
Improve	2
Stay about the same	3
Worsen	4
Worsen substantially	5
<i>Don't know</i>	6

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POLITICAL QUESTIONS

1. I would like to ask how close or distant you feel towards various political parties and organizations. If you feel close to a party you would support it. If you feel distant you would oppose it. I will name a political party or organization and would like you to tell me whether you feel very close, close, neutral, distant or very distant to the political party or organization.

	Very close	Close	Neutral	Distant	Very distant	Uncertain/ Don't know	
AZAPO	1	2	3	4	5	0	24
PAC	1	2	3	4	5	0	25
SACP	1	2	3	4	5	0	26
ANC	1	2	3	4	5	0	27
DP	1	2	3	4	5	0	28
UDM	1	2	3	4	5	0	29
NNP	1	2	3	4	5	0	30
IFP	1	2	3	4	5	0	31
ACDP	1	2	3	4	5	0	32
FREEDOM FRONT	1	2	3	4	5	0	33
CP	1	2	3	4	5	0	34
FEDERAL ALLIANCE	1	2	3	4	5	0	35

2. Which **one** of the following statements do you agree with most strongly?

Mark only one answer

Democracy is always preferable to any other system of government	1	
In some cases an authoritarian government or a dictatorship is preferable to democracy	2	
For people like me it does not matter whether there is democracy or not	3	
<i>Uncertain/Don't know</i>	4	36

3. Are you a sympathizer or a member who regularly attends meetings or are you an office bearer of ...

Interviewer: If the respondent is for example a sympathizer of one youth club and an office bearer of another youth club. Please indicate the highest category, in this case office bearer.

Type of institution	Sympathiser	Active member	Office bearer	None	
Political party/grouping	1	2	3	4	37
Trade union	1	2	3	4	38
Women's organization	1	2	3	4	39
Youth organization	1	2	3	4	40
Civic organization	1	2	3	4	41
Anti-crime group	1	2	3	4	42
Other (specify)					
.....	1	2	3	4	43

Here are a few questions about South Africa's national government and some economic matters. Many people don't know the answers to some of the questions, so if there are some you don't know, just tell me and we'll go on.

4. Nelson Mandela is the president of South Africa. Who would you say is the **deputy** president?

Interviewer: Do not read options. Surname is sufficient for correct response.

Thabo Mbeki	1	
Other name (specify)		
.....	2	
<i>Don't know</i>	3	44

5. Who would you say is ultimately responsible for determining whether a **law is constitutional or not**? Is it ...

Read out

The president	1	
The minister of justice	2	
The constitutional court	3	
Parliament	4	
<i>Don't know</i>	5	45

6. Which political party would you say has the **second most members** in the National Assembly of Parliament? Is it the ...

Read out

Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	1
Democratic Party	2
African National Congress	3
New National Party	4
United Democratic Movement	5
<i>Don't know</i>	6

46

7. How many members of the National Assembly of parliament would you say must agree in order to approve **changes to the constitution**?

Read out

At least half of them	1
At least two-thirds of them	2
At least three-quarters of them	3
All of them	4
None of them – because the constitution cannot be changed	5
<i>Don't know</i>	6

47

8. Political parties are sometimes placed on **scale from 'left-wing' to 'right-wing'**. If you are familiar with these terms, could you tell me which of the following two parties you would say is generally the more 'right-wing': the African National Congress or the Freedom Front?

African National Congress	1
Freedom Front	2
They are both equally right-wing	3
Not familiar with the terms	4
<i>Don't know</i>	5

48

9. Tell me which of the following statements is closest to your understanding of what the word '**inflation**' means when it is used regarding economic matters. Would you say that 'inflation' means that ...

Read out

The number of people without jobs is growing	1
Foreign investment is entering the country	2
Businesses are expanding	3
Consumer prices are rising	4
<i>Don't know</i>	5

49

10. Whose responsibility would you say is it to present the **government's budget speech** in parliament each year? Is it ...

Read out

The speaker of parliament	1	50
The minister of finance	2	
The president	3	
The governor of the Reserve Bank	4	
<i>Don't know</i>	5	

EMIGRATION

1. During the past twelve months, have you looked into the possibility of emigrating from South Africa to another country?

Yes	1	51
No	2	
<i>Don't know</i>	3	

2. If "Yes" in question 1. Have you taken any specific steps during the past 12 months to leave the country (e.g. contacting embassies or agencies, gather information about specific countries, etc.)?

Yes	1	52
No	2	

3a. How many children does the respondent have (if any)?

..... 53

3b. If the respondent has children: Do you have any children living outside the country?

Yes	1	54
No	2	
<i>Not applicable</i>	3	

4. Do you have any brothers or sisters that emigrated from South Africa? If "Yes", how many?

..... 55

YEARS OF OLDER PERSONS

1. The United Nations decided to designate a specific year as the **International Year of Older Persons (IYOP)**. Which year was decided upon?

1998	1
1999	2
2000	3
<i>Don't know</i>	4

56

2. Please indicate from which source you have been informed about the International Year of Older Persons (IYOP). If more than one source, please indicate only the source which you learnt from **most often**.

Radio	1
TV	2
Newspapers/magazine/pamphlet/brochure	3
Poster/billboard	4
SA Council for the Aged	5
Other welfare organization or government department (Please specify).....	6
Church	7
Other (Please specify).....	8
<i>Not applicable</i>	9

57

ELECTRICITY

1. Which of the following statements best describe your understanding of the concept **energy efficient**?

a	To use energy wisely (To save energy)	1
b	To use all energy resources available	2
c	To waste electricity or energy	3
d	To lower your living standard	4
e	None of the above	5
f	<i>Don't know</i>	6

58

2. An energy week will be held in June 1999 to create awareness, inform and educate consumers on the wise and efficient use of energy. Please indicate the statement you agree mostly with.

a	I would like to receive information about participation in the energy week	3
b	I think an energy week is a good idea, but I am not interested in participating	4
c	I think an energy week is a bad idea	5
d	<i>Don't know</i>	6

59

3. How or through which channel would you like to be informed on how to save energy in your household? Indicate the most important one.

a	Personal talks	1
b	Mass media (such as radio, television, newspapers, etc.)	2
c	Information material (such as brochures, pamphlets, posters, videos, etc.)	3
d	Schools or libraries	4
e	Direct mail	5
f	Your local municipality, metropolitan council or local authority	6
g	Oramedia (drama and/or music plays)	7
h	Exhibitions and/or promotions (such as open days, shopping centre promotions, etc.)	8
i	Energy suppliers (such as Eskom, oil companies, etc.)	9
j	Other (please specify).....	10
k	<i>Don't know</i>	11

60-61

4. What will motivate you to use energy wisely and efficiently in your household? Indicate the most important one.

a	Financial concerns (saving money for the household)	1
b	Using or buying appliances or apparatus that are energy efficient (appliances that use energy more efficiently such as microwave ovens, compact fluorescent light bulbs, etc.)	2
c	Better time utilization (to save time by using a microwave oven, kettle, electric slow cooker, etc.)	3
d	In the country's interest (to utilize the country's energy resources effectively)	4
e	Other (please specify).....	5
f	<i>Don't know</i>	6

62

5. Which one of the following organizations in your view should take responsibility to promote the efficient use of energy?

a	The Department of Minerals and Energy	1
b	ESKOM	2
c	Municipalities, local authorities, metropolitan councils	3
d	Educational institutions	4
e	Other (please specify).....	5
f	<i>Don't know</i>	6

63

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

1. To what level did you successfully pass ...?

	Not at all	Gr 1-7	Gr 8-10	Gr 11-12	1-2 years at tertiary/ higher education – Under-graduate level	Major subject(s) at under-graduate level	Post-graduate level	
Mathematics	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	64
Physical or chemical sciences	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	65
Technology or engineering	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	66
Information or computer sciences	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	67
General biological, life or health sciences	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	68

2. How important are the following in helping you to cope every day life (including work)?

	Not at all important	Fairly unimportant	Neither unimportant nor important	Important	Very important	
Mathematics	1	2	3	4	5	69
Science	1	2	3	4	5	70
Technology	1	2	3	4	5	71

3. Now I would like to read you some statements like those you might find in a newspaper or magazine article, for each statement, please tell me if you generally agree or disagree. If you feel especially strongly about a statement, please tell me that you strongly agree or strongly disagree.

	Strongly agree	Agree	<i>Neutral</i>	Disagree	Strongly disagree	<i>Don't know</i>	
Science and technology are making our lives healthier, easier and more comfortable	1	2	3	4	5	6	72
Most scientists want to work on things that will make life better for the average person	1	2	3	4	5	6	73
With the application of science and new technology, work will become more interesting	1	2	3	4	5	6	74
Because of science and technology, there will be more opportunities for the next generation	1	2	3	4	5	6	75
We depend too much on science and not enough on faith	1	2	3	4	5	6	76
It is not important for me to know about science in my daily life	1	2	3	4	5	6	77
Science makes our way of life change too fast	1	2	3	4	5	6	78

4. Have the benefits of scientific research outweighed the harmful results or have the harmful results outweighed the benefits?

Benefits strongly outweigh the harmful results	1	79
Benefits outweigh the harmful results	2	
Benefits equal the harmful results	3	
Harmful results outweigh the benefits	4	
Harmful results strongly outweigh the benefits	5	

5. Please indicate which of the following statements are true or false.

	True	False	<i>Don't know</i>	
The earliest human beings lived at the same time as the dinosaurs	1	2	3	6
The oxygen we breathe comes from plants	1	2	3	7
Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria	1	2	3	8
	Light	Sound	<i>Don't know</i>	
Which travels faster: light or sound?	1	2	3	9
	Earth goes around the sun	Sun goes around the earth	<i>Don't know</i>	
Which one of the following statements is correct?	1	2	3	10

6. There are a lot of issues in the news, and it is hard to keep up with every area. I'm going to read to you a short list of issues, and for each one – as I read it – I would like you to tell me if you are very interested, moderately interested, or not at all interested.

	Very interested	Moderately interested	Not at all interested	
New scientific discoveries	1	2	3	11
Use of new inventions and technologies	1	2	3	12
New medical discoveries	1	2	3	13
Environmental issues	1	2	3	14

COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION

1. How easy or difficult do you find it to get information on what the government is doing?

Very easy	1
Easy	2
<i>Neither easy nor difficult</i>	3
Difficult	4
Very difficult	5
<i>Uncertain/Don't know</i>	6

15

2. If you find it difficult to get information on what the government is doing, what do you think is the most important reason for this? (One response allowed)

.....

--	--

 16-17

3. What kind of information would you like to receive on what the government is doing? (Three responses allowed.)

.....	<table border="1"><tr><td></td><td></td></tr></table>			18-19
.....	<table border="1"><tr><td></td><td></td></tr></table>			20-21
.....	<table border="1"><tr><td></td><td></td></tr></table>			22-23

4. Which three methods would you prefer to receive information on what the government is doing? (Three responses allowed.)

.....	<table border="1"><tr><td></td><td></td></tr></table>			24-25
.....	<table border="1"><tr><td></td><td></td></tr></table>			26-27
.....	<table border="1"><tr><td></td><td></td></tr></table>			28-29

5a. Please name the three most important issues on what the government is doing that you received information on during the past year. (Three responses allowed.)

Employment	01			
Economy	02			
Workings of government	03			
RDP	04			
Education	05			
Safety and security	06			
Government development planning	07			
Government expenditure	08			
Health	09			30-31
Services/water	10			32-33
Other (Please specify).....				34-35

5b. How did information on what the government is doing reach you? (Three responses allowed.)

Television	1			
Radio	2			
Printed media	3			
Rallies/Conferences	4			
Brochures	5			
Community leaders	6			
Telephone	7			36
Personal (one to one basis)	8			37
Other (Please specify).....	9			38

ELECTION

Do you have a valid South African identity document? If so, which one of the following do you have?

No – Not a South African citizen	1	39
No – South African citizen but has no South African ID document	2	
A green ID with barcode	3	
A green ID without barcode	4	
A temporary ID certificate	5	
A temporary registration certificate	6	
A blue ID (Book of life)	7	
A former homeland ID	8	
A reference book	9	
<i>Do not know</i>	0	

2. Did you register to vote in the 1999 election?

Yes	1	40
No	2	

3. If you did not register to vote in the 1999 election, please indicate the most important reason why you did not register?

Uneligible to vote (E.g. not a South African citizen)	01	41-42
Did not know that I have to register	02	
The registration period was too short	03	
Far from the registration point at time of registration dates	04	
The registration point was already closed	05	
It was examination time and thus impossible to go and register	06	
I do not possess an identity document	07	
Not interested in the election	08	
Do not have time to register	09	
Information about registration was incomplete	10	
Did not know where to register	11	
Other (Specify).....	12	

4a. Do you think the government has done enough to communicate information about registrations for the 1999 general election?

Yes	1	43
No	2	
<i>Don't know</i>	3	

4b. If you think the government has not done enough in communicating information about registrations for the general election in 1999, please state the most important reasons why you think so. (Two responses allowed.)

.....

.....

44-45
46-47

5. As far as you know, will a person who did not register be allowed to vote in the 1999 election?

Yes	1
No	2
<i>Don't know</i>	3

48

6. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) has been tasked to administer the 1999 election. How positive or negative do you view the IEC?

Very positive	1
Positive	2
<i>Neutral</i>	3
Negative	4
Very negative	5

49

7. In your view, is the IEC neutral or does it support a particular political party?

The IEC is neutral	1
The IEC supports a political party	2
<i>Don't know</i>	3

50

8. Do you believe that other people will know how you vote or is your vote secret?

People will know	1
My vote is secret	2
<i>Don't know</i>	3

51

9. Do you know where the polling station will be located where you will be required to cast your vote in the election?

Yes	1
No	2
I can vote at any polling station	3

52

10. Do you intend to vote in the next general election?

Yes	1
No	2
<i>Uncertain/Don't know</i>	3

53

11. At what time of the day do you intend to vote?

Before 7am	01
7am – 8am	02
8am – 10am	03
10am – 12 noon	04
12 noon – 2pm	05
2pm – 4pm	06
4pm – 6pm	07
6pm – 8pm	08
8pm – 9pm	09
9pm	10
Don't know	11
<i>Will not vote</i>	12

54-55

INTERVIEWER: THE QUESTION ON PARTY SUPPORT SHOULD NOT BE ASKED TO THE RESPONDENT. HAND THE QUESTIONNAIRE OVER TO THE RESPONDENT TO FILL IN BY HIM/HERSELF. ONLY IN THE CASE OF A RESPONDENT WHO IS UNABLE TO FILL IN (BECAUSE HE/SHE CANNOT READ OR WRITE. SHOULD YOU DO IT ON HIS/HER BEHALF – NOT ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE HOUSEHOLD.

12a. If there were an election tomorrow, which party would you support?

b. And which party would be your second choice?

	First choice	Second choice
ANC	01	01
PAC	02	02
NNP	03	03
DP	04	04
IFP	05	05
FF	06	06
CP	07	07
ACDP	08	08
UDM	09	09
AZAPO	10	10
OTHER (Please specify)	11	11

56-57

58-59

- 12a. If there were an election tomorrow, which party would you support?
 c. And which party would be your second choice?

