SASAS

South African Social Attitudes

Changing Times, Diverse Voices

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HSRC PRESS

Published by HSRC Press
Private Bag X9182, Cape Town, 8000, South Africa
www.hsrcpress.ac.za

First published 2006

ISBN 0-7969-2117-2

Copy editing by Karen Press
Typeset by Jenny Wheeldon
Cover design by Farm Design
Print management by comPress

Distributed in Africa by Blue Weaver
Specialist Publishers Representatives
PO Box 30370, Tokai, Cape Town, 7966, South Africa
Tel: +27 (0) 21 701-4477
Fax: +27 (0) 21 701-7302
email: orders@blueweaver.co.za
www.oneworldbooks.com

Distributed in Europe and the United Kingdom by Eurospan Distribution Services (EDS)
3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, WC2E 8LU, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7240 0856
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7379 0609
email: orders@edspubs.co.uk
www.eurospanonline.com

Distributed in North America by Independent Publishers Group (IPG)
Order Department, 814 North Franklin Street, Chicago, IL 60610, USA
Call toll-free: (800) 888 4741
All other enquiries: +1 (312) 337 0747
Fax: +1 (312) 337 5985
email: frontdesk@ipgbook.com
www.ipgbook.com

Contents

List of tables

List of figures

Acknowledgements

The South African Social Attitudes Survey series is fundamentally a collective effort, involving a wide number of individuals who fulfil a range of roles and bring to the project a wealth of different capabilities. Although not an exhaustive list, we wish to extend our thanks to the following people who in various ways have participated in and helped shape this study.

- We wish to express our heartfelt gratitude to the anonymous 4 980 South Africans who so generously gave of their time to participate in the 2003 round of our survey.
- Thanks are also due to the members of staff from various research programmes in the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) who participated in the formative workshops and planning meetings of this study.
- Professor Roger Jowell, of the Centre for Comparative Social Surveys (City University, London), was a fountain of knowledge and a constant source of support and guidance during the survey. We are ever grateful for the comparative insight that he so willingly shared from his experience in managing the British Social Attitudes and European Social Surveys.
- We also received very insightful counsel and recommendations on general analysis from the former CEO and president of the HSRC, Dr Mark Orkin. His continued support for this endeavour over the last three years has been extraordinary.
- For detailed and enormously useful comments on earlier drafts, we are extremely grateful to two anonymous reviewers, as well as the editorial advice provided by Dr John Daniel, Inga Norenius, Karen Press and Louise Torr. The structure and content have substantially benefited from this review process. Thanks are also due to Cathy Connolly of the Medical Research Council for providing statistical advice.

The core team of researchers, who spent innumerable hours designing, directing and reporting on the study, was in turn ably supported by a number of complementary teams, each of which played an indispensable role in bringing the survey to fruition. Our thanks go out to the following:

- the sampling team, who developed and implemented the sampling strategy based upon the HSRC's Master Sample, in addition to producing the maps that guided the fieldwork process. In this regard, a debt of gratitude is owed to Professor David Stoker, Dr Khangelani Zuma and Dr Mbithi wa Kivilu, together with Craig Schwabe and Johann Fenske from the Geographical Information Systems unit;
- Zakes Langa and Bongiwe Mncwango of the translation team, for ensuring that we dispensed with unnecessary jargon and achieved conceptual equivalence in the different official languages;

- members of the fieldwork team, including both the fieldworkers and their supervisors, whose responsibility it was to ensure that all the interviewing got done;
- our administrative staff, who played an invaluable role in compiling, organising and distributing the survey's extensive documentation. A special word of thanks goes to Annemarie Booysens, who in sickness and in health, and through thick and thin, has remained wedded to this study; and
- thanks are also due to the data management team, consisting of Monica Peret, Anneke Jordaan and Ann Coetzer, who tirelessly carried out our data processing and cleaning.

Acronyms and abbreviations

ACDP	African Christian Democratic Party
ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
BEE	black economic empowerment
DA	Democratic Alliance
DoE	Department of Education
DP	Democratic Party
DPLG	Department of Provincial and Local Government
DWAF	Department of Water Affairs and Forestry
EA	enumerator area
EPOP	Evaluation of Public Opinions Programme
ETT	Electoral Task Team
FF+	Freedom Front Plus
GCIS	Government Communication and Information System
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
GHS	General Household Survey
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
HDI	Human Development Index
HRC	Human Rights Commission
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
ID	Independent Democrats
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
ISSP	International Social Survey Programme
MF	Minority Front
MPCC	Multi-purpose Community Centre
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NI	national identity
NNP	New National Party
NP	National Party
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PCAS	Policy Coordination and Advisory Services unit, Office of the President
PRAESA	Project for the Study of Alternative Education in South Africa
PSU	primary sampling unit
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SABSSM	The Nelson Mandela/HSRC South African HIV/AIDS behavioural risks, sero-status and media impact survey
SADC	South African Development Community
SADHS	South African Demographic and Health Survey
SAHRC	South African Human Rights Commission

SALDRU	Southern African Labour and Development Research Unit
SANCO	South African National Civics Organisation
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SASAS	South African Social Attitudes Survey
SES	socio-economic status
SMME	small, medium and micro enterprises
SSU	secondary sampling unit
STI	sexually transmitted infections
UCDP	United Christian Democratic Party
UDM	United Democratic Movement

Provinces of South Africa

EC	Eastern Cape
FS	Free State
GT	Gauteng
KZN	KwaZulu-Natal
LP	Limpopo
MP	Mpumalanga
NC	Northern Cape
NW	North West
WC	Western Cape

Neighbouring countries

Bot	Botswana
Les	Lesotho
Mal	Malawi
Moz	Mozambique
Nam	Namibia
Tanz	Tanzania
Zam	Zambia

Note: Names of South African population groups

During the apartheid regime, legislation divided the South African populace into four distinct population groups based on racial classification. Although the notion of population groups is now legal history, it is not always possible to guage the effects of past discriminatory practices, and the progress of policies designed to eradicate them, without reference to it. For this reason, the HSRC continues to use the terms black African, coloured, white or Indian/Asian people where it is pertinent to the analysis of data.

1 *Introduction*

Udesh Pillay

Overview

The peaceful and rapid transformation of South Africa from an authoritarian, apartheid regime to an open, non-racial democracy within less than a decade was as unpredictable as it was inspiring. As we celebrate ten years of democracy, critical reflection on how this process unfolded becomes paramount for our endeavours to sustain its momentum. The lessons of the last ten years provide useful and illuminating insights that allow one to (re)engage in policy debate and interrogate the discourse on democracy and development, in the interests of making South Africa a better place for all, a process President Mbeki (2004) describes as:

> [moving] our country forward decisively towards the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment… [and] taking care to enhance the process of social cohesion; [and achieving] further and visible advances with regard to the improvement of the quality of life of all our people, affecting many critical areas of social existence, including health, safety and security, moral regeneration, social cohesion, opening the doors of culture and education to all and sport and recreation.

As we embrace a second decade of democracy, it becomes necessary to draw on a range of experiences, a plethora of policy interventions, a great deal of legislation, and much scholarly analysis, including public-opinion research, in order to make sense of our recent past and, indeed, help shape our short-term future.

Prospects for consolidating democracy in South Africa, and attempts to address the country's uncertain economic fortunes, depend largely on three critical factors: the ability of government to make informed decisions and strategic interventions based on the principles of good governance and sound policy; the willingness and determination of the stakeholder community, including political parties, civil society organisations and the private sector, to provide the checks and balances required to maintain and nurture a constitutionally-enshrined democratic dispensation; and the ability of the research community to produce research, either self-generated or commissioned, that provides penetrative and textured accounts of the multifaceted nature of our society.

The compilation which follows, based on the gathering of information about the South African public's attitudes, beliefs, behaviour patterns and values, and measuring specific attitudes and opinions on democracy and governance, poverty,

social identity, service delivery, and other important moral issues of the day, is an illustration of this last factor. The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) has pioneered research on social attitudes in South Africa, both in recognition of the paucity of such research in the past and as an indication of its value for our present society. Underscoring the significance of such research, Habib (2002: 8) has concluded that:

> …knowledge about citizens' perceptions is crucial not only to inform government officials about what the citizenry thinks of their performance and policies, but… it enables researchers and scholars to make continuous assessments of citizens' attitudes which constitutes one of the structural conditions for democratic sustainability.

Further amplifying the value of such research, Carlson (1975, cited in Osborne and Rose 2000: 373) notes that:

> …always the opinions of relatively small publics have been a prime force in political life, but now, for the first time in history, we are confronted everywhere by mass opinion as the *final determinant* [emphasis added] of political and economic action. Today, public opinion and attitudes operate in quite new dimensions and with new intensities; its surging impact upon events becomes characteristic of the current age – and its ruin or salvation.

As a result, opinion polls and attitude surveys are now widely used by a number of different participants in the political process. Political parties have commissioned surveys to frame their election campaigns, think tanks and interest groups consult survey results regularly in order to propose feasible policy solutions, while governments around the world have used opinion polls to mobilise and maintain support (Rothmayr and Hardmeier 2002: 124). In a similar vein, legislators and their staff have utilised survey results for guidance in their own efforts to bring opinion in line with the policy initiatives they intend to support (Gandy 2003).

Over the past decade, however, the most notable contributions to the fields of attitudinal and public opinion research have been predominantly concerned with the extent to which policy decisions are consistent with the preferences, values and attitudes of the general public (Monroe 1998: 6). Based on the tenets of normative democratic theory, which propose that a democratic government's responsiveness towards its citizens should be substantive and not merely extend to those periods leading up to elections, research on the impact of opinion polls and attitude surveys has been concerned largely with the extent to which public attitudes and preferences influence public policy; how often and to what purpose governments use such survey results; and the manner in which the survey results are integrated into political decision-making (Rothmayr and Hardmeier 2002: 124). Dyadic analysis has shown that the behaviour of 'individual decision makers is correlated with some kind of measure of public preference or attitude of his/her

constituency', while collective analyses have disaggregated national surveys to the level of the state in order to estimate the distribution of public opinion for states and other units (Monroe 1998: 6). Some studies have attempted to measure the consistency between the opinions and attitudes of the mass public on specific issues and the enacted policy, while others have been primarily concerned with the congruence between the changes in public opinion and the changes in policy (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994: 9). Still others have measured the extent to which '"dynamic representation" is present where political actors are alert to shifts in public opinion and adjust their behaviours accordingly' (Burstein 1998: 36). As Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson (1995, as cited in Burstein 1998: 119) write:

> We propose that public opinion moves meaningfully over time, that government officials sense this movement, and that… those officials alter their behaviour in response to this sensed movement. This is dynamic representation, a simple idea and an old one. Public sentiment shifts. Political actors sense this shift. And then they alter their policy behaviours at the margin.

Although the current volume is not (primarily) concerned with examining the extent to which public opinion and attitudes in South Africa are consistent or congruent with policy outcomes, these arguments serve to illustrate the extent to which public policy is rooted in the larger framework of societal attitudes and the realities that frame such attitudes, and highlight the importance of rigorous analysis and interpretation of such attitudinal data. In the South African case, such analysis and interpretation of attitudinal data are becoming increasingly important as we begin to embrace the second decade of democracy and the resultant social, political and economic transformations that accompany it. Of particular relevance to the field of attitudinal research in South Africa is the changing nature of public policy formulation and implementation since 1994. With the overwhelming victory of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994, the South African government was provided with a number of 'macro-windows' for policy renewal, which resulted in a period of extreme policy renewal in the country (Keeler 1993 as cited in Booysen and Erasmus 2001: 241). By 2000, however, the focus had shifted towards the introduction of fresh policy initiatives and a determination to broaden the concept of the South African democracy to include a requirement that it produce 'socially responsible policy outputs' (Booysen and Erasmus 2001: 242). But limited state capacity and a number of policy constraints have resulted in the incremental implementation of policy in South Africa. Bekker (1996) highlights a number of constraints on policy formulation and implementation in South Africa, which point to the importance of rigorous public attitude research in order to address these constraints. Many of these constraints are deeply grounded in the societal attitudes inherited from both the apartheid era and the transition to democratic rule. As an example, the nature of the South African transition created a situation in which newly-employed civil servants worked alongside those whose employment had

commenced under the previous regime, resulting in a clash between 'new' values and 'old' experience or expertise. Attitudinal research in South Africa is ideally placed to address this clash, and to provide South African policy-makers with viable policy options.

The 'forum movement', established at the onset of democratic rule, was based on the expectation that public policy should bear civil society's stamp of approval, but research has shown that it is often the less needy who utilise opportunities for public participation in South Africa. Public opinion and attitudinal research in South Africa is therefore able to provide policy-makers with insights into the values and attitudes of a broader range of South Africans, thereby indirectly extending the role of the 'public' in shaping policy.

According to Bekker (1996: 244), 'the evolution of new public policy in South Africa is also dictated by cultural imperatives'. One main cultural current in South Africa promotes a new form of nationhood, which is based on territory rather than cultural uniqueness; the other claims the right to 'celebrate cultural uniqueness'. Racial consciousness, in a culturally plural society like South Africa, complicates policy development. The policy directive for the South African government is to build a single nation whilst enabling different cultures to express themselves. By the turn of the century, this nation-building imperative was frustrated by continuing (and often growing) socio-economic discrepancies between black and white people, despite the rapid growth of the new black middle class and a range of poverty-alleviation and economic-growth strategies. The 'two nations' debate subsequently replaced 'rainbowism' as a comparative framework within which to address the causes of the problem of persistent inequality. Because of the emotional weight of the debate, and mobilisation by the opposition parties to the right of the ANC, it became difficult to translate the aforementioned nation-building imperatives into legal obligations, especially in the immediate pre-election period.

This development again underscores the value of public opinion and attitudinal research in informing policy in South Africa. In other words, as the country attempts to consolidate forms of nationhood, whether by invoking claims to territorial integrity or claims to cultural uniqueness, and as these claims are translated into legislation, the public's opinions and attitudes provide useful benchmarks for policy-makers.

Commencing in the 1980s with the so-called Omnibus surveys, and then followed in the late 1990s by the annualised, nationally representative Evaluation of Public Opinions Programme (EPOP), the HSRC's engagement in public opinion research has been robust and noteworthy. The data gathered over the years have been used extensively by national and provincial government departments, policy analysts, think tanks, politicians, journalists and academics, and have been of interest to the general public. The EPOP surveys have covered a wide range of topics including satisfaction with service delivery, perceived national priorities, political preferences, and attitudes on the state of the economy.

Notwithstanding the contribution made by the EPOP surveys, however, there is broad consensus within the HSRC regarding the need for a quality upgrade. This is attributable to various concerns that have been raised *vis-à-vis* the programme. One such concern is the excessive time lag between data collection and dissemination, which has tended to range between six months and a year. Public opinions change rapidly, depending on changing political and personal circumstances. If public perceptions and attitudes are to inform policy debate and a general discourse on development, for instance, then a thorough analytic digest of such opinion needs to be forthcoming as soon as possible. A second concern relates to the fragmented nature of previous project management efforts, in the sense that they were not sufficiently well co-ordinated. This is especially true of the *ad hoc* manner in which client-driven modules or questions were incorporated into the survey. A third concern has to do with the reports accompanying the release of the EPOP data sets, which have tended to err on the side of being overly descriptive. While descriptive accounts are important, it is only through sound and rigorous analysis, often well-grounded conceptually and theoretically, that meaningful contributions to policy debates are made. Finally, and most significantly, inconsistency in the content of the EPOP survey instruments over time has been a problem. While this does not pose a difficulty in terms of informing us of public opinions on particular issues at a specified point in time, it does frustrate attempts at effectively developing a longitudinal perspective of attitudinal change in the country. Thus, the EPOP surveys did not provide a satisfactory source for the systematic deciphering of the changes in mass attitudes before and during the early years of South Africa's transition to democracy. While there was some continuity in questions posed in each version of the instrument, there was little attempt to analyse these data in time-series fashion.

In responding to the previously mentioned shortcomings of the EPOP surveys, and in heeding the calls for an upgrading of their quality, it was decided to establish a rigorous, annual South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), of which this volume represents the first such undertaking. The primary objective of SASAS is to design, develop and implement a conceptually and methodologically robust study of changing social attitudes and values in South Africa. In meeting this objective, the HSRC intends to position itself so as to be able to carefully and consistently monitor and explain changes in attitudes amongst various socio-demographic groupings. It is intended that SASAS will explore a wide range of value changes, including the distribution and shape of racial attitudes and aspirations, attitudes towards democratic and constitutional issues, and the redistribution of resources and power. Moreover, there is also an explicit interest in mapping changing attitudes towards some of the great moral issues that confront and are fiercely debated in South Africa, for instance abortion, gender issues, AIDS, crime and punishment, governance, service delivery, etc.

In sum, then, SASAS is intended to provide a unique long-term account of the social fabric of modern South Africa, and of how its changing political and institutional

structures interact over time with changing social attitudes and values. As Young, Savola and Phelps (1991: 2) remind us:

> …the special value of longitudinal data is generally recognised as deriving from their unique ability to preserve information about the nature of industrial development. Sequences of events and patterns of change that occur within the individual, the family, or some other unit can be studied most effectively through the use of longitudinal data… [it allows] one to follow respondents in *real time* [emphasis added] rather than retrospectively.

Thus, using data from SASAS, stakeholders will be able to make detailed comparisons between provinces (or groups) on a wide range of social issues, monitor state-sponsored interventions, and analyse social and political trends.

Methodological considerations

Determining the thematic content of the survey

In determining the thematic content of the SASAS survey, key perennial topics were identified which were then woven together with policy and academic debate (and intervention) in mind. These topics were additionally designed to provide reliable and robust measures that can help to shape our understanding of present-day South Africa, and the processes of change taking place within it. While it is difficult to predict precisely what issues are likely to be of national importance in, say, five or ten years' time, given the influence of factors that vary by discipline, time and space, it is possible to make informed guesses as to what issues will continue to be important for monitoring purposes. Moreover, it was possible at an early stage to eliminate certain classes of questions. For instance, various transient issues over which media opinion polls happily have a monopoly were excluded. Designed to be conducted on an annual basis, SASAS will instead focus on longer-term variations in culture and social structure within the country. It therefore aspires to be an instrument that can identify and interpret climate shifts in social circumstances and values, rather than simply monitoring changes in the weather.

To accommodate the wide variety of topics that was included in the 2003 survey, two questionnaires were administered simultaneously. This will continue to occur in future phases of the SASAS survey. Apart from the standard set of demographic and background variables, each version of the questionnaire contains a harmonised core module that will remain constant from round to round, with the aim of monitoring change and continuity in a variety of socio-economic and socio-political variables (see Table 1.1). In addition, a number of themes will be accommodated on a rotational basis. This rotating element of the survey consists of two or more topic-specific modules in each round of interviewing and is directed at measuring a range of policy

and academic concerns and issues that require more detailed examination at a specific point in time than the multi-topic core module would permit (see Table 1.1).

In respect of the two SASAS questionnaires, the questions contained in the core module (demographics and core thematic issues) were asked of all 5 000 respondents, while the remaining rotating modules were asked of a half sample of approximately 2 500 respondents each. The two different versions of the questionnaire were administered concurrently in each of the chosen sampling areas.

Table 1.1 *Structural and thematic content of the questionnaires in the 2003 SASAS survey*

SASAS Questionnaire Version 1	SASAS Questionnaire Version 2
• Cover and respondent selection	• Cover and respondent selection
• Household roster	• Household roster
• Democracy	• Democracy
• Identity	• Identity
• Public services	• Public services
• Moral issues	• Moral issues
• Poverty	• Communication
• Generational and gender attitudes and family/ household violence	• ISSP module – National identity
	• Democracy part 2
• Crime	• Crime
• Voting	• Voting
• Demographics and other classificatory variables	• Demographics and other classificatory variables
• Nature of families and family authority	• Nature of families and family authority

Legend: ☐ Questions common to both versions of the questionnaire
▒ Questions that are unique to one version of the questionnaire
Note: ISSP = International Social Survey Programme

Sampling design

The survey was designed to yield a representative sample of adults aged 16 and older (with no upper age limit), regardless of their nationality or citizenship, in households geographically spread across the nine provinces. The sample was drawn from the HSRC's Master Sample. The rationale for the Master Sample's development, which took place in the latter half of 2002, was partially attributable to the desire to establish a programme of longitudinal social survey research within the HSRC. By permitting repeated visits to households, or a cross-section of households, over periods of time, endless possibilities were opened up for accurately identifying and recording shifts and trends in public opinion, and any other subject matter, which was deemed to be vital for accurate planning and policy-making decisions.

The Master Sample consists of 1 000 census enumerator areas (EAs) with 11 visiting points being selected in each area, yielding a total of 11 000 visiting points. The EAs

chosen from the 2001 census sample frame were stratified by the socio-demographic domains of province, geographical sub-type and the four population groups. The first round of SASAS involved the random selection of 5 000 individuals from the Master Sample. The Master Sample was developed in order to allow the HSRC to conduct longitudinal social surveys. More specifically, it was designed with the sampling demands of the SASAS time-series in mind, as well as those of other important social surveys such as the HSRC's AIDS behavioural survey (SABSSM), in order to provide critical information for policy-making purposes.

Considered one of the more sophisticated samples of its kind internationally, the HSRC's Master Sample combines an intricate sample design with the use of advanced Geographic Information Systems (GIS), remote-sensing and census-collation approaches and technology. Ortho-rectified aerial photographs, digital maps from satellite images and ground-based maps of sites were used to define the exact geographic location of the areas to be included in the sample, and were subsequently used to select the dwelling units where people were interviewed during the 2003 SASAS baseline survey. Different types of areas, defined primarily by the dominant dwelling type, population group and location in urban versus rural localities, were drawn on to ensure that respondents from different types of communities throughout the country had an equal chance of being selected for inclusion in the survey sample frame. Additionally, fieldworkers used Global Positioning Systems to identify the spatial co-ordinates of each household.

The generation of the Master Sample was completed in September 2002, and hardcopy and electronic 'navigational kits' were immediately archived in the Surveys, Analyses, Modelling and Mapping Unit of the HSRC. The first project to benefit from the Master Sample was the aforementioned SABSSM study, followed by phase 1 of SASAS.

Fieldwork and capture

The national survey on which the analysis in this volume is based was conducted between August and October 2003. The duration of the face-to-face interviews ranged from 60 minutes in the urban and more built-up areas, to around 90 minutes in the peri-urban and deep rural areas. Capturing of the questionnaires was outsourced, while quality control of the captured data was done in-house by checking each (handwritten) completed questionnaire with the electronically-captured questionnaire. Subsequently, editing programmes that were written in-house were run on the data to check for 'out of range' codes and skip patterns, and errors were corrected programmatically as well as online. Programmes were also written and executed to create the required input for the calculation of weights to the data. The resultant combined and weighted data approximated the distribution of the population of South Africa in terms of population group, province, gender and educational qualification.

Figure 1.1 *Location of HSRC Master Sample EAs in South Africa*



Sources: HSRC GIS Centre (2002)

The realised sample (4 980) was only marginally less that the intended 5 000. In terms of province and population group, the spread was sufficiently wide to facilitate accurate statistical generalisations about opinions prevailing within each province and among persons of each of the four main population groups.

In preparation for authors to commence writing, a compact disc containing the individual and combined data sets, copies of the questionnaires, cross-tabulations run at the request of authors, 'realisation' statistics, background HSRC Omnibus and EPOP information, and examples of chapters from international public attitude surveys – including the British Social Attitudes survey – was distributed to individual contributors, mostly for stylistic guidance.

The chapters in this volume

The chapters that follow are divided into three thematic areas, each mirroring issues that both the government and citizenry are dealing with as we nurture and consolidate what, in many instances, is still a very fledgling democracy in South Africa.

Race, class and politics

This section deals primarily with the issue of constitutional democracy and governance, national identity, and the intersection of race and class in voting patterns. While President Mbeki's recent State of the Nation speech celebrated ten years of democracy and lauded accomplishments over the preceding year, a cautionary note was sounded on the need for the values and norms enshrined in our Constitution to become a more entrenched part of everyday practice and behaviour. Race relations, issues of national identity and commitment to our public institutions and processes were all cited as issues requiring urgent attention in order to give expression to a constitutionally-enshrined vision of a future South Africa. The chapters in this section tease out the dynamic interplay between such imperatives and the contemporary attitudes of the adult population of South Africa. And they do so from a useful vantage point: in the aftermath of a third democratic national election held in 2004, and with a second democratic municipal election on the horizon.