Would not vote	12	12					
Uncertain	13	13					
Don't know	14	14					
Refuse	15	15					54-55

13. Did the respondent complete the question on party support by him/herself?

Yes	1	
No/ - Fieldworker completed on his/her behalf	2	60

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION

**PUBLIC OPINION ON
NATIONAL PRIORITY ISSUES
ELECTION '99**

Public opinion on National Priority Issues Election'99

**Findings of a national sample survey conducted in December 1998
by the Group: Democracy and Governance
of the Human Sciences Research Council**

**Editor:
Dr S. Rule**

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Pretoria
1999

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Executive summary

In a democratic system it is essential that the government and its policy-making institutions be informed of the needs of its citizens so that endeavours to meet these needs can be prioritized. Conversely, it is important that citizens should be informed about policies that affect their lives. The HSRC's Monitoring and Analysis of Public Opinion Programme aims to achieve these two goals by providing the government, civil society and the South African public in general with up-to-date information on the public's knowledge, opinions and perceptions regarding matters of national interest. This report analyses the December 1998 public opinion survey of 2200 randomly selected adults throughout the country. It is complemented by data on party support trends gathered from a survey conducted in March 1999. Other matters discussed include the development of a democratic culture in South Africa, national priority issues, evaluations of the economy and economic policy, service delivery, satisfaction with government and gender issues.

In terms of political party allegiance, the African National Congress (ANC) has maintained the support of the majority of voters in South Africa during its first term of office in government. Support for the main opposition parties has fluctuated during the same period, with shifts away from the New National Party and Inkatha Freedom Party and growth for the Democratic Party and the newly formed United Democratic Movement. In the event of a low percentage poll in June 1999, the ANC is likely to get two-thirds of the votes cast as opposition party supporters generally indicate less commitment to exercising their vote than do ANC supporters.

With regard to support for democracy, the survey revealed that three-quarters (74%) of adult South Africans are in favour of democratic system of government. Some issues pertaining to a liberal democracy are not widely understood, however. Significant proportions of the population support some form of censorship, the government's right to ignore the constitution in the event of majority support and restrictions on freedom of expression. There is virtual unanimity on the government's obligation to protect voters from violence and intimidation during elections. About half of the population feels that dissatisfaction with the government should be shown by voting differently. A further 28% feel that complaining to the relevant authority is the correct route to follow. Ten percent think that protest action is appropriate and only one percent believe that violent action is necessary. Basic knowledge levels on the political system are reasonable, but more detailed knowledge on the composition of the National Assembly and the provisions of the constitution is not widespread.

In terms of government priorities, in December 1998, 41% of the respondents thought that the government's top priority for the next ten years should be fighting crime. A further 32% said that job creation should be the top priority. Interestingly, in March 1999, the positions of these two priorities had reversed. Other matters mentioned by fewer respondents were that people should be given more influence over government decisions, that better services should be provided, that the education system should be improved and that prices should be established.

In respect of changes in living standards, more than half of the population feels that the financial situations of their households have worsened during the last year. Those living in the Northern Province perceive themselves to be the hardest hit in this regard. Only 16% perceive that the government's economic policies have had a positive effect, the majority of these being black. This sentiment is held by less than 10% among the white, coloured and Indian populations. Half of the population favours a prominent role for government in the economy, whereas 43% prefer the free market and 7% do not know. Whites are more in favour of the free market, while blacks prefer state intervention in the economy.

In 1994 almost two-thirds of the population was satisfied with the national government. This had declined to just less than half of the population by December 1998 in terms of the general political situation in South Africa and with the way in which the country, the provinces and local areas were being governed. Greatest levels of satisfaction are apparent in North West (between 46% and 59%) as opposed to the Northern Province, where up to 73% are dissatisfied with their provincial and local governance. Blacks are generally more satisfied than coloureds and much more satisfied than Indians and whites about governance in South Africa at all levels. Nevertheless, there remains a high level of trust in the national government, with almost half of the general population indicating that they have either “strong trust” or “trust” in the current national government. Again, however, trust levels vary with race – much lower proportions of the coloured, Indian and white populations trust the government.

One of the reasons for dissatisfaction with the government can be traced to perceived differential delivery of services throughout the country. Significant numbers of the respondents indicated that the delivery of running water (35%) and electricity (41%) had improved since 1994. However, this was the perception of around 60% of the respondents in Mpumalanga and the Free State but of only 35% or less among those living in KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and the Northern Province. Similarly, the delivery of health care services was perceived to have improved by about half of the Gauteng and Free State respondents but by less than 30% of those in KwaZulu-Natal, the Northern Cape and the Western Cape. Services were seen to have improved since 1994 by less than 10% of the white respondents, who enjoyed high quality service delivery prior to 1994, but by between 21% and 55% of the blacks, for whom this did not exist previously.

It is of concern that in spite of the improvements since the inception of the new government, more than half of all South Africans (42% black, 52% coloured, 76% Indian, 85% white) think that it is not safe to live in the country. Nevertheless, 40% think that race relations have improved and that racial tension has lessened.

A gender gap is evident in that males and females have different perceptions of the priorities that women have when voting. More men think that women prioritize equality in decision making, family welfare and crime prevention than do women themselves. On the other hand, women prioritize the need for women’s rights, education and work or business opportunities more than men think they do. Wealthier people are less in favour of preferential appointments for women or women’s quotas in parliament than are poorer people.

A few other trends emerged from the survey. Almost half of the population thinks that insufficient priority is given to ensuring clean and honest government. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is seen to have been a good thing by 57% of South Africans (black 72%, coloured 44%, Indian 40%, white 15%). Forty percent (black 52%, Indian 41%, coloured 13%, white 12%) approve of the military intervention of the South African National Defence Force in Lesotho during 1998.

Chapter 1

Introduction and background

This report outlines public attitudes about national priorities, social issues, political parties and the government's service delivery programme. It also reflects the extent of and attitudes towards the transition from the previous apartheid system to a constitutional democracy. The publication of these data is of particular interest at the end of the term of office of the first democratically elected government in South Africa. While most of the data were generated from a survey undertaken in December 1998, the latest statistics on party support were extracted from the March 1999 survey results. Subsequent reports during 1999 will explore the March survey results in greater detail.

The aim of the HSRC's Public Opinion Analysis Programme is to provide regular and reliable data and analysis of various national social priority issues. The programme utilizes longitudinal surveys to determine public attitudes to such issues, and to analyse and disseminate the research findings in the national interest. In this process a longitudinal database is continually updated, thus facilitating comparisons and the identification of trends over time.

Government, parliament, civil society and the various political parties will be able to utilize the findings in formulating policy priorities for the future. Of more immediate value is that the 1999 election campaign agenda is effectively encapsulated in the range of public opinions reported. Other role players are likely to benefit from the analysis of socio-political and economic matters. These include the research community, businesses, non-governmental organizations, foreign representatives, donors and diplomats, analysts and the public in general.

Chapter 2

Methodological approach to the survey

Survey questionnaires were administered to random clustered national probability samples of 2200 respondents from throughout the Republic of South Africa in December 1998 and March 1999. Results based on the national samples (see variables) have a maximum margin of error of $\pm 4,7$ percentage points. In the case of small cell sizes, such as the Indian population or the population of the Northern Cape, both of which make up relatively small components of the sample, results should be treated with some caution. Trends are nevertheless identifiable in such cases.

The sample design for the December 1998 survey had of necessity to be based on the most recently released census data at that stage, namely those of 1991 (the final results of the 1996 census had not yet been made available.) The former Transkei-Bophuthatswana-Venda-Ciskei (TBVC) states were excluded in the 1991 census and statistics from these areas had to be added to the totals for the provinces of which they now form part in order to determine the sample proportional representation of the nine provinces. The universe of the sample design was all members of the South African population of 18 years and older, which was stratified according to nine socio-economic area types:

1. Rural areas in former self-governing and TBVC areas
2. Informal settlements in urban areas (metro and non-metro) previously reserved for blacks, Indians and coloureds
3. Hostels and hotels
4. Urban areas previously reserved for coloureds
5. Urban areas previously reserved for Indians
6. Urban areas previously reserved for blacks
7. Non-metropolitan urban areas previously reserved for whites
8. Metropolitan urban areas previously reserved for whites
9. Rural areas excluding the former self-governing and TBVC states

The allocation was roughly proportional to the adjusted 1991 population census figures (the 1996 results had not yet been released at the time of the survey) with a few exceptions. Multistage cluster (probability) sampling was used to draw the respondents, using the adjusted 1991 population census figures as a sampling frame. Census enumerator areas and similar areas were used as the clusters in the penultimate sampling stage, from which an equal number, one or two by four, households were drawn. All clusters were drawn from the final clusters with equal probability (systematically). The respondents were drawn at random from qualifying household members. The provincial distribution of the realized sample is listed in Table 1.

The realized sample was weighted according to the adjusted 1991 biographical features of the South African population of 18 years and older, and is thus a broad reflection of the perceptions of the adult population of South Africa. Some of the biographical features of the weighted sample are listed in Appendix 1.

Table 1: Sample allocation, December 1998

Province	Sample selected	Realisation
Western Cape	256	255
Northern Cape	104	98
Eastern Cape	296	288
Free State	208	185
KwaZulu-Natal	344	351
Mpumalanga	200	200
Northern Province	248	247
Gauteng	344	344
North West	216	214
Total	2216	2182

It should be noted that the data analysis was undertaken by means of SPSS and the techniques used were restricted to the generation of frequency tables, cross-tabulations of variables and Chaid and factor analysis. Owing to rounding of percentages, totals reflected in some tables do not add up to 100%.

Chapter 3

Trends in political affiliation

3.1 Voting intentions

On the eve of the second fully democratic elections in South Africa it is pertinent to investigate the voting intentions of the electorate. In HSRC surveys, two regular questions are used to explore respondents' political orientations:

- ? If a general election were held tomorrow, for which of the current political parties would you vote?
- ? How close or distant do you feel towards each of the following political parties and organizations? (Followed by a list of parties)

Surveys conducted by the HSRC prior to the national and provincial elections of April 1994 and the local elections of 1995 and 1996 were largely accurate in predicting the election outcomes. Extrapolated trends correctly indicated the victory of the African National Congress (ANC) and its procurement of over 60% of votes cast. The second and third highest recipients of votes, namely the National Party (NP) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) were also correctly forecast.

Since the term of office of the National Assembly elected in 1994, several new parties have emerged. They include the United Democratic Movement (UDM) formed by Bantu Holomisa and Roelf Meyer, who broke away from the ANC and NP respectively, and the Federal Alliance, a party formed in 1998 under the leadership of Louis Luyt. Also, some parties that did not contest the 1994 elections have entered the electoral fray in 1999. These include the Conservative Party (CP) and the Azanian People's Organization (Azapo). These developments are likely to impact on voting behaviour in June 1999.

Table 2 lists the proportions of respondents in successive surveys who indicated support for the various political parties. These figures alone cannot be used to predict the outcome of the 1999 elections because three categories of respondents did not name any particular party as the potential beneficiary of their votes. These categories are those who do not intend voting, those who are unsure about the party they will vote for and those who refused to divulge their voting intention. It would be risky to subtract these categories of respondent from the total and to recalculate percentages for each political party on the assumption that these respondents would vote in the same proportions for each political party as those who have stated their voting intentions. To avoid making this assumption, a voting model has been developed which takes into account responses to other political questions and simulates the probable voting intentions of the respondents concerned. The voting is discussed in the next section of this report.

Table 2: Changes in party support, 1996 - 1999

Party	Feb 96	Feb 97	Feb 98	Dec 98	Mar 99
African National Congress (ANC)	55,3	52,8	44,5	48,8	56,3
(New) National Party (NNP)	13,4	11,7	10,9	10,5	8,5
Democratic Party (DP)	1,0	1,5	2,5	6,7	5,8
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	-	-	5,9	5,4	3,2
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	6,3	4,3	3,1	4,4	4,4
Freedom Front (FF)	2,0	1,3	2,3	1,8	1,3
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	0,8	1,8	2,1	1,1	0,9
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	0,4	0,4	1,1	1,1	1,1
Conservative Party (CP)	1,1	0,4	0,4	1,0	0,3
Federal Alliance (FA)	-	-	-	0,4	0,4
Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO)	0,2	0,4	0,2	0,3	0,2
SA Communist Party (SACP)	0,1	0,6	0,6	0,0	0,0
Other	0,5	3,5	0,6	0,6	0,5
Would not vote	6,0*	10,2*	11,0*	10,8	3,6
Don't know	12,9	11,1	14,8	3,8	5,2
Refused				3,4	8,3
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

*"Would not vote" and "Refused" combined in these surveys

Figure 1: Changes in political party support, 1994 - 1999

(Available on request)

Several trends are discernible from Table 2 and Figure 1. The ANC has maintained its dominance of the political landscape, with more than one in two respondents indicating that were an election held tomorrow, they would support the ANC. Although the high levels of support received in the 1994 elections declined during the middle of the ANC government's term of office, these levels had largely been regained by 1999. The NP (now NNP) has gradually lost the support of large numbers of voters and seems likely to obtain less than half the proportion of votes it secured in 1994. The major beneficiary of the swing away from the NNP is the DP, a trend that has been verified in by-elections held during the past five years. Support for the DP has grown dramatically since 1997 to the extent that it may challenge the NNP as second largest party in the new parliament. The UDM has garnered support from a base of zero in 1997 to that of between 3% and 4% in 1999. The IFP has lost support from its 10% level in 1994 and appears to be the favoured party of less than one in twenty voters at this stage. None of the other parties were mentioned by more than one in 40 of the respondents.

Disaggregated by province the cell sizes become too small for generalization but they are reproduced in the next table to provide an indication of broad trends. Indications are that the ANC will receive the largest number of votes in all nine provinces. They will probably constitute the majority in all the provinces except the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, where the NNP and IFP will need support from other parties to wield power. The ANC majority in Gauteng may be smaller than that in the Free State, in view of the much larger proportion of potential non-voters in the latter province. The sample size in the Northern Cape was only 101 and thus too small to be statistically reliable. Consequently the ANC proportion in that province may be inflated.

Table 3: Support for political parties by province, March 1999

Party	WC	NC	EC	FS	KN	MP	NP	GT	NW	Total
ANC	30	56	74	71	28	74	82	55	75	56
PAC	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
NNP	29	13	6	5	7	2	1	10	2	9
DP	10	4	2	2	9	3	2	9	4	6
IFP	0	1	0	1	21	0	0	1	0	4
FF	0	1	0	2	1	2	0	4	1	1
CP	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
ACDP	1	6	1	1	1	0	0	3	1	1
UDM	2	2	12	2	3	0	2	2	1	3
AZAPO	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	1	0	3	0	3	0	1	4	1
Wouldn't vote	6	1	1	2	8	4	3	2	3	4
No choice	19	16	3	10	23	12	11	13	11	14
Total	98	102	102	101	102	101	101	102	102	100

The ANC has maintained a solid support base among the black respondents. Seven out of ten black respondents (70%) said that they would vote for the ANC were an election to be held during March 1999. This compares favourably with the 67% in December 1998 and 69% in February 1998. The coloured respondents were evenly divided between the NNP and ANC (each 33%). This represents a dramatic shift. In February 1998 there was a 2:1 split between supporters of the NP and ANC amongst coloured voters (NP: 37%, ANC: 25%). By December, ANC support had increased to the extent that it was almost level with that of the (now) NNP (34% for the ANC and 35% for the NNP).

Among white respondents, three in ten (31%) indicated support for the DP and 26% for the NNP in March 1999. This is also indicative of a shift since 1998. In February 1998 the proportions of whites also said that they would vote for the (then) NP and the DP respectively were 23% and 18%. This split had reversed to 15% (NNP) and 31% (DP) by December 1998. The Indian respondents were equally supportive of the ANC and NNP (27% each), with 14% indicating support for the DP. This constitutes a considerable decline for the NNP, which had the support of 52% of the Indian respondents in both February and December 1998. More whites (6%) than blacks (3%), coloureds (4%) or Indians (3%) said that they would not vote.

Overall trends are thus:

- ? The ANC has retained most of its support among black respondents and has gained support among coloured and Indian respondents
- ? The NNP has lost support among white and coloured respondents
- ? The DP has gained support, especially among white respondents
- ? The FF's support among white respondents has increased to 8%
- ? The UDM has overall support at the 3% level

Figure 2: Party support levels by race

(Available on request)

The March 1999 survey also monitored the public's closeness to and alienation (distance) from various political parties. Since May 1994 the pattern has not changed dramatically, with the largest proportion of respondents feeling closest to the ANC. The December 1998 survey showed that the ANC remained the party with the most respondents (55%) feeling close to it. It is followed at some distance by the NNP (24%), the DP (8%), the SACP (12%) and the PAC (10%). For the black respondents the ANC was by far the most popular (76%) party with its ally the SACP trailing at 18% and the PAC at 14%. Feelings were almost equally split among coloureds between the NNP (37%) and the ANC (34%), the Indians felt closest to the NNP (37%) and the DP (25%) and the whites felt closest to the NNP (51%) and the DP (45%) in December 1998. The only other parties to be mentioned by more than one in ten of any group were the FF, CP and IFP in the case of the white respondents and the DP in the case of the coloured respondents.

Table 4: Closeness to political party by race, December 1998

Party	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
AZAPO	7	1	1	0	5
PAC	14	2	0	1	10
SACP	18	2	1	1	12
ANC	76	34	9	4	55
DP	4	13	25	45	14
UDM	9	4	2	10	8
NNP	14	37	37	51	24
IFP	8	3	8	12	8
ACDP	3	2	5	5	3
FF	1	1	4	26	6
CP	0	0	0	18	4
FA	1	0	1	5	1

Looked at in terms of home language groups, the largest proportions of all but two of the major language groups of South Africa said that they would vote for the ANC in the March 1999 survey. This ranged from over 80% of the three main Northern Province groups, namely speakers of Tshivenda (87%), Sepedi (84%) and Xitsonga (84%) to 44% of the isiZulu-speaking respondents. For home speakers of Afrikaans the NNP was first the choice of 30%, the ANC of 19% and the DP of 15%. For English speakers the DP came first among 32%, the NNP among 23% and the ANC among 14%. Other parties for which 10% or more of any particular language group said they would vote were the IFP (19%) in the case of speakers of isiZulu and the UDM among isiXhosa-speakers (10%). The figures in this table should be interpreted with caution owing to the small cell sizes in many cases, but are probably broadly indicative of trends.

3.2 Intention to vote

For the success of the 1999 elections it is important for the public to be informed about and to participate in the elections. At the time of the February 1998 survey, 81% of the respondents already knew that the elections would be held in 1999 and 74% indicated that they would take part. The main reasons that people gave for their intention to vote for a specific party in the elections were economic (28%), made up of “economic considerations” (8%) and “economic promises” (20%). One in seven respondents (15%) said they would vote for a party if it promised to create jobs. These considerations related directly to living standards and quality of life. The third most important reason that respondents would vote for a party was loyalty towards that party (14%). When this question is analyzed by race it emerged that 40% of the Indian, 31% of the black, 26% of the white and 19% of the coloured respondents indicated that economic considerations would influence them to vote for a specific party. Job promises would influence 18% of the black, 9% of the coloured, 10% of the Indian and 4% of the white respondents to vote for a specific party. Loyalty to a party would influence 13% of the blacks, 24% of the coloureds, 13% of the Indians and 9% of the whites to vote for the party. Combating crime was given by 3% of the black, 6% of the coloured, 15% of the Indian and 16% of the white respondents as a reason for voting for a party.

Table 5: Political party support by home language, March 1999

Party	Afr	Eng	Sot	Tsw	Ped	Swa	Nde	Xho	Zul	Tso	Ven	Total
ANC	19	14	78	77	84	81	77	80	44	84	88	56
NNP	30	23	0	1	1	0	1	1	4	0	0	9
DP	15	32	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	4	6
IFP	0	0	1	0	1	1	2	1	19	4	0	4
UDM	2	1	2	1	2	0	2	10	2	2	0	3
FF	7	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
ACDP	3	5	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	1
Other	5	2	2	6	0	0	9	2	0	0	0	2
No vote	4	7	4	1	2	2	3	1	6	2	2	4
Refused	15	15	10	12	10	16	4	5	23	7	6	14

3.3 Voting model

The impact on the election results of voters who do not vote or who do not specify their voting intentions needs to be taken into account in the interpretation of these survey results. If one in ten voters does not exercise their right to vote, the impact of the votes of those who do will be inflated. It accordingly makes sense not to include those who do not intend voting when extrapolating potential election results. It also makes sense to exclude those who did not state their voting intentions when endeavouring to arrive at a more realistic prediction of the 1999 election results. This can be accomplished by subdividing them according to their responses to other questions about the parties to which they feel “closest”, their levels of satisfaction with the government and the broad patterns of social segmentation that occur within the electorate. Finally, we need to bear in mind that there is not an equal likelihood that all voters will vote. The model provides a reliable indication of the likelihood that any given South African voter will vote for the ANC, vote for an opposition party or will not vote at all. This would facilitate the projection of the outcome of elections had they been held at the time of the survey in December 1998. Some of the key findings of the voting model, applied to the December 1998 survey data, are:

- ? ANC electoral support at the national level is very close to the 62,7% that it achieved in the 1994 elections.
- ? Opposition parties are more susceptible to so-called “voter apathy” than is the ANC. Our current estimates of voter participation rates suggest the effect of “apathy” on the combined share of all opposition parties is likely to be between 3 and 4%.
- ? Opposition parties enjoy a slight advantage among “uncertain” voters who say that they intend to vote, suggesting that many are uncertain about the particular opposition party for which they will vote.

One way of presenting these findings is as “scenarios” for different levels of voter participation. Based on the correspondence between our own survey results on voting intention and on the preliminary voter registration figures reported by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), our election research team regards a scenario in which actual voters comprise a representative “mix” of the 65 to 75% of the eligible electorate who are most likely to vote (i.e. who are the least “apathetic”). In the event of the ANC maintaining its established support base, it is likely to achieve a two-thirds majority in the upcoming general elections on condition that less than 65% of the population votes. In a higher-turnout election, the ANC would probably score a smaller majority, similar to its 63% result in 1994. Opposition parties could achieve a combined vote share of about 40% if participation is high, while in a low-turnout election their share could fall below 30%.

Had an election been held at the time of the December survey, the ANC would probably have achieved a majority of between 62 and 73%, depending on the precise level of voter participation. The NNP would probably have come second, with a vote share in the range of 9 to 12%. The DP and UDM would probably have followed closely, in overlapping ranges of 5 to 8% and 4 to 6% respectively. The IFP would probably have achieved 4 to 5% nationally, while the FF would probably have obtained a vote share of between 1 and 2%.

Three-quarters (75%) of the eligible electorate have indicated their intention to vote in the general elections. There is also likely to be some “slippage” between the percentage registered and the percentage who will actually vote, although the precise extent of this slippage is difficult to predict at this stage in the election campaign. The segment of the electorate least inclined to vote consists of those who are dissatisfied with the performance of the government but do not feel close to any opposition party. The projections of the HSRC’s voting model should not be interpreted as direct predictions of the outcome on election day, as they are based on voter sentiment measured in December 1998. Since the beginning of 1999, political parties have stepped up their campaigns to mobilize supporters and encourage them to register. The success or failure of these recent efforts is not reflected in the projections presented here.

Table 6: Estimated party support by level of voter participation, December 1998

Party	Scenario		Sampling error
	“High turnout” (75% propensity restriction)	“Low turnout” (65% propensity restriction)	
ANc	62	65	4
NNP	12	11	2
DP	8	7	2
UDM	6	6	4
IFP	5	5	2
FF	2	2	1
ACDP	1	1	1
PAC	1	1	1
CP	1	1	1
FA	<0,5	<0,5	1
AZAPO	<0,5	<0,5	1
Others	1	1	1

Note: Party support levels have been rounded to the nearest percentage point and are subject to sampling error. “Propensity restriction” scenarios were calculated by progressively eliminating those with the lowest propensity to vote. Put in less technical terms, the 75% restriction scenario can be interpreted as the result of a hypothetical election in which the 25% of the electorate who are least likely to vote are excluded, while all (or a representative cross-section) of the remaining 75% participate. Sampling errors incorporate design effects related to stratification, clustering and probability weighting.

Chapter 4

Democratic development

In a democratic system it is essential that the government and its policy-making institutions be informed of the needs of citizens so that efforts to meet these needs can be prioritized. Conversely, it is important that citizens should be informed about policies that affect their lives. The HSRC's Monitoring and analysis of Public Opinion Programme aims to achieve these two goals by providing the government, civil society and the South African public in general with up-to-date information on the public's knowledge, opinions and perceptions regarding government and other matters of national interest.

4.1 Attitudes towards democracy

One of the tenets of the constitution is that "The people shall govern". The government is committed to democracy and to giving all people access to power. Without democratization, efforts to reconstruct the country will fail. The question can consequently be asked: Do people really want and value democracy? In the December 1998 survey the respondents were asked to select from a list which system of government they felt is preferable. Almost three-quarters (74%) agreed with the statement that "Democracy is always preferable to any other system of government". The nature of democracy is such that the views and opinions of all citizens should be aired freely and considered and acted upon by the elected government. Interestingly, one in 14 respondents opted for an authoritarian system, one in eleven felt that it did not matter and the rest (8%) did not know. Variations in opinions on systems of government between the races were not large (Table 7). This is a surprising finding, given the apartheid history of racial segregation and polarization. Multivariate analysis of attitudinal differences on the basis of other social variables reveals that the impact of income and education levels, gender and perceived changes in living standard since 1994 were also minimal. The most marked difference was that between wealthier and poorer whites, the latter being somewhat less favourably disposed towards democracy.

The questions asked here do, however, rest on the assumption that the concepts "democracy" and "authoritarian" are widely understood in the same way when translated into the various languages of the respondents. This may or may not be the case, the advent of democracy in South Africa having been relatively recent. None of the respondents grew up under a universally democratic system and perceptions of democracy would certainly be coloured by this experience. Nevertheless, attitudes towards democracy in South Africa are consistent with those in other "new" democracies such as Portugal and Spain, where 61% and 70% respectively agree with the statement that "democracy is preferable to any other form of government". However, South Africa scores significantly higher than Chile (52%), Brazil (42%) and Poland (31%), similarly to Uruguay (73%) but lower than Argentina (77%) and Greece (87%).

Table 7: Support for democracy by race

Opinion	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Democracy is always preferable	78%	66%	58%	70%	74%
Authoritarian system is preferable	8%	3%	5%	6%	7%
Does not matter	9%	19%	22%	12%	11%
Uncertain/Don't know	5%	12%	15%	12%	8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Figure 3: Comparative international support for democracy

(Available on request)

4.2 Views on liberal democracy

In order to explore opinions on the perceived role of government and acceptable limits to state interventionism, the respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the following series of statements:

1. The government should have the authority to prevent citizens from expressing opinions that are negative or unpopular.
2. Citizens should have the right to form or join organizations freely, such as political parties, business associations, trade unions and other interest groups.
3. The government should be allowed to ignore the Constitution if a majority of citizens clearly supports their action.
4. Elected officials should bear ultimate responsibility for government decisions.
5. All citizens 18 years and older should have the right to vote in elections.
6. There should be at least two well-established parties for voters to choose from in elections.
7. The government should carefully control the flow of information to the public about issues of major national importance.
8. The government should ensure that all voters are protected from violence and intimidation during election.

Two factors (Labeled “liberal” and “interventionist” for the purposes of this report) emerged when the factor analysis technique was applied to responses to these eight statements. Three variables had significant negative correlations with the interventionist factor, namely household income, standard of living and level of education. Respondents with higher incomes, higher living standards and higher levels of education were more likely to be opposed to state intervention in terms of information control, free political expression and tampering with the constitution than were their less wealthy, less educated counterparts. In apparent contradiction, however, a small negative correlation emerged between the liberal factor and standard of living. This implied less desire for freedom of political activity among those with higher living standards. There were no correlations with other social variables, owing to the widespread agreement with the statements related to this factor among all social strata.

More illuminating is an examination of the responses to the two questions with the highest loadings on the interventionist (the extent to which government should censor unpopular opinions) and liberal (the role of government in protecting voters from electoral violence) factors in relation to party political affiliation. Sentiments in favour of government censorship of “negative” or “unpopular” opinions were expressed by almost half (46%) of the respondents interviewed. These views were most common among respondents who indicated a preference for the ACDP (59%), AZAPO (68%), ANC (58%) and PAC (56%). Given the wide prevalence to take note of these views among their supporters, it would be prudent for the parties concerned to take note of these findings.

In contrast, smaller proportions of those who said that they would vote for the IFP (49%), UDM (36%), NNP (23%), FA (14%), CP (11%), DP (10%) or FF (9%) indicated agreement with government prevention of such opinions being expressed (Table 8). The majorities of potential voters for all of the largest opposition parties thus favoured less control of information flow than did those who support the ANC. The implication for the NNP is that the extensive censorship laws that prevailed under its predecessor, the old NP government, would not be favoured by contemporary supporters of the NNP.

Table 8: Support for government authority to restrict expression of negative opinions

Party support	Strongly agree	Agree	No opinion	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
ANC	24	34	10	16	11	5	100
NNP	5	18	13	25	32	7	100
DP	5	5	10	21	59	0	100
UDM	17	19	11	27	23	3	100
IFP	9	40	16	15	17	3	100
FF	2	7	9	23	57	2	100
ACDP	9	50	5	18	18	0	100
PAC	24	32	8	16	20	0	100
CP	8	4	0	27	61	0	100
FA	7	7	15	14	57	0	100
AZAPO	0	67	0	33	0	0	100
SACP	50	0	0	50	0	0	100
Other	0	17	8	17	58	0	100
No choice	10	18	10	15	42	5	100
Total	18	28	10	18	22	4	100

4.3 Political violence

In respect of opinions on political violence and the role of government in preventing it, there was near unanimity among the respondents of all political persuasions. More than nine out of ten (92%) agreed or strongly agreed that the government had a responsibility to ensure the protection of voters. Significantly, supporters of a party that was arguably the most affected by political violence during the 1994 elections, namely the IFP, were the most likely to be neutral (10%) or to disagree (8%) that ensuring protection was a government responsibility. Most unequivocal in their agreement with the protective role of the government, were supporters of the DP, only two percent having no opinion on the topic.