'Issues of democracy and governance' by John Daniel, Roger Southall and Sarah Dippenaar argues that while South Africans seem proud of their Constitution and, ten years into our democracy, often celebrate how far down the road our society has come in delivering on the rights and freedoms enshrined in this document, the picture which emerges from the survey of the social and political views of individual South Africans is somewhat different. More nuanced analysis, according to the authors, suggests a fragility among South Africans with regard to the country's commitment to and trust in democracy and its institutions and processes. They point out, in addition, that in a number of areas, notably with regard to issues such as the death penalty, sexual orientation and abortion, attitudes among the public have hardened and are out of sync with government policies (see also Chapter 12 by Rule and Mncwango). In fact, the authors make the point that on the basis of the results, 'South Africans still come across as fairly conservative – racist, homophobic, sexist, xenophobic and hypocritical', with little moderation of such authoritarian attitudes in sight. Pressure to amend the Constitution to reflect a new belief and value system emerging from a 'post-struggle' generation may well become a reality, it is posited.

Sanusha Naidu's chapter entitled 'Voting behaviour and attitudes in a post-apartheid South Africa' attempts to qualify the race hypothesis in South Africa as it pertains to electoral choice and behaviour. By elucidating electoral trends from the 2004 national elections, the author questions the salience of race as a (primary) determinant of voting behaviour in South Africa, or the general consensus that

South Africa's electoral outcomes are race-based. After thorough and rigorous interrogation of the SASAS data, Naidu develops what one could call an 'electoral heterogeneity' argument, one that postulates that while 'race in many ways prefigures in daily realities and at times determines our social interactions, it is not the only variable or identity that structures citizens' behaviour in South Africa'. In other words, the overlap and intersection of a range of other variables, notably class, gender and age, as well as other emergent identities, begin to whittle away the stark dichotomies predicated on a race-based thesis of citizen choice and behaviour. Thus, while the author concludes from an analysis of the 2004 voting data that the racial or ethnic complexion of support for each of the main parties remains fairly distinct, she also identifies an emerging trend which suggests that there are other self-expressed motivations for party choice.

The chapters by Arlene Grossberg, Jaré Struwig and Udesh Pillay, 'Multicultural national identity and pride', and Marlene Roefs, 'Identity and race relations', are both extremely useful and illuminating accounts of the vexed question of national identity in South Africa and its interrelationship with race and other key variables. Grossberg, Struwig and Pillay test as a prime hypothesis whether favourable socio-economic and political conditions promote a shared sense of nationhood and pride, and advance democratic consolidation. They conclude, through an examination of the 2003 SASAS and 2004 International Social Survey Programme data, that national identity, which is constantly open to redefinition and reconstruction, is clearly predicated on and promoted through improved satisfaction with living conditions. Their study, however, also reveals that crucial to the realisation of this 'hegemonic' project is the manner in which citizens perceive democracy, and their levels of trust in government and other key institutions in the democratic system. Roefs, on the other hand, is interested in the interrelationship between race and national identity, and in how these in turn co-vary with perceptions about race relations. Her thesis is that a strong sense of national identity is taking root in South Africa which might contribute to unifying rather than excluding and dividing various population groups. In this regard, though testing an entirely different set of hypotheses, Roefs' account corroborates the findings of Grossberg, Struwig and Pillay, although perhaps the author's most illuminating finding from an examination of the survey data is confirmation that strong race identity correlates with a strong national identity. In other words, national and sub-group identities appear to co-exist in South Africa without impeding one another.

Poverty, inequality and service delivery

While indisputable evidence over the past ten years suggests that the quality of life for most South Africans has improved, and that the state has made a concerted effort to address poverty, inequality and service delivery challenges, both scholars and practitioners are of the opinion that much needs to be done to consolidate the centrality of the assault on poverty in South Africa, especially, as President Mbeki

characterises it, in its 'second-economy' guise. The chapters in this section, through an interrogation of the robust attitudinal data, provide nuanced insights into what some of our key development challenges are, and the remedial efforts required to mitigate these.

Benjamin Roberts' chapter, 'The happy transition? Attitudes to poverty and inequality after a decade of democracy', provides an overarching digest, and a critical examination, of individual welfare in South Africa a decade after the transition. The author does this by using the 2003 SASAS data – a combination of measures of life satisfaction, happiness, domain satisfaction and relative deprivation – as a means to complement more income-based or money-metric definitions of poverty. Following an attempt to quantify the magnitude of the 'quality-of-life' situation among the adult population of South Africa, commentary is offered on how policy intervention should unfold. Roberts concludes by noting that while the attitudinal scorecard for government performance is generally encouraging, there are some sectors where the forecast is somewhat less positive.

The next three chapters in this section provide illuminating insights, and then offer critical commentary, on three crucial service-delivery sectors in South Africa, namely water, education, and health.

Zakes Langa, Pieter Conradie and Benjamin Roberts' chapter, 'Slipping through the Net: Digital and other communication divides within South Africa', is an exposé of the digital divide in South Africa, and provides evidence to suggest the existence of huge disparities in access to digital technologies and applications due largely to the fact that, even a decade after democracy, the country remains one of the most inequitable societies in the world. Attitudinal data from the SASAS survey are produced to show how the digital divide in South Africa – whether based on computer access, Internet access or Internet usage – reflects wider social inequalities and entrenched patterns of social stratification in the country, most ably demonstrated along race, geographic, income, education and, to a lesser extent, gender lines. Of concern to the authors is the fact that the poor may become even further marginalised, given that basic computer skills have been identified as crucial to economic success and personal advancement. It is argued that while the South African government and private-sector bodies have made encouraging advances in trying to narrow digital disparities, more active and focused intervention is required in broadening technological access. The authors also reflect tangentially on levels of political participation and trust that derive from wider access to digital technologies and applications.

David Hemson and Kwame Owusu-Ampomah look at 'The "vexed question": Interruptions, cut-offs and water services in South Africa'. The chapter starts from the premise that water delivery in South Africa is undergoing a critical transition as the responsibility for the delivery and management of water shifts rapidly from national to local government. As this transition occurs, controversy around issues of

equity abounds, with the most vexing question being the rate of cut-offs of water for non-payment. Using the 2003 SASAS data and, for comparative purposes, drawing on the 2001 EPOP data, public perceptions of the government's performance in service delivery are analysed, following which the location of dissatisfaction and respondents' experiences of interruptions of supply are measured. The crucial question of cut-offs is then examined, with the authors reporting that a significant proportion of respondents, mostly a core of the poor in urban areas, experienced interruptions relating to cut-offs over the period mid-2002 through mid-2003. Hemson and Owusu-Ampomah argue that this repeated pattern of cut-offs of poor households counters the hypothesis that there is a culture of non-payment in relation to water services among the very poorest, and that the phenomenon is therefore more reflective of an endemic socio-economic problem. The chapter concludes with commentary on the usefulness of public attitude surveys in linking attitudes to conditions and, in so doing, providing insights into the constitutional remedies that may be needed to mitigate social problems, as citizens' participation both through municipal structures and in civil society begins to take root.

Mbithi wa Kivilu and Seán Morrow's account, 'What do South Africans think about education?', in contrast to the previous chapter, provides a broad-brush overview and a more upbeat synopsis of public attitudes to a range of educational issues. The authors highlight the paradox that despite education historically being a highly contested area in South Africa, a dearth of material exists on attitudes to education. They argue that this makes it difficult to know how the findings of specific studies measure up against the actual state of public opinion. In probing, through the SASAS data, a range of educational issues, from perceptions on the integration of schools and other educational institutions through to attitudes regarding aspirations in schooling, and measuring these against a range of categories, the authors conclude by noting that respondents by and large seem to be displaying much good sense and wisdom in their engagements with the education system. This, broadly speaking, augurs well for the country's educational future.

Health issues are explored next, in 'A healthy attitude?' by Chris Desmond and Gerard Boyce. Arguing that health is a key component of people's lives, but conceding that South Africans have mixed attitudes towards health, the authors interrogate a range of questions included in the SASAS instrument that focus on health behaviours and attitudes towards them, and on the influence of various factors on how healthy individuals say they feel. In highlighting and disentangling a number – although not an exhaustive set – of factors at work in shaping people's perceptions of health, Desmond and Boyce argue that while preferences for different health behaviours vary across individuals and groups, the role of circumstance in enabling both preference and the ability to translate preference into choice is of paramount importance. The point is made that while people are entitled to exercise different health preferences, this is often limited by available choices. Varied access to information and differential ability to interpret that information are also cited as

mitigating factors. Where individuals reside, their levels of income and wealth, and a range of other personal circumstances influence the discretion individuals have to make choices pertaining to their health. The chapter concludes with an illustration of the benefits that accrue from being healthy, and the implications this has for a programme of action required to place people in situations where the ability to follow through on their preferences is nurtured.

Societal values

The last section of this compilation provides sobering accounts of how deeply-entrenched moral values, norms and practices affect social behaviour, and reinforce embedded attitudes among individuals in the body politic of South Africa. As such these accounts offer salient reminders that the provisions in our celebrated Constitution do not guarantee particular forms of behaviour, and that changes in mindset – particularly in relation to a locally-embedded set of values, norms and idiosyncratic practices – are required at both a collective and an individual level if the trajectory of such behaviour is to change.

In their chapter 'Partner violence', Andrew Dawes, Zosa de Sas Kropiwnicki, Zuhayr Kafaar and Linda Richter attempt for the first time in South Africa to report on the extent and severity of domestic violence, by measuring the behaviour of both men and women and then exploring some of the predictors of violence among couples. Drawing on SASAS data from the family/household violence module, they identify domestic violence as a major public health problem which, sadly, seems to be regarded as acceptable in South Africa. Their results reveal that women are twice as likely to be domestic assault victims as their male partners, and that the poor are at greater risk of partner violence than other groups, especially given the co-occurrence of race and class in South Africa. Their analysis thus reveals that a cluster of characteristics predicts partner violence, and that single-strategy interventions that focus on changing individual attitudes and behaviour are unlikely to meet with success. This is because the predictors of partner violence contain multiple influences and are overwhelmingly shaped by a set of prevailing norms and locally-based practices. Recommendations to mitigate the problems should therefore start from this premise. The paper concludes by prescribing a set of interventions that range from changing the collective mindsets of men to more forcefully invoking the legislation and constitutional provisions that are currently in place.

'Rights or wrongs? An exploration of moral values' by Stephen Rule and Bongiwe Mncwango is an illuminating exposé of questions of moral values in South Africa. Interrogating a series of questions on important moral issues (premarital sex; same-sex sexual relationships; abortion; the death penalty) that were posed to respondents in the SASAS 2003 module on moral issues, the authors set out to test the hypothesis that government policy on moral issues is more 'progressive' than the attitudes of the electorate. The results are extremely revealing, with Rule and

Mncwango characterising public opinion in South Africa as largely 'traditionalist' in the sense that most adult South Africans are of the opinion that premarital sex, same-sex sexual relations and abortion are wrong, and that the death penalty is an appropriate form of punishment for a convicted murderer. The authors argue that the implications of such findings for government are critical, requiring that policy-makers internalise the extent to which South Africans hold more conservative views in the above areas than do their political representatives, and that law enforcers exercise a degree of compassion and understanding when citizens express opposing views to those enshrined in the Constitution. Conversely, citizens expressing these 'traditional' views will need to be more tolerant in respecting the newly-enshrined rights that are being exercised by relative minorities within the country.

Mark Orkin and Roger Jowell, in the concluding synthesis chapter 'Ten years into democracy: How South Africans view their world and themselves', provide postscript commentary on the results and findings of the survey, drawing conclusions on the 'state of the people' in South Africa, and offer comment on the policy ramifications of such a study.

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Race, class and politics

2 *Issues of democracy and governance*

John Daniel, Roger Southall and Sarah Dippenaar

I curse the day that I voted on the 27th of April. I had my hopes to live a better life. But from the frying pan into the fire. Democracy has done nothing.

Agnes Sehole, 62, Soweto

There is a change. There are still some white guys who are racists, and Indians… and other blacks who are racists… But it is a different day. Those are issues for old people.

Unis Mtshibhonong, 22, Alexandra

I certainly am happier living in the new South Africa. I don't have such a guilty conscience about being white. Now equal opportunity is here and it is a good thing.

Rochelle Sacheim, 62, Saxonwold.[1]

Introduction

South Africans are proud of their Constitution, often holding it up as one of the world's most liberal and rights-friendly. Constitutional experts frequently cite it as an exemplar of liberal democracy. This stems largely from its provision of an extensive range of political, social and economic rights. It guarantees rights to life (in terms of which capital punishment has been outlawed), to free speech and movement, to freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, to work, shelter and employment, to the sexual orientation of one's choice, and much more. All discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, age, disability and sexual orientation is prohibited. Those who drafted the Constitution did not, it seems, turn their collective minds to the issue of same-sex marriages but now that the Supreme Court in Bloemfontein has done so, it is no surprise that it reached much the same conclusion as did the Massachusetts Supreme Court earlier in 2004 – which was that to prohibit such marriages is unconstitutional.[2]

In their reflections on the tenth anniversary of this country's democracy, much was made by analysts of how far down the road South African society had gone in delivering on these rights and freedoms. They noted the dismantling of all prejudicial regulations in regard to gays and lesbians, the significant increases in the number of women in public office, the independence of the Constitutional Court

and the fact that it has at times not been swayed by the state's opposition to the extension of certain socio-economic rights pertaining to, for example, shelter, land and health.[3]

Overall, commentators expressed satisfaction at the extent to which the constitutionally-imposed democratic order had been consolidated in the decade since the ending of apartheid. During this period five nationwide elections (three national/provincial elections and two local government elections) had been staged successfully and without any serious legal hiccup in the form of any challenge to their legitimacy, fairness and outcome. Seats had changed hands, governments at the provincial level had been overturned and there had been no instance of a ruling group not adhering to or implementing the people's will. Some fears had been expressed prior to the April 2004 election that the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) might refuse a transfer of power should it lose the KwaZulu-Natal election. In the event, the transition was smooth, with the outgoing IFP premier nominating his African National Congress (ANC) counterpart to the post of premier. Majority rule seems to have been well and truly entrenched.

Yet from this present HSRC survey of the social and political views of individual South Africans a different, or rather more nuanced, picture emerges. Public attitudes in a number of areas seem unreconstructed, and ten years of democracy seem to have done little to moderate what can be described as hard-line, authoritarian attitudes on such politico-social issues as capital punishment and gay sex. On the basis of this survey, South Africans still come across as deeply conservative – racist, homophobic, sexist, xenophobic and hypocritical in terms of sexual beliefs and practices. Furthermore, significant numbers do not appear particularly enamoured of the state of South Africa's democracy and continue to express relatively high levels of distrust of the legislative institutions of the 'new' South Africa at all levels (national to local), as well as of the post-apartheid court system and police. However, in this regard, it should be mentioned that while the levels of trust remain low, the trend is upwards, albeit modestly. These observations are discussed in more detail in the sections that follow.

As noted in the HSRC's predecessor annual survey of political knowledge and perceptions (Daniel and de Vos 2002), questions probing the extent to which South Africans are satisfied or dissatisfied with their post-apartheid governance, and their degree of trust in state and civic institutions, can assist us not only to understand the prospects for democracy but also to shape and consolidate it. As Daniel and de Vos noted in their chapter on this issue in the 2002 volume (Daniel and de Vos 2002: 13), 'though hard won, democracy cannot and should not be taken for granted… For democracy to thrive and grow, the citizenry needs to develop a genuine sense of support for and faith in the new democratic regime and its institutions'. Equally, popular perspectives that give support to authoritarian or illiberal sentiments can serve to undermine attempts to let the new democratic order take root. In short,

the political culture that prevails in South Africa should be accorded due weight in assessing the prospects for democratic consolidation.

Satisfaction with democracy

The initial question posed to respondents concerning governance was a simple albeit broad one – were they satisfied or dissatisfied with democracy in South Africa? What constituted the concept 'democracy' was not defined. A six-point scale (including 'neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' and 'don't know') was used to measure satisfaction levels, which are summarised in Table 2.1 by combining the 'very satisfied/satisfied' and 'very dissatisfied/dissatisfied' into one category each. Responses differentiated by race and gender were as follows:

Table 2.1 *Level of satisfaction with democracy in South Africa, by sex and race*

Satisfaction	Male	Female	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Total**
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Satisfied	48	44	50	38	34	28	46
Dissatisfied	34	39	37	31	45	47	37
Neither*	19	17	13	31	21	25	18
Base	*2 317*	*2 638*	*3 796*	*436*	*141*	*569*	*4 957*

* Includes the 'don't know' responses.
** Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Sex: $X^2 = 31.28$ (df = 5, p = 0.12, not significant); Race: $X^2 = 305.38$ (df = 20, p = 0.000)
Source: SASAS (2003)

While a larger percentage of respondents indicated that they were generally satisfied with democracy (overall only 8 per cent were extremely satisfied), it still seems noteworthy to us that after nine years of democracy less than half of respondents had a positive view of democracy while the views of more than one-third were negative. Interesting, too, is the high percentage of respondents (18 per cent) who either did not have a view or did not know. What this may reflect is the ambivalence many may feel about a situation where, while they now have more rights than in the past, this may not have resulted in an improvement in their material circumstances. Or perhaps this group includes those who think that democracy has brought with it such things as increased crime levels. What we feel, however, is that the most likely explanation lies in the fact that the respondents were given no definition of democracy and, without clarity in their own minds, took shelter in the neutral/don't know category. Future surveys should provide a clear and simple definition of democracy.

On the other hand, it is possible that while numbers of our respondents may actually approve of democracy as a system, they were unhappy about the actual state

of our democracy at the time of the survey. It seems probable to us that a significant proportion of that one-third of respondents expressing their dissatisfaction with democracy in South Africa are not anti-democratic, but rather are expressing discontent with some aspect of current political practice, like the floor-crossing provision or one-party dominance in general. The question as phrased did not permit a nuancing of responses and this is also something which future surveys should address.

Whatever the case, those dissatisfied with South Africa's democracy and the 'don't know' and 'neither' group collectively make up more than half of all the respondents. This could suggest a continuing fragility in South Africa's affection for democracy.

Unfortunately a direct comparison with the results of the 2001 survey (Daniel and de Vos 2002) is not possible as, on that occasion, the question asked probed people's satisfaction with 'national governance', which is not the same as 'satisfaction with democracy'. Democracy is a considerably broader concept, for whilst the latter entails an assessment of institutions and political culture in general, national governance suggests a focus on the more limited area of government performance. For what it is worth, however, it is interesting to note that in 2001 satisfaction with national governance was lower at 38 per cent, and dissatisfaction higher at 43 per cent, than the recorded figures on democracy in 2003.

When these figures are broken down by party affiliation, the results are broadly similar. Unsurprisingly, ANC supporters have both the highest levels of satisfaction (58 per cent) and the lowest levels of dissatisfaction (30 per cent). Equally unsurprising is the fact that New National Party (NNP) supporters recorded the lowest levels of satisfaction (26 per cent) with democracy of all party affiliates. Given the significant white Afrikaner support base of the party and the party's spectacular descent from power since it left the Government of National Unity in 1996, this figure is predictable. Interestingly, however, the NNP's dissatisfaction level (44 per cent) was lower by four percentage points than that of the other party essentially reflective of racial minority interests, the Democratic Alliance (DA).

When analysed by province and race, it is worth noting that black African residents of the poorer of South Africa's nine provinces (in which one could safely assume a poor record of delivery) recorded the highest levels of satisfaction. These ranged from 56 per cent in the Free State to 54 per cent in the Eastern Cape to 52 per cent in both Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal. In respect of only two other sub-groups was the 50 per cent figure (or more than half) reflected, and that was in regard to the levels of dissatisfaction of Indians/Asians in KwaZulu-Natal (57 per cent) and white residents in Gauteng (54 per cent).

It is interesting to contrast these findings with those that emerged from a poll of 2 961 South Africans in October and November 2003, some eight weeks after the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS). This poll was conducted jointly by

the *Washington Post* newspaper, the Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard University. Asked whether they thought democracy had been a good or bad thing for South Africa, 78 per cent said it was a good thing and only 8 per cent responded negatively. This is a far more positive view than the one expressed earlier. The outlook for the future was also more positive, with 81 per cent expressing the view that South Africa would remain a democratic country. This was up significantly from 1998, when only 54 per cent held that view (*Washington Post*/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University 2004).[4]

Nearer the HSRC's findings was the response to the question as to whether the country was moving in the right direction. Here the national mean was 59 per cent, with 39 per cent dissenting. This is broken down by race in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 *Direction in which the country is going, by race*

Country is going in the…	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Right direction	65	44	30	36	59
Wrong direction	34	51	67	58	39
Do not know	1	5	3	6	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: *Washington Post*/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University (2004)

What is striking about these figures is how differently the racial minorities and black Africans perceive the state of the nation after ten years of democracy. Two-thirds of black Africans express a positive view while, on average, six out of ten of the racial minorities have the opposite opinion. Indians stand out as the most disenchanted. It is therefore surprising to us that in the April 2004 national elections, and only five months after this poll was conducted, the ANC won every single Indian-dominated voting district in the Western Cape, Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, ousting the previously dominant party which was either the DA or the NNP.

A significant feature of the satisfaction levels by province is, once more, the relatively modest levels of support for democracy (Table 2.3). But again we need to be cautious. What this table may actually be reflecting is not so much support for democracy *per se*, but rather views on delivery, that is, the outputs of democracy. In only three of the provinces does the level top the 50 per cent mark, and then only by margins in the region of 1 per cent. The national mean across the provinces is 46 per cent for the satisfaction indicator and 37 per cent for the levels of dissatisfaction. The one extraordinary figure that jumps out from the table is the low level of dissatisfaction with democracy recorded in the Western Cape, which is half the national mean. On the other hand, the neither/don't know figure in this province is nearly double that, and way above the national mean.

Table 2.3 *Level of satisfaction with democracy in South Africa, by province**

Satisfaction	WC	EC	NC	FS	KZN	NW	GT	MP	LP
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Satisfied	45	51	37	51	48	39	40	44	51
Dissatisfied	19	36	33	36	36	39	41	44	41
Neither**	37	12	30	13	16	22	19	12	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Base	*534*	*659*	*93*	*304*	*997*	*412*	*1 115*	*328*	*516*

* See Acronyms (page xiv) for province abbreviations
** Includes the 'don't know' responses.
$X^2 = 384.73$ (df = 40, p = 0.000)
Source: SASAS (2003)

Overall, these levels seem unrelated to party rule or perceptions of government performance. Thus, the levels in both the provinces which at the time of the survey were either not ruled singly by the ANC, or where the ANC was the junior partner in a coalition arrangement, had higher satisfaction levels than some of those provinces ruled by the ANC. The fact that a change of provincial government would occur in KwaZulu-Natal only six months after the survey is also not presaged by these figures. If in KwaZulu-Natal, then why not in the Northern Cape where, despite its lowest level of satisfaction, the incumbent ANC government increased its majority in the 2004 provincial election? And how does one explain the fact that the highest satisfaction level was recorded by the government (Eastern Cape) widely regarded as the least effective of all nine provincial governments? It was this that led to the sacking (or 'redeployment', to use the current language of political correctness) after the 2004 election of the Eastern Cape's provincial premier. Similarly paradoxical is the fact that Gauteng, which is generally perceived to be the fastest-growing and most efficiently run province in the country, reflected the second-highest level of dissatisfaction.

One possible explanation comes from relating these levels to the extent of the presence of racial minorities in the provinces. Thus, the provinces with large black African majorities and smaller numbers of white and other minorities (like the Free State, Eastern Cape and Limpopo) score highest on the satisfaction index. But do those provinces with larger numbers of white, coloured and Indian/Asian people tend to score lower? This would explain the dissatisfaction figure for Gauteng but not the case of the Western Cape, with its significant coloured and white populations, and that of the Northern Cape, with its high concentration of coloured people.

Confusing though these figures may be in regard to the provincial governments, the observation made in 2002 by Daniel and de Vos (2002: 13) seems to us still pertinent. They expressed the view then that in the context of South Africa's past history of oppression and the euphoria which greeted the arrival of democratic

government in 1994, the fact that less than half of respondents should record satisfaction with the overall state of democracy is at least surprising, if not a cause for concern. On the other hand, given that democracy is a political concept, perhaps that is not so surprising when one considers our respondents' answers to the question of the importance of politics in their lives (Table 2.4). Here only one in three of those polled (33 per cent) indicated that they considered politics to be either very important or important, while 47 per cent felt it was very unimportant or not important. Fully one-fifth had no view on the issue or did not know.

Table 2.4 *Perceived importance of politics, by province*

Satisfaction	WC	EC	NC	FS	KZN	NW	GT	MP	LP	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Important	25	40	29	50	24	41	30	33	40	33
Unimportant	50	37	38	36	56	37	51	51	45	47
Neither*	26	23	33	14	20	22	19	16	15	20
Total**	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Base	*272*	*331*	*45*	*145*	*481*	*196*	*555*	*162*	*253*	*2 441*

* Includes the 'don't know' responses.
** Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
$X^2 = 298.51$ (df = 40, p = 0.000)
Source: SASAS (2003)

What these numbers suggest is a decline of interest in politics in the post-apartheid era. This is not particularly surprising. In the minds of many, the 'struggle' is over. The variance across provinces and environmental milieux is not particularly noteworthy. That the lowest level of interest in politics (24 per cent) should be in KwaZulu-Natal is perhaps reflective of the role and influence of the IFP, a group which was essentially the instrument of the Zulu aristocracy. Less easy to explain is the fact that the largely rural Free State province recorded the highest level of interest in politics.

Here again it is necessary to draw attention to the lack of a definition of politics being given to the respondents. We thus have no real idea what they understood by the concept. Did they understand by it only the act of voting, or was it seen as relating to issues of power, delivery and so on? As noted earlier, this is a lack which will need to be remedied in future rounds of the survey.

Perceptions of life chances

The notion of life chances or prospects was probed by questioning respondents as to whether they perceived themselves to be worse or better off since 1999, and whether they thought life would improve or worsen in the five years ahead. Responses by race and gender follow in Tables 2.5 and 2.6.

Table 2.5 *Since the 1999 election, has life improved for people like you?*

	Male	Female	Black African	Coloured	Indian/ Asian	White	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Improved	33	33	38	22	28	13	33
Stayed the same	38	37	38	38	22	36	38
Got worse	26	27	22	35	48	48	27
Do not know	3	2	2	5	2	3	3
Total*	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Base	*2 316*	*2 624*	*3 782*	*433*	*138*	*573*	*4 942*

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Sex: $X^2 = 2.69$ (df = 3, p = 0.871, not significant); Race: $X^2 = 361.56$ (df = 12, p = 0.000, significant)
Source: SASAS (2003)

Table 2.6 *In the next five years, will life improve for people like you?*

	Male	Female	Black African	Coloured	Indian/ Asian	White	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Improve	47	39	48	39	44	15	43
Stay the same	22	22	22	14	12	28	22
Get worse	20	24	18	23	32	48	22
Do not know	11	15	12	24	12	9	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Base	*2 307*	*2 620*	*3 770*	*435*	*139*	*568*	*4 929*

Sex: $X^2 = 32.25$ (df = 3, p = 0.048); Race: $X^2 = 284.02$ (df = 12, p = 0.000, significant)
Source: SASAS (2003)

Overall, it would appear that South African women, probably like women all over the world, are less satisfied with the status quo, and significantly less optimistic about the future, than men. This accords with the fact that women are disadvantaged relative to men with regard to the law, employment, benefits and so on. Surprisingly, and it would seem paradoxically, in a set of questions relating to discrimination in South Africa today, less than 1 per cent of respondents felt that the grounds for their discrimination were gender-based.

Looking at these figures, the current ANC government, which has constructed a new democratic dispensation in which formal racial distinctions have been abolished, and has presided over an economy which has delivered a low but consistently positive level of economic growth since 1994, will, in our view, be entitled to feel disappointed that only 33 per cent of respondents saw themselves as better off since 1999. A slightly higher figure of 43 per cent feel somewhat more optimistic about the

future, believing that life for them will improve over the next five years. What this reflects is the fact that the economic-growth benefits of the new era have not been equally shared, and that the majority of South Africans remain outside the loop of economic advancement. That fully four out of ten South Africans, including some who have not experienced an improvement in their lifestyles, should be optimistic about the future helps explain the continuing popular strength of the ANC. It also reflects a maturity of political outlook, in that it shows a recognition that change in general, and the assault on poverty in particular, takes time.

The government may be even more frustrated by the racial profiles of our answers. On the whole, it is not surprising that black Africans, the principal victims of apartheid, should be the most satisfied and the most optimistic about their present and future life prospects (even though only 37 per cent see themselves as better off since 1999). Yet in contrast, white people – who continue to dominate the economy, receive better education, and the majority of whom (from census and other data) would appear to have enjoyed a better rather than a worse standard of living since 1994 – are by far the most discontented and the least optimistic. What this reflects, in our view, is a subconscious resentment on the part of the white populace that they no longer 'run the show', even though they still have some ability to influence events. Furthermore, it is likely that the government's affirmative-action and black-empowerment policies cloud their views as to the future, particularly with regard to their children. In an analysis of the current SASAS survey, Roberts (2004: 13) notes that only 15 per cent of white people supported black preferential hiring and promotion policies, in contrast to 80 per cent of black Africans. The figures for coloured and Indian/Asian respondents were 17 per cent and 31 per cent respectively.

As is perhaps to be expected, perceptions of improvement and prospects are significantly related to respondents' party-political orientations. Hence, when the answers to the questions at issue are cross-tabulated with recorded 2004 party preferences, we find the following:

Table 2.7 *Since the 1999 election has life improved for most people, by party support*

Respondents' party preferences	Improved %	Stayed the same %	Got worse %	Do not know %	Total* %	*Base*
ANC	51	28	17	3	100	*2 258*
DA	25	20	52	2	100	*240*
IFP	19	42	36	3	100	*167*
NNP	41	21	36	2	100	*131*
Other Parties	35	30	25	10	100	*162*

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
$X^2 = 396.88$ (df = 21, p = 0.000, significant)
Source: SASAS (2003)

Respondents who are inclined towards the ANC (one in two) and NNP (four in ten) are most likely to see life as having improved. These parties were in coalition at the time of the survey, and were expected to continue working together after the 2004 election. Meanwhile, only 25 per cent of DA supporters thought life had improved, and over 50 per cent believed it had worsened. This is wholly consistent with the adoption by the DA (and by its predecessor, the Democratic Party [DP]) of a strategy of 'robust' opposition to the ANC, and its belief, as depicted by its 2004 election slogan, that 'South Africa deserves better'. Yet, interestingly, supporters of the IFP, a party which at the time was in an uncomfortable coalition with the ANC at both national and provincial levels and with the DA at provincial level, were considerably more undecided than adherents of the other parties: only 19 per cent felt that life had improved, whilst 42 per cent felt that it had stayed the same, and 36 per cent felt that it had actually become worse. Equally interesting, however, is the fact that while 56 per cent of ANC supporters, 27 per cent of DA supporters, and 45 per cent of NNP supporters felt that life would improve for people over the next five years, the relevant figure for IFP supporters was 32 per cent, suggesting that their perceptions at the time were influenced by uncertainties about the party's post-election alignment.

Another interesting finding is that, overall, the 35–49 and 50+ age groups seem least satisfied and least optimistic about their current life chances (Tables 2.8 and 2.9). One possible explanation is that those in the 35–49-year-old category would include the black African (at that time) schoolchildren who had been most affected by the school boycotts and educational struggles of 1976 and later. They have been left significantly less well-equipped to enter the labour market than groups younger than they are. Similarly, the majority of black African over-50s will be the products of the educationally-inferior bantu education system and thus will also be poorly equipped for the modern labour market.

Table 2.8 *Since 1999, has life improved for people like you, by age group*

	16–24	**25–34**	**35–49**	**50+**
	%	%	%	%
Improved	37	35	29	30
Stayed the same	39	39	36	35
Got worse	19	24	33	32
Do not know	4	2	2	3
Total*	100	100	100	100
Base	*1 387*	*1 222*	*1 297*	*1 028*

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Table 2.9 *Will life improve for people like you over the next five years, by age group*

	16–24 %	25–34 %	35–49 %	50+ %
Improve	52	49	34	35
Stay the same	20	19	27	23
Get worse	20	18	25	26
Do not know	9	14	14	16
Total*	100	100	100	100
Base	*1 384*	*1 222*	*1 297*	*1 020*

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

While differences between age groups are not huge, the younger age groups do appear to feel that life either at present or in the future has more to offer them. Interestingly, this is in spite of the huge difficulties that many school-leavers experience in finding employment. On the other hand, young people tend to be more optimistic than older groups. So this is not all that surprising.

Attitudes towards the provinces

The negotiated settlement was famously a compromise agreement between the key parties involved. Having reached a stalemate politically and diplomatically, and with the economy reeling because of sanctions and the then government's inability to maintain political order, the ANC and its adversaries arrived at a Constitution which embodied government institutions and values that – although widely celebrated – were simultaneously regarded as 'second best' by those involved in different ways. For instance, whereas the ANC had argued for a unitary state and the conservative National Party and the then liberal DP for federalism, the settlement established a quasi-federalist system whereby the nine new provinces were to receive only limited independent powers, whilst their autonomy was to be severely inhibited by their overwhelming financial dependence upon the central government. In this circumstance, it is not wholly surprising that popular enthusiasm for the new institutions and system of governance, whilst broadly positive (and most certainly enthusiastically welcomed, given the transition from authoritarianism), should today be relatively lukewarm, especially in a context of ten years of democratic government which has overseen an only slowly growing economy, a significant relative decline in formal employment and the alarming impact of HIV/AIDS. Nor should it be surprising, given South Africa's unhappy history of racial dominance and challenges to racial oppression, that attitudes towards the new democracy should be significantly racially skewed, with white South Africans having a considerably less favourable perspective than black South Africans.

The rather lukewarm orientation of respondents to South Africa's new democracy, as exemplified by the responses highlighted earlier, is further exemplified by two sets of questions, which probed respondents' perspectives on provincial government.

On the one hand, the questions summarised in Table 2.10 put forward propositions that are, classically, central to arguments in favour of federalism, in the sense that sub-national levels of government are classically seen as limiting the powers of central government and hence erecting defences against misrule and oppression. On the other hand, of course, the ANC during the negotiation process had argued strongly for a unitary structure of government, insisting, *inter alia*, on the need for national uniformity and efficiency.

Significantly, our respondents' attitudes barely reflect this debate. Indeed, if anything, they turn it on its head. Broadly speaking, four out of ten respondents are in agreement that provincial governments prevent too great an accretion of national government power, with there being no significant difference in this opinion between black African, Indian/Asian and white respondents, although only three out of ten coloured respondents favour that statement. Meanwhile, significantly fewer white, Indian/Asian and coloured respondents than black African respondents disagree with that statement (that is, they seem to favour stronger rule from the centre). On the other hand, answers diverge when respondents are asked to agree or disagree with the view that provincial governments bring government closer to the people: a bare majority of all respondents agrees with this pro-federalist view, with support significantly strongest amongst black Africans. In contrast, white respondents are split down the middle on this issue, with 34 per cent in agreement, 39 per cent against, and 27 per cent neither agreeing nor disagreeing.

Table 2.10 *Attitudes towards provinces as institutions*

Provincial governments	Agree/ Disagree	Male	Female	Black African	Coloured	Indian/ Asian	White	Total
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Prevent national govt becoming too strong	Agree	42	41	43	30	44	43	42
	Disagree	38	30	36	27	27	26	34
Base		*2 317*	*2 630*	*3 787*	*433*	*140*	*572*	*4 947*
Bring govt closer to the people	Agree	52	50	55	38	45	34	51
	Disagree	31	28	28	31	37	39	30
Base		*2 317*	*2 628*	*3 785*	*432*	*139*	*572*	*4 945*

Source: SASAS (2003)

The key to understanding why black Africans, particularly, should have a significantly more favourable attitude towards provincial governments probably lies less in the sphere of political theory than in issues of identity and instrumentality. At the time

of the survey, seven out of the nine provinces were ruled by the ANC, whilst the ANC was a partner in a ruling coalition in the remaining two. As the large majority of white people favours other parties, which with the exception of the NNP took no part in the governing of provinces, it is perhaps to be expected that any theoretical preference for federalised governance has been tempered by the realities of power, or more particularly in the case of parties which are supported by the majority of white people, by the exclusion from power. Meanwhile, judgements concerning provincial governments seem also to reflect their efficacy, as is suggested by Table 2.11.

Table 2.11 *Attitudes towards the efficacy of provincial government*

Provincial governments	Agree/ Disagree	Male	Female	Black African	Coloured	Indian/ Asian	White	Total
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Are a waste of taxpayers' money	Agree	44	48	47	43	53	45	46
	Disagree	34	28	32	25	31	32	31
Base		*2 299*	*2 635*	*3 774*	*433*	*141*	*570*	*4 934*
Ensure that national govt distributes resources fairly	Agree	48	47	52	34	36	32	47
	Disagree	32	28	28	29	42	38	30
Base		*2 316*	*2 624*	*3 779*	*433*	*140*	*572*	*4 941*

Source: SASAS (2003)

Since 1994, there have been numerous media stories concerning the inefficacy of provincial government. Whether reflective of real performance levels or not, tales abound about corruption, incompetence, failures of and delays in delivery. However, the good news for the provinces indicated by the present survey is that overall, less than half of those interviewed felt that provincial governments were a waste of money, with no major variations in view amongst racial groups. However, although just over a half of black Africans felt that provincial governments help facilitate a fair distribution of resources, this view was shared by only around a third of coloured, Indian/Asian and white respondents and just less than half of respondents taken as a whole.

Provincial governments are for the present, at least, an established feature of the constitutional and political landscape. However, responses to our survey suggest that they are not strongly rooted in popular affections, and that whilst there is mild support for the principle of a devolution of power, this is severely qualified by perceptions of the provinces' performance.

Institutional trust

In a bid to elaborate our understanding of South Africans' rather limited satisfaction with the state of democracy, respondents were asked to indicate their levels of trust

in particular institutions of both government and civil society. Again, a six-point scale was used to construct a trust index, and for comparative purposes, we refer to the results of similar questions posed in the HSRC's 2001 survey (Daniel and de Vos 2002). The responses according to population group are presented in Table 2.12.

Table 2.12 *Trust levels by gender and race of selected institutions in South Africa (percentage that 'strongly trust' or 'trust')*

Institution	Male	Female	Black African	Coloured	Indian/ Asian	White	Total	2001 survey
National government	58	52	62	36	43	25	55	52
Provincial government	49	50	54	36	46	31	49	
Local government	44	41	46	34	45	28	43	38
Parliament	55	51	59	40	42	21	53	
Business	53	47	51	39	53	46	50	43
Police	41	42	43	37	28	40	41	40
The SABC*	70	71	76	64	65	45	71	
Churches	80	82	82	81	62	78	81	81
SANDF	59	53	60	46	40	39	56	49
The courts	48	46	49	38	38	37	47	45
The IEC	59	54	62	43	47	30	56	63

Sources: SASAS (2003); Daniel & de Vos (2002)
* See Acronyms (pages xiii–xiv) for explanation of abbreviations

Overwhelmingly, the most trusted institutions of those we asked respondents to rate were the churches, endorsed by fully 81 per cent of the population. This is no surprise. Apart from being consistent with the result obtained in 2001, it echoes the remarkably high esteem in which church groups are held in southern Africa; for instance, 84 per cent of Basotho indicated their trust in the churches when Rule and Mapetla (2001: 129) posed this same question in Lesotho in September 2000. If probed more deeply, the positive reasons for this extraordinarily high level of trust, across all population groups, would appear to emanate from a combination of the prominent caring role played by the churches historically amongst the white, coloured and black African communities (albeit in highly variant ways), and the hugely symbolic role played by some churches and church officials in the struggle against apartheid.

The notion of 'distance from politics' may also explain the high level of trust (71 per cent) recorded for the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). This is interesting on two counts. Firstly, both under apartheid and more recently, the SABC has been the butt of numerous accusations that – far from being truly independent of the state, as modelled on idealistic notions of the British Broadcasting Corporation – it has, rather, served as the voice of government, or

more particularly, of the ruling party. In the present set of responses, this view would appear to find some considerable echo amongst white respondents, only 45 per cent of whom indicate their trust even if, overall, a large majority expresses confidence in the public broadcaster. However, the second aspect of interest is provided by a comparison with the responses recorded by the HSRC in 2001 which, rather than homing in on the SABC in particular, asked a more general question about trust in 'the media', to which a much lower proportion of respondents (53 per cent) responded positively. There are quite a number of reasons why there should be this differentiation: for instance, the press may be seen as politically aligned, whilst trust levels in newspapers may also be determined by their relatively low circulation in South Africa, especially amongst poorer communities (who, by contrast, will more generally have access to radio at least). Whatever the reasons, the SABC clearly is one of the most trusted institutions nationally.

Ranking third in the survey of trusted institutions was the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), which secured trust ratings of 56 per cent in 2003 and 63 per cent in 2001. Daniel and de Vos (2002: 23) suggest that the latter figure was 'impressively high', and may well have reflected faith in the organisation's ability given its efficient conducting of the 1999 general election and the 2000 local government election. It would also seem to reflect the high levels of satisfaction with the voting system (72 per cent) and 'the way we elect our government' (74 per cent) recorded by the survey conducted on behalf of the Electoral Task Team (ETT) in 2002 (Mattes and Southall 2004: 53). However, whilst it is dangerous to comment on findings from surveys conducted relatively close together, any reduction in the level of trust for the IEC, as indicated by our present findings, must be regarded as disturbing, especially when they record popular opinion in the run-up to the general election of 2004. Even more alarming is the unfavourable attitude towards the IEC recorded amongst white people, more of whom (33 per cent) distrust than trust (29 per cent) the institution. (Interestingly, whilst 51 per cent of this group were satisfied with 'the way we elect our government' in the ETT survey, only 37 per cent felt that voters, and only 34 per cent felt that parties, were treated equally during the 1999 election.) Whilst the idea of a racial cleavage within the electorate has long been established, the extent to which some two-thirds of the white populace feel alienated from the electoral system and its institutions is clearly significant, even though it may well reflect unhappiness with electoral outcomes as much as actual dissatisfaction with electoral mechanisms.

Only slightly behind the IEC is the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), which enjoys the trust of 56 per cent of our respondents, support being significantly higher amongst black Africans (60 per cent) than amongst other population groups (white respondents recording the lowest trust levels at 39 per cent). Even allowing for any popular credit that may have accorded to the SANDF for a perceived fast pace of transformation, and notably its post-apartheid integration of the armed wings of the liberation movements, this is a high rating compared with other key

institutions – notably Parliament (trusted by 53 per cent) – which have been more demonstrably democratised. To be sure, the SANDF has received a good press because of its involvement in peacekeeping operations (such as in Burundi), but equally, perceptions of defence institutions would just as probably have taken a battering from widespread allegations about corruption and economic distortions resulting from the government's defence spending. Yet neither of these explanations appears satisfactory, and indeed the mystery is deepened by the similarly high trust rating (67 per cent) accorded by the Basotho to a defence force in Lesotho which, until recently, has been blatantly politically-aligned and an instrument of dictatorship. To be sure, even under apartheid, the military liked to present itself as apolitical, and merely as the efficient servant of the government of the day. Yet why such an image should have taken apparently firm root amongst the population of South Africa (and perhaps of southern Africa as a whole) needs further investigation.

The trust accorded to national government (55 per cent) is not only consistent with the 2001 survey (52 per cent) but is also higher than that recorded for provincial government (49 per cent) and local government (43 per cent – SASAS 2003; 38 per cent – Daniel & de Vos 2002: 21). It is also higher than the overall level of satisfaction with democracy that was recorded earlier. This may well be because the concept of 'national government' is more easily understood and/or has more partisan implications than 'democracy', and hence reflects wider support levels for the ANC, which is the predominant party of national government. Nonetheless, it is still low, given the nature of the transition in South Africa away from racially authoritarian to democratic rule, and especially given that nearly three in ten respondents actually record their distrust of national government as an institution. Meanwhile, only one in two South Africans appears to trust provincial government, and considerably less than half (43 per cent) trust local government. What is notable, and perhaps disturbing, is that whilst 51 per cent of our respondents agreed that provincial government serves to bring government closer to the people, the level of government which as a vehicle of delivery is actually closest to the people, namely local government, is that which in practice elicits the lowest levels of trust. Perhaps it is its very closeness which accounts for this, for the people have first-hand sight and knowledge of the failings and frailty of this sector. Their judgement is, therefore, much more personal than it is in relation to those sectors of government more remote from their lives.

In the light of recent events, the relatively high level of trust expressed for Parliament as an institution (53 per cent favourable as opposed to 25 per cent expressing distrust) should be noted. It will be interesting to see whether the 2004 survey reflects a more negative trend in the light of the 'horse-trading' and reports of monies being exchanged in regard to the floor-crossing exercise and the evidence of apparent corruption, if not criminality, emerging from the 'travelgate' scandal.[5]

The lowest levels of trust are recorded for the police (41 per cent) and the courts (47 per cent), both institutions with which a high proportion of the black African population will have had negative contact historically, although interestingly support levels for both are almost as low amongst white as amongst black African respondents. Both findings may reflect the high concern accorded by South Africans to the incidence of crime in the country. Crime and safety (19 per cent) were listed by our respondents as second only to poverty (39 per cent) as one of the three most important challenges facing South Africa; overall it is clear that much needs to be done if the public images of both institutions are to be enhanced.

Daniel and de Vos (2002: 23) argued on the basis of the 2001 survey that 'overall, business, the media, and non-governmental organisations such as the church were more trusted by the public than government institutions, although white South Africans displayed a much greater degree of trust in business than blacks did'. On the whole, this continues to be the case, although on the basis of SASAS 2003 it does need to be qualified, as national government (trusted by 55 per cent) is now more trusted than business (50 per cent). It should also be noted that black African support for business (51 per cent) is now recorded as actually higher than that of white support (46 per cent).[6]

The one significant and satisfying feature of the 2003 survey is that almost across the board, trust levels in the key institutions of the 'new' South Africa are up on two years ago, with the exception of the IEC. That drop is likely to be reversed in the next survey, given the overwhelming organisational success of the 2004 national election and the widespread praise heaped on it for its efforts. Nonetheless, as argued by Daniel and de Vos (2002: 27), much still needs to be done if state institutions, as presently structured, are to be adequately grounded in popular attitudes.

The socio-political attitudes of South Africans

We return at this point to the earlier reference to the conservative nature of South African attitudes in relation to a number of social issues that have relevance to political attitudes. These include racism and racial discrimination, capital punishment and abortion, all of which remain controversial themes in the ongoing national political discourse. It is not our intention to examine these attitudes in close detail, as that is done elsewhere in this volume in Chapter 12 by Stephen Rule and Bongiwe Mncwango, as well as in Chapter 5 by Marlene Roefs. However, what is of interest to us is how out of sync the generally conservative to reactionary social attitudes of South Africans are with the principles and values underlying the Constitution.

The issue of capital punishment is perhaps where this disjuncture is most stark. In what was its first really significant judgement, the Constitutional Court abolished capital punishment in terms of the principle of the right to life. This decision had

– and still has – the support of the ANC's leadership. Former President Mandela is on record as saying that the ANC will never reintroduce the death penalty, and there is no doubt that the issue touches a deep emotional scar in many of those in power today who watched helplessly as fellow comrades and activists went to the gallows, some on trumped-up or overblown charges. Yet, as Rule and Mncwango observe, three out of four South Africans (75 per cent) favour, and one out of two (50 per cent) strongly favours, the reintroduction of capital punishment for a murder conviction. Only a small minority (18 per cent) sides with the government on this issue.

The government is also at odds with mainstream public opinion on the issue of abortion. Here only 21 per cent agree with the state's legalisation of abortion, while overall 74 per cent of respondents regard abortion to be wrong in some respect. Over half of those polled (56 per cent) disapprove of abortion even where there is a strong chance of the baby suffering a serious defect.

Much the same applies to the issue of homosexuality. Gay and lesbian rights are enshrined in the Constitution, making South Africa one of a minority of states to have enacted these rights. Gay and lesbian marches, film festivals and the like now form a familiar part of the national landscape. Yet only 7 per cent of respondents thought that gay sex was not wrong at all, while a majority of South Africans (78 per cent) thought it was always wrong and a further 9 per cent thought that it was wrong to some degree.

An interesting question that these issues raise in our minds is why the African Christian Democratic Party, which has the restoration of capital punishment and opposition to abortion as central planks in its policy platform and which claims a strongly Christian ideology, attracts only about 2 per cent of the national vote. The answer probably lies in the overwhelming 'pulling power' of the ANC as the deliverer of liberation. This factor, at this stage in the political life of democratic South Africa, overrides all other issues, be they ideological, religious, ethnic or of any other nature.

Another feature of current mainstream public opinion in South Africa is its hostility to outsiders. This is not as hardline as the attitudes discussed earlier. In fact, as shown by Grossberg, Struwig and Pillay in Chapter 4 of this volume, opinion is split three ways and in almost equal proportions. An estimated 34 per cent of South Africans state that they welcome all immigrants irrespective of their national origins, 34 per cent welcome some immigrants on a selective basis, while 32 per cent are hostile to all immigrants. When asked which groups of immigrants are least welcome in South Africa, the respondents placed foreign Africans at the top of the list: 28 per cent of respondents were opposed to other African immigrants, four times more than the figure for the next two categories which were Americans and returning South Africans (both at 8 per cent). What this boils down to is that black South Africans oppose the entry to South Africa of other black Africans. This hostility to fellow black Africans runs contrary to popular discourses around such issues as

African solidarity, brotherhood and so on, and contrary, too, to the principles of pan-Africanism and the ideological underpinnings of the African Renaissance, the New Partnership for African Development and the Charter of the African Union. What this question failed to probe is what underpins this hostility to other Africans. We suspect it is less bigotry (although that would not be totally absent) than the fact that in a context of mass unemployment, those with no foothold, or only a precarious one, in the job market regard foreigners as competitors in their quest for a scarce resource – a job.