Bearing in mind the political violence that preceded the April 1994 elections and the political assassinations in KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape during 1998 and early 1999, it is pertinent to assess opinion on the current potential for political violence. The respondents were asked to nominate one of several options as the preferred way of showing dissatisfaction with the government. Almost half (48%) indicated that, if dissatisfied, they would “vote differently at the next election” and three in ten (28%) said that they would “complain to the relevant authority”. One in ten opted for protest action and only one percent, regardless of the race of the respondents concerned, said that they would “commit violent actions” if they were dissatisfied with the government. The option of voting differently was preferred by the largest proportion of all the race categories, but to a somewhat lesser extent by the blacks than by the other groups. The second and third most frequently mentioned options of complaining to the relevant authorities or of undertaking protest action were more likely to be chosen by the blacks than the whites, coloureds or Indians, however.

Table 9: Support for government protection of voters from electoral violence/intimidation

Party support	Strongly agree	Agree	No opinion	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
ANC	69	23	4	1	1	2	100
NNP	68	24	5	1	1	1	100
DP	80	18	2	0	0	0	100
UDM	70	25	3	0	0	2	100
IFP	53	27	10	2	6	2	100
FF	77	23	0	0	0	0	100
ACDP	64	36	0	0	0	0	100
PAC	76	24	0	0	0	0	100
CP	69	31	0	0	0	0	100
FA	86	7	7	0	0	0	100
AZAPO	67	33	0	0	0	0	100
SACP	100	0	0	0	0	0	100
Other	58	42	0	0	0	0	100
No choice	74	22	4	0	0	0	100
Total	69	23	4	1	1	2	100

Table 10: Expression of dissatisfaction with the national government

Preferred method	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Vote differently at the next election	42	57	75	56	48
Complain to the relevant authority	34	21	11	16	28
Undertake protest action	12	5	2	5	10
Commit violent actions	1	1	0	1	1
Other methods	1	1	4	2	1
Uncertain/Don't know	10	15	8	20	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Seven in ten respondents indicated that they felt positive about peaceful protest actions as a response to dissatisfaction with the government. Differences between races existed in that this opinion was held by three-quarters (77%) of the black respondents, two-thirds of the coloured (68%) and Indian (66%) respondents and less than half (45%) of the white respondents. Two-thirds (65%) of all the respondents felt that peaceful protest actions were successful (ranging from 80% of the blacks to 32% of the whites).

In contrast, more than two-thirds of the respondents (69%) felt extremely negative, very negative or negative about forceful (but non-violent) protest actions. Only one in eight (12%) were neutral and the remaining respondents were either positive (13%), or very positive (4%) or extremely positive (2%) about forceful protest actions. Nevertheless, the majority (61%) acknowledged that forceful protest actions were successful. Regarding violent protest actions, only one in ten (11%) respondents responded positively, ranging from a level of 16% among the black respondents to only 1% among the whites. Again, however, it was acknowledged by one in seven (15%) that violent protest actions were successful. The implications for the 1999 elections are that although most people are not in favour of violent protest action, there is a minority who recognize its effectiveness in bringing about change should no alternatives be available.

Figure 4: Expression of dissatisfaction with the government

(Available on request)

4.4 Levels of political knowledge

Another method of testing levels of understanding about systems of government is to ask specific knowledge-based questions about the system that has been established in South Africa. To this end, the respondents were requested to answer a series of multiple-choice questions, only one of the given answers being correct. The questions were as follows (correct answers indicated in brackets):

1. Nelson Mandela is the president of South Africa. Who would you say is the Deputy President? (Thabo Mbeki)
2. Who would you say is ultimately responsible for determining whether a law is constitutional or not? (The Constitutional Court)
3. Which political party would you say has the most members in the National Assembly of Parliament? (African National Congress)
4. Which political party would you say has the second most members in the National Assembly of Parliament? (National Party)
5. How many members of National Assembly of Parliament would you say must agree in order to approve changes to the constitution? (At least two-thirds).
6. Political parties are sometimes placed on a scale from 'left-wing' to 'right-wing'. If you are familiar with these terms, could you tell me which of the following two parties would you say is generally the more 'right-wing': The African National Congress or the Freedom Front? (Freedom Front).
7. Whose responsibility would you say is it to present the government's budget speech in parliament each year? (Minister of Finance).

Table 11: Knowledge about government and parliament

Question	Deputy president	Law is constitutional	Largest party in parliament	Second largest party in parliament	Number required to change constitution	"Right-wing party	Presenter of budget speech
Correct answer	91	27	85	48	27	40	60
Incorrect answer	1	60	4	27	49	25	27
Don't know	8	13	11	25	24	35*	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

**Including the response "not familiar with the terms"*

About nine out of ten respondents knew the names of the deputy president and of the largest party represented in parliament. Three-fifths (60%) were able to indicate that the Minister of Finance has the responsibility of presenting the government's budget speech in parliament. There was much less knowledge evident in respect of the other questions, with less than half of the respondents being able to provide the correct answer to any one of them. Only one out of 20 (5%) indicated that they did not know the answer to any of the questions. In comparative perspective, these levels of knowledge about political matters are reasonably good, but indicate that there is considerable room for raising political knowledge levels among the population.

4.5 Perceived legitimacy of the government

Finally, in determining the extent to which democracy is being consolidated in South Africa, it is pertinent to investigate the perceived levels of legitimacy of the government. The legitimacy of a government can be described as that government's right to rule (Scaff, 1985; Sternberger, 1968). The literature indicates that this right as it affects modern state usually has three bases:

- (a) The popularity of a government
- (b) The maintenance of the principles on which that government came to power
- (c) The degree to which the government maintains order in its territory

The evaluation of the government on the dimensions of fairness, effectiveness, transparency, power and honour in the years 1994 to 1998 indicates that

- ? Between 48% (for strength) and 43% (for effective governance) of the respondents evaluated the government positively in February 1998 (the average positive evaluation was 45%)
- ? Between 38% (for ineffectiveness) and 31% (for lack of transparency) of the respondents evaluated the government negatively in February 1998 (the average negative evaluation was 34%)
- ? Between 23% (for transparency and honour) and 18% (for fairness) of the responses in the February 1998 survey fell into the uncertain or neutral category (the average uncertain or neutral response was 20%).
- ? If the February 1998 responses and those of May 1994 are compared on all five dimensions, the positive evaluations decreased by an average of 29%, and the negative responses increased by an average of 29%.

In February 1998, 48% of the respondents evaluated the government positively (33% positive and 15% very positive). This corresponds closely with the 47% approval rating for the job done by government obtained in an IDASA survey conducted in mid-1997. On the other hand, 41% evaluated the government negatively (29% negative and 12% very negative). Eleven percent were uncertain or neutral. Between May 1994 and February 1998, the very positive evaluation decreased by 34 percentage points while the positive evaluation remained at a fundamentally constant level.

Figure 5: Perceived positive characteristics of the government

(Available on request)

Figure 6: Perceived negative characteristics of the government

(Available on request)

Figure 7: Overall evaluation of the government

(Available on request)

The latter increased by 9 percentage points in the February 1997 survey and then decreased again in the February 1998 survey. The negative and very negative evaluations have increased by respectively 24 and 11 percentage points since 1994.

The very high level of legitimacy the government enjoyed after the elections in May 1994 had tapered off to a certain extent by February 1995. Thereafter there was a slight improvement in the positive evaluation of legitimacy. The decrease in the positive evaluation of the government (between May 1994 and February 1995) can possibly be ascribed to the fact that by far the greatest part of the South African population had very high (even unrealistic) expectations of the government that could not be realized by February 1995.

Subsequently, expectations surrounding local elections started to rise. This factor, coupled with a possible greater sense of realism and moderation over time, could have brought about the slight rise in the proportion of respondents indicating a positive evaluation of the government. After February 1996 the overall legitimacy of the government improved and subsequently remained essentially constant, albeit at more “realistic” levels.

The indexed responses on legitimacy were analyzed by means of the Chaid technique. Chaid is an “automatic interaction detector” technique based on the Chi-squared statistic and is designed especially for categorical dependent variables. Chaid is merely a descriptive measure to gain insight into data. The purpose of the analysis was to see who were positive towards the government and to try to explain why the respondent felt this way. The following explanatory variables were included in the analysis:

- ? Demographic/biographical variables, namely home language, occupational status, province, income, educational level, age, gender, marital status, race.
- ? Economic variables, namely improvement in standard of living, government doing its best to meet the economic needs of South Africans, satisfaction with the general economic situation and changes in quality of life under the current government;
- ? Political perceptions, such as party-political support, satisfaction with the political situation, feeling of security/insecurity, expectations and perceptions of the government’s control over crime, perceptions of the governing of South Africa, attitudes between races;
- ? Access to information, namely reading newspapers, watching TV, access to the Internet and the feeling among respondents that they know what is going on in the government.

The government was given the most negative evaluation by the Afrikaans-speaking respondents, the white and Indian respondents, the respondents with Grade 12 and higher qualifications and the respondents from the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Northern Cape and Gauteng.

The legitimacy of the government was also shown to be linked to perceptions about whether economic needs were being met. The respondents most positive towards the government were generally

- ? Satisfied that the government was doing its best to meet the economic needs of the public (78%: Table 12);
- ? Satisfied with the economic situation in South Africa (87%);
- ? Confident that the government understood the economic needs of the respondents (72%).

Table 12 indicates how the respondents who were positive towards the government felt about the government meeting the economic needs of South Africans (72%).

When the legitimacy of the government was analyzed according to the political perceptions of the respondents, those respondents who were (i) satisfied with the way South Africa was being governed (60% - See table 13), and (ii) satisfied with the goals of the government (79%), felt positive overall towards the government. If legitimacy is analyzed by political party the respondents supporting the ANC, SACP and PAC evaluated the government most positively. This finding indicates that people who enjoyed the greatest benefits in the previous political dispensation (such as Afrikaans speakers and NP supporters) continue to rate the legitimacy of the government the least positively.

Table 12: Legitimacy of the government by economic need satisfaction

Meet economic needs	Legitimacy of the government			
	Positive	Negative	Uncertain/ Neutral	Total
Doing its best	78	17	5	100
Neither	46	29	25	100
Not doing its best	22	70	8	100
Uncertain	38	32	30	100

Table 13: Legitimacy of the government by satisfaction with national governance

Satisfaction	Legitimacy of the government			
	Positive	Negative	Uncertain/ Neutral	Total
Satisfied	90	7	3	100
Neither	43	28	29	100
Dissatisfied	17	74	9	100
Uncertain	18	22	60	100

The survey revealed that the less people watched television, the more positive they were towards the government. Those respondents who did not have a television set were the most positive towards the government (62% - Table 14). Conversely, those who watched television tended to be more critical of the government (Only 46% were positive).

Table 14: Legitimacy of the government by time spent watching television

Time	Legitimacy of the government			
	Positive	Negative	Uncertain/ Neutral	Total
Less than one hour	41	51	9	100
1-2 hours	44	45	11	100
2-3 hours	52	38	10	100
3-4 hours	55	38	7	100
More than four hours	44	43	14	100
Never watch TV	36	52	12	100
Do not have TV	62	28	11	100

Only one thirds (34%) of the respondents indicated that television was their main source of news, however. More than half (54%) depended on the radio for news and one in eleven (9%) said that newspapers were their main source of news (3% did not know which type of media was their main source of news). The proportions of those mainly dependent on television, radio and newspapers for news were respectively 51%, 46% and 64% dissatisfied (or very dissatisfied) with the way South Africa was being governed. This shows that although radio listeners are less dissatisfied with national governance than are TV viewers, the most dissatisfied category are those who depend on newspapers as a source of news.

In summary it appears that several factors affected perceptions on the legitimacy of the government:

- ? The more strongly the respondents believed that the government had no control over crime, the less likely they were to evaluate the government as legitimate.
- ? The more the respondents were inclined to believe that their standard of living would fall, the less likely they were to evaluate the government as legitimate.
- ? The less satisfied the respondents were with the political situation and the economy, the less likely they were to evaluate the government as legitimate.
- ? The less safe the respondents felt, the less likely they were to evaluate the government as legitimate.
- ? Although the majority of respondents evaluated the government as legitimate, a decline in the positive sentiment has occurred.

Chapter 5

National priorities

5.1 Things needing to be changed

The respondents were asked to state the three things that they would ask the government to change in order to make life better for people like themselves. Six items were by far the most frequently mentioned. These were employment, crime, services, housing, education and health care. The first two (employment and crime) were mentioned by 56% and 44% of the respondents respectively. Thus more than half (56%) said that “employment” should be changed, the need for jobs clearly being important in a high unemployment environment and “crime” was mentioned by more than two-fifths (44%) of the respondents. Just over a quarter felt that services, housing or education were in need of change. Table 15 lists the top ten items requiring change.

Table 15: Priorities for change

Item needing change	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Employment	66	56	46	24	56
Crime	32	50	64	79	44
Services*	37	16	3	7	28
Housing	31	34	20	5	26
Education	28	17	30	20	26
Health care	14	18	6	22	15
Economy	4	5	31	22	9
Living standards	8	5	10	4	7
Decrease tax	2	7	15	16	6
Pension money banking	5	9	1	4	5

*Household services such as water and electricity supply

The table reveals distinct differences in perceived priorities by members of the different race categories. Whereas for the black and coloured respondents, employment was the item seen by most as in need of change, the Indians and whites most frequently mentioned crime. Second most mentioned by the black respondents were services and only third was crime. For the coloureds the second most mentioned item was crime and for both the whites and Indians, employment was the second most frequently mentioned item.

5.2 Perceived government priorities by race

When presented with discrete categories from which to choose, the picture changed somewhat. The respondents were asked to select one item from a list of potential priorities for the government during the next ten years. They were implicitly required to think more altruistically in terms of the broader society and less in terms of their own personal or household needs. The fight against crime was seen as the top national priority for the next ten years by 41% of all the respondents. This was followed by job creation (32%), with better services (8%), improvements to the education system (6%) and preventing prices from rising (4%) seen to be top priorities by far fewer respondents. In successive HSRC surveys since 1995 there has been a gradual shift in perceived national priorities.

In October 1995 housing provision (35%) was accorded highest priority, but by February 1996 there was more emphasis on the need for job creation (44%). This increased to 52% in February 1997. While job creation (35%) remained the first priority in the February 1998 survey, the high percentage of respondents who identified the maintenance of law and order (29%), which was previously not a distinct option as a priority, indicated a growing awareness of crime prevention as a national priority. During the course of 1998, crime overtook job creation as the major national priority in the minds of South Africans (Figure 8), two in five specify this option. Data collected in March 1999 indicate that job creation has once again become the top priority (41%), with crime prevention in second place, mentioned by a third (32%) of the respondents.

Figure 8: Changes in ten-year priorities for the government

(Available on request)

Differences of opinion emerged between the races in respect of priorities in the December 1998 survey, as was the case in previous surveys. Whereas for the coloured, Indian and white respondents, fighting crime was mentioned most frequently, this item came marginally second amongst the black respondents. For the latter group, creating more jobs was mentioned by 3% more respondents than fighting crime, the respective proportions being 37% and 34%.

Noteworthy here is that the fairly large gap (19%) between job creation and crime prevention among the black respondents in February 1998 had narrowed to only 3% by December 1998.

Table 16: Top ten-year priority for the government by race, December 1998

Priority	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Fighting crime	34	38	43	64	41
Creating more jobs	37	34	23	14	32
Providing better services	10	10	5	1	8
Giving people more influence over government decisions	8	6	7	7	8
Improving the educational system	6	5	13	5	6
Keeping prices from rising	3	6	6	3	4
Eliminating political violence	2	0	0	2	2
Protecting political rights	1	1	3	3	1

5.3 Perceived government priorities by living standard

Historically, race has been a good proxy indicator of wealth and a range of other indicators such as level of education, occupation, income and standard of living. Since the demise of apartheid the emergence of a new middle class among communities previously disadvantaged by apartheid makes the crude use of race less accurate in gauging the different needs of the wealthier and the poorer sectors of South African society. A living standard measure (LSM) was calculated for each respondent according to his/her access to a range of household appliances, services, shops and financial services. Table 17 reveals differences in perceived government priorities amongst those with high versus those with low living standards according to the December 1998 survey.

Table 17: Top ten-year priority for the government by LSM

Priority	Living standard measure								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Total
Fighting crime	41	36	28	25	43	41	52	59	41
Creating more jobs	20	36	37	41	34	37	22	19	32
Providing better services	13	17	14	10	6	6	5	0	8
Giving people more influence over government decisions	16	4	8	8	8	5	8	9	8
Improving the educational system	7	2	6	8	5	7	6	6	6
Keeping prices from rising	2	3	5	4	2	3	4	3	4
Eliminating political violence	1	2	2	2	1	0	2	1	2
Protecting the political rights of citizens	0	1	1	1	2	1	2	3	1

This form of disaggregation reveals that fighting crime is prioritized by all but two of the eight different living standard groups. In only LSM categories 3 and 4 was fighting crime not seen as the top priority for the government. In those cases, creating more jobs was mentioned by more respondents than was fighting crime. The overall trend is that as living standards increase, the greater is the likelihood that fighting crime will become a priority. Conversely, the higher the living standard of a respondent, the less the likelihood of his/her perceiving the creation of more jobs as being the top ten-year priority for the government. In terms of providing better services, giving people more influence over government decisions and eliminating political violence, the respondents with lower LSMs were more likely to give these a top priority rating than were their wealthier counterparts. The opposite is a less immediate material need and therefore not unexpectedly, more of a priority for the wealthier sector with higher LSMs. The improvement of the education system was accorded similar priority by all LSM groups.

5.4 Perceived government priorities in each province

In order to determine the spatial variation in perceived priorities, it is pertinent to cross-tabulate responses by province. In December 1998, fighting crime was the top priority among the largest segment of respondents in all but one province. In North West, creating more jobs was perceived as being the top priority by the largest proportion of respondents. In the Northern Province and North West, providing better services was seen as a priority by larger proportions than in other parts of the country. North West had the highest proportion of respondents who prioritized giving people more influence over government decisions. Improving the education system and eliminating political violence was accorded higher priority in the Free State than elsewhere, as was keeping prices from rising in the Western Cape.

Table 18: Top ten-year priority for the government by province

Priority	Province									
	WC %	NC %	EC %	FS %	KN %	MP %	NP %	GT %	NW %	Tot %
Fighting crime	43	48	42	40	41	38	40	44	28	41
Creating more jobs	31	27	33	33	34	27	25	34	36	32
Providing better services	9	9	6	3	6	8	14	4	11	8
Giving people more influence over government decisions	4	7	8	6	4	9	9	8	16	8
Improving the education system	4	2	6	9	7	8	6	7	3	6
Keeping prices from rising	7	5	1	6	5	6	5	2	2	4
Eliminating political violence	1	2	2	3	1	1	2	1	3	2
Protecting the political rights of citizens	1	0	3	0	2	3	0	1	1	1

Chapter 6

Perceptions of economic issues

The respondents were asked several questions relating to the economic circumstances of their own households as well as those pertaining to South Africa as a whole. They were also asked about how they viewed the economic performance of the government. A study by Przeworski *et al.* (1996:38) concludes that economic factors are vital in sustaining democracies. Once a country has a democratic government, its level of economic development will have a major effect on the chances of democracy surviving. Economically poor democracies are extremely fragile. Przeworski *et al.* (1996:43) further note that people expect a democracy to reduce income inequality, and that democracies were indeed more likely to survive when they did so.

Although the South African economy is generally seen to have sound fundamentals, the effect of the weak rand has ramifications throughout the economy. On the positive side, export opportunities are boosted for certain sectors including mining. However, currency depreciation creates uncertainty, increases the risk premium associated with investment in South Africa and raises the user cost of capital in the domestic economy.

A disquieting aspect of longer-term employment trends in the South African economy is that the number of employment opportunities created during each phase of economic recovery is not keeping pace with the growth of the country's economically active population. One in three (29%) of South Africa's economically active population are unemployed and actively seeking employment. This places South Africa broadly on a par with world unemployment rates: "According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) some 30% of the world's workforce is either unemployed or underemployed in industrial and developing countries taken together".

6.1 Household financial situation (by race and province)

In the light of these economic concerns the attitudes of the respondents to their present economic situation and future prospects were tested. More than half (58%) of the respondents indicated that the financial situations of their households had worsened during the past 12 months. One fifth (21%) said that their situations had remained constant, and for only the remaining one-fifth (20%) had things improved. Significant variations were apparent between the four race groups, however. Whereas the proportions of black and coloured respondents who said that their circumstances had worsened were 55% and 56% respectively, the equivalent statistics for the Indian and white respondents were 71% and 67%. This is not unexpected given the major programmes under way to compensate communities that had been disadvantaged by apartheid. It is a testimony to the efforts of the government that a quarter (25%) of the black respondents were able to say that the financial situations of their households had improved during the last 12 months, in comparison to only 12% of the coloured respondents, 11% of the whites and 7% of the Indians.

Table 19: Change in household financial situation in past 12 months

Nature of change	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Got a lot worse	29	24	20	29	29
Got a little worse	25	32	51	38	29
Stayed the same	20	31	21	21	21
Got a little better	22	10	5	8	17
Got a lot better	3	1	2	3	3
Do not know	1	2	1	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Given the economic climate it is not surprising that almost two-thirds (63%) of the respondents indicated that they were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the financial situations of their households. One in eight (12%) respondents were neither dissatisfied nor satisfied and one in five (22%) were satisfied with their households financial situation. In a country like South Africa, where such extremes of wealth and poverty exist side by side, it is not the experience of poverty *per se* but relative deprivation that is of critical importance in shaping the mindsets and attitudes of South Africans. With this in mind, the respondents were asked how they thought the current financial situation of their households compared with that of other households around the country. More than two in five (43%) felt that it was either a lot worse or a little worse. Just less than a third (29%) thought that their financial situation was about the same, leaving a quarter (25%) who indicated that conditions were either a little better or a lot better. The geographical dimensions of perceptions of comparative levels of wealth are of great importance here. A much higher than average proportion of the respondents in the Northern Province (58%) felt that their financial situation was worse than that of other households in South Africa. Conversely, a far smaller than average proportion of the respondents in the Western Cape (29%) and the Eastern Cape (32%) thought this was the case. Looked at another way, greater proportions of the respondents in North West (31%) and Mpumalanga (31%) thought that they were better off than other South African households, while far fewer thought so in the Northern Cape (7%).

Table 20: Relative household financial situation by province (%)

Comparison	WC	NC	EC	FS	KN	MP	NP	GT	NW	Tot
A lot worse	11	17	15	20	18	18	36	20	10	20
A little worse	18	31	16	24	30	26	22	17	26	23
About the same	44	38	37	23	28	23	20	32	28	29
A little better	17	7	25	25	18	24	19	24	24	21
A lot better	4	0	4	3	4	7	2	4	7	4
Do not know	6	7	3	5	2	2	2	3	5	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Figure 9: Financial situation is worse than that of other households
Available on request

6.2 Effects of government economic policy

In our attempt to gauge overall levels of optimism or pessimism, the respondents were asked to speculate about future economic conditions. The question posed was "How do you think the general economic condition in the country will change during the next twelve months?" The responses were not dissimilar to those to the question about the current situation. Almost half (46%) expected that the situation would deteriorate during the next year (i.e. 1999) (in comparison with only 34% in the HSRC survey of February 1998). One in seven (15%) respondents thought that it would remain the same and only one in three (30%) anticipated an improvement, a small decline from the 32% in the February 1998 survey. Striking differences in the responses to this question emerged when the responses were disaggregated by race. The black respondents had far more optimistic expectations, with more than a third (37%) thinking the economic situation would either get a little or a lot better. A similar level of optimism was evident among the coloured respondents (35%), but this contrasted markedly with the expectations of the Indians (17%) and whites (4%), few of whom thought that things would improve. So widespread was the pessimism among the latter two groups that 63% of the Indians and 81% of the whites thought that conditions would get worse.

The respondents were asked six questions in order to determine their views on the effects of the government's economic policies:

1. During the past 12 months, would you say that the government's policies had a good or bad effect or that they did not make much difference with regard to the financial situation of your household?
2. During the past 12 months, would you say that the government's policies had a good or bad effect or that they did not make much difference with regard to the general economic situation in the country?
3. During the past 12 months, would you say that the government's policies had a good or bad effect or that they did not make much difference with regard to the economic situations of people like you?
4. During the past 12 months, would you say that the government's policies had a good or bad effect or that they did not make much difference with regard to the prospects of people like you getting a job?
5. During the past 12 months, would you say that the government's policies had a good or bad effect or that they did not make much difference with regard to the prices people like you have to pay for the things you buy?
6. During the past 12 months, would you say that the government's policies will have a good or bad effect or that they will not make much difference with regard to the general economic situation of the country?

The patterns in the responses to these questions were similar to those of the preceding ones. The whites tended to respond least positively and blacks most positively, with overall levels of positive sentiment being expressed by less than one in five respondents to all but one of these questions. The exception was the last question, about the future effects of the government's economic policies. In the latter case, almost a quarter (23%) thought that the impact of the policies would be good. This was in line with the responses to a similar question in the February 1998 survey but represented a significant decline in optimism compared to previous surveys. In February 1997, a third (33%) of the respondents were confident that the economy would improve, and in February 1994 almost half (49%) felt this way. Clearly there has been a sharp decline in the levels of expectation concerning future economic conditions in spite of the widely acknowledged sound macro-economic fundamentals prevailing in the country. Strong racial differences in the responses were evident in all the surveys.

These poor perceptions of government economic policy should also be seen in the context of the responses of a sizeable proportion of the respondents (between 20% and 34%), who indicated that the government's policies had not made or will not make much difference to any of the specified situations. Of concern to the government will be the negative response to all six questions by about half of all the respondents, who felt that its policies had had or will have a negative effect.

6.3 The free market versus large-scale state intervention in the economy

In searching for indicators of preferred future economic directions for the country, the respondents were requested to select from two statements the one that came closer to their views on economic interventionism. The statements were:

- A. The government should take a more active role in the economy, because the private sector and market forces are unlikely to solve the complex economic problems of the country.
- B. The government should allow the private sector and market forces to operate more freely because government controls will only make the country's economic problems worse.

Table 21: Perceived effect of government's economic policies

Aspect	Effect	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
On the financial situation of my household	Good	22	4	5	1	15
	Bad	36	46	67	70	44
On general economic situation in the country	Good	22	6	4	3	16
	Bad	37	53	68	83	48
On economic situations of people like me	Good	22	6	5	1	15
	Bad	38	49	60	79	48
On prospects of people like me getting or keeping a job	Good	20	5	8	1	14
	Bad	47	56	86	80	56
On prices people like me have to pay for things we buy	Good	13	2	5	1	9
	Bad	56	76	78	89	65
On future general economic situation in the country	Good	31	13	5	3	23
	Bad	27	41	64	76	40

Statement A outlines a policy advocating a high degree of state intervention in the economy whereas Statement B advocates a freer market policy. Intuitively one would expect that respondents with less access to economic opportunities or with lower levels of education or wealth would be more inclined to opt for Statement A. The opposite would apply to more privileged respondents, who could be expected to select Statement B.

In terms of race, a clear preference for B was evident among the whites, eight out of ten (81%) of whom selected the free market option. Among the other three races, the distinction was not so clear, with between a third and two-thirds opting for either statement in each case.

Table 22: Preference for more or less active government role in the economy

Policy option	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
More active government role in the economy	60	41	66	12	50
Freer operation of private sector and market forces	34	40	34	81	43
Do not know	6	19	0	7	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100

When the responses to this question are cross-tabulated with the political party for which the respondents said they would vote, the pattern is highly illuminating. Each party had a different mix of economic preferences. More than half of the respondents who expressed support for the ANC, SACP, PAC, ACDP and UDM and all of the AZAPO-supporting respondents favoured the intervention of the government in the economy. Most of the respondents who said that they would vote for the DP, IFP, CP and FA were in favour of the free market option, as were those who supported other smaller parties or who did not divulge their voting preference. The single, marked exception was the NP (now NNP), supporters of which were evenly divided between intervention (49%) and the free market (43%). With the exception of the supporters of the FA, fewer than one in ten respondents were in doubt about their preferred economic option.

Table 23: Preferred government role in the economy by party political preference

[illegible]

In order to test the consistency of attitudes towards the role of the government in the economy, the statements about intervention versus the free market were followed by four others relating to taxation, labour movements, affirmative action and foreign business dealings. All of these required responses that would indicate a preference for either intervention or the free market. The respondents were almost equally divided between willingness to pay more tax if this would allow the government to improve services that were important to them personally (48%) and unwillingness to pay more tax even if this meant that the government would not be able to improve services (45%). Disaggregated by race, the whites (72%) and Indians (79%) were twice as likely as the coloureds (35%) and blacks (36%) to be opposed to higher taxation. Three in five (57%) respondents were in favour of a strong and active labour movement in order to defend the interests of the majority of South Africans. This proportion was much higher among the black respondents (69%) than among the whites (13%). Similarly, three in five (62%) thought that people from previously disadvantaged groups should be given preference by employers when they hired and promoted workers. Again, the blacks (76%) were far more in favour of this form of affirmative action than were the whites (9%). There were marginally more respondents against (43%) than in favour (39%) of the government restricting business dealings between South Africans and people in other parts of the world because of the unpredictability of world markets. This opposition was greatest among the whites (68%) and smallest amongst the black respondents (36%).