The one area where there appears to have been some softening of attitudes is in the sphere of race and race relations. Questioned as to whether they thought race relations in South Africa had improved, 55 per cent stated that they had, up from 42 per cent in the 2001 survey. In addition, a slight drop was recorded in the percentages of those who thought they had grown worse – 15 per cent in 2001 and 13 per cent in 2003. Also heartening, given our history, was the fact that a majority of respondents (54 per cent) stated that there were no racial groups in South Africa which they did not like. Those that affirmed that there were racial groups they did not like constituted 39 per cent. Overall nationally, the white population group was the most distrusted (28 per cent), except in the Western and Northern Cape provinces where black Africans were most distrusted at 48 per cent and 43 per cent respectively. Given the large coloured populations in these two provinces, what this probably represents is the continuing prejudice of many coloured people towards black Africans.

With regard to discrimination, only 31 per cent of respondents felt that they were victims of one form of prejudice or another. Of those, two-thirds or 67 per cent felt that they were discriminated against on grounds of race. Though high, this was down on 2001 when 73 per cent of respondents cited race as the grounds for their disadvantage. Significantly, the second most cited grounds for discrimination (10 per cent) was that of 'not working' or unemployment. As noted earlier, only 0.5 per cent of respondents cited gender as grounds for their discrimination.

The disjuncture between public attitudes and constitutionally-enshrined rights is not limited only to areas of social behaviour. It is manifest, too, in the realm of liberal political rights. Freedom of speech and the right to know/access to information are central pillars of the Constitution. In terms of these rights, Parliament has enacted freedom of information legislation which is gradually beginning to open up doors previously locked and bolted. Yet, in a series of questions designed to test the public's attitude to what in our view is one of the most basic of rights, 56.1 per cent of respondents accepted a view (20.3 per cent strongly so) that governments should have the power to control information given to the public, with 28.3 per cent disagreeing. By political party, the IFP most strongly took this view, with slightly over two-thirds of IFP supporters (67.6 per cent) holding this view. This was not particularly surprising to us, but the fact that the ANC was close behind with two-thirds (66.1 per cent) of its supporters sharing this view, was surprising.

In response to a related question, namely, whether government should have the authority to prevent criticism, the results were somewhat similar although the gap between the pro- and anti-clusters was narrower. In this case, 44.3 per cent of respondents supported the restrictive position in contrast to 41.3 per cent opposing it. By party, the ANC topped the IFP in this respect with over half of ANC supporters polled (53.7 per cent) in favour and 36.8 per cent opposed. Most strongly opposed was the DA, with 73.2 per cent registering their opposition to restrictions on the free expression of views.

For those commentators who have pointed to what they see as centralising and authoritarian tendencies on the part of the current ANC leadership, and of the Mbeki regime in general, these latter figures will be fuel for the fire. They will convince these commentators that South Africa under the ANC is destined to join the well-filled ranks of African dictatorships. We do not accept that view but we do feel, however, that the statistics suggest that no one should take for granted even some of the most basic of the rights which South Africans have enjoyed since 1994.

Conclusion

Overall, one of our conclusions from this look at the country's commitment to, and trust in, democracy and its institutions and processes is that there is an incrementally positive trend, with small increases in confidence in national governance and the like. The survey of public attitudes on social and political issues reveals, as we noted earlier, a gap between the majority public view and the rights' regime of the Constitution. Does this suggest that in years to come there could be a series of constitutional amendments to bring the Constitution in line with the public view? Could we, for example, expect the restoration of capital punishment or a limiting of the right to abortion? We think not. In fact, we suggest that there might be an opposite process with the public gradually shifting its collective view to one which accepts and embraces the positions currently reflected in the Constitution. In this regard, we see the government assuming a vanguard leadership role around these contentious issues in which, rather than pandering to the public's views, it is attempting to reshape those views. It is leading from the front, so to speak. Its success or otherwise in this regard will be an important issue which the HSRC will continue to map in the years ahead.

Notes

1 All quotes are taken from an article by Richard Morin in the *Washington Post* (31.03.2004) headed 'Despite Deep Woes, Democracy Instills Hope'. This was the first part of a two-part article reporting on a national survey of South African public opinion conducted in the last quarter of 2003 by the *Washington Post* for the Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard University.

2 In 2004 the Massachusetts Supreme Court became the first United States court to declare same-sex marriages to be legal. The court is headed by Chief Justice Margaret Marshall, a former South African who in 1967 served a term as president of the National Union of South African Students.

3 Three cases come to mind where the Court has ruled against the state. The first is the Grootboom case, where the Court upheld the rights of squatters to land; the second is the Richtersveld case, where the Court upheld the rights to restitution of a community dispossessed under apartheid of land which was then given over to the South African Defence Force; the ANC wished to leave the land in the hands of the military. In the third case, the judgement upheld the Treatment Action Campaign's demand for the state to provide antiretroviral drugs for HIV/AIDS sufferers.

4 The 1998 data come from a nationally representative attitudinal survey, entitled 'Reality check: South Africans' views of the new South Africa', conducted in November and December 1998 by the Kaiser Family Foundation together with the Independent Newspapers Group.

5 'Travelgate' is the scandal that emerged in 2004 over the misuse of travel vouchers by South African Members of Parliament (MPs). The MPs allegedly colluded with several travel agents to make false claims and inflate the prices of air tickets in order to cover the costs of luxury car rentals and hotel accommodation.

6 This is perhaps a result of publicity given to the government's black empowerment initiatives.

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3 *Voting behaviour and attitudes in a post-apartheid South Africa*

Sanusha Naidu

Introduction

Since South Africa's first democratic election in 1994, it has become commonplace in mainstream academia and among many analysts to interpret the electoral outcomes as ethnicity- or race-based. This approach is based on the view that, considering South Africa's history of racial polarisation, it should not be surprising that the electorate tends to vote largely along racial lines. However, opponents of this hypothesis tend to disagree. Instead, they argue that the race census argument treats race as an independent, objective variable, without considering the strong overlaps between racial and class categories, and tends to oversimplify the correlation between racial categories and voting patterns by simply interpreting it as causation (Habib and Taylor 2001). Following the third democratic election of 2004 the race census debate is still being contested (Habib and Naidu 2004). The key issue at stake is whether the race census argument can help to advance South Africa beyond its deeply divided racial history, and towards the establishment of a viable parliamentary opposition and the consolidation of democracy in its second decade of freedom. Against this backdrop, and as a contribution to the debate about voting behaviour and attitudes in South Africa, this chapter will interrogate the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2003 data and attempt to elucidate electoral trends that emerged in the 2004 national elections.

The dominant view

The race census argument advances the view that voting patterns in South Africa resemble a prism of racialised politics because racial and ethnic political identities predominate among the citizenry, with black Africans voting for 'black parties' and white people for 'white parties'. This interpretation is justified by the election results in all three national polls where the dominance of the African National Congress (ANC) and the inability of opposition parties to capture the black African vote appear to conform to the widely accepted thesis that the members of the electorate conceptualise and identify themselves in racial terms that govern their electoral behaviour (Giliomee and Simkins 1999). The 1994 electoral outcomes, in particular, provided a basis for this conceptualisation. The historic nature of the 1994 elections led commentators like Guelke (1996) and Johnson (1996) to conclude that the

elections were an ethnic/racial census while others (Southall 1994; Lodge 1995) saw them as a 'liberation census'. Polarisation in the voting patterns observed in the 1994 elections led Southall to conclude that 'the newly enfranchised African majority very evidently conceived the election as the culmination of decades of the struggle against apartheid, and as an inauguration of a new era of majority rule' (1994: 91). According to Southall the latter reflected 'an historically determined division of the electorate into camps of colonisers and the colonised, represented primarily by the National Party (NP) and the African National Congress (ANC) respectively' (1994: 86). Such a conceptualisation led Reynolds to deduce that 'while there was a high degree of correlation between ethnicity and voting behaviour in 1994, this did imply an unthinking or "irrational" vote' (Reynolds 1999: 176). In essence what these analysts were alluding to was the fact that the racialised predictability of the 1994 election results was logical considering the legacy of social engineering under colonialism and apartheid and the significance of the election in terms of launching democracy in a post-apartheid South Africa. Considering the latter, could we have expected the electoral outcome in the 1994 elections to be anything other than a race census?

The hegemony of the racial factor in electoral behaviour, however, did not abate with the euphoria of the 1994 elections. In 1999 academic analysts and media commentators once again drew on the fact of South Africa being a highly divided society, which, in their view, marked the continuing significance of race and ethnicity. In the week after the election, an editorial in the *Mail & Guardian* stated: 'There is mounting concern that after our second democratic election, South Africa is more racially divided than ever' (*Mail & Guardian* 11–17 June 1999). Themba Sono, writing in *The Star*, argued that '[b]eneath the veneer of civilised discourse… [there] exists among most South Africans a hardened racial crust' (8 June 1999). Certainly the 1999 elections illuminated instances of the race and ethnic census thesis; this was especially true in the way politics informed opposition-party campaigning.

The logic of racial arithmetic was self-evident within opposition parties. The NP and the Democratic Party/Democratic Alliance (DP/DA), in particular, 'prioritised their campaign issues in relation to how particular issues correlated to the interests of their specific racial and ethnic group support as revealed in opinion poll data' (Taylor and Hoeane 1999: 136). In this regard the NP and especially the DP/DA focused on a negative (anti-ANC) campaign invoking the spectre of an ANC two-thirds majority. This tactic implicitly linked domination to racial politics and implied that black Africans were going to oppress white people (Taylor and Hoeane 1999: 136). Moreover, the main opposition parties used this tactic to consciously appeal to the insecurities of the coloured and Indian/Asian minorities who were uncertain of the new South Africa and to frighten these groups into voting for them by playing up the 'politics of exclusion'. As such the DP/DA was able to successfully capture the conservative Afrikaner vote, as well as some coloured and a fair number of Indian/Asian votes, to replace the NP as the official opposition in the National Assembly.

Other evidence from the 1999 elections which reaffirmed the significance of the racial/ethnic census thesis was the resurrection of Lucas Mangope in the North West province, and the regional support received by the United Democratic Movement (UDM) in the Eastern Cape. In the case of the United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP), Mangope was able to exploit ethnic divisions by appealing to Setswana-speaking citizens, describing the ANC as a 'Xhosa-led' party. He also appealed to the politics of exclusion by arguing that under Xhosa rule life for Tswana people was deteriorating. On the other hand, even though the UDM used the ethnic card, it did so more subtly by proclaiming that the party represented all Xhosa interests and emphasised that the ANC had neglected tradition and rural development. It would seem that the support that the UCDP and the UDM garnered from ethnic groupings in their respective provinces lifted these parties to the position of official opposition in the North West and Eastern Cape respectively, and signalled the re-emergence of ethnic politics. In sum, the evidence from the 1999 elections pointed to the continuing significance of race and ethnicity. Moreover, it vindicated the pundits of the discourse who reaffirmed that the election results conformed to racial and ethnic bloc voting.

SASAS 2003

In the run-up to the 2004 national democratic elections, the race and ethnicity debate once again came to the fore. Speculation remained high about whether the ANC would garner a two-thirds majority at the polls, while opposition parties were hoping to make some significant inroads into the former's dominance. Eight months before the April 2004 election the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) embarked upon SASAS 2003. As part of the study, respondents were asked to speculate about their intended voting behaviour in the upcoming 2004 elections. Of interest in this regard was determining whether the electoral behaviour of South Africans did, indeed, conform to the conventional wisdom of the race or ethnic census argument. The methodology employed to discern the results from this component of the study used discriminant analysis. This statistical technique used the biographical characteristics of SASAS respondents who indicated the party for which they intended to vote, to impute the probable votes of the one-third (33 per cent) of SASAS respondents who did not reveal their voting intentions (Rule, Zuma, Orkin and Pillay 2004). Whereas the proportion of 'unknowns' was only 28 per cent amongst black Africans, it was much higher for the other groups (the coloured group 45 per cent, the white group 50 per cent and the Indian/Asian group 60 per cent). The results in Table 3.1 are based on this technique.

Table 3.1 *Imputed ethnic support within each party*

	ANC	DA	IFP	UDM	NNP	ACDP	Other	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
White	0	76	2	3	13	20	24	12
Coloured	5	11	0	0	57	29	12	9
Indian/Asian*	1	4	14*	0	6	3	6	3
Black non-Zulu	74	6	1	97	15	48	46	54
Black Zulu	20	2	83	0	9	0	13	23
Other	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Total**	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: IFP = Inkatha Freedom Party; NNP = New National Party; ACDP = African Christian Democratic Party
* An anomaly emerged in the prediction of a 14 per cent Indian/Asian share of the IFP vote owing to a misallocation in the discriminant analysis of many 'unknown' Indian/Asian voters to the IFP by virtue of the majority of this group being resident in KwaZulu-Natal, the country's only IFP electoral stronghold. Election results demonstrated that this was not the case, the ANC, DA and Minority Front (MF) being the major beneficiaries of the 'unknown' Indian/Asian vote.
** Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Table 3.1 reflects the ethnic support within each party. Almost two-thirds of support within the ANC is from non-Zulu black Africans (74 per cent). Numerically, this manifests itself as almost one-quarter isiXhosa-speaking, with most of the balance spread across the other main non-Zulu black language groups, namely Sesotho, Setswana and Sepedi. However, almost one-quarter of ANC support does come from isiZulu-speakers.

In contrast, the 83 per cent Zulu black African support within the IFP is indicative of the fact that the party is Zulu-based and appeals to Zulu nationalism. The 76 per cent white support within the DA again highlights what is common knowledge. But the latter, also reflected in Table 3.2, demonstrates this party's inability to broaden its support base, especially amongst black African voters, which has important implications for its prospects of consolidating its position as the official opposition in government. As long as the DA's racial profile remains predominantly white, the party's chances of capturing the black African vote will remain elusive. This is because the party's electoral issues appear to remain contradictory and unconvincing to the majority black electorate. As long as the party's leader, Tony Leon, attacks President Mbeki over Zimbabwe and continues to appear to appease its white constituency by remaining steadfast on the death penalty (which in fact has majority support amongst all races; see Chapter 12 by Rule and Mncwango in this volume), the party will be seen as conveying anti-black sentiment. This, indeed, marginalises the black African voters who are less convinced that they can be accommodated within the party. In the case of the NNP, its dominant support base, though dramatically diminished, remained coloured voters. Of interest, however, is the 20 per cent Zulu black African support within the ANC. Although not significant, the latter reflects

an interesting trend, namely that the ANC was making critical inroads into the Zulu vote at the time of the survey; this trend manifested itself in the ANC victory in KwaZulu-Natal in the April 2004 elections. In 1999, the IFP had only marginally managed to beat the ANC in the province (42 per cent versus 39 per cent).

Table 3.2 *Imputed party support within each ethnic group*

		ANC	DA	IFP	UDM	NNP	ACDP	Other	Total
White	%	2	82	1	0	8	1	7	100
Coloured	%	36	15	0	0	44	1	4	100
Indian/Asian*	%	17	18	45*	0	13	0	7	100
Black non-Zulu	%	91	1	0	2	2	0	3	100
Black Zulu	%	60	1	34	0	3	0	2	100
Other	%	32	55	0	0	13	0	0	100
Total**	%	67	12	9	1	7	0	3	100

* An anomaly emerged in the prediction that 45 per cent of South African Indian/Asian voters would vote for the IFP owing to a misallocation in the discriminant analysis of many 'unknown' Indian/Asian voters to the IFP by virtue of the majority of this group being resident in KwaZulu-Natal, the country's only IFP electoral stronghold. Election results demonstrated that this was not the case, significant numbers in fact opting for the small KwaZulu-Natal-based MF, as well as the larger DA and ANC.
** Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

The dominance of the ANC amongst non-Zulu (91 per cent) as well as Zulu black Africans (60 per cent) is notable. This again reaffirms the ANC's support base, especially amongst non-Zulu black Africans. Interesting, though, is party support for the ANC amongst Zulu black Africans, which is 60 per cent compared to the IFP's 34 per cent. (An anomaly emerged in relation to the Indian/Asian vote, owing to its massive 60 per cent non-disclosure of voting intention. The imputation allocated many of the 'unknowns' to the IFP, which election results subsequently showed not to be the case.)

The NNP emerged as the party of choice for coloured respondents (44 per cent). This was consistent with the 1999 election voting trends, where the NNP lost the conservative white Afrikaner vote to the DP but retained its presence amongst coloured voters particularly in the Western Cape. The 2004 election, however, revealed a further serious haemorrhage of NNP support during the months between the conducting of the survey and the April voting day, leaving the NNP with a mere 2 per cent of votes cast. Many coloured voters appeared to have given their support to the ANC, the DA or the newly formed Independent Democrats (ID).

Table 3.3 *Imputed party vote within each age group*

		ANC	DA	IFP	UDM	NNP	ACDP	Other	Total
16–24	%	70	10	8	2	6	0	3	100
25–34	%	76	6	8	1	6	0	2	100
35–49	%	61	18	8	1	8	0	4	100
50+	%	61	15	13	1	6	1	3	100
Total*	%	67	12	9	1	7	0	3	100

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Party support across all age groups reflects an overall affinity with the ANC. For the IFP, support across the age groups appears constant with a slightly higher percentage of 13 per cent in the 50+ category. This appears to be consistent with the overall profile of the IFP. Its appeal to Zulu nationalism and attachment to tribal identity find greater resonance amongst the older generation of supporters, who are mainly located in the rural areas. The NNP, on the other hand, demonstrates a fairly even showing across all the age categories. The slightly higher percentage found in the 35–49 age category (8 per cent) is again indicative of the conservative element found amongst coloured respondents in this category. This conservatism can be linked to issues of employment insecurity and the uncertainty of sustainable livelihoods, especially given the prevailing uncertainty about prospects in the fishing industry, which is probably a source of income for many in this category. The DA also finds that its presence amongst all age categories is more or less even, but with a higher presence in the older categories. This could be a reflection of the older average age of white voters in comparison with their black African counterparts.

Table 3.4 *Imputed age distribution within each party*

	ANC	DA	IFP	UDM	NNP	ACDP	Other	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
16–24	24	19	20	37	22	18	23	23
25–34	29	13	23	22	23	24	19	26
35–49	26	40	25	18	36	4	39	28
50+	21	27	32	23	20	54	19	23
Total*	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

The age distribution of support within each party also reflects a fairly consistent level of support for the ANC across age groups, though with slightly higher than average support from those younger than 35. There is less consistency in support

across the age groups within the DA, IFP, NNP and UDM. Amongst ACDP and IFP voters 54 per cent and 32 per cent respectively are over 50, while amongst DA and NNP voters 40 per cent and 36 per cent respectively are aged 35–49. Interestingly, support in these parties appears to peak amongst the older age categories. The UDM, on the other hand, appears to garner a relatively high proportion of its support from the 16–24 age group. This could be attributed to its regional support base in the Eastern Cape, where poverty and unemployment are endemic with the youth being most adversely affected.

Table 3.5 *Imputed gender distribution of votes for each party*

	ANC	DA	IFP	UDM	NNP	ACDP	Other	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Female	52	50	64	41	60	35	50	53
Male	48	50	36	59	40	65	50	47
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: SASAS (2003)

While the gender distribution of votes within the ANC and the DA appears fairly even, for the other parties there are stark contrasts. Amongst IFP and NNP voters 64 per cent and 60 per cent respectively are females whereas only 36 per cent and 40 per cent respectively are males. On the other hand, amongst ACDP and UDM voters the converse is true, with male voters forming majorities of 65 per cent and 59 per cent respectively. This dichotomy in the gender representation for these parties highlights interesting dynamics around the issue of the gendered vote.

Table 3.6 *Imputed male vote for each party within each ethnic group*

		ANC	DA	IFP	UDM	NNP	ACDP	Other	Total
White	%	3	80	2	0	6	1	8	100
Coloured	%	40	19	0	0	35	0	7	100
Indian/Asian*	%	17	27	35*	0	17	0	4	100
Black non-Zulu	%	92	2	0	3	1	1	2	100
Black Zulu	%	67	1	27	0	2	0	3	100
Other	%	57	20	0	0	23	0	0	100
Total**	%	69	13	7	2	6	0	3	100

* An anomaly emerged in the prediction of a high proportion of Indian/Asian votes for the IFP. This occurred owing to a misallocation in the discriminant analysis of many 'unknown' Indian/Asian voters to the IFP by virtue of the majority of this group being resident in KwaZulu-Natal, the country's only IFP electoral stronghold. Election results demonstrated that this was not the case, with many of these votes in fact being cast in favour of the small KwaZulu-Natal-based MF, as well as the larger DA and ANC.
** Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Table 3.7 *Imputed female vote for each party within each ethnic group*

		ANC	DA	IFP	UDM	NNP	ACDP	Other	Total
White	%	1	83	1	1	9	0	6	100
Coloured	%	31	12	0	0	53	2	2	100
Indian/Asian*	%	17	7	56*	0	10	1	10	100
Black non-Zulu	%	91	1	0	2	2	0	3	100
Black Zulu	%	55	1	40	0	3	0	1	100
Other	%	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	100
Total**	%	66	12	11	1	7	0	3	100

* See note for previous table.
** Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Conventional wisdom suggests that poorer classes in society will support parties to the left, while the middle class and more privileged layers will throw in their lot with parties on the right of the political spectrum. While the former have a material interest in fundamentally changing the political and socio-economic arrangements in society, the latter prefer the retention of the status quo. The translation of this logic into party-political support in South Africa would see the ANC receive support from the poor of all communities while the opposition parties would be the beneficiaries of the middle- and upper-middle-class vote. This, then, suggests that the ANC should be the vanguard party for the poor and the lower middle classes. An assessment of Tables 3.8 and 3.9 will provide further insight into this argument.

Table 3.8 *Imputed distribution of party support within each personal monthly income category*

		ANC	DA	IFP	UDM	NNP	ACDP	Other	Total
No income	%	73	7	11	1	6	0	2	100
R1–R500	%	76	2	14	2	3	0	4	100
R501–R1 500	%	71	4	12	1	10	1	2	100
R1 501–R5 000	%	39	30	12	1	13	0	6	100
R5 001+	%	28	46	7	0	8	1	10	100
Refuse/uncertain/ don't know	%	48	30	7	1	11	0	3	100
Total*	%	66	12	11	1	7	0	3	100

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Amongst those with a personal monthly income of R1 500 and less, the ANC is the dominant party of choice. However, as personal income increases, shifts in party support become significant. Whereas support for the ANC demonstrates a

dramatic decline amongst those with a personal income of over R1 500, for the DA the converse is true. That support for the DA should increase amongst those with a personal income of over R1 500 and peak amongst those earning R5 001+ should not be surprising, given that the results in this survey show that the DA support base is mainly white, and probably conforms to this profile.

Like the ANC, the IFP is a party of choice amongst the poorer sections of society, peaking at 14 per cent for those with a personal income between R1 and R500. These are probably residents of the rural areas where the party garners most of its support. Of significance, though, are those who refused to declare or were uncertain about their personal income. Amongst this category, the ANC was the preferred choice with 48 per cent of respondents intending to cast their vote for the party. The profile of these respondents could be the newly emergent black African elite as well as those from the Indian/Asian and coloured groups. The fact that the DA is the only other party to have significant support within this group (30 per cent), reaffirms the party's support base.

Table 3.9 *Imputed distribution of party support by monthly personal income category*

	ANC	DA	IFP	UDM	NNP	ACDP	Other	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
No income	48	24	44	35	33	12	33	43
R1–R500	16	2	18	27	6	0	16	14
R501–R1 500	20	7	20	21	25	54	13	19
R1 501–R5 000	4	16	7	4	10	0	13	6
R5 001+	1	10	2	0	3	6	9	3
Refuse/uncertain/ don't know	11	40	10	13	23	28	17	16
Total*	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

The income profile of supporters within parties illustrates interesting dynamics. From Table 3.9 it is apparent that support for the ANC is predominantly amongst those with a monthly personal income of R1 500 or less. The same can also be said of the IFP. For the DA, however, the majority of the support seems to be derived from those in the higher income brackets of R1 501+ and peaks amongst those who refused to disclose or were uncertain of their monthly income. The income profile of NNP supporters emerges as strongest amongst those earning R1 500 or less.

So what do Tables 3.8 and 3.9 tell us about the conventional wisdom? It does appear from the results that patterns of voting behaviour based on income distribution conform to the conventional wisdom noted earlier. Generally, it would seem that

amongst the lower income groups and the economically marginalised, the ANC is the party of choice, whereas within the higher income brackets (predominately white) opposition parties, in particular the DA, are preferred. What this demonstrates is the historical link between race and resources, which still impacts on post-apartheid South Africa and may account for some of the continuing racial polarisation of party politics.