A factor analysis was performed on the responses to these four sets of statements, together with the initial pair on forms of economy. A single factor emerged and a value for this factor was assigned to each respondent. Almost half (44%) of the loading on this factor came from the first pair of statements (intervention vs free market). It was hypothesized that respondents with lower LSMs would be more inclined to score less on the intervention factor. This was, in fact, not the case. Only a weak positive correlation (0,268 Pearson's correlation significant at the 0,01 level) existed between LSM and preferred degree of intervention. Only among the respondents with the highest LSMs was there a clear majority (77%) opposed to intervention. From this can be inferred that views on state intervention in the economy and standards of living are largely unrelated. Rather, it is race that appears to be the major determinant of economic policy preferences.

Table 24: Preference for government intervention in the economy by LSM

Degree of preference for intervention	Living standard measure							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8 High
LOW	65	77	60	63	65	55	42	23
HIGH	35	23	40	37	35	45	58	77
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Chapter 7

Government performance and service delivery

As indicated in the chapter on democratic consolidation, levels of satisfaction with government performance have declined during the course of its five-year term of office. The current extent and the specific dimensions of this dissatisfaction at national, provincial and local levels are explored in this chapter.

Figure 10: satisfaction with the government, 1994-1999

Available on request

7.1 Satisfaction with the government

The respondents were asked how satisfied they were with the general political situation in South Africa as well as with the way their local area and province and the country were being governed. Table 25 summarizes levels of dissatisfaction with these different dimensions of the polity in each province. The percentages are the totals of those indicating that they were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the dimension of governance specified in each case. It should be of concern to the government that in excess of half of the respondents were satisfied neither with the general political situation in the country nor with the way in which the country was being governed at any of the three levels of government. The geographical variations in the extent of this dissatisfaction give some indication of which provinces were perceived to be enjoying better governance than others. In all dimensions, the respondents in North West were less dissatisfied than their counterparts in the other provinces. It is the only province in which more respondents expressed satisfaction than dissatisfaction at any level. The most extreme levels of dissatisfaction emerged in the Northern Province, where almost three-quarters (73%) of the respondents were dissatisfied with the governance in their local areas, more than two-thirds (69%) with the governance of their province and almost three in five with the national governance. Overall, dissatisfaction with national and provincial governance was at a marginally lower level than dissatisfaction with local governance and with the general political situation. Local authorities should therefore receive the most urgent attention, although other levels are also in need of remedial action.

Table 25: Level of satisfaction with governance in SA by province

Province		WC	NC	EC	FS	KN	MP	NP	GT	NW	Tot
General, political situation	Dissatisfied	59	54	55	45	63	48	59	50	39	55
	Satisfied	23	19	28	44	23	40	28	37	46	31
Local area governance	Dissatisfied	49	61	57	54	53	51	73	53	38	55
	Satisfied	32	20	30	34	32	39	15	34	48	31
Provincial governance	Dissatisfied	49	46	60	43	57	50	69	48	34	53
	Satisfied	27	23	27	46	26	40	22	38	50	32
National governance	Dissatisfied	57	52	47	35	55	44	56	48	30	50
	Satisfied	27	23	41	53	30	46	29	40	59	37

Figure 11: Satisfaction with national governance in South Africa

Available on request

As with other indicators, there was a racial dimension to the levels of satisfaction with different levels of governance. The white and Indian respondents expressed considerably higher levels of dissatisfaction than did the coloureds and especially blacks, for whom dissatisfaction was lower than for any of the other groups. Nevertheless, more than half (54%) of black respondents were dissatisfied with the governance of their local areas and almost one in two (48%) were dissatisfied with the governance of the provinces in which they lived. The only group among whom there were more respondents who were satisfied than dissatisfied at any level was black respondents in relation to national governance. In this instance, 49% were either satisfied or very satisfied with the way South Africa was being governed in comparison with 36% who were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. This may be accounted for by a perceived relative remoteness of national government from the average respondent and therefore its exemption from the critical judgement that would be passed on local and provincial government and their respective more visible deliverables. Local government is responsible for the delivery of municipal services such as water, electricity, sewerage reticulation, rubbish removal and local street maintenance. Provincial government administers education and health services.

Table 26: Levels of satisfaction with governance in SA by race, December 1998

Race		Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
General political situation	Dissatisfied	44	58	82	84	55
	Satisfied	41	21	13	7	31
Local area governance	Dissatisfied	54	54	72	54	55
	Satisfied	34	26	21	26	31
Provincial governance	Dissatisfied	48	52	77	70	53
	Satisfied	40	18	15	13	32
National governance	Dissatisfied	36	54	82	87	50
	Satisfied	49	22	14	6	37

7.2 Trust in the government

An intriguing aspect of the December 1998 survey was that although more than half of the respondents were generally dissatisfied with the political situation and with the different levels of government, there was a relatively high level of trust in the national government. This was highest amongst the blacks (60%) but progressively lower among the coloureds (30%), Indians (19%) and whites (9%). Thus, in spite of the level of dissatisfaction, there is a window of opportunity open to the government to improve on its past performance, on the basis of the high level of trust among the respondents (46%).

Table 27: Levels of trust in national government by race, December 1998

Race	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Strong trust	21	8	2	1	15
Trust	39	22	17	8	31
Neither trust nor distrust	13	23	1	8	12
Distrust	17	26	63	37	24
Strong distrust	7	16	13	44	15
Uncertain/Don't know	3	5	4	2	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Figure 12: Trust in the national government
Available on request

7.3 Service delivery in the provinces

In searching for reasons for levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with government performance it is pertinent to investigate opinions in relation to specific aspects of expected service delivery with a view to focused remedial action. The respondents were questioned specifically on whether there had been an improvement in the delivery of particular services in the areas in which they live. The services were running water, electricity, affordable housing, water borne sewerage disposal, local public libraries, recreational facilities, tarred roads and street drainage, public transport, local police stations, health care and rubbish removal.

On the positive side and a testimony to the substantial inputs made by the government during its initial five-year term of office was the opinion of two in five (41%) respondents that the delivery of electricity in their areas had improved or had improved substantially since 1994. Similarly, a third of the respondents said that the delivery of health care (36%), running water (35%) or public transport (33%) had improved to a similar degree. Roughly one in five respondents also expressed the view that there had been improvements or substantial improvements since 1994 in rubbish removal, tarred roads and street drainage, the delivery of affordable housing, waterborne sewerage disposal, local police stations, local public libraries and recreational facilities.

Certain provinces appear to have fared considerably better than others in service delivery. The highest proportions of respondents in any province that indicated that there had been improvements in five of the eleven specified services (sewerage disposal, local public libraries, recreational facilities, tarred roads, rubbish removal) were in Gauteng. The wealthiest province was thus perceived by many of its residents to have benefited in respect of these services. In respect of the major deliverable services, the Free State was perceived to have benefited most in terms of the delivery of health care, electricity and affordable housing, while Mpumalanga had experienced the most benefits in respect of running water. Public transport was perceived to have improved by the highest proportion of respondents in North West. The Free Staters more than the respondents in the other provinces perceived that local police station delivery had improved.

7.4 Differences in perceptions of service delivery by race

In terms of race, the perceptions of whether or not these services had improved varied considerably. It is evident that the black respondents perceived themselves to be the beneficiaries of improvements in the delivery of every one of the services. This indicates the successful targeting of those who had been most disadvantaged by the inequitable programmes of service delivery under apartheid. In the areas of electricity, water, health care and public transport roughly one out of every two black respondents indicated that delivery had improved or had improved substantially. It appears, however, that the coloured and Indian respondents perceived themselves to have benefited less from the delivery of services. Only one or two in ten coloured or Indian respondents acknowledged an improvement in any of the specified services during the period since the 1994 elections. Among the white respondents it is noteworthy that a small proportion also experienced an improvement in service delivery under the democratic government.

Table 28: Improvement of service delivery since 1994 by province

Service	WC	NC	EC	FS	KN	MP	NP	GT	NW	Tot
Running water	22	35	36	57	28	58	21	42	48	35
Electricity	23	44	46	66	35	61	34	45	46	41
Affordable housing	22	29	25	42	14	29	5	36	18	22
Waterborne sewerage disposal	14	25	22	43	14	27	4	41	18	21
Local public libraries	13	19	19	35	15	13	6	37	15	19
Recreational facilities	17	11	24	21	13	12	2	33	7	17
Tarred roads/Street drainage	24	8	20	27	29	21	7	43	23	25
Public transport	23	16	32	41	36	32	19	42	49	33
Local police stations	18	19	29	32	15	25	11	30	25	21
Health care	21	26	41	52	29	36	30	48	39	36
Rubbish removal	18	31	31	44	23	27	4	53	19	27

Figure 13: Improvement in delivery of running water since 1994*Available on request***Figure 14: Improvement in delivery of electricity since 1994***Available on request***Figure 15: Improvement in delivery of affordable housing since 1994***Available on request***Figure 16: Improvement in delivery of health care since 1994***Available on request***Table 29: Improvement of service delivery since 1994 by race**

Service	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Running water	46	20	10	8	35
Electricity	55	20	11	9	41
Affordable housing	27	20	9	9	22
Waterborne sewerage disposal	29	14	6	3	21
Local public libraries	24	15	5	7	19
Recreational facilities	21	13	6	7	17
Tarred roads/Street drainage	33	20	12	4	25
Public transport	45	26	4	3	33
Local police stations	27	15	3	8	21
Health care	46	24	9	11	36
Rubbish removal	38	15	4	2	27

Of concern is the high proportion of respondents who indicated deterioration in the delivery of the specified eleven types of services. One in three respondents or more perceived that the delivery of health care, affordable housing, tarred roads and street drainage and local police stations had deteriorated since the elections of 1994. This should be a matter of great importance to the government in provinces that are historically known to have been poorer or more deprived than others. The Northern Province falls into this category and it is noteworthy that between four and six out of every ten respondents perceived that no changes had occurred in respect of the delivery of the

eleven services. These levels are substantially higher than the national average across all nine provinces. More specifically, the highest proportions of respondents in any province who saw the delivery of affordable housing, waterborne sewerage disposal, local public libraries, recreational facilities and rubbish removal as having worsened or worsened substantially resided in the Northern Province.

In respect of the other provinces, almost a quarter of the North West respondents said that the delivery of running water and electricity had got worse. The delivery of health care, tarred roads, street drainage and public transport was perceived by the highest proportions of residents in the Northern Cape to have worsened since 1994. Regarding local police stations, four out of ten respondents in four provinces perceived a deterioration in delivery, namely, Gauteng, North West, Northern Province and Mpumalanga. While the improvements in service delivery are indicative of a meeting of targets, reported above, it is clearly counterproductive to neglect the maintenance of existing services. The responses to questions in this regard, when analyzed by race, indicate that the whites and Indians perceived a worsening in the delivery of services to a greater extent than was the case with the other race groups.

Table 30: Service delivery stasis or deterioration by province

Service	Change	WC	NC	EC	FS	KN	MP	NP	GT	NW	Tot
Running water	Same	72	39	59	30	57	37	59	42	27	50
	Worsened	3	12	5	12	15	4	20	16	23	14
Electricity	Same	72	33	45	27	43	27	43	39	29	42
	Worsened	2	16	10	7	22	11	23	16	24	16
Affordable housing	Same	48	31	35	25	49	39	45	24	30	38
	Worsened	24	30	33	27	34	23	47	33	40	35
Waterborne sewerage disposal	Same	72	33	66	32	64	38	49	43	46	53
	Worsened	5	25	11	19	21	20	40	14	30	21
Local public libraries	Same	67	38	44	42	62	37	45	36	39	47
	Worsened	6	19	24	17	22	28	41	17	38	24
Recreational facilities	Same	54	29	51	46	52	39	46	33	40	44
	Worsened	15	34	16	27	32	28	43	24	39	29
Tarred roads & street drainage	Same	51	22	43	36	46	33	45	24	34	38
	Worsened	23	62	36	35	24	43	48	33	41	35
Public transport	Same	45	34	41	40	40	29	43	28	27	36
	Worsened	16	45	18	7	14	27	23	16	17	18
Local police stations	Same	63	47	49	35	55	31	50	28	34	44
	Worsened	16	28	17	29	30	39	39	40	40	33
Health care	Same	40	31	29	30	41	22	48	15	31	32
	Worsened	34	37	29	17	30	36	21	34	29	30
Rubbish removal	Same	62	36	58	33	55	35	43	31	42	45
	Worsened	17	11	10	22	21	17	44	15	33	23

Of concern is that almost every second white respondent indicated a deterioration in the delivery of health care, tarred roads, street drainage and local police stations. Similar proportions of Indian respondents also said that the delivery of affordable housing and recreational facilities had deteriorated. While it may be that the deterioration of these services was marginal and from an initial very high standard, large proportions of these respondents indicated that the worsening in delivery had been substantial. This was especially noticeable in respect of health care among the white respondents, 36% of whom said that this service had deteriorated substantially.

However, this can be juxtaposed against the 45% of blacks who reported an improvement in the delivery of health care, an outcome of the redirection of resources into primary health care for previously disadvantaged communities at the expense of the specialized medical attention to which wealthier, urban communities previously had access. About one in four of the black respondents indicated that the delivery of either waterborne sewerage disposal, local public libraries or rubbish removal had worsened after the 1994 elections. The proportions of other groups that had experienced a deterioration in these particular services were smaller.

Table 31: Service delivery stasis or deterioration by race

Service	Change	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Running water	Same	39	69	66	79	50
	Worsened	15	8	24	10	14
Electricity	Same	27	67	64	76	42
	Worsened	18	10	25	13	16
Affordable housing	Same	38	53	45	28	38
	Worsened	32	23	46	45	35
Waterborne sewerage disposal	Same	42	73	71	77	53
	Worsened	26	8	21	9	21
Local public libraries	Same	41	69	69	53	47
	Worsened	28	5	24	20	24
Recreational facilities	Same	41	60	48	47	44
	Worsened	32	17	43	23	29
Tarred roads & street drainage	Same	35	56	54	39	38
	Worsened	32	23	32	54	35
Public transport	Same	35	57	54	26	36
	Worsened	20	13	39	40	18
Local police stations	Same	42	62	50	39	44
	Worsened	30	20	46	47	33
Health care	Same	33	46	44	20	32
	Worsened	20	28	45	62	30
Rubbish removal	Same	33	69	70	68	45
	Worsened	26	14	24	16	23

Chapter 8

Gender issues

The respondents were asked several questions that elicited opinions on gender-related issues. The differences between the male and female responses to these questions are illuminating. To every question a greater proportion of the women than the men indicated that more attention should be given to the needs and representation of women.