Conclusion

In the light of the April 2004 election results, this chapter reflects on the SASAS 2003 responses to the question about the parties for which South Africans intended to vote. The issue at hand was the extent to which voting patterns effectively constitute a race census paradigm. Undoubtedly, racial considerations will remain a reality in South Africa's future history. It would be unreasonable to assume that they will not, given the fact that the country has only in the last decade begun the long and arduous task of transcending the racism bequeathed by over 350 years of white domination. Given this reality, it does appear 'normal' that the majority of black South Africans will vote along racial lines. But does this mean that there is an automatic correlation between racial identities and electoral behaviour, as is assumed in the racial census thesis? And how, then, do we explain the electoral behaviour of those within the Indian/Asian and coloured groups who have identified with white opposition parties? Did they do so out of fear that a black African government would discriminate against them? A cursory reflection on the data presented does reveal that voting behaviour is, indeed, largely prescribed by racial identity. Yet deeper consideration and analysis of this argument demonstrates a more complex picture, influenced by a matrix of issues.

Firstly, while policy proposals and election manifestos of the various political parties illustrate a degree of ideological convergence, the manner in which they informed the campaign strategies of many of the larger opposition parties appeared to make crude racial assumptions about the South African electorate. A party's assumption that certain issues are of relevance only to certain racial and ethnic groups tends to influence sections of the electorate to judge that party as not representing their interests. In effect the racial credentials of parties, particularly those of the larger opposition parties, lead the majority of the electorate, especially black Africans, to see opposition parties like the DA as being exclusive instead of inclusive. This exclusivity is viewed in racial terms.

A second consideration, related to the first, is the apparent *swart gevaar* tactic employed by opposition parties to 'frighten' minorities into voting for them. This tactic tends to assume that material issues and interests overlap with race. Opposition parties play on the material vulnerability of individuals within minority groups. Habib and Naidu (1999) demonstrated this in their article entitled 'Election '99: Was there a "coloured" and "Indian" vote?', in which they challenged the notion

that the South African election was a racial census and interrogated the assumption that groups vote as homogeneous blocs. The results of the 1999 election showed distinct correlations between income categories and voting behaviour. Durban's Phoenix and Chatsworth districts, where the majority of residents are South African Indians with an average household income (at the time) of less than R2 500, were decisively won by the DP and NNP respectively. In contrast, the ANC performed well in Indian/Asian-dominated areas where the converse was true (i.e. with higher average household incomes), such as Lenasia in Gauteng. The same was true for areas with coloured majorities.

Given that the data draw on responses from respondents as of October 2003, it is worthwhile to draw correlations with the 2004 election outcomes concerning the significance of the race census thesis. On the whole, the significant overall (70 per cent) electoral support for the ANC (especially amongst black Africans, coloured and Indian/Asian people), suggests that citizens' voting behaviour is less determined by racial identities than expected. This is demonstrated by two examples. Firstly, amongst the poor components of the Indian/Asian and coloured electorate, movement towards the ANC was evident in the 2004 electoral results. In Phoenix, a large working-class Indian/Asian township that lies on the outskirts of Durban, the ANC was the biggest winner, where its share at the polls increased from 9 per cent in 1999 to 25 per cent in 2004. The DA, on the other hand, which had significant support (39 per cent) in the area during the 1999 elections, only managed to capture 1 of the 31 voting districts in 2004. Moreover, its overall support in the township fell from 39 per cent to 25 per cent. Similar trends were recorded in Chatsworth and other working-class Indian/Asian townships, while the ANC also consolidated its strength in more middle-class Indian/Asian suburbs where it had previously enjoyed some support. In the Western Cape, increased working-class support for the ANC occurred in coloured communities. In the April 2004 election the ANC remained the largest player in the province and, together with the NNP, constituted a majority there.

Secondly, the right-of-centre IFP's poorer showing at the polls in 2004 is an indication that the appeal of Zulu nationalism is in decline, the ANC having managed a fairly sophisticated campaign that penetrated all levels of society. As a result the ANC garnered 47 per cent of the vote and emerged as the largest political actor amongst isiZulu-speaking people in KwaZulu-Natal. While it was harder to determine the electoral behaviour of Indian/Asian respondents, given the small sample size within the survey, the shift in support amongst isiZulu-speaking respondents towards the ANC was evident when the data were disaggregated by race, age, gender and personal income.

The failure of left-leaning black opposition parties (like the UDM) to offer any serious challenge to the ANC's dominance at the polls was also reflected in the data.

Their own policy programmes had clearly not found resonance in the black African community. For instance, while the Pan Africanist Congress's (PAC) prioritisation of land redistribution constitutes recognition of a critical need, the African electorate was conscious that their material conditions are affected by a matrix of interrelated issues of which land is only one. Indeed, this turns the dominant race census thesis on its head.

The evidence from the 2004 election outcomes suggests that other emergent identities are beginning to soften the stark dichotomies of race that linger ten years after the demise of apartheid. This will be further elucidated in future SASAS surveys, on the basis of which more sophisticated analyses will be possible, in relation to race, electoral behaviour and the process by which the South African electorate arrives at its choices. For now though, it must be noted that the blanket application of the race census argument in interpreting our elections cannot be applied uniformly without explaining the anomalies of why left-leaning black opposition parties are not able to garner support away from the ANC, and why there is an apparent decline in Zulu nationalism. Thus, although race in many ways figures as a factor in daily realities and at times determines our social interactions, it is not the only variable or identity that structures citizen behaviour in South Africa. And such overlaps in identity invariably inform the behaviour of the electorate on election day.

Postscript

Projections of the outcome of the election made by the HSRC on the basis of SASAS, conducted in September 2003, were not far off the mark. Using discriminant analysis to predict the voting behaviour of survey respondents who did not declare their intentions, the HSRC made a forecast that the ANC would win 68 per cent of votes cast and 271 seats, followed at some distance by the DA with 11 per cent and 42 seats. This statistical technique used the biographical characteristics of SASAS respondents who indicated the party for which they intended to vote, to impute the probable votes of the one-third (33 per cent) of SASAS respondents who did not reveal their voting intentions (see Table 3.10). Whereas the proportion of 'unknowns' was only 28 per cent amongst black Africans, it was much higher for the other groups (the coloured group 45 per cent, the white group 50 per cent, the Indian/Asian group 60 per cent). The HSRC's predicted result was thus a relatively large imputed vote for the NNP in relation to the numbers who stated up front that this was their party of choice. The subsequent downward trajectory of NNP support was tracked by successive public opinion surveys by Markinor in November 2003 (6 per cent) and February 2004 (5 per cent). In the event, it is clear that many of these 'unknowns' actually voted for other parties, the NNP ending up with only 2 per cent of votes cast.

Table 3.10 *Comparing intended party support with actual 2004 general election outcomes*

Political party	HSRC prediction from SASAS, September 2003 survey	Actual election result (number of seats)
ANC	271	279
DA	42	50
IFP	28	28
NNP	35	7
UDM	7	9
PAC	2	3
AZAPO	2	2
FF+	2	4
ACDP	2	6
ID	2	7
UCDP	2	3
MF	1	2
AEB	1	0
Other	3	0

Note: AZAPO = Azanian People's Organisation; FF+ = Freedom Front Plus; AEB = Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging

The realised 69 per cent (279 seats) for the ANC and 12 per cent (50 seats) for the DA constituted electoral successes for the two main parties in excess of what our model had predicted. The haemorrhage of potential support for the NNP during the months between the SASAS survey in September 2003 and the election seven months later accounted for the substantial gains of the ANC and DA. The other major beneficiary of this trend was the ID, which at 2 per cent (7 seats) emerged with significantly more than the HSRC's predicted 0.4 per cent (2 seats). In addition, the IFP won precisely the 28 seats predicted, indicative of the power of discriminant analysis in imputing for the distinctive rural isiZulu-speaking support base of this party. The ACDP and FF+ performed substantially better than their predicted outcomes, with 6 and 4 seats respectively, instead of their anticipated 2 seats each.

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4 *Multicultural national identity and pride*

Arlene Grossberg, Jaré Struwig and Udesh Pillay

South Africa offers an example of a country with a short history of inclusive democracy, and a significant history of inter-group conflict and oppression (Eaton 2002: 50). As a result of apartheid, South African society has been characterised by a plurality of groups who have either been 'named' in terms of specific identities by others, or have 'claimed' exclusive identities for themselves. Individuals have defined themselves, or been defined, in terms of specific criteria, often constructed in response to political, social and economic dynamics. The primary – although not exclusive – identities that characterise and have created tensions within South Africa are based on racial, ethnic, religious, gender and linguistic groupings.

As an emerging liberal democracy, South Africa is faced with the challenges of consolidating fragile new democratic institutions and legitimising its new constitutional order. The aim of the process of nation-building has been to enable the growth of a common and shared loyalty towards the state and its institutions amongst all citizens, a loyalty that is able to transcend identities imposed by the former order and ascribed on the basis of race.

Social research has taken particular interest in a range of issues pertaining to national identity. However, there is a relative paucity of information on national identity and its relations to perceptions of democracy. Ten years into the new democracy, and the constitutional proscription of race-based discrimination,[1] we examine how various sectors of South African society construe an inclusive national identity and how this national identity relates to perceptions of democracy, to trust in the government and other key institutions in the democratic system, and to satisfaction with living conditions.

This chapter therefore aims to test the hypothesis that favourable socio-economic-political conditions promote a shared sense of nationhood and pride, and advance democratic consolidation. In order to test our hypothesis, we develop a measurement of national pride and identity and relate this to perceptions of democracy, institutional trust and satisfaction with living conditions. We begin with an analysis of what generally constitutes a sense of nationhood and pride. The chapter first deconstructs and defines key features of national identity and national pride, and discusses their interdependence.

We then pose this cluster of questions: What specifically constitutes a South African sense of nationhood and pride? Has South Africa's national identity strengthened or weakened? How do we compare with other countries that similarly have histories

of group contestations (eg. language or religion in Canada, Ireland and the United States)? We examine the association of such constructs as civic and ethnic national identity and pride in specific achievements, as conveyed in the 2003 South African Social Attitudes and 2003 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)[2] survey data. The political dimension of national pride is reflected in questions concerning pride in the way democracy works; political influence; economic achievements; the social security system; and equal treatment of different groups of people. Additionally, pride in sports, science, literary achievements, military forces and history reflects a cultural perspective which is more ambiguous. The history of a country, for example, means different things to different individuals, and has varied connotations. History, or common descent, however, is important, since what constitutes a nation is partly determined by its history.

In order to provide a framework for the debate, we turn our focus to an examination of similarities and disparities between supra-national, national, and sub-national constructs of a South African sense of nationhood. Analysis at different levels of a post-apartheid South African nationhood may reveal fundamental contradictions and complexities. The focus on the supra-national investigates the extent to which South Africans identify with the broader region or continent, whilst the focus on the sub-national attempts to distinguish constructs of a sense of nationhood and pride as perceived by different social groups who may have very different ways of imagining the nation. We question whether having supra- or sub-national identities would be in contestation with developing a strong, widely held sense of citizenship and national identity. In addition, we focus on national identity and pride disaggregated by race, language, ethnicity and gender. Our supporting argument is that post-apartheid realities may have shifted social alignments away from race to other entities such as class, culture, age, economic conditions, rural/urban differences, regional diversity and influences, or some combination of these. We also unravel common strands (such as sports) that could unite these disparate sectors and contribute towards development of a common and shared loyalty.

Finally, we develop a typology of national identity and pride in order to investigate associations between national identity, national pride and socio-politico-economic factors and living conditions.

Our conclusion contextualises our findings within a post-apartheid liberal democracy and makes recommendations as to the way forward.

Defining national identity

A growing body of literature has probed the meaning and role of national identity, both historically and in contemporary South Africa. In this section, we add perspectives from several scholars, notably Norris (1999), Castles and Miller (1993), Wardle (2004), Epstein (1995), Smith and Jarkko (2001), Guibernau (1995) and Hobsbawm (1990).

The precise definition of national identity is unclear. McCrone and Surridge remark that '[n]ational identity is one of the most discussed but least understood concepts of the late 20th century… it is subtle, elusive and contains many fragmented qualities bundled under one heading' (Norris 1999: 1).

According to Epstein (1995: 1), there is no single construction of the new South Africa – instead there are different although not necessarily intentional constructions, which are specific and relevant in nature. They favour specific forms of identity, which are not applicable to everyone who claims to be South African. Epstein states that national identities cannot be viewed as coherent and unified, but are constituted by specific differences. National identities and cultures are not fixed. They are shaped by various processes and are constantly open to change, redefinition and reconstruction (Epstein 1995: 21). There is a constant need to explore those processes that are responsible for the creation and recreation of national culture, identity and consciousness.

Identities are by nature social constructs. 'The real issue is how, from what, by whom and for what [identities are constructed]' (Castles and Miller 1993: 7). National identity can vary among individuals of the same nation. However, individual differences notwithstanding, people also think similarly regarding what makes them members of a nation. National identity can be seen as an awareness of affiliation with the nation that gives people a sense of who they are in relation to others, or infuses them with a sense of purpose that makes them feel at home (Keane 1994). Features of national identity include a historical territory, common myths and historic memories, a mass culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members (Castles and Miller 1993; Wardle 2004).

Affiliation to the nation can be explained through what Dijkink (in Castles and Miller 1993) refers to in territorial context as a 'prison of experience'. He asserts that there are already indications of 'political geographical socialisation' in very young children and argues that there is a basis for the thesis that persons born in the world are conditioned not only by the genes of their parents, but also by the genius of a time and place. The three arguments that support this view are that the culture-bound experiences of a person's formative years are difficult to extinguish in later life; that there is a particular structure of information-processing pertaining to each place; and that the daily impact of events and human activities creates what psychologists call an 'adaptation level' to style, sounds, quantities and solutions.

In order to conceptualise national identity, Smith (1991) divides the concept into civic and ethnic national identity. Civic national identity includes a well-defined territory, a community of laws and institutions, a single political will, equal rights for members of the nation and common values, traditions or sentiments that bind people together. Respect for institutions and laws and having citizenship are the factors central to the civic model. The ethnic model is characterised by common descent or perceived common descent, where the people are one.

Globalisation raises a central strategic issue in debates about the transformation of the nation-state and implications for national identity. Guibernau (1995) has observed that globalisation results in an affirmation of national identity. Globalisation is bringing about a radical transformation of the nation-state and opening up the way for alternative political units to develop and consolidate. At a time when traditional sources of identity such as class are weakening or receding, national identity seems to acquire an unexpected and powerful significance. According to Smith (1991), national identity can be broadly characterised as the cohesive force that both holds nation-states together and shapes their relationships with the family of nations (Smith and Jarkko 2001: 20).

The preceding scholarly analysis implies that the precise definition of national identity is unclear and that there are numerous constructs which are constantly open to change, redefinition and reconstruction. Therefore, ten years into the new democracy in South Africa, we want to determine how processes and changes over this period have defined a sense of nationhood.

Association of national identity, national pride and nationalism

Implicit within the paradigm of national identity is its association with national pride. Modernist scholars such as Hobsbawm (1990) have argued that distinguishing between states and asserting one's own supremacy create national pride, which in turn is the principle instrument in the development of the nation-state (Hastings 1997). Castles and Miller (1993) observe that national identity cannot be imagined without the feelings of trauma and pride that arise from external relations. In this respect, feelings of national identity and national pride are difficult to separate. Smith and Jarkko (2001) state that national pride is the positive sentiment that members of the public feel towards their country as a result of their national identity. It is both the pride and the sense of esteem that one has for one's nation and the pride or self-esteem that one derives from one's national identity.

For the purpose of this study, national identity and national pride are seen to be integral to a sense of nationhood, and to differ from nationalism. National identity is not synonymous with nationalism. National pride is related to feelings of patriotism and nationalism (a strong national devotion that places one's own country above all others). National pride coexists with patriotism and is a prerequisite of nationalism, but nationalism extends beyond national pride (Smith and Jarkko 2001).

What constitutes a South African sense of nationhood?

Ten years ago, Adam (1994: 46) stated that '[a] South African nation has yet to be born. South Africa at present constitutes an economic and political entity, but not an emotional one'. Five years later, Maré (1999) and Mattes (1999) asserted that although South Africa is a fragmented society, needing some form of integration

and cohesion and not having an ideological organising principle that could pull the society together, South Africans seemed to have developed rather quickly a common civic state nationalism. Data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2003 indicate a compelling loyalty to South Africa, with 83 per cent of respondents stating that they would rather be a citizen of South Africa than of any other country, and 93 per cent of South Africans being either very proud or somewhat proud of South Africa (Table 4.1). This reveals a strong allegiance to the country, and is an indication of a strong nationalist sentiment. It is, however, cautioned that South African history has demonstrated that such symbols of nationalism do not actually make a nation. Chidester, Dexter and James (2003: 307) assert that, given the diversity of language, culture and religion in South Africa, the post-apartheid government has sought ways to turn diversity from a potential obstacle to nationalism into a national resource, not in search of uniformity but as a means to achieve unity. The national flag, anthem, and sports were the basic ingredients of national cohesion in a new South Africa. These sentiments were echoed in 2003 by the then Deputy Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, Brigitte Mabandla, who commented, 'We have embarked on an exciting new voyage of discovery as we begin to explore and define who we are as a people' (Chidester et al. 2003: 295).

Table 4.1 *Percentage of people by race agreeing to the following statements*

Statement	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Total
Would rather be a citizen of South Africa than any other country (%)	88	68	81	65	83
Base	*1 881*	*221*	*68*	*287*	*2 457*
Very proud or somewhat proud of being South African (%)	94	94	96	86	93
Base	*1 881*	*221*	*68*	*285*	*2 459*

Source: SASAS (2003)

With regard to a sense of nationhood, South Africa rates relatively highly in comparison with other countries, including well-established democracies such as the United States of America (USA). The 1995 ISSP data show that nearly 90 per cent of Americans would rather be citizens of the United States than of any other country. Smith and Jarkko (2001) attribute this allegiance to collective beliefs that America is the remaining superpower and the world's largest economy, both of which have an element of idealism that inspires pride in Americans. In South Africa, shared ideals may be shaped on the one hand by ideological and intellectual forces that have crystallised national ideologies within the new democracy. These would include the broad range of popular slogans, such as 'the rainbow nation' and '*Simunye*' ('We are one', a slogan associated with South African Broadcasting Corporation [SABC] television), sporting achievements such as the 1995 Rugby World Cup victory

which was hailed as a triumph of national reconciliation, and icons such as Nelson Mandela, whose legacy continues to guide and shape South Africa's politics. On the other hand, the citizenry shares a common quest for material benefits, such as jobs, improved services and life conditions.

Smith and Jarkko (2001) have found that national pride has generally been declining worldwide across recent generations in all domains except sport. The general decline in national pride across generations is probably derived from a general decline in nationalism and patriotism as globalism and multilateralism have grown in recent decades (Camilleri and Falk 1992; Craige 1996).

Contrary to these trends, Roefs (2003: 15) found that national identity in South Africa had strengthened over the three-year period 1998–2000. Overall, the proportion with a strong national identification increased by 10 per cent per annum. However, black and white South Africans differed in the degree of identification, and there were significant variations within ethnic groups. She states that the proportion of respondents with weak national identity tendencies declined significantly between 1999 and 2000 amongst both black and white South Africans. However, the proportion of white South Africans with a weak national identity was almost twice as large as that of black South Africans. These findings are corroborated by the 2003 SASAS data. Roefs (2003) concludes that increasing numbers of people perceive themselves to be South Africans and feel that they belong to the nation.

Afrobarometer[3] data over time (Burgess 2002) indicate that between 1995 and 2000, most South Africans rated consistently highly in relation to national pride. Whereas black Africans remained almost unanimous on this issue, there was a marginal decline in this sentiment amongst white, coloured and Indian South Africans (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2 *How proud are you of being South African? Comparison by race over time*

Proud of being South African		1995	1997	1998	2000
Black African	%	93	95	95	94
Indian/Asian	%	92	89	84	84
Coloured	%	94	92	95	87
White	%	87	85	73	75

Source: Burgess (2002)

Our data support the contention of Maré (1999) and Mattes (1999) that, although at certain levels we are still a fragmented society, we have developed a rapid sense of civic nationalism, and this could have been supported through nation-building ideologies.

How does South Africa compare with countries having similar histories of group contestation?

In a comparison of 2003 SASAS data (mean scores) with the 1995 ISSP mean scores on national pride, Ireland and the United States had the highest average scores on national pride, followed by Canada, Austria and New Zealand. South Africa rated sixth, ahead of 18 other countries in which data were collected (Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1 *National pride: A comparison of 23 countries*



Sources: SASAS (2003); Smith & Jarkko (2001)

When South Africa is compared with other countries that have histories of group contestation (for example language or religious conflicts in Canada, Ireland and the United States), South Africa rates highest in response to the statement that 'the world would be a better place if more countries were like South Africa' (Table 4.3). This is, however, counterbalanced by South Africans' relatively low rating of their country as being 'better than most other countries'. This assessment by South African respondents that 'the world would be a better place if more countries were like the respondent's country' could reflect on South Africans' pride in the marvel of transformation; the seeming contradiction present in the fact that respondents give a lower rating of South Africa as being 'better than most other countries' could reflect on the many challenges and obstacles facing our new democracy.

South Africa also compared favourably with both the USA and Canada in responses to the statement that the country should remain one nation rather than become

separate states. In 1995, citizens from the USA were most proud of their country, stating that the USA is better than any other country, and should remain one nation (the 1995 data in the USA obviously do not factor in any possible fallout from the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent war in Iraq).

Table 4.3 *Cross-country analyses: Four countries that have a history of group contestations*

	South Africa	USA	Ireland	Canada
World would be a better place if more countries were like the respondent's country (%)	58	26	35	45
Base	*2 458*	*1 299*	*970*	*1 491*
Respondent's country is better than most other countries (%)	65	81	71	77
Base	*2 458*	*1 329*	*979*	*1 513*
Remain one nation rather than become separate states (%)	79	94	–	76
Base	*2 455*	*1 224*	–	*1 400*

Sources: SASAS (2003); Other countries, ISSP 1995 data

Comparing civic national identity

Asked about what truly constitutes being a South African, views from respondents varied in relation to place of birth, citizenship, country of residence, language, religion, respect for the law, feelings of belonging and ancestry.

Most South Africans are of the opinion that being truly South African means having South African citizenship (94 per cent) and having been born in South Africa (92 per cent). The 1995 ISSP results indicated that most USA respondents are also of the opinion that to be truly American is to have USA citizenship, to be able to speak the official language and to respect American political institutions and laws. The Irish also felt that Irish citizenship meant being truly Irish, but that this needed to be combined with feeling Irish. Most prominent for Canadians as a sign of being truly Canadian was to have respect for Canadian political institutions and laws.

South Africans ranked first in terms of the proportion of people with the highest ratings on issues that measure civic national identity, with the exception of respect for political institutions/laws, in which Canada and the USA ranked the highest (Table 4.4).

Table 4.4 *Cross-country analyses: Distribution of pride in being truly South African/American/Irish/Canadian*

	Considered important and very important			
To be truly South African/American/Irish/Canadian is to…	**South Africa**	**USA**	**Ireland**	**Canada**
Have been born in (respondent's country) (%)	92	69	86	45
Base	*2 464*	*1 325*	*990*	*1 491*
Have (respondent's country's) citizenship (%)	94	93	92	87
Base	*2 461*	*1 339*	*987*	*1 506*
Have lived in (respondent's country) for most of one's life (%)	87	73	82	52
Base	*2 460*	*1 324*	*990*	*1 501*
Speak at least one official language (%)	90	93	42	81
Base	*2 464*	*1 340*	*984*	*1 502*
Be a member of the Christian church (%)	80	54	54	25
Base	*2 443*	*1 309*	*981*	*1 465*
Respect (respondent's country's) political institutions/laws (%)	79	93	89	93
Base	*2 462*	*1 324*	*974*	*1 499*
Feel South African/American/Irish/Canadian (%)	89	87	96	88
Base	*2 461*	*1 328*	*983*	*1 486*
Have South African/American/Irish/Canadian ancestry (%)	85	–	–	–
Base	*2 457*	–	–	–

Sources: SASAS (2003); ISSP 1995 data

Sub-national, national and supra-national identities

The focus on supra-national identity investigates the extent to which South Africans identify with the broader region or continent, whilst the focus on the sub-national attempts to distinguish constructs of a sense of nationhood and pride as perceived by different social groups, who may have very different ways of imagining the nation. We question whether supra- or sub-national identities are in contestation with a sense of national identity.