Table 32: Opinions on gender-related issues

Issue	Female	Male	Total
Women's needs are given insufficient priority by government	32	27	30
Women have different priorities in mind when compared to men	31	20	27
Political party manifestos should take gender differences into account	39	28	34
It is important to have women in parliament as members of parliament	84	73	79
A quota for women on party lists for parliament is a good thing	56	41	50
There should be a law to force political parties to adopt a quota system for women's representation	79	68	75
Because of past discrimination women should be given preference over men by employers who are hiring or promoting workers	51	33	43
Have heard of the Commission for Gender Equality (CGE)	36	41	38
The CGE fulfils an important function (respondents who knew about CGE only)	83	73	79

Disaggregated by race, significant differences in opinions on the issue of gender equality were also evident. The white and coloured respondents were less likely to say that the government did not have enough priority to women's needs. The white and Indian respondents were more likely to think that women and men had different priorities. While about a third of the respondents thought that political party manifestos should take gender differences into account, the Indian respondents were more likely to feel this way than other respondents. The majority of the respondents of all races felt that there should be women members of parliament. However, the feelings about quotas for women on political party lists were less unanimous. Whereas half of the black respondents (54%) and three-quarters (78%) of the Indian respondents thought that quotas were a good thing, this was the case with only 43% of the coloureds and 31% of the whites. Nevertheless, higher proportions among the respondents of all races thought that the law should enforce quotas for women on party lists. This approach was least favoured by the whites and most favoured by the Indian and black respondents.

In regard to preferential appointment or promotion of women in the workplace, opinions were sharply divided by race. Again, the Indian and black respondents were most in favour of this, with the coloured and white respondents mainly being opposed to it. Between two and four out of every ten respondents had heard of the CGE, and of these, most of the blacks and Indians and fewer of the whites and coloureds were of the opinion that it fulfilled an important function.

8.2 Perceptions of women's priorities

Clear gender differences exist when it comes to perceptions of women's priorities when voting. Almost one in three (31%) indicated that in comparison with men, women had different priorities in mind when they voted. Conversely, only one in five (21%) of the male respondents subscribed to this view. Disaggregated by race, the whites and Indians (both 38%) were almost twice as likely to think that women had different priorities to men when voting, than the coloureds or blacks (both 23%). No clear relationships between income, age or province and opinions on women's voting priorities were discernible.

The priority when they vote that was mentioned by the largest proportion of the women was their demand for equality and participation in decision making (34%). Other priorities were the issues of family welfare (25%), education (22%) and women's rights (21%). Of slightly less prominence were the need for work and business opportunities (19%), crime prevention (17%) and the need to respect the differences between man and women (17%).

Table 35: Comparison of female and male perceptions of priorities for women when voting

Priority	%female perception	% male perception
Equality/Participation in decision making	34	40
Family welfare	25	28
Education	22	13
Women's rights	21	11
More work/business opportunities	19	15
Crime prevention	17	21
Respect for men/women differences	17	20
Security	14	10
More women involved in politics	13	14
Standard of living	9	7

However, the males perceived women's priorities to be in a somewhat different sequence. Although the issue of equality and participation in decision making was seen as a priority to women voters by both the men and the women, more of the men (40%) thought that women prioritized this need than did the women themselves. Similarly, more of the men thought that women prioritized family welfare, crime prevention and the need to respect the differences between men and women, than was the case. In contrast, the stated priorities of women that were relatively less recognized by the men were education, women's rights and the need for more work or business opportunities. Male politicians should note these differences and especially the issues that the female electorate is prioritizing.

Figure 17: Perceptions of women's priorities by gender

Available on request

The perceived priorities of women also differed according to the race of the respondent. Whereas equality and participation in decision making is the top priority of women voters as seen by the black (43%), the coloured (47%) and the Indian respondents (28%), this was only their third highest priority as seen by the whites (20%). The whites prioritized family welfare (35%) and security issues (30%) above gender equality.

This trend is reinforced by the other major priorities as perceived by the black respondents, namely women's rights (27%) and respect for men/women differences (24%). Relatively few of the Indian and coloured respondents assigned priority to the latter two issues, however (10% and 3% respectively for the "respect" issue; 8% and 5% for the women's rights issues). Disaggregated by age, the issue of equality and participation in decision making was seen as a top priority by four out of every ten respondents aged from 18 and 44, and by a similar proportion (36%) among those in the 55-64 category. In contrast, the largest proportions (34%) of only two age groups (45 to 54 and 65+) named family welfare as the top priority of women.

8.3 Preferential employment of women

The gendered nature of the respondents was most noticeable when it came to the issue of the preferential employment or promotion of females rather than males. Whereas half (51%) of the female respondents were in favour of this form of affirmative action, only a third (33%) of the males agreed. Nevertheless, more than a quarter (28%) of the women disagrees with this form of preferential policy. Racially, far larger proportions of the Indian (57%) and black (52%) respondents were in favour of workplace preference for women than was the case among the coloureds (27%) and whites (13%). This could arguably be accounted for by the lesser prevalence of male dominance among the latter two groups. A strong negative correlation (-0,959 Pearson, significant at the 0,01 level) existed between the income group into which the respondent fell and his/her being in agreement with employer preference for women. Individual access by women to a higher level of income would lessen the need for external intervention on their behalf. Again, the respondents in the relatively wealthy Western Cape (17%) were the only ones to deviate significantly from the national average (43%) in favour of preference for women in the workplace. Fewer older (55 year and above: 31%) than younger (18-24: 51%) respondents agreed that women should be given preference over men by employers in their hiring and promotion policies.

Table 36: Preferential employment or promotion of women by income

	None	R1- R829	R830- R2499	R2500- R4159	R4160- R5829	R5830- R8329	R8330+	Refused or ?	Total
Agree	53	45	41	35	24	13	13	34	42
Disagree	26	33	38	43	57	72	56	36	35
Neither or?	21	22	21	22	19	15	31	30	23
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

8.4 The Commission for Gender Equality

Less than two out of every five (38%) respondents had heard of the Commission of Gender Equality (CGE). This proportion is as low as only 14% in the Northern Cape. Surprisingly, slightly more men (41%) than women (36%) are aware of the CGE. Disaggregated by race, the black (42%) and white (37%) respondents were more likely than the Indian (33%) or coloured (20%) respondents to know about the CGE. Although no clear relationship existed between awareness of the CGE and income level, the second highest income group (R5830-R8329) was more aware (56%) of the CGE than any of the other groups of respondents. In contrast only a quarter (27%) of the respondents earning between R1 and R830 per month knew about the CGE. More younger than older respondents had heard of the CGE.

Table 37: Knowledge of the Commission for Gender Equality

	WC	NC	EC	FS	KN	MP	NP	GT	NW	Total
Yes	31	14	29	50	33	29	47	45	42	38
No	69	86	71	50	67	71	53	55	58	62
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Most respondents (79%) thought that the CGE fulfils an important task. However, more of the women (83%) than male (73%) respondents shared this view, and considerably more of the black (87%) and Indian (77%) respondents than the coloured (62%) or white (47%) respondents. In terms of income levels, four out of every five respondents with incomes of less than R2500 per month thought that the CGE fulfils an important task as opposed to only two out of five in the top income category (R8330+). The CGE would be expected to meet the more extreme needs of lower income households than those of their privileged counterparts. The opinions of people in different provinces on this issue vary from only 53% in the Western Cape to 83% in KwaZulu-Natal and 84% in the Free State, who think that the CGE fulfill an important task. Age and the view that the CGE fulfils an important task are negatively correlated in that the older the age group, the fewer the respondents who held this view.

8.5 Women in Parliament

Although most (79%) respondents thought that to have female members of parliament is necessary, not surprisingly, more women (84%) than men (73%) held this view. Men are more likely than women to think that having women MPs is not important or were unsure about the issue. There were no significant differences between either the different income groups or races in this regard. It should be borne in mind by both genders that more of the female than male respondents were in favour of women MPs.

Table 38: Importance of women in parliament as MPs

Opinion about women in parliament as MPs	%Male	%Female
Important to have women MPs	73	84
Not important to have women MPs	17	11
Unsure	10	5
Total	100	100

Provincially, only in the Northern Province a substantially lower proportion (64%) of respondents than the national average felt that it was important to have women members of parliament. Slightly larger proportions of younger respondents thought that there should be women MPs than their older counterparts (81% in the 18-34 category as opposed to 75% of the over 64s).

Almost two-thirds (63%) of the respondents thought that having women members of parliament had the effect of representing the needs of women. Slightly more of the female than male respondents held this opinion. A larger proportion of blacks (69%) than of the other races (coloureds: 59%; whites: 50%; Indians: 43%) held this opinion. A further one-fifth of all respondents (21%) thought that having women in parliament would change the priorities. About one in six (15%) of the respondents thought that it changed the nature of political debate. The latter two views were more likely to be held by Indians than the other race categories and by respondents who lived in one of the three provinces with large metropolitan settlements, namely Gauteng, the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. Age did not appear to influence opinions on this matter.

Not surprisingly, More of the women (56%) than men (41%) respondents saw the adoption by political parties of a quota for women members of parliament in a positive light. Far more of the Indian (78%) respondents than the other race groups were in favour of a female quota (blacks: 54%, coloureds: 43%, whites: 31%). There was a broad negative correlation between agreement with a quota system and level of income. More respondents with incomes of less than R830 per month (46%) or no income (58%) were in favour of female quotas than those in the highest income categories (23%). Provincial differences ranged from two-thirds (65%) of the respondents who were in favour of quotas in the Free State to only a third (33%) in the Western Cape. More of the younger respondents (54% of the 18-24 group) were in favourably disposed towards women's quotas in parliament than the older respondents (39% of the 65+ group).

[illegible]

Table 40: Support for legalized women’s quotas for political parties by province

[illegible]

Chapter 9

Other sociopolitical issues

9.1 Safety and security

Chapter five of this report outlines the national priorities as perceived by respondents in the December 1998 HRSC survey. It emerges that four out of ten respondents would like to see a change in the level of crime prevention and 41% of the respondents see this as the top national priority for the government during the next 10 years. In view of the perceived serious levels of crime prevailing in the country at the time of the survey in December 1998, respondents were asked three questions in regard to their own safety and their perceptions about the government's control of the crime situation. Not unexpectedly, one out of every two respondents indicated that they think South Africa is not a safe country to live in, that they do not feel personally safe on most days and that they perceive the government to have no control at all over the crime situation in the country.

Disaggregated by province, the only part of the country where opinions were more positive was the North West, where about a quarter of the respondents thought that South Africa and they themselves were not safe and one third thought that the government had no control over crime. The North West and Free State were the only provinces where more respondents felt that South Africa was a safe country to live in (60% and 48% respectively) than those who did not (27% and 43%). The question about personal safety was more relevant in that it took personal experiences into account rather than the broader perceptions of the national situation. In this instance, more respondents in the North West (69%) and the Western Cape (52%) felt personally safe on most days than did not (23% and 41% respectively) and in the Free State the proportions of respondents who felt safe and unsafe were equal (45%) each, with the remaining one out of ten respondents who felt neither safe nor unsafe. The lower levels of the incidence of crime in these provinces, whether actual or only perceived, are worth greater investigation in order to allay the serious levels of negative opinion in the rest of the country.

Table 41: Perceptions of safety and the control of crime by province

Service	Change	WC	NC	EC	FS	KN	MP	NP	GT	NW	Tot
% views on living in South Africa	Unsafe	53	58	51	43	54	48	58	58	27	52
	Safe	35	24	39	48	35	47	35	34	60	39
% views on daily personal safety	Unsafe	41	47	44	45	55	44	59	53	23	49
	Safe	52	46	49	45	36	50	34	36	69	43
% views on government control over crime situation	No control	68	62	54	46	46	50	54	51	34	51
	Some control	28	28	41	40	51	35	35	41	58	41
	Full control	2	4	2	12	2	10	7	7	7	5

Perceptions of the respondents with regard to safety and crime prevention differed significantly by race. Whereas nine out of ten whites and eight out of ten Indians felt that South Africa was not a safe country to live in and that the government had no control over the crime situation, only four out of ten blacks and five out of six out of ten coloureds shared this view. The Indian respondents indicated that they feel personally unsafe (31%) or very unsafe (44%) on most days. Only four to six respondents from the other three groups shared this feeling.

Table 42: Perceptions of safety and the control of crime by race

Race		Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
% of views on living in South Africa	Unsafe	42	52	76	85	52
	Safe	49	37	13	9	39
% views on daily personal safety	Unsafe	44	43	75	63	49
	Safe	48	49	17	27	43
% views on government control over crime situation	No control	37	64	79	88	51
	Some control	53	31	19	11	41
	Full control	7	2	0	0	5

9.2 Race relations

In the aftermath of apartheid, one of the critical factors in the achievement of national reconciliation is an improvement in race relations. Respondents were questioned about their perceptions of the extent to which race relations in South Africa had changed since the elections in April 1994. A very promising finding of this survey is that four out of ten respondents felt that race relations had improved and that there was less racial tension against them. A further three out of ten indicated that these aspects had remained the same and two or three out of ten perceived that circumstances to be worse. It is illuminating that larger proportions of the black respondents than the coloured, the Indian or the white respondents perceived race relations as having improved personally and in general. Six out of ten white respondents and five out of ten Indian respondents felt that race relations on a general as well as a personal level had deteriorated since April 1994. Of further interest is that considerably more white and Indian (25% in each case) respondents felt that race relations in the country had improved than thought that racial tension against them had reduced.

Table 43: Perceptions of race relations in South Africa since 1994 by race

Nature of changes perceived		Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Race relations in the country	Improved	46	39	25	25	40
	Remained the same	36	40	25	15	32
	Deteriorated	14	20	48	57	24
Racial tension against people like you	Became better	46	35	15	15	38
	Stayed the same	33	49	33	26	33
	Became worse	16	13	51	58	26

Figure 18: Race relations since 1994 according to respondents of each race

Available on request

Table 44: Perceptions of race relations in South Africa since 1994 by province

Changes perceived		WC	NC	EC	FS	KN	MP	NP	GT	NW	Tot
Race relations in the country	Improved	44	15	43	46	39	38	21	48	64	40
	Te same	33	41	33	21	34	32	38	30	16	32
	Deteriorated	21	40	21	29	24	25	32	22	18	24
Racial tension against people like you	Became better	37	14	40	43	34	39	23	45	63	38
	The same	45	44	36	25	38	27	35	29	19	33
	Worsened	16	39	21	29	27	31	33	25	16	26

The pattern that emerges provincially is that perceptions of an improvement in race relations and a reduction of racial tension are stronger in some parts of the country than in others. Noteworthy is the North West, where almost two-thirds of respondents expressed positive evaluations of the situation. In Gauteng and the Free State less than half of the respondents felt that race relations had improved and that racial tension had lessened. In contrast, there were stronger perceptions that the situation had either remained the same or deteriorated among the respondents in the Northern Cape and Northern Cape (between three and four out of ten) than those in any of the other provinces.

9.3 Government corruption

Respondents were asked whether the government is giving sufficient priority to ensuring clean and honest government. Almost half (44%) felt that the government is not doing enough, three in ten (29%) said that the matter was receiving sufficient priority, 13% felt that it was given too high a priority and 14% were uncertain or did not know. Marked differences existed in the way this issue was perceived by the different races. Whereas only one third (33%) of the black respondents felt that the government was not giving enough attention to the prevention of corruption, three-quarters of the white (77%) respondents shared this feeling. Overall in terms of gender, more males (48%) than (41%) thought that the government gives the matter too low a priority.