In relation to different geographical scales, South Africans' attachment to their town/village and country emerged as strongest, significantly ahead of their provinces of residence. In contrast, only just over a third (38 per cent) were 'very attached' to a

supra-national African identity. Daniel, Habib and Southall (2004: 18) advise that whatever South Africa's short-term interest, it cannot escape assuming greater regional responsibilities in Africa. South Africa plays a leading role in the African Union, the New Partnership for African Development and the South African Development Community, yet has been extremely cautious in assuming the role of a regional power within Africa, which is arguably reflected in the relatively weak extent to which South Africans identify with their broader region or continent. A political focus on internal issues may thus influence citizens' dissociation from the supra-national; this dissociation may also be attributable to a sense of xenophobia.

Table 4.5 *Comparison of sub-national, national and supra-national identities*

	Town and village	Province	South Africa	Africa
	%	%	%	%
Very attached	64	54	62	38
Slightly attached	26	31	24	30
Not very attached	5	9	8	15
Not at all attached	3	4	4	13
Do not know	2	2	2	4
Total	100	100	100	100
Base	*2 461*	*2 459*	*2 461*	*2 452*

Source: SASAS (2003)

Approximately one-third of South Africans (34 per cent) indicated that they would only welcome certain immigrants to South Africa, while 32 per cent stated that they would welcome none. Xenophobia was mostly directed at African migrants, with 28 per cent of respondents indicating that they would least welcome African immigrants to their country. Prejudice against Africans may be associated with a fear of loss of economic opportunities.

Table 4.6 *Perceptions of xenophobia*

	Percentage	*Base*
Generally welcome all immigrants to South Africa	34	*835*
Generally welcome some immigrants to South Africa	34	*830*
Generally welcome no immigrants to South Africa	32	*794*
Total	100	*2 459*

Source: SASAS (2003)

Regional perceptions of national identity and pride

Table 4.7 shows that the Western Cape displays a tendency towards sub-group affiliation, as opposed to national identity. In the Western Cape respondents tend to be less enthusiastic about being citizens of South Africa (55 per cent), and only about one-third (34 per cent) are under the impression that the world would be a better place if countries were more like South Africa. They are least proud of South Africa's history (54 per cent) and its social security system (32 per cent). In addition, they are least optimistic about future economic prospects in South Africa (29 per cent). These trends are, however, balanced by their relatively low scores on 'some things make me feel ashamed of South Africa' (49 per cent). In contrast to other provinces, Western Cape residents are least opposed to foreigners buying land in South Africa.

These findings are consistent with voting patterns (see Chapter 3 by Naidu and Chapter 2 by Daniel, Southall and Dippenaar in this volume). Bekker, Leilede, Cornelissen and Horstmeier (2000) have investigated the dual process of identity construction from above and from below in the Western Cape, and discerned the importance of the local to residents. Although provincial leaders claim that a provincial identity is emerging in the Western Cape, Bekker et al. have found (in rank-and-file discussions on national, provincial and local matters) no meaningful evidence of provincial identity and only a weak sense of national identity in the province. They conclude that 'residents are confused by distinctions of national, provincial and local bodies and their knowledge of their separate activities is patchy at best' (Bekker et al. 2000: 233).

As shown in Table 4.7, Eastern Cape residents scored highest in levels of pride in the way democracy works and, together with those of the Free State, in levels of pride in the fair and equal treatment of all groups. Limpopo province, followed by the Free State and the Eastern Cape, were most proud of South Africa's history (the ranking of history is complex, through issues relating to subjectivity and interpretation). A distinguishing factor of KwaZulu-Natal residents is that they are the least proud of South Africa's armed forces and their political influence in the world. KwaZulu-Natal residents, together with Free State residents, feel most strongly that tribal groupings prefer to maintain distinct traditions rather than blend into larger groups. This sentiment does not, however, appear to detract from feelings of national pride amongst residents of these provinces.

Table 4.7 *Perceptions of pride, by province* (percentage that agree and strongly agree with statements)*

	WC	EC	NC	FS	KZN	NW	GT	MP	LP	Total
Rather be a citizen of South Africa than any other country	55	88	89	94	86	90	82	87	86	83
Some things make me feel ashamed of South Africa	49	79	51	82	63	57	66	85	65	67
World would be a better place if countries were more like South Africa	34	68	54	72	57	65	52	68	70	58
South Africa is a better country than most	48	70	64	75	60	77	55	81	86	65
Proud of the way democracy works in South Africa	59	71	54	65	59	65	54	51	64	60
Proud of South Africa's political influence in the world	54	68	54	58	45	62	51	56	69	56
Proud of South Africa's social security system	32	62	66	58	43	60	55	55	59	53
Proud of South Africa's scientific and technological achievements	66	74	67	67	69	64	57	60	72	66
Proud of South Africa's arts and literature achievements	58	79	64	73	70	72	58	69	81	69
Proud of South Africa's armed forces	58	70	65	78	54	70	56	63	70	62
Proud of South Africa's history	54	76	67	82	73	70	74	70	86	73
Proud of South Africa's fair and equal treatment of all	56	72	59	75	60	55	55	54	71	61
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in South Africa	22	62	61	60	51	59	59	55	64	54
Better if race/ethnic groups maintain distinct customs	28	64	37	71	65	41	59	58	54	56
Living conditions in neighbourhood will improve in five years	29	60	54	64	47	56	40	51	69	49
Base	*269*	*329*	*47*	*153*	*499*	*207*	*558*	*164*	*257*	*2 483*

* See Acronyms (page xiv) for province abbreviations.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Is having a sense of national identity in contradiction with having any group-based identification?

From Table 4.8 it is evident that group-based identities are not necessarily incompatible with developing a strong, widely-held sense of citizenship and national identity. Though South African data generally show a strong allegiance

to the country, nationality ranked relatively low (fifth) for all races in choice of identities. In 2003, given a broad range of parameters with which to identify, almost a third (29 per cent) of South African respondents indicated that their first choice of identity was family, followed by race or ethnicity (22 per cent), current or previous occupation (17 per cent), and gender (10 per cent). Eight per cent of respondents identified themselves firstly as South African, and six percent by region. This concurs with previous studies (Mattes, Taylor and Poore 1997; Roefs 2003), which found that it is possible to have a national identity amidst a multiplicity of group identities.

Table 4.8 *National identity in relation to most important self-identification*

	South Africa (percentage)
Family or marital status	29
Race/ethnic background	22
Current/previous occupation/homemaker	17
Gender	10
Nationality	8
Religion	6
Part of South Africa that you live in	4
Age group	3
Social class	1
Preferred political party, group, or movement	0
Total	100
Base	*1 815*

Source: SASAS (2003)

Trends indicate that although race is still a significant factor in identity formation, this is being superseded by other identities, notably family. Amoateng and Richter (2004: 263) state that:

> the family in all its diversities appears to be alive and well in South Africa. Even though forces of modernisation, such as industrialisation and urbanisation have brought about certain obvious changes, the resilience of family forms as a key social unit is demonstrated by the persistence and continuity of certain elements of family life. Worldwide, governments are increasingly developing policies to strengthen family life in recognition of the fact that the family plays irreplaceable roles in society.

Roefs (2003) concurs with these findings in her observation that, between 1997 and 2000, a strong decrease in racial self-identification coincided with a steady increase in descriptions based on 'other' characteristics. (Chapter 5 in this volume by Roefs explores various configurations of dual identity, in terms of relationship to the nation, one's race, language and class.) Habib (2002) states that ruling and

opposition parties are much more preoccupied with racial identities than are citizens. Citizens' behaviour and decisions are much less determined by racial identities than analysts have led us to believe. Investigation shows that within a democratic South Africa, shifting identities now take cognisance of identity markers such as family, age, gender, religion and class. Dynamics appear to have changed since 1998, when Gibson and Gouws (in Muthien, Khosa and Magubane 2000: 164) showed that nearly 40 per cent of South Africans selected racial terms, and another 30 per cent more specific sub-racial or ethnic terms, to describe their primary identity. Slightly more that 20 per cent claimed a national identity as the primary means of describing themselves. The study showed a strong sense of group identification, with most South Africans attaching political significance to their primary group.

Table 4.9 *African countries comparison of national identity in relation to self-identification**

Identity group (sorted)	Bot	Les	Mal	Moz	Nam	Tanz	Zam	Average
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Occupation	6	13	38	18	16	35	29	22
Language/tribe/ethnic group	27	49	14	14	18	17	10	21
National identity	42	12	7	17	10	25	0	16
Class	6	10	20	2	7	2	14	9
Religion	8	12	8	4	3	7	18	9
Gender	2	0	4	2	29	2	2	6
Race	0	0	6	1	6	0	0	2
Region	0	3	0	0	1	1	0	1
Age-related	1	1	0	2	1	0	1	1
Family or marital status	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	1
African/West African/Pan-African	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Individual/personal	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Political party identity	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
Traditional leader	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Marginalised group (eg. disabled, etc.)	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Island	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	1
Can't explain	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Don't know	5	0	2	2	2	8	5	4
Refused to answer	0	0	0	0	1	0	18	3
Missing data	0	0	0	36	0	0	0	5
Total**	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Base	*1 200*	*1 200*	*1 200*	*1 200*	*1 199*	*1 198*	*1 200*	*8 397*

* See Acronyms (page xiv) for country abbreviations.
** Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: Afrobarometer (2002–2003)

Table 4.9 indicates that southern African countries differ in rating national identity in terms of other identies. The Afrobarometer (2002–2003) data indicate that on average, occupation, language, tribe or ethnic group identity and national identity are the most important self-identification factors in southern African countries. In Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, occupation was the most important self-descriptor, while language/tribe/ethnic group was the most important self-descriptor in Lesotho. In Namibia, gender was the predominant self-descriptor, whereas in Botswana, people described themselves mostly in terms of nationality.

When self-identification is considered by race in South Africa, further analysis (Table 4.10) reveals that black Africans identify most frequently with race or ethnic background (25 per cent), white (52 per cent) and coloured people (31 per cent) identify foremost with family or marital status, whereas Indians/Asians tend to identify primarily with occupational status (39 per cent).

Table 4.10 *National identity and most important self-identification, by race*

	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Family or marital status	24	31	30	52	29
Race/ethnic background	25	25	11	7	22
Current/previous occupation/homemaker	17	10	39	17	17
Gender	11	11	0	2	10
Nationality	9	5	4	7	8
Religion	5	10	11	8	6
Part of South Africa that you live in	5	2	2	2	4
Age group	3	3	2	2	3
Social class	1	1	0	4	1
Preferred political party, group, movement	0	1	0	0	0
Total*	100	100	100	100	100
Base	*1 303*	*193*	*46*	*270*	*1 812*

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

The emphasis of the black African and coloured respondents on race is echoed in findings by Rule (2004) and Friedman (2004) from the 1999 elections. Their analysis suggests that voting patterns in South Africa resemble a 'prism of racialised politics' because racial and ethnic political identities predominate amongst the citizenry, with black people voting for black parties, and white people for white parties. Friedman (2004: 2) is of the opinion that it is not the 'issues' that decide how South Africa votes; rather, it is identity – race, language, religion – which shapes electoral choices. According to Mangcu (Daniel et al. 2004: 108–110), the assumption of the presidency by Thabo Mbeki signalled the introduction of a more radical Africanist

approach to national politics than that of Mandela, who embodied the concept of racial reconciliation. Mangcu concludes that the issue of racial reconciliation is still an open and vexed one, made more so by the struggle for power at various levels of government and the shifting nature of coalition politics.

Roefs (2003: 129) states that national identity has weakened amongst black African respondents, with a strong class identity beginning to emerge. However, among all other groups, national identity seems to have strengthened. She argues that this may indicate a decline in interest in the nation or national affairs among black African people, who now strongly appear to be a class-based group.

Comparisons of pride in being South African among the five largest ethnic groups (Afrikaner, English, Zulu, Xhosa and Tswana) indicate that the Tswana were most proud (97.2 per cent), followed by the Zulu (95.5 per cent), Afrikaner (91.9 per cent), English (91.2 per cent) and Xhosa (89.2 per cent) groups (Roefs 2003: 127). Roefs (ibid.) observes that a sense of national identity within all five groups increased between 1998 and 2000, though at different paces and in varying degrees.

Age as a determinant of national identity

When analysed by age (Table 4.11), trends indicate that identification with the family increases with age, whilst identification with nationality and gender decreases. Identification with race or ethnic background peaks at 25 per cent amongst the 25–34 age group, with lower levels amongst their younger and older counterparts.

Table 4.11 *Most important self-identification, by age*

	16–24 years	25–34 years	35–49 years	50+ years	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Family or marital status	17	27	34	40	29
Race/ethnic background	20	25	22	20	22
Current/previous occupation/ homemaker	17	17	18	12	17
Gender	15	9	9	5	10
Nationality	14	6	6	8	8
Religion	4	9	5	9	6
Part of South Africa that you live in	5	5	3	2	4
Age group	7	1	2	2	3
Social class	1	1	2	2	1
Preferred political party, group, movement	1	0	1	0	0
Total*	100	100	100	100	100
Base	*490*	*442*	*545*	*334*	*1 811*

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

The 2003 SASAS results indicate no discernible role for gender in influencing ways of self-identification. Similarly, Smith and Jarkko (2001) found gender to be a non-factor in almost all countries. Despite differences in attitudes towards the use of force and the military, and the possibility of greater national alienation owing to practices of gender discrimination, men and women report similar levels of national pride within countries compared internationally.

Association between a sense of nationhood and democratic consolidation

In testing our hypothesis we questioned whether national identity and pride have any influence on perceptions of democracy. Eaton (2002), Rustow (1973) and Habib (2002) have argued that there is a strong association between a sense of nationhood and democratic consolidation. National identity has a strong relationship to practical concerns about the establishment of 'national legitimacy' and 'stable democracy' (Eaton 2002: 47). Political philosophers argue that countries require most of their citizens to adopt a shared sense of nationhood as a prerequisite for the successful democratic functioning of the state. The more we understand how people construe the national political community and their place in it, the more we can contribute to debates about nation-building, influencing government policy, and encouraging construction of nationhood which will enhance a healthy democracy. This is supported by Rustow (1973: 120–122), who has called national unity the 'single background condition' that must be present before democratisation can proceed. Habib (2002: 3) states that 'for democratic consolidation to be effected in South Africa then, group identities have to be transcended, or at least, eclipsed in prominence by a new national identity'. The spin-offs of such a contract include the growing value of human dignity, tolerance, increased levels of political participation and the waning of all forms of discrimination. Chidester et al. (2003: 295) caution that in 'any consideration of nation-building, the government has to consider the rifts of South Africa's past, the realities of the present as well as the challenges yet to be fully appreciated or engaged with'. This tremendous legacy of fragmentation has to be overcome under contemporary global circumstances where the nation-state, in many cases, operates in circumstances of extensive population movements and demands for recognition of sub-populations. In other words, the contemporary world is characterised by the conflicting, though at times related, pressures of globalisation and fragmentation. South Africa has to deal with these same issues, overlaid on apartheid's social contours and erosions (Maré 1999: 244).

At this juncture of South Africa's history, how does South Africans' sense of national identity and pride relate to their perceptions of democracy, to trust in the government and other key institutions in the democratic system, and to satisfaction with living conditions?

Multivariate analysis (see Appendix to this chapter) demonstrates the strong relationship between satisfaction with the way democracy works in South Africa, trust in national government, trust in the courts and national identity.

A similar pattern exists with regard to national pride, but with the noteworthy mitigating effects of levels of household income and education. People with higher income, higher education and higher employment status tended to score lower on the pride index, indicative of a more critical and broader world view. A significant positive association was found between pride and expectancy of life improvement, satisfaction with democracy, trust in national government, trust in the courts, satisfaction with the reduction of crime and satisfaction with increases in job creation. The more satisfied people were with the aforementioned issues, the higher they scored on the national pride index. It can thus be stated that favourable socio-economic-political conditions encourage the development of a strong common identity. Conversely, unfavourable conditions weaken a sense of national identity and pride.

Conclusion

The SASAS data suggest that, though national identity varies among individuals, and there are many challenges facing the country, South Africans have a developed sense of nationhood. In spite of challenges facing the country, public opinion indicates that many people are proud of South Africa and have a strong allegiance to the country. Liebenberg and Duvenage are optimistic about the prospect of creating a common democratic culture, stating that the consolidation of a working democracy is realisable in heterogeneous communities (Muthien et al. 2000). Globalisation, on the other hand, contributes to the decay of the nation-state and the existence of autonomous national cultures (Castells, in Hjerm 2004). Hjerm has stated that it will be increasingly difficult to uphold political practices based on a homogeneous nation-state. The history of South Africa consists of sustained contestations over national identity and the mobilisation of identities towards political goals (Ramutsindela 2002) and democracy in diverse societies is possible only through 'special' arrangements such as consociationalism (Lijphart 1977). (South Africa's calendar of public holidays is an example of negotiated nationalism.)

Given the diversity of language, culture and religion in South Africa, the post-apartheid government has sought ways to turn diversity from a potential obstacle to nationalism, into a national resource, in search of not uniformity but unity (Chidester et al. 2003). Thus the national flag, anthem, and sports have been used as basic ingredients of national cohesion in the new South Africa. It is, however, cautioned that South African history has demonstrated that such symbols of nationalism do not actually make a nation.

National pride is greatest in stable, established, developed democracies (Smith and Jarkko 2001). Although South Africa has a short history of inclusive democracy, it compares favourably with established democracies in this respect. We can question how such high levels of national identity and pride can be explained in a transitional democracy that is still a divided society. Is there a reason why people oppressed

and repressed by a minority group can so easily and enthusiastically become so proud of their country? In South Africa, the apartheid state tried to impose ethnic and racial identities, and denied a sense of 'South Africanness' to the majority of citizens. According to Mattes (1999), it is possible that the symbols of Mandela, the Constitution, the rainbow nation and ideas of democracy, non-racialism and reconciliation may be providing a basis for a new national consensus that will enable the country to strengthen its democracy. According to James A Joseph, United States Ambassador to South Africa (1998), transformation, reconstruction and reconciliation are the product of a national will to create a different future. Joseph (1998: 7) states that:

> the road on which the country is now traveling is carved out of national consensus… The problems of race and legacy of apartheid still cast a long shadow on the South African landscape, but I remain optimistic that the South Africans are on the right track and that the potential remains for them to build a community that is a model for an independent world that is integrating and fragmenting at the same time… The Mandela magic will not always be around, but I am convinced that the Mandela legacy will continue to guide and shape South Africa's politics for a long time to come.

Social identities are increasingly being shaped by class and occupation rather than by race and ethnicity, and South Africans are in general agreement about the key problems facing the country, despite differences of race, wealth, class or gender.

Our research concludes that national identity, which is constantly open to redefinition and reconstruction, relates to perceptions of democracy, trust in the government and other key institutions in the democratic system, and to satisfaction with living conditions. National unity can be further promoted through principles based on the Constitution. These would comprise the construction of an open and inclusive vision of national identity, stressing a common commitment to civic culture, and including the promotion of mutual tolerance and the amelioration of social and economic disadvantage among citizens. Indeed, it is the reduction and ultimate eradication of the contemporary disjuncture between the political and socio-economic dimensions of democracy, clearly a collective endeavour, that will help sustain the impetus towards a truly collective sense of national pride and identity.

Appendix

Data for this chapter are drawn from the ISSP module that was fielded in the SASAS survey. The ISSP is a programme for international comparative attitude studies. One topic is examined each year in the same way in all the participant countries, which at present amount to 39. The module on national identity was fielded in 1995 and again in 2003. South Africa became a member of the ISSP in 2002 and has therefore fielded only one module on national identity, namely the 2003 module. At the time of writing this chapter, 2003 data were available only from South Africa, and

comparative data in this chapter are thus 2003 data for South Africa and 1995 data for all other countries. The 2003 ISSP module on national identity deals with areas like national identity, nationalism, patriotism and globalism and is to a large extent a replica of the survey conducted in 1995.

In developing a typology of national identity and national pride, the ISSP questionnaire was scrutinised for variables that are associated with *national identity* and *national pride.*

For the purposes of this study, the following variables were considered to create an index for *national identity* that measures a sense of nationhood and affiliation with South Africa:

- Rating the importance of nationality;
- Attachment to South Africa;
- To feel South African;
- It is better if groups adapt and blend in the larger society;
- It is essential that South Africa remains one nation.

Statements that implicitly or explicitly measure national pride were grouped together to form a *national pride* index:

- I would rather be a citizen of South Africa than any other country;
- The world would be a better place if people from other countries would be more like South Africans;
- Generally speaking, South Africa is a better country than most other countries;
- Proud/very proud of being South African;
- Proud of the way democracy works;
- Proud of South Africa's political influence in the world;
- Proud of South Africa's social security system;
- Proud of South Africa's scientific and technological achievements;
- Proud of South Africa's achievements in sports;
- Proud of South Africa's armed forces;
- Proud of South Africa's history;
- Proud of South Africa's fair and equal treatment of all groups.

Binary scores were used to distinguish between strong and weak national identity and national pride. Respondents who indicated no national pride or identity received a zero score. Each affirmative answer received a score of 1. These indices were treated as the dependant variables, and the aim was to isolate independent variables that described and contributed to a sense of national identity and pride. The Chi Square statistic was used to test the significance of the association between the variables and the Spearman correlation coefficient (ρ) was used to assess the direction and strength of the association.

Table 4A.1 *Association between national identity/pride and selected factors*

Variable	National identity		National pride	
	ρ	*P value	ρ	*P value
Education	0.046	< 0.001	–0.123	< 0.001
Employment status	0.023	= 0.002	–0.032	< 0.001
Household income	0.054	= 0.004	–0.226	< 0.001
Expect that life will improve or get worse in the next five years	0.059	< 0.001	0.087	< 0.001
Satisfaction with the way democracy works in South Africa	0.179	< 0.001	0.072	< 0.001
Trust in national government	0.081	< 0.001	0.126	< 0.001
Trust in courts	0.075	< 0.001	0.076	< 0.001
Satisfaction with cutting crime	0.029	= 0.012	0.018	< 0.001
Satisfaction with job creation	0.020	< 0.004	0.072	< 0.001

*Where 1 = Dissatisfied/distrust and 5 = Satisfaction/trust

Notes

1 Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) recognises the equal human rights of all, with Section 9 containing the equality clause that outlaws unfair discrimination on the basis of, *inter alia*, race, gender, sex, marital status, ethnic or social origin, and culture.

2 The ISSP is a continuing annual programme of cross-national collaboration on surveys covering topics important for social science research. It brings together pre-existing social science projects and co-ordinates research goals, thereby adding a cross-national, cross-cultural perspective to the individual national studies.

3 The Afrobarometer is an independent, non-partisan research project that measures the social, economic and political atmosphere in Africa.

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5 *Identity and race relations*

Marlene Roefs

South Africa has been characterised historically by identity politics. The minority National Party government imposed apartheid on political and economic life for almost 50 years and drew the non-white population into subordinate political structures, which merely excluded them from formal politics and decision-making processes. Group identities were forced upon people by their racial classification in the categories black, coloured, Indian/Asian or white. The Group Areas Act, the Land Act, the Population Registration Act and the Separate Amenities Act gave body to the apartheid system. An important psychological consequence of South Africa's social engineering was that people developed strong racial and nationalist identities. According to Turner et al. (1987), depersonalisation was enforced along racial and political lines. Apartheid was identity politics brought to perfection (Adam & Moodley 1993; Sisk 1995; Marx 1998).

In 1991, after decades of liberation struggle and international pressure, former President de Klerk announced the removal of statutory discrimination. Inclusive democracy thus entailed the enactment of, amongst other new legislation, the Promotion of Equality Act, the Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act and the Employment Equity Act, all of which primarily affect the workplace. Additionally, institutions were established to promote reconciliation and to protect the citizenry from rights abuses. These included the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the South African Human Rights Commission and the Land Commission (Grossberg 2002).

Following the fundamental political change of 1994, political leadership and academics in South Africa have debated the 'national question', a question which is underpinned by fear of competing sub-national identities and a lack of overarching national identity. As Mattes puts it, 'Democracy presumes widespread agreement on the identity of "the nation" or "the people" that are supposed to govern themselves as a political unit. Agreement on "the national question" has been seen to be the irreducible prerequisite necessary to have a democratic state' (1999: 261). The national question is the question of how to build a common sense of belonging to the South African nation. 'Nation building is the construction of the reality and the sense of common nationhood which would result from the abolition of disparities in the quality of life among South Africans based on the racial, gender and geographic inequalities we all inherited from the past,' according to the then Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki (1998).

The first section of this chapter provides insights into the formation of a national identity in South Africa. Has an inclusive national identity been formed and to what extent does a national identity contrast or coalesce with racial, language, class or other identities in society? Answering this question will entail an examination of survey data relating to the formation of dual identities, i.e. combinations of strong national and strong group identities. The second section of the chapter focuses on racism and its relation to identity. After describing racism in South Africa among the various population groups, it analyses racism in relation to the formation of race identity and national identity.