Table 45: Priority given to ensuring clean conduct by public officials by race

	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Too high a priority	17	5	6	3	13
Sufficient priority	37	17	27	8	29
Too low a priority	33	48	64	77	44
Uncertain/Don't know	13	30	3	12	14
total	100	100	100	100	100

Whereas the proportions of respondents in most parts of the country who felt that insufficient priority is given to the corruption issue, two provinces stand out at opposite extremes. Respondents in the North West were most positive, only one quarter (24%) thought that the government did not do enough about corruption, while three out of five (60%) respondents in the Northern Cape felt this way.

Table 46: Priority given to ensuring clean conduct by public officials by province

Anti-corruption priority	WC	NC	EC	FS	KN	MP	NP	GT	NW	Tot
Too high a priority	6	7	13	13	7	10	9	18	32	13
Sufficient priority	18	8	28	33	47	22	20	27	30	29
Too low a priority	48	60	43	40	41	44	52	47	24	44
Uncertain or ?	28	25	16	14	5	24	19	8	14	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

9.4 Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The activities of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) generated much publicity during the term of office of the first democratically elected government. Opinions on its value were tested in the December 1998 survey. The question asked was "Do you think that the TRC has been a good thing or a bad thing for the country?"

Race and language were good determinants of responses and more than half (51%) of the black respondents indicated that it was a “very good thing” for the country as opposed to only 18% of the Indian, 17% of the coloured and 3% of the white respondents. At the other extreme, the TRC was thought to be a bad or very bad thing by 12% of the black, 22% of the coloured, 51% of the Indian and 72% of the white respondents. Afrikaans-speaking white respondents were more likely to say that it was a “very bad thing” (46%) than English-speaking white respondents (25%). Overall, the female respondents were marginally more likely (59%) to say that the TRC was a good or very good thing for the country than were their male counterparts (56%). Respondents aged less than 30 years were more likely (66%) to feel positive about the TRC than those aged 30 or more (54%). This pattern was similar across all races except for the Indian respondents, in which case older respondents were more positive than younger ones.

Table 47: Perceptions of the TRC by race

Race	Very good	Good	Neutral	Bad	Very bad	Don't know
Black	51	21	9	6	6	6
Coloured	17	27	21	12	10	13
Indian	18	22	4	28	23	5
White	3	12	10	17	55	3
Total	37	20	10	10	17	6

9.5 SANDF in Lesotho

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) participated in a task force of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) that intervened in the Lesotho political crisis during 1998. This action gave rise to adverse publicity for the SANDF from various quarters. With a view to determining the extent of such sentiment, respondents were asked whether or not they supported the military intervention. Opinions were almost evenly divided between those in favour of the intervention (40%) and those against it (38%). About one in ten (11%) respondents were neutral on the issue and a further one in ten (11%) did not express an opinion. Geographically, support for the intervention was strongest amongst respondents living in the North West (54%), the Free State (48%) and KwaZulu-Natal (47%). The latter two provinces are situated immediately adjacent to Lesotho and would have been most likely to be exposed to the military activities that occurred. A sharp divide in opinion emerged between the races, with more than half (52%) of the black respondents supporting the intervention as opposed to 41% of the Indian, only 13% of the coloured and 12% of the white respondents. Of the seven largest language groups, speakers of Sesotho were most likely to “strongly support” the intervention (52%) as opposed to only 31% of isiZulu-speakers, 26% of isiXhosa-speakers and as few as 16% of English-speakers or 6% of Afrikaans-speakers. In contrast, higher proportions of the other groups were strongly supportive of the SANDF intervention in Lesotho. These included speakers of Xitsonga (58%), isiSwati (62%), isiNdebele (54%) and Tshivenda (53%).

Younger respondents were more supportive of the intervention than older ones. Between four and five out of ten respondents aged less than 45 years expressed support, as opposed to less than three out of ten respondents aged 45 or more.

Similarly, respondents with lower levels of income tended to support the intervention and those with high incomes opposed it. Whereas four or more out of ten with incomes below R2500 per month support the intervention, only 9% of those with incomes in excess of R8330 support it. There was no significant difference between the responses of males and females on this issue.

Table 48: Opinion of SANDF intervention in Lesotho by home language

Home language	Strongly support	Support	Neutral	Oppose	Strongly oppose	Uncertain Don't know
IsiZulu	31	21	12	16	10	10
IsiXhosa	26	20	10	16	16	12
Afrikaans	6	8	14	19	38	16
Sepedi	28	11	19	14	16	12
English	16	8	7	32	28	9
Setswana	29	30	11	12	10	8
Sesotho	52	15	1	13	14	6
Xitsonga	58	16	13	5	7	0
Siswati	62	8	1	14	7	7
Tshivenda	53	11	4	14	3	15
IsiNdebele	54	7	0	18	11	11
Total	26	14	11	18	19	11

Chapter 10

Conclusions

This report has demonstrated the utility of maintaining a database of contemporary public opinion on socio-political and economic issues in South Africa. Changes in the levels of popular support for the majority party and the various opposition parties have been monitored. The data collected can be used to provide a broad indication of the likely outcome of the June 1999 elections. The widespread acceptance of democratic government has also been shown, in spite of differential degrees of importance being ascribed to specific tenets of liberal democracy such as freedom of expression and the control of information.

Analysis of the national priorities as perceived by the electorate has highlighted the need to address the primary issues of crime prevention and job creation. The survey has also revealed varying perspectives on the extent to which the government should intervene in the national economy.

The delivery of services such as running water, electricity, health care and affordable housing is perceived to have improved since 1994 in certain parts of the country to a greater extent than in others. In many instances residents of the North West are more satisfied with service delivery than their counterparts in the rest of South Africa. The opposite is true in respect of the Northern Province.

Whereas most South Africans now have very negative perceptions about the safety of life in this country, significant numbers say that race relations have improved and that racial tension has decreased since 1994. Cleavages of opinion about how to deal with issues of gender inequality exist along racial and income lines. Black people and people who have low incomes are more in favour of employment practices that favour women than are wealthier or white people.

A large proportion of the population think that insufficient priority is given to eliminating corruption in government. Opinions are divided along racial lines about the benefits of the TRC and the SANDF intervention in Lesotho. In both instances, blacks respond more positively than whites.

As this report is going to press, the results of the March 1999 survey have become available. Some of these have been incorporated into this report. The rest will form the basis of a subsequent series of analyses that will be published after the June 1999 elections.

Appendix 1: Weighted biographical features of the December 1998 sample

Race	% of adult population
<i>African</i>	67,0
<i>White</i>	18,3
<i>Coloured</i>	9,6
<i>Indian</i>	5,1
Total sample	100,0

Province	% of adult population
<i>Western Cape</i>	9,6
<i>Northern Cape</i>	2,1
<i>Eastern Cape</i>	9,2
<i>Free State</i>	3,5
<i>KwaZulu-Natal</i>	20,5
<i>Mpumalanga</i>	7,4
<i>Northern Province</i>	17,7
<i>Gauteng</i>	22,1
<i>North West</i>	8,0
Total sample	100,1

Socio-economic category	% of adult population
<i>Rural areas in former self-governing and TBVC areas</i>	31,7
<i>Informal settlements in urban areas (metro and non-metro) previously reserved for African, Indian or coloured people</i>	6,3
<i>Hostels, hotels: urban metropolitan and non-metropolitan</i>	5,6
<i>Former coloured townships: metropolitan and non-metropolitan</i>	8,9
<i>Former Indian townships: metropolitan and non-metropolitan</i>	3,6
<i>Former African townships: metropolitan and non-metropolitan</i>	20,4
<i>Non-metropolitan urban areas previously reserved for white people</i>	4,4
<i>Metropolitan urban areas previously reserved for white people</i>	10,9
<i>Rural areas excluding the former self-governing and TBVC states</i>	8,2
Total sample	100,0

Gender	% of adult population
<i>Male</i>	44,4
<i>Female</i>	55,6
Total sample	100,0

Age	% of adult population
<i>18 – 24 years</i>	17,1
<i>25 – 34 years</i>	22,1
<i>35 – 44 years</i>	23,2
<i>45 – 54 years</i>	14,3
<i>55 – 64 years</i>	11,5
<i>65 + years</i>	11,8
Total sample	100,0

Most important source for news	
<i>Television</i>	33,8
<i>Radio</i>	53,8
<i>Newspapers</i>	9,3
<i>Do not know</i>	3,1
Total sample	100,0

Access to regular telephone at home for personal use	% of adult population
<i>Yes</i>	37,7
<i>No</i>	62,3
Total sample	100,0

Access to regular cell phone at home for personal use	% of adult population
<i>Yes</i>	11,1
<i>No</i>	88,9
Total sample	100,0

Marital status	% of adult population
<i>Civil marriage with child/ren</i>	28,4
<i>Civil marriage without child/ren</i>	4,5
<i>Traditional marriage with child/ren</i>	11,4
<i>Traditional marriage without child/ren</i>	0,7
<i>Civil and tradition marriage with child/ren</i>	5,8
<i>Civil and tradition marriage without child/ren</i>	0,4
<i>Betrothed with child/ren</i>	1,1
<i>Betrothed without child/ren</i>	0,3
<i>Living together with child/ren</i>	1,8
<i>Living together without child/ren</i>	0,7
<i>Divorced with child/ren</i>	3,1
<i>Divorced without child/ren</i>	0,7
<i>Widowed with child/ren</i>	8,0
<i>Widowed without child/ren</i>	0,6
<i>Never married with child/ren</i>	14,3
<i>Never married without child/ren</i>	18,2
<i>Other</i>	0,1
Total sample	100,1

Do you have a personal computer in your home?	% of adult population
<i>Yes</i>	9,4
<i>No</i>	90,6
Total sample	100,0

Language spoken mostly at home	% of adult population
<i>Afrikaans</i>	19,6
<i>IsiZulu</i>	18,4
<i>Sepedi</i>	15,2
<i>English</i>	13,8
<i>Setswana</i>	9,1
<i>IsiXhosa</i>	9,0
<i>Sesotho</i>	6,7
<i>Xitsonga</i>	2,3
<i>SiSwati</i>	2,0
<i>TshiVenda or Lemba</i>	2,0
<i>IsiNdebele</i>	1,3
<i>European language</i>	0,6
<i>Oriental language</i>	0,0
<i>Other African language</i>	0,0
Total sample	100,0

Educational qualification	% of adult population
<i>None</i>	10,0
<i>Grade 1 or Grade 2</i>	1,5
<i>Grade 3</i>	1,9
<i>Grade 4</i>	3,1
<i>Grade 5</i>	3,3
<i>Grade 6</i>	3,9
<i>Grade 7</i>	7,8
<i>Grade 8</i>	8,9
<i>Grade 9</i>	5,3
<i>Grade 10</i>	12,6
<i>Grade 11</i>	9,4
<i>Grade 12</i>	18,3
<i>Grade 12 plus college diploma</i>	6,8
<i>Technikon diploma</i>	2,7
<i>Technikon higher diploma</i>	0,7
<i>Bachelor's or Honours degree</i>	3,2
<i>Master's diploma</i>	0,1
<i>Master's degree</i>	0,5
<i>Doctoral degree</i>	0,1
<i>Other</i>	0,1
Total sample	100,2

Current employment status	% of adult population
<i>Housewife not looking for work</i>	11,3
<i>Housewife looking for work</i>	4,5
<i>Informal sector</i>	0,6
<i>Informal sector looking for work</i>	0,9
<i>Pensioner</i>	16,5
<i>Student</i>	8,8
<i>Self-employed full time</i>	5,5
<i>Self-employed part-time</i>	2,3
<i>Employed part time</i>	3,2
<i>Employed full time</i>	22,9
<i>Subsistence farming</i>	0,9
<i>Unemployed</i>	4,3
<i>Unemployed looking for work</i>	18,0
<i>Other</i>	0,2
Total sample	99,9

Average household monthly income	% of adult population
<i>None</i>	3,2
<i>R1 – R39</i>	0,5
<i>R40 – R59</i>	0,0
<i>R60 – R79</i>	0,3
<i>R80 – R119</i>	0,8
<i>R120 – R159</i>	1,2
<i>R160 – R249</i>	1,7
<i>R250 – R419</i>	4,1
<i>R420 – R579</i>	9,1
<i>R580 – R829</i>	5,8
<i>R830 – R1249</i>	10,2
<i>R1250 – R1659</i>	9,6
<i>R1660 – R2499</i>	8,7
<i>R2500 – R4159</i>	10,6
<i>R4160 – R5829</i>	4,9
<i>R5830 – R8329</i>	5,1
<i>R8330 – R124999</i>	3,8
<i>R125000 – R16659</i>	2,8
<i>R16660 – R24999</i>	1,5
<i>R25000 – R41659</i>	0,5
<i>R41660 +</i>	0,6
<i>Refused to answer</i>	8,3
<i>Uncertain/Don't know</i>	6,8
Total sample	100,1

Which church do you belong to	% of adult population
<i>Uncertain</i>	0,9
<i>Afrikaanse Protestantse Kerk</i>	0,7
<i>African Methodist Episcopal Church</i>	1,1
<i>Anglican Church of the Province of Southern Africa</i>	4,7
<i>Church of England</i>	1,1
<i>Apostolic Faith Mission of South Africa</i>	5,4
<i>Assemblies of God</i>	1,1
<i>Baptist Church</i>	1,9
<i>Buddhist</i>	0,0
<i>Ethiopian churches</i>	0,5
<i>Full Gospel Church of God in South Africa</i>	1,2
<i>Reformed churches of South Africa</i>	2,1
<i>Hindu</i>	3,2
<i>Islam</i>	1,9
<i>Jehovah's Witnesses</i>	0,7
<i>Lutheran and Evangelical Lutheran Church in South Africa</i>	5,1
<i>Methodist Church of South Africa/Wesleyan Church</i>	7,0
<i>Moravian Assemblies of God</i>	0,2
<i>Nederduitse Hervormde Kerk</i>	1,0
<i>Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk</i>	5,7
<i>New Apostolic Church</i>	1,3
<i>Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in Afrika</i>	2,9
<i>Nederduitse Gereformeerde SendingKerk</i>	2,1
<i>NGK</i>	2,5
<i>Old Apostolic Church</i>	0,0
<i>Orthodox (Greek, Serbian, Russian)</i>	2,0
<i>Presbyterian Church of South Africa</i>	2,0
<i>Reformed Ecumenical Synod</i>	0,1
<i>Rhema Bible Church</i>	0,6
<i>Roman Catholic Church</i>	7,3
<i>Seventh Day Adventist Church</i>	0,7
<i>Shembe</i>	0,4
<i>International Fellowship of Christian Churches</i>	0,0
<i>Traditional African Beliefs</i>	0,3
<i>Union of Orthodox Synagogues in South Africa</i>	0,0
<i>United Congregational Church of South Africa</i>	0,8
<i>World Alliance of Reformed Churches</i>	0,1
<i>Zion Christian Church</i>	10,7
<i>Other Zionist churches</i>	4,0
<i>Other Black Independent Churches</i>	2,3
<i>None</i>	10,4
<i>Refused to answer</i>	0,6
<i>Other religions</i>	3,1
Total sample	99,9