Nation-building: a matter of 'superordinate' and/or 'sub-group' identities

The nation-building process is underpinned by an ideology of inclusiveness and tolerance of diversity. The emerging South African nation is portrayed as a 'rainbow nation' whose unity emanates from racial and ethnic diversity. The *Simunye* ('we are one') and the *Masakhane* ('working together': a partnership between communities and local government to enhance upliftment) campaigns are examples of this endeavour. The relative ease with which old national symbols such as the national anthem, flag and other symbols have been replaced by new ones may be seen as a successful instance of the forging of a new patriotism, a kind of national identity.

However, the notion of a rainbow nation, which was strongly promoted during Nelson Mandela's presidency, has given way under President Mbeki to more of a spotlight on the racial divide in the country. His depiction of the 'two nations' state highlights the disparity between the poor, mainly black nation and the rich, mainly white nation. How, then, to build one nation out of a bipolar society? Is it a matter of assimilation of the racial minority into the majority, do race groups need to converge, or will there be other ways to form one nation, ways which focus less strongly on race or ethnicity?

According to Boyce (1999: 233), nation-building in South Africa will most certainly have to overcome the narrow and sectional interests that have for decades been the mobilising principle and one of the most fundamental principles of the apartheid system, namely ethnicity. He points out that liberals as well as Marxists have severely underestimated the durability of ethnicity. Boyce argues that we should be emphasising the shared aspects of our cultures and thereby developing a new national identity unconstrained by cultural particularity or prejudice (1999: 238). Nation-building in the present South African dispensation should seek first to consolidate the new democracy by promoting a new democratic culture.

Maré (1999) does not believe in the possibility of creating a single political/national identity in the short to medium term. Instead he argues for the prioritisation of political stability, economic growth and a united effort to achieve social justice. National cohesion should centre on the idea of shared values and ideals. According

to Mbeki (1998), the reality of two nations, underwritten by the perpetuation of the racial, gender and spatial disparities born of a very long period of colonial and apartheid white minority domination, constitutes the material base which reinforces the notion that, indeed, we are not one nation, but two nations. Reflecting on the period 1994–1998, he believes that 'neither are we becoming one nation. Consequently, also, the objective of national reconciliation is not being realised'.

At the same time, a number of studies suggest that a 'national identity' or superordinate identity is quite common among South Africans (see Mattes 1997; Klandermans, Roefs and Olivier 2001; Roefs 2002). These studies, as well as Chapter 4 by Grossberg, Struwig and Pillay in this volume, show that people feel proud to be South African and that being a South African is an important part of their lives. What remains unclear is the meaning of a national identity. Does it point to a single unifying factor that provides a basis for assimilation, or is it being associated with exclusion of certain race groups?

It is generally maintained that the development of a national identity is particularly difficult in divided societies, where several collective identities exist that challenge an overarching identity (Lijphart 1977; Gagiano and Giliomee 1990). This is especially the case in those societies where segmentation and cleavages are based on ascriptive or nearly ascriptive characteristics such as race, language, or religion, which are rooted in traditional identification patterns (Dahl 1971; Stremlau 1997). The consolidation of democracy may particularly suffer from ethnic cleavages (cf. Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1995: 42). These authors argue that ethnicity often determines who will be included in or excluded from power and resources.

Other authors argue that strong group identity can be combined with strong national identity (eg. Adam and Moodley 1993; Adam 1994; Mattes 1997). They maintain that national and sub-group identities can coexist without impeding one another. Recent studies by Roefs (2002) and Klandermans et al. (2001) tested whether strong group identities correlated with strong national identity. These studies showed that it is very possible for black and white South Africans to combine strong group identities (including race identity) with a strong national identity, i.e. to form dual identities. This chapter will thus assess whether strong national identity necessarily precludes the formation of strong race identity or *vice versa*.

Identity and inter-group relations

Every time rights and resources are distributed in terms of category membership, people are treated in terms of collective identity, be it age, class, race, region, sexual orientation or religion. Identity politics can easily produce a deeply divided society, where life chances are systematically distributed unequally (whether by intention or outcome). If various ethnic, class, political and other groups of people within a state identify with the nation, conflict between these groups can be more easily managed

or avoided than in a situation where groups feel they are not fully recognised by the state or feel excluded from the nation (Diamond et al. 1995). In addition, a strong national identity might be associated with an ideal notion of national identity, which demands that all groups are treated equally or that disadvantaged groups are systematically favourably treated.

There is growing evidence that a dual identity, that is a combined sub-group and superordinate identity, is to be preferred (see Tyler and Lind 1992; Gonzalez and Brown 1999; Mattes 1999; Hornsey and Hogg 2000 for examples of empirical studies). A strong national identity makes it possible for people to look at sub-groups in a different way and to accept that sub-groups in a society are treated differentially. Huo, Smith, Tyler and Lind (1996) demonstrate that a sufficiently high level of superordinate identification makes it possible for authorities to maintain cohesion within an ethnically diverse community. However, studies such as those of Gonzalez and Brown (1999), Klandermans, Sabucedo and Rodriguez (2000) and Hornsey and Hogg (2000) emphasise that superordinate identity only has this effect if people can maintain their sub-group identity as well. Indeed, history has demonstrated repeatedly that suppression of subordinate identity reinforces sub-group identification. For fear of inter-group hostility, governments tend to foster a superordinate national identity and to suppress the expression of sub-group identities.

In Franco's Spain every sign of regional identification was severely suppressed, to give one example (Johnston 1991). These studies show that forcing people to forsake their sub-group identity (such as class identity, ethnic identity, or gender identity) in favour of a superordinate identity easily backfires. Inter-group hostility and bias seem to increase rather than decrease. Sub-groups provide meaningful bonds between people. People are inclined to identify with more exclusive groups and to maintain the distinctiveness associated with sub-group membership (Brewer and Silver 1997; Simon et al. 1998; De Weerd and Klandermans 1999).

Sub-group and superordinate identities are neither mutually exclusive nor necessarily correlated. Indeed, it has been argued that the two are independent and it has been suggested that a dual identity, that is strong sub-group identification in combination with a strong superordinate national identity, is desirable in that it binds people into meaningful groups and to the larger society.

In South Africa, it remains unclear how race identity and national identity, or a combination of these, relate to perceptions and experience of racial discrimination. Have efforts to build an overarching national identity (a superordinate identity), which 'glues' the racially segmented society together, had an impact on race relations? According to Maré, 'it is remarkable how little discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of racism, "race" and racialism has taken place within political or academic circles – such a comment would apply to the post-1994 situation as well' (1999: 245). The remainder of this chapter thus analyses relations between the various forms of identity and racial discrimination.

National and group identity

National identity[1] was assessed in terms of agreement with three statements, which were combined into a single index of national identity (NI). The statements were (1) 'I would rather be a citizen of South Africa than of any other country in the world', (2) 'the world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like South Africans', and (3) 'generally speaking, South Africa is a better country than most other countries'.[2] (Chapter 4 in this volume by Grossberg, Struwig and Pillay contains separate detailed analyses of responses to these statements.) The response categories were (1) 'strongly agree', (2) 'agree', (3) 'neither agree nor disagree', (4) 'disagree', and (5) 'strongly disagree'. These five categories were recoded so that the highest score reflected strong agreement. The 'do not know' option was deleted from the score to enable more advanced data analysis.

Race, language and class identity[3] were assessed by the question 'to what extent do you feel attached to the following types of people' (a) 'those who belong to the same race group as you?' (b) 'those who speak the same language as you?', and (c) 'those who are in the same financial position as you?' The four answer categories were 'very attached', 'slightly attached', 'not very attached', and 'not at all attached'. As with national identity, these categories were recoded with the highest score reflecting strong attachment, and the 'do not know' option was deleted from the score.

In order to study dual identities, NI, and race, language and class identities were dichotomised into either weak or strong categories. If a person scored 4 or higher on the NI he or she had a strong national identity.[4] A person who scored 3.5 or higher on race, language or class identity had a strong group identity.[5] In addition to race, two other historical cleavages in South African society that offer comparative degrees of group identification are language and class. The analysis of class, sex and age differences in identification were analysed within the racial groups.

All the following analyses are based on univariate or multivariate analysis, such as t-test, analysis of variance, and more advanced multivariate analysis.

Table 5.1 *National identity (NI) index by race group*

Race	*N*	Mean	Std. Dev.
Black African	*1 753*	3.9	.77
Coloured	*189*	3.7	.81
Indian/Asian	*59*	3.7	.88
White	*257*	3.3	.89
Total	*2 258*	3.8	.82

Source: SASAS (2003)

Analysis of the mean scores on NI (Table 5.1) reveals that black South Africans had the strongest national identity and white South Africans the weakest, with

Indian/Asian and coloured respondents in-between. In line with previous studies on national identity, differences between black and white respondents were most significant (see Klandermans et al. 2001).

Further analysis among the various language groups revealed that NI was strongest amongst Tshivenda- and Xitsonga-speakers and weakest among Afrikaans- and English-speakers (see Table 5.2).

Table 5.2 *National identity (NI) index by language group**

Language	*N*	Mean	Std. Dev.
Sesotho	*281*	3.8	.73
Setswana	*145*	4.0	.78
Sepedi	*189*	3.9	.63
siSwati	*63*	3.8	.74
isiNdebele	*34*	4.1	.65
isiXhosa	*369*	4.0	.84
isiZulu	*533*	3.9	.79
Xitsonga	*100*	4.2	.69
Tshivenda	*33*	4.3	.78
Afrikaans	*337*	3.5	.92
English	*119*	3.4	.77
Indian	*31*	3.7	.97
Total	*2 234*	3.8	.82

* These categories refer to the 11 official languages plus Indian languages spoken by South Africans.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Interestingly, most of the relatively small groups of Tshivenda- and Xitsonga-speakers are geographically resident near the South African borders with Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Whether a stronger NI among these language groups relates to more direct exposure to the neighbouring countries or, for instance, to minority status, would be an interesting research question for a further study. The finding that Afrikaans- and English-speakers (predominantly non-black) generally had a weaker NI is attributable to the racial differences highlighted earlier. Less significant variation was found with regard to gender, age and class differences. However, it is noteworthy that black African females expressed a somewhat stronger NI than their male counterparts. Furthermore, the findings amongst black African and coloured people suggest a tendency for younger people to identify less strongly with the nation than do older people. Lastly, NI was somewhat stronger amongst poorer black African and coloured people than amongst the other class groups.

Race group identity was strongest amongst black Africans and weakest amongst coloured people. As with NI, race identity was stronger amongst black Africans than amongst the other three race groups.

Table 5.3 *Race identity, by race group*

Race	*N*	Mean	Std. Dev.
Black African	*1 883*	3.7	.56
Coloured	*214*	3.4	.69
Indian/Asian	*66*	3.6	.72
White	*276*	3.5	.67
Total	*2 439*	3.7	.60

Source: SASAS (2003)

The second group identity assessed was that pertaining to language. On average, language identity, with a mean of 3.7, was as strong as race identity. However, siSwati-speakers scored a mean of 3.9 on language identity, indicative of its importance, given the maximum of 4. English-speakers emerged with the weakest language identity.

Table 5.4 *Language identity, by language group*

Language	*N*	Mean	Std. Dev.
Sesotho	*291*	3.7	.62
Setswana	*161*	3.6	.67
Sepedi	*218*	3.8	.53
siSwati	*63*	3.9	.31
isiNdebele	*36*	3.5	.78
isiXhosa	*403*	3.7	.49
isiZulu	*562*	3.8	.41
Xitsonga	*93*	3.7	.55
Tshivenda	*34*	3.6	.92
Afrikaans	*367*	3.5	.69
English	*125*	3.4	.69
Indian	*34*	3.5	.91
Total	*2 389*	3.7	.59

Source: SASAS (2003)

Additionally, gender, age and class differences in race and language identity were analysed within race groups. Amongst coloured people, females tended to identify more strongly with their own race and language groups than did males. No gender differences in this respect emerged among the other groups.

With regard to age, race identity only varied amongst white people. Interestingly, white youth identified more strongly with their race group than did older white people. A speculative explanation might be that race identity among the youth is more salient because of the affirmative-action policy in South Africa, which favours non-white appointments and creates uncertainty about job opportunities and stability. Identification with language did not differ according to age.

Furthermore, it was found that race and language identities were somewhat weaker amongst the higher-class than amongst the lower-class black Africans. Race and language identities were somewhat stronger amongst coloured people in middle-class households than amongst their better- or worse-off counterparts. Wealthier white people tended to identify less strongly with their race than did those from middle- or low-income households.

The analysis of class identity revealed that this was found to be weaker than race or language identities, with a mean score of only 3.3 (Table 5.5).

Table 5.5 *Class identity, by household income group*

Class	*N*	Mean	Std. Dev.
None	*208*	3.4	.80
R1–R500	*258*	3.3	.92
R501–R1 500	*748*	3.4	.85
R1 501–R5 000	*336*	3.2	.94
R5 000+	*218*	3.3	.85
Total	*1 769*	3.3	.87

Source: SASAS (2003)

Class identity did not vary systematically across class groups. However, analysis within the race groups suggested that class identity was stronger amongst poorer than amongst wealthier coloured respondents, whereas it was stronger amongst middle-income black African respondents than amongst their poorer or wealthier counterparts. Furthermore, class identity was generally stronger amongst younger than amongst older adults. However, older Indian/Asian South Africans emerged with a stronger class identity than did those who were middle-aged.

Overall, these descriptions of national and group identity suggest that national and group identities, especially in terms of race and language, are quite strong. In particular, black Africans tend to have the strongest senses of national, race and language identity. What is important for the following analysis of dual identities and how this phenomenon relates to racism is that gender, age, and class differences largely depend on the race group studied. In other words, different dynamics seem to be operative in different race groups.

Dual identities

Political scientists have argued that a citizenry that shares a strong feeling of belonging to the nation best serves democracy. Social psychologists, on the other hand, argue that in addition to a superordinate identity, people should be able to build and maintain significant bonds with social sub-groups, which offer them means to develop social identities. The question is whether in South Africa the racially divided, unequal and heterogeneous character of society, which has for a long time been extremely politicised, allows for the formation of such dual identities across racial, ethnic, and class groups.

In order to answer this question, all respondents were assigned to one of the following groups:

1. Strong group identity but weak national identity
2. Weak group identity and weak national identity
3. Weak group identity but strong national identity
4. Both strong group identity and strong national identity.

These four groups were constructed on the basis of three potentially politically relevant sub-group identities – race, language and class. The percentages in Table 5.6 ('National and race' column) show the proportion of respondents who identified with their race group and at the same time identified with the nation.

Table 5.6 *Dual identities: Nation and race, by race*

Race		Race	None	National	National and race	Total	*Base*
Black African	%	24	11	16	50	100	*1 388*
Coloured	%	29	22	10	39	100	*316*
Indian/Asian	%	30	23	17	29	100	*191*
White	%	32	24	15	30	100	*273*
Total *	%	26	15	15	44	100	*2 168*

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Strong race identities amongst black and coloured respondents tend to combine with a strong national identity. The proportion of black Africans with a dual identity (50 per cent) is twice as large as that with only a strong race identity (24 per cent). In contrast, for both the white and the Indian groups, those with strong race identities approximately equalled the proportions with a strong dual identity. Correlations between race and national identity showed that, indeed, among black African and coloured respondents national identity was positively related to race identity,[6] whereas no significant relation was found among Indian/Asian and white respondents.[7]

The same type of analysis was conducted for a dual national and language identity. Roughly the following pattern could be observed. South Africans with English as their mother tongue were least likely to combine a strong language identity with national identity (see Table 5.7). Among Indians/Asians, and speakers of Afrikaans, siSwati and isiZulu, the proportion of respondents that combine a strong language identity with a strong national identity tended to be somewhat higher than the proportion of respondents with a strong language identity but without a strong national identity. This tendency was somewhat stronger among Sesotho-, Setswana-, Sepedi-, isiNdebele-, Xitsonga- and Tshivenda-speakers. The proportion of these South Africans with both a strong language identity and a strong national identity was more than twice the magnitude (about 2.2 to 2.7 times) of that proportion without a dual identity of this nature. However, a dual identity was most likely amongst speakers of isiXhosa. In other words, relatively few isiXhosa-speakers with a strong language identity had a weak national identity.

As was the case with the relationship between race and national identity, language and national identity were only correlated amongst a few groups. Among Afrikaans-speakers the correlation between language identity and national identity was positive and significant ($r = .12$, $p < .01$). The same was found for Xitsonga-speakers ($r = 37$, $p < .001$) and isiXhosa-speakers ($r = .43$, $p < .0001$). However, no significant correlations between language and national identity were found amongst the other language groups. In other words, group identity and national identities are not necessarily related; they can coexist and are sometimes related.

Table 5.7 *Dual identities: Nation and language*

Language		Language	None	National	National and language	Total	*Base*
Sesotho	%	25	7	14	54	100	*181*
Setswana	%	19	10	25	46	100	*166*
Sepedi	%	22	10	9	59	100	*183*
siSwati	%	33	10	12	45	100	*51*
isiNdebele	%	22	5	19	54	100	*37*
isiXhosa	%	16	16	11	57	100	*318*
isiZulu	%	35	4	9	52	100	*288*
Xitsonga	%	22	10	10	57	100	*77*
Tshivenda	%	24	6	9	61	100	*33*
Afrikaans	%	31	18	13	38	100	*524*
English	%	30	39	13	18	100	*148*
Indian	%	31	14	19	36	100	*113*
Total *	%	27	14	13	46	100	*2 119*

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

The analysis of dual class identity and national identity was biased by the strong relationship between race and class[8] (as measured by its surrogate, monthly household income). Amongst the higher income groups (> R1 500), a strong class identity is less often combined with a strong national identity than among the lower income groups (see Table 5.8). Amongst lower income groups, the proportion with both a strong class identity and a strong national identity is more than twice the size of that with a strong class identity only.

Table 5.8 *Dual identities: Nation and class*

Income		Class	None	National	National and class	Total	*Base*
None	%	14	19	31	36	100	*163*
R1–R500	%	17	13	27	43	100	*240*
R501–R1 500	%	17	17	25	41	100	*652*
R1 501–R5 000	%	18	27	25	30	100	*316*
R5 000+	%	17	39	20	24	100	*223*
Total	%	17	22	25	36	100	*1 594*

Source: SASAS (2003)

Clearly, what these findings reveal is that dual identities do exist. A strong national identity is frequently combined with strong race, class or language identity. Indeed, in some instances positive correlations were found between national and group identities, which means that strong national identity is more likely when people have a strong group identity and *vice versa*. For instance, amongst black Africans, race and national identity are positively correlated, as are language and national identity amongst Afrikaans-speakers.

The next question is whether it actually makes a difference as to how people relate to one another if they have strong group and/or national identities. Are strong group identities associated with more racism? How does a strong national identity relate to more positive race relations? These issues are tackled in the section that follows.

Racism

South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2003 respondents were asked to assess their experiences and perceptions of the existence of the reality of 'racism' in their everyday lives. Firstly, they were requested to answer the question, 'How often do you feel racially discriminated against?', the options ranging from 'not at all' to 'always'. Secondly, in relation to locality, they were asked, 'Where has racial discrimination happened to you most recently?' Thirdly, in order to determine comparative perceptions of racism, each respondent was asked whether he/she agreed or disagreed with statements about each race group in the form, 'Do you

agree or disagree with the statement that most black Africans/coloured people/Indians/Asians/white people in South Africa have racist attitudes?' With a view to tracking perceived changes, the fourth question was phrased thus: 'South Africa used to have apartheid by law between white, black, coloured and Indian. Since 1994, do you think that race relations in the country have improved, remained the same, or deteriorated?' It emerged clearly that racism was perceived to exist between all population groupings to a greater or lesser degree. The paragraphs that follow describe the major findings.[9]

Table 5.9 *How often do you feel racially discriminated against?*

Frequency	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not at all	63	68	50	53	62
Sometimes	27	20	40	33	27
Often	5	9	7	7	6
Always	5	3	3	7	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: SASAS (2003)

White and Indian/Asian respondents were more likely to have experienced racial discrimination than were coloured and black respondents. About two-thirds of black and coloured respondents had 'not at all' experienced discrimination versus about half of the Indian/Asian and white respondents. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that black males felt discriminated against more frequently than did black females. In addition, both white and black younger respondents felt more discriminated against than the older generations. Amongst black Africans, both the poorest and the richest most frequently felt they were victims of discrimination, whereas among white people, the highest income group felt more discriminated against than did the lowest income group.

Most experiences of discrimination happened 'at work' (33 per cent) or 'when applying for a job' (16 per cent). Other places where discrimination was experienced by substantial numbers included 'in shops' (15 per cent), 'on the roads' (8 per cent), 'at educational institutions' (6 per cent) and 'at government departments' (5 per cent). These results show that work-related sites of discrimination (at work or when applying for work) were the most typical places where people experienced racial discrimination. However, some interesting racial differences were found (see Table 5.10). Relatively high proportions of white respondents experienced discrimination at shops (21 per cent) and government departments (14 per cent). Similarly, Indians/Asians were somewhat more likely than the other race groups to have experienced racism at government departments (13 per cent).

Table 5.10 *Where has this racial discrimination happened to you?*

Place	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White
	%	%	%	%
At work	36	23	50	14
At an educational institution	6	0	0	9
In shops	13	17	10	21
On the roads or on the streets	7	17	3	5
When applying for a job	14	25	10	21
In a government department	3	1	13	14
In social clubs	0	0	0	0
In theatres	0	0	0	0
In restaurants	2	1	0	0
In sport	1	5	0	5
Elsewhere	8	5	7	5
Everywhere	6	3	7	6
Not applicable	3	3	0	0
Total *	100	100	100	100

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Perceptions of racism among the race groups were assessed by asking whether a respondent agreed that most members of a particular race group had racist attitudes. As is shown in Figure 5.1, white people were most negatively perceived, with 80 per cent of black and 65 per cent of Indian/Asian respondents agreeing that most white people are racist. On the other hand, only 37 per cent of coloured and 30 per cent of white respondents thought that most white people are racist. Again the historical black/white schism is confirmed by the mirroring pattern found with regard to the statement that most black people are racist. The majority of white respondents (69 per cent) agreed with the statement. However, among Indians/Asians as well the majority (63 per cent) thought that most black people are racist. Coloured and Indian/Asian people were generally regarded as less racist than the other race groups, an exception being that 54 per cent of the black respondents were of the opinion that most Indians/Asians are racist.

Overall, the black and Indian/Asian groups were most likely to agree that the 'other' race groups are racist. Clearly, perceptions of racism among the race groups differ from experiences of racism, since fewer black than white people claimed to have experienced racial discrimination. Looking at generational differences, it is worth noting that black respondents aged between 25 and 34 indicated that they were most aware of racism, with the highest proportions agreeing that among other race groups most people are racist. The youngest generation of coloured people was more aware than the older generation of racism amongst white and Indian/Asian people.

Figure 5.1 *Percentage in agreement: 'Most white people/coloured people/black Africans/Indians/Asians are racist'*



Regarding the question of whether people felt that race relations had improved, almost three-fifths of South Africans (57 per cent) felt that this was the case. About three in ten (29 per cent) felt that since 1994, race relations had remained the same. As is shown in Table 5.11, perceptions of race relations differed significantly across the races. Black and coloured respondents followed the pattern described. Indian/Asian and in particular white people, on the other hand, tended to be more divided on the issue with larger proportions saying that race relations had deteriorated (respectively 25 per cent and 41 per cent).

Table 5.11 *Since 1994, have race relations in South Africa improved or deteriorated?*

	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Improved	59	61	58	42	57
Same	32	28	16	17	29
Became worse	9	11	25	41	14
Total *	100	100	100	100	100

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Most worrying, perhaps, is the finding that the youth tends to be most negative about improvement in race relations (see Tables 5.12a and 5.12b). Just a small majority (54 per cent) of black people aged between 16 and 24 years thought that race relations had improved over the past decade, whereas the proportion who thought this was about 64 per cent of those aged over 35 years. The same tendency was apparent

amongst the white youth, of whom only 28 per cent were of the opinion that race relations had improved.

Table 5.12a *Since 1994, have race relations in South Africa improved or deteriorated? (Black South Africans, by age)*

Race relations	16–24 yrs	25–34 yrs	35–49 yrs	50+ yrs	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Improved	54	57	64	62	59
Same	35	32	29	30	32
Became worse	11	11	7	8	10
Total *	100	100	100	100	100

Table 5.12b *Since 1994, have race relations in South Africa improved or deteriorated? (White South Africans, by age)*

Race relations	16–24 yrs	25–34 yrs	35–49 yrs	50+ yrs	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Improved	28	45	42	54	43
Same	29	13	20	9	17
Became worse	43	42	38	37	39
Total *	100	100	100	100	100

Tables 5.12a and b: * Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

This might be a cohort effect, however. Older people who lived during the apartheid era might have a different frame of reference regarding race relations than that of the youth, who were aged between 6 and 14 years in 1994 and had not really experienced apartheid.

In short, approximately half of South African adults are of the view that race relations have improved in the country since the advent of the universal franchise government in April 1994. The youth (black and white South Africans), however, is somewhat more negative about race relations.

Racism and identity

The main question in this chapter is whether experiences and perceptions of race relations differ by group and national identity. Do people with a strong race identity experience more racism than those with a weak race identity, and does it make a difference whether people feel strongly or weakly attached to the nation at large? The relation between race identity (as well as class) and perceived race relations was explored by partial correlations.[10] 'Class' identity was included to facilitate

comparisons with another type of group identity. Analysis of the whole sample resulted in low and mostly insignificant correlations. However, as the previous sections on identity and race relations suggested, different dynamics were at work for the different race groups (see Table 5.13).

Table 5.13 *Significant partial correlations between national, race and class identity and race relations (controlled for gender, age, income and educational levels)*

	Black African			Coloured		Indian/Asian	White
	Nat. ID	Race	Class	Nat. ID	Class	Nat. ID	Nat. ID
Frequency racially discriminated against	–.08**		–0.09**				–.17*
White racist				.21**	.18**	.24**	
Coloured racist	–.10**	–.09**	–.14***	.22**			.21*
Black racist	–.13***	–.07*					
Indian racist	–.14***						.28**
Deterioration in race relations	–.10***	–.11***	–.08*	–.18**			

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Source: SASAS (2003)

Firstly, among black respondents, all the significant correlations were negative. This indicates that the stronger one's group identity the less negative one's perceptions about race relations. For instance, the more strongly one felt attached to black people, the less likely one would be to say that coloured or black people are racists or that race relations had deteriorated. Also, those who strongly identified on the grounds of class appeared to be less likely to feel discriminated against; to say for example that coloured people are racist, or that race relations had deteriorated. With regard to national identity amongst black respondents, it appeared that a stronger national identity was related to less negative perceptions of race relations.

A different pattern emerged amongst coloured people. Only class identity related to perceptions of race relations and of these, only to perceived racism amongst white people. The stronger one's class identity the more likely one was to detect racism amongst white people. A strong national identity was related to more negative perceptions regarding racism amongst white and coloured people, but also to less negative views about changes in race relations.

Indians/Asians who identified strongly with the nation were more likely than others to report racism amongst white people. In the same vein, white South Africans with strong national identities were more perceptive of Indian/Asian and coloured racism. However, it was also found that strong national identity amongst white South Africans correlated with less frequent experiences of racial discrimination.

Interestingly, overall stronger relationships were found between perceived race relations and national identity than between perceived race relations and group identities.[11] At the same time, a stronger national identity can relate both to negative and to positive views on racism among other race groups. What these findings suggest is that a stronger national identity does not necessarily translate into and cannot necessarily be associated with less perceived racism among certain race groups. The finding that national identity does relate to more optimistic views on race relations and racism among the majority group, black South Africans, and to more pessimistic views on the minority groups, suggests that at a more abstract level national identity might contribute to less negative views on race relations.

Lastly, the relationship between racism and dual identities was analysed. This revealed that amongst black Africans the combination of a strong race identity with a strong national identity was related to less negative perceptions of race relations (except for perceptions of racism amongst white people). However, dual identity was much less distinctly correlated with race relations amongst white, coloured or Indian/Asian respondents.[12]

The relation between group and national identity on the one hand and race relations on the other hand appears to be complex. These findings suggest that perceptions of either improving or deteriorating race relations are independent of the strength of race group identity *per se*. Much depends on whether one belongs to the majority black African group or to one of the minority race groups. However, a strong national identity seems to be associated with more optimistic perceptions of race relations, irrespective of one's race.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have shed light on the interrelationship between race and national identity and how these in turn co-vary with perceptions about race relations. Firstly, it was found that a strong national identity is prevalent in South Africa. Furthermore, the hypothesis that strong race identity, and for that matter also other strong group identities, can correlate with a strong national identity was confirmed. Thus, in line with other authors focusing on South Africa, such as Mattes (1997), Adam and Moodley (1993) and Klandermans et al. (2001), this chapter confirms that national identity and sub-group identities can coexist without impeding one another.

Although a national identity has formed, there is definitely a need for improvement in race relations. More than a third of South Africans felt racially discriminated against. This mostly referred to work-related discrimination. Furthermore, a large majority of black Africans thought that white people were racist. Conversely, the majority of white people thought that black Africans were racist. At the same time, the majority felt that race relations had improved since 1994, though this perception was less strong amongst white and Indian/Asian people than amongst black African and coloured people.

Secondly, linkages between perceptions about race relations and race, national or dual identities were interrogated. The frequency of experienced racism and the perceived deterioration of race relations were mostly negatively associated with national identity, irrespective of race group. This suggests that the stronger one's national identity, the less one experienced racism and the more likely one was to perceive an improvement in race relations.

The link between race identity and perceived racism amongst other race groups, on the other hand, appeared to depend on whether one was a member of a minority or the majority group. Strong identification with a minority race group tended to be associated with a greater probability of perceptions of racism among other groups. Conversely, identification with the majority race group was likely to be associated with a lower level of perceived racism amongst other groups.

Lastly, amongst South Africans with 'dual identities' (i.e. strong identification with the nation as a whole and with one or more than one of the following: language, race, class), this appeared to result in positive and constructive perceptions amongst black South Africans with both a strong national and a strong group identity. Amongst white, coloured and Indian/Asian South Africans, however, such a dual identity hypothesis could not be confirmed.

The findings suggest that national identity is more contested amongst the race group minorities, especially when combined with a strong group identity. Interestingly, however, this contestation resulted in more negative perceptions of racism amongst other 'fellow' minority groups.

This study suggests that a national identity is in the process of formation and that this might contribute to unifying rather than to excluding and dividing various population groups. The weak, though statistically significant, link found between strong national identity and perceived improved race relations seems to stretch further than a common struggle for citizenship which, according to Boyce, has been the single most unifying project in South Africa (1999). Even if, as Mattes (1999) argues, South Africans are claiming their South African identity only because it was previously denied to them, this is not necessarily happening at the expense of minority race groups. Rather, national identity seems to be associated with some rivalry amongst minority groups in terms of maintaining each other's stereotypes of racism.

Notes

1 The descriptions and statistical analyses of differences in national, race, language and class identities, as well as the descriptive sections on discrimination, are based on adjusted weighted data of the 2003 SASAS. When weighted to the total adult population, all statistical tests register as significant. The adjusted weight is thus based on the realised sample multiplied by the original weight and then divided by the originally weighted total sample.

Analysis of data on dual identity and its relation to discrimination uses the unweighted data in order to ensure the number of cases is not too small for statistical analysis.

2 Out of a number of national identity-related items, these items loaded on one factor. Cronbach's Alpha was .71.

3 In this chapter a distinction has been made between race, language and class identity. Race identity refers to identification with one's race group as defined by the categories of apartheid law; language identity to identification with one's language group; and class identity to identification with one's income group. One could argue that race and language together refer to ethnic identity. I have chosen to treat race and language identity as two forms of ethnic identity that merit separate analysis. Class identity is a much wider concept than one's income, of course. However, given the generally strong correlations between other indicators of race, such as education or employment status, and the straightforward interpretation of income levels, I have chosen to limit the analysis to income levels instead of using a combined and unvalidated measure of 'class'.

4 The mean score on national identity was 3.84 (sd. = .82) with a mode and median of 4.

5 The mean score on race identity was 3.68 (sd. = .60), on language identity 3.70 (sd. = .59), and on class identity 3.30 (sd. = .89). All had a mode and median of 4.

6 $r = 16$ and $r = 24$ respectively, both with $p < .001$

7 This is not to say that dual identities, in this case race and national identity, are necessarily dependent on each other. Combinations of race and national identity were largely independent, as the lack of statistical association among white and Indian/Asian respondents and the relatively low effects of race among black and coloured respondents revealed (.162 = 3% and .242 = 6% explained variance, respectively). What the data do suggest, however, is that people do combine strong race and national identities.

8 Since household income is still strongly related to race, which does seem to impact on class and national identity, the analysis of the relationship between class and national identity was also analysed within race groups. Positive correlations between national and class identity among black ($r = .13$, $p < .001$), coloured ($r = .36$, $p < .001$) and Indian/Asian ($r = .15$, $p < .01$) respondents confirmed the findings presented in Table 5.8. No correlation was found among white respondents, who generally fall within the highest income groups.

9 These results are based on the adjusted weights. In the analysis of variance we controlled for other demographic variables, such as age and income where this was relevant.

10 Unweighted data were used. The analysis was controlled for gender, age, education and income.

11 In order to control for spurious correlations between group identities and race relations, the same analysis was conducted with national identity as one of the controlling variables. This yielded the same results with just slightly lower correlations.

12 White respondents with a dual identity were most likely to perceive racism amongst coloured people. Racism amongst Indians/Asians was perceived highest amongst white people with a strong national identity and a weak race identity. Coloured respondents with a strong national identity were more negative about racism amongst themselves than were those with a weak national identity. Dual identity amongst coloured respondents was

associated with negative perceptions of racism amongst white people. In addition, coloured respondents with neither a strong race identity nor a strong national identity were least likely to have experienced racial discrimination.

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Poverty, inequality and service delivery

6 *The happy transition? Attitudes to poverty and inequality after a decade of democracy*

Benjamin Roberts

'Zulu, lomhlaba unzima, lomhlaba'

('This world is a harsh place, this world' – Zulu proverb*)*

Following the decisive victory of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa's third democratic elections in April 2004, President Mbeki quickly reaffirmed that in spite of notable progress during the country's first decade of democracy, there remained an overwhelming and urgent mandate to deliver. The ANC's election manifesto, 'A People's Contract to Create Work and Fight Poverty', set forth a series of ambitious socio-economic objectives and targets, the most critical being the promises to halve poverty and unemployment by 2014 (African National Congress 2004). While there exists much debate and disagreement about the patterns and dynamics of poverty and inequality, the process of political and economic transformation appears to have been accompanied by rising impoverishment as well as mounting inequality in both incomes and opportunities (Roberts 2004). As the government sets about the task of meeting these challenges and living up to its commitments to improve people's lives, data from the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) enable us to reflect on and examine individual welfare a decade after the transition.[1]

The measurement of poverty in South Africa, as in most developing countries, has long been dominated by money-metric approaches, according to which income or expenditure is used to determine individual or household well-being. However, building on the international consensus that has evolved over the last decade in relation to the multidimensional nature of poverty, these income-based definitions of poverty are increasingly being complemented by research into subjective measures of poverty.

This chapter therefore begins by examining the extent to which South Africans consider themselves impoverished, and how this corresponds with their satisfaction with various aspects of life, with life in general and with overall happiness. The question of how subjective well-being differs according to socio-economic factors such as age, gender, marital status and labour force status is also explored. Recognising that levels of income inequality remain persistently high, and taking account of the progressive shift away from the relative importance of race towards class as a determinant of inequality, the second section of the chapter considers

attitudes to inequality. It also reflects on perceptions about the responsibility of the state in addressing poverty and inequality. The third and final section of the chapter provides some suggestions about how the research could be useful for policy-makers.

Experience and perceptions of poverty in South Africa: Reviewing the evidence

Research on subjective well-being has tended to focus disproportionately on wealthy nations, a situation largely determined by data availability. The renewed international emphasis on poverty that followed the publication of the 1990 World Development Report has brought rapid advances in data collection in developing and transition countries. South Africa is by no means exceptional in this regard. Over the course of the first decade of democracy, there have been impressive achievements in the availability of quantitative data sets, which Møller (1997) heralded as 'South Africa's emergent social indicators movement'. Coinciding with the transition to democracy and an increasing demand for detailed demographic and socio-economic data in developing countries more generally, the national statistical agency, Statistics South Africa, initiated a programme of cross-sectional, nationally representative household surveys.[2] In addition, a number of multi-topic surveys have been commissioned by national and international development agencies, most notably the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development survey conducted in 1993.[3] Panel data sets, where the same households or cohort of individuals are repeatedly visited in order to gain a better and more sophisticated understanding of micro-level social dynamics over time, have also been initiated. Examples include the Birth to Twenty Study, the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study, the Cape Area Panel Survey and Demographic Surveillance Sites in Agincourt (Mpumalanga), Dikgale (Limpopo) and Hlabisa (KwaZulu-Natal).

There has been a notable but less dramatic improvement in qualitative data, by means of which a more nuanced portrayal of well-being in South Africa can be developed. The 1993 Southern African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) survey included a module on perceived quality of life, with items on household-level life satisfaction, perceived needs, perceived physical safety, relative poverty status, and perceived life change if a new government were to come to power. Klasen (1997) used the data to explore the relationship between poverty, deprivation and well-being.[4] The analysis revealed that a broader measure of deprivation identifies a group of particularly deprived people that are missed using conventional income- or expenditure-based poverty measures. This 'missed' group consisted predominantly of rural-based black people, particularly from KwaZulu-Natal. Powdthavee (2003) uses the data to examine patterns of happiness in the country. The results show that the relationship between subjective well-being and socio-economic variables is similar to that in developed countries. Well-being rises with income (Klasen 1997; Powdthavee 2003) and tends to be higher among white people, households with

small numbers of family members, those living in rural areas, and among households owning some durable assets (especially a motor vehicle, telephone and geyser). As one would intuitively expect, unemployment is shown to be detrimental to reported well-being, both at the individual and the household level. The average educational and occupational status of other individuals living in the same household correlates significantly with reported well-being. Relative income also matters to well-being. A positive perception of past progress is associated with higher levels of reported quality of life. Bookwalter and Dalenberg (2004) find that important differences exist between the poor and the rich in relation to the determinants of subjective well-being. Among poorer households, transportation and housing play the most important role in determining well-being, while sanitation, water, energy, education and health are relatively more important for richer households.

In 1997 the government commissioned the country's first national qualitative poverty study, the South African Participatory Poverty Assessment, to complement the SALDRU survey results and in an attempt to provide a more nuanced understanding of poverty. The study used case studies and various participatory techniques to elicit public experience and perceptions of poverty. This endeavour to understand the lived experience of poverty was viewed as crucial for pro-poor policy-making. This is not only because definitions of poverty have conventionally been constructed by the non-poor, which has direct implications for the likelihood that policies and programmes will effectively target the poor, but is also a result of the apparent lack of consensus on the meaning and measurement of poverty among senior-level government officials (May and Norton 1997; Everatt 2003). The research exercise revealed that the poor characterised their poverty as:

- alienation from kinship and the community, especially among the elderly and for single mothers;
- food insecurity, particularly among children, and the poor quality of food;
- overcrowded living conditions and poorly-maintained homes;
- the use of basic forms of energy and the associated burden on women of collecting firewood;
- a lack of adequately paid, secure jobs or the situation where nobody in the household is employed; and
- fragmentation of the family owing to absent fathers and children living away from their parents (May and Norton 1997; Woolard 2002).

While issues such as hunger, unemployment and job insecurity are fundamentally related to not having enough money, the exercise also pointed strongly to the need to accommodate non-material factors when considering what it means to be poor or, alternatively, what characterises the good life. Well-being in South Africa therefore includes elements that transcend economic prosperity.

Of the few studies that have actually aimed to monitor subjective well-being in the country, the South African Quality of Life Trends Project has the distinction of being

the longest-standing.[5] Initiated in the early 1980s, the study has regularly collected a range of subjective and objective social indicators, and has charted trends in life satisfaction, happiness and expectations of future life satisfaction (Møller 2001; Møller and Dickow 2002). The indicators of overall life satisfaction, happiness and domain satisfaction (satisfaction with different aspects or domains of life) reported during the turbulent 1980s reflected major societal divides, especially in terms of race. White South Africans were consistently happier with most aspects of life and black South Africans were least satisfied and happy, with coloured and Indian South Africans falling somewhere in-between. Despite the major political changes of the 1990s and the wide-ranging nature of policies and programmes to redress historical social inequalities, the reality of rising unemployment, persistent poverty, crime and HIV/AIDS could conceivably serve to offset any positive gains in subjective well-being. This is in fact borne out by the fact that white people have continued to register the highest levels and black people the lowest levels of life satisfaction and happiness, with only a slight convergence in the post-apartheid period.

In terms of expectations for the future, 1994 appears to be an important benchmark, with an inversion of the racial hierarchy of responses after this date. For black people, a generally pessimistic view of the future (especially in the last days of apartheid) became progressively more optimistic, while the observed optimism amongst the white populace came to be supplanted by a more pessimistic outlook (Møller 2001). In sum, the post-apartheid pattern of subjective well-being seems to be characterised by a situation where white people are largely satisfied with life but possess negative future expectations, in contrast to black people, who are predominantly dissatisfied with life but have positive expectations of the future (Møller and Saris 2001).

The Human Sciences Research Council's Social Movement Surveys, which were conducted annually (in February/March) between 1994 and 2000, asked respondents about their perceptions of the current situation relative to past and future life expectation at the personal, group and national levels. The results are a rich and complex tapestry of attitudes. One interesting and important finding is that satisfaction and dissatisfaction vary according to whether people assess their personal situation, the situation of the group they identify with, or the situation of the people of South Africa. This is most notably evident in the case of white and black South Africans. Black people remained consistently dissatisfied about their present personal circumstances in general, but reported that the situation of their group had improved considerably compared to the previous five years and that the future outlook for the group was bright. White South Africans seemed to hold the opposite opinion. They were satisfied with their current personal situation but felt that the situation of their group had worsened over time and that the group had equally bleak future prospects. One possible interpretation of these results is that black South Africans recognised that there had been some gains for their group during the 1990s, which in turn cultivated hope for the future despite their dissatisfaction with their personal situation. Although white South Africans were

relatively contented with life, the perception that things had worsened for their group as a whole over time could be what fuelled concerns about their own future, hence the negative future prognosis (Klandermans, Roefs and Olivier 2001: 88).

Throughout the 1990s, there were two important divergences from the attitudinal trends outlined. There was a dramatic increase in subjective well-being, most acutely observed for black South Africans, immediately after the first democratic election in 1994. This post-election euphoria was, however, short-lived, possibly because of the divergence between expectations or aspirations and actual improvements in living conditions as the decade progressed. The September 1999 round of the Quality of Life Trends Project also exhibited distinct improvements in global life satisfaction and future life expectations for all population groups (Møller 2001). The 2000 Social Movements Survey showed similar improvements for all population groups (Klandermans et al. 2001). This is again suggestive of a euphoric moment in the aftermath of the second democratic elections of 1999.

Poor, relatively speaking

In order to investigate the relationship between income and well-being, respondents were asked the following direct question: 'Would you say that you and your family are wealthy, very comfortable, reasonably comfortable, just getting along, poor or very poor?' Responses to this self-assessed poverty status were subsequently stratified according to three broad categories, namely the 'poor', those 'just getting by' or the 'vulnerable', and the 'better-off/wealthy'.[6] Table 6.1 shows that approximately one-quarter of South Africans aged 16 years and older considered themselves poor, two-fifths saw themselves as vulnerable and marginally less than one-third saw themselves as comfortable or wealthy.

Table 6.1 *Self-assessed poverty status, by population group*

	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Wealthy/comfortable	23	38	60	77	32
Just getting by	47	33	34	22	42
Very poor/poor	30	30	6	2	26
Total*	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted Base N	*1 880*	*213*	*70*	*287*	*2 461***

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
** A number of respondents did not specify a population group.
Source: SASAS (2003)

As with income- or expenditure-based definitions of poverty, there emerges a remarkable gradient when disaggregation by population group is done, reflecting the close correlation between living standards and race that continues to exist in the country. Nearly a third of black African respondents viewed themselves as poor, 47 per cent said they were just getting by, and only 23 per cent designated themselves as comfortable or wealthy. While a similar share of coloured respondents classified themselves as impoverished, nearly 40 per cent viewed themselves as comfortable or wealthy. In contrast, self-perceived poverty was virtually non-existent among white and Indian/Asian respondents, with 77 per cent and 60 per cent respectively indicating that they were comfortable or wealthy.

Hard times

Table 6.2 shows the responses to two sets of variables aimed at eliciting some sense of material hardship. An estimated 45 per cent of the adult population perceived the income of their households as being inadequate to meet basic needs. This situation of economic vulnerability was more acutely experienced among the self-identified poor (74 per cent) and those 'just getting by'. Casual workers, the unemployed (especially work-seekers), pensioners, and those that were temporarily sick were also at risk of income deprivation. Being black African, never having married, being male, and aged between 25–34 years or older than 50 (the youthful unemployed and pensioners) are other personal attributes that seem to influence the likelihood of having insufficient resources to meet basic consumption needs. Respondents residing in provinces with lower levels of human development, including Limpopo, North West, Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, and KwaZulu-Natal, tended to report higher levels of income deprivation.[7]

Over time, individuals and households develop different kinds of arrangements to manage various forms of risk to which they are or could be exposed. These can be informal in nature, examples including migration, the buying and selling of assets (such as cattle or property), informal borrowing and lending, multiple jobs, storing goods for future consumption, and building and using social relationships, taking children out of school, reducing the number of meals per day, and trying to save. These arrangements could also involve taking advantage of market-based institutions such as banks and moneylenders or relying on government-provided assistance or insurance (social grants, public works programmes, subsidies) if they are available (World Bank 2001; Norton, Conway and Foster 2002). In order to further examine responses to situations of financial vulnerability, respondents were asked whether they had been unable to pay a clothing or furniture account, or borrowed from family, friends or a moneylender in the last year.

Table 6.2 *Dimensions of financial security, by self-assessed poverty status and population group*

	'My household's income is adequate for our needs' (% disagree or strongly disagree)	In the last year did any of the following happen to you because of a shortage of money?			
		Could not pay clothing/ furniture account on time (%)	Asked for financial help from family (%)	Asked for financial help from friends (%)	Borrowed from a *mashonisa* or money-lender (%)
Total	45	37	45	28	11
Self-assessed poverty status					
Wealthy/comfortable	18	23	27	14	5
Just getting by	49	36	50	31	14
Very poor/poor	74	55	58	39	14
Population group					
Black African	53	43	52	33	12
Coloured	37	28	38	21	10
Indian/Asian	17	16	22	9	7
White	10	9	11	7	5
Age cohort					
16–24 years	42	33	46	22	8
25–34 years	53	42	50	32	8
35–49 years	41	37	43	33	12
50+ years	45	35	40	24	18
Gender					
Male	46	33	42	26	11
Female	45	39	48	29	11
Marital status					
Married	40	34	36	27	13
Widowed/separated/divorced	42	33	47	32	17
Never married	49	39	50	27	8
Employment status					
Unemployed, not seeking work	45	36	61	27	11
Unemployed, seeking work	58	49	53	35	10
Pensioner (aged/retired)	45	27	36	21	15
Temporarily sick	59	43	79	23	0
Permanently disabled	28	32	37	19	7
Housewife, not looking	23	17	34	26	5
Student/learner	37	26	45	19	3
Self-employed (full time)	23	27	26	18	15
Employed part-time	61	47	56	39	18
Employed full-time	35	33	33	26	16
Other (specify)	52	11	30	14	0

Source: SASAS (2003)

Slightly more than a third of respondents indicated that they had encountered a situation where they were unable to maintain the repayment of debt on a clothing or furniture account. This situation was more pronounced for the self-defined poor (55 per cent), the work-seeking unemployed and casual workers, the black population, those aged 25–34, those never married, and women. At the geographical level, debt default is more common in the Eastern Cape, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and Free State, as well as in rural localities.

As an important coping strategy in times of financial need, individuals may rely on borrowing from family or friends as a significant form of social capital. Almost half of respondents borrowed from family, with this behaviour more prevalent amongst the black population, the unemployed and casual workers, students, youth (16–34), those never married or widowed/separated/divorced, as well as amongst the poor and those 'just getting by'. Borrowing from friends was not as widespread (28 per cent) as borrowing from family, but was similarly typical among casual workers and the work-seeking unemployed, black people, the poor and those 'just getting by', women and 25–49 year olds. Relying on market-based institutions was relatively rare, with only 11 per cent of respondents reporting borrowing from a moneylender in the year prior to the survey. This could be partly attributable to the absence of market institutions, or it could be a response to the excessively high interest repayments charged on loans. It may also represent a tendency to rely on family members who have access to a social grant, such as the old-age pension, or who are regularly employed, in times of need (Møller and Ferreira 2003). Borrowing from moneylenders was more widespread among the employed (regular, casual and self-employed), pensioners, the black population, the defeated unemployed,[8] older cohorts (35 and older), the married, the poor and those 'just getting by'.

Empty stomachs

Research conducted over the last decade has shown that food insecurity has been on the increase. Children have been disproportionately affected by this development. Malnutrition has been worsening, with the prevalence of underweight children increasing from 9.3 per cent to 10.3 per cent during the late 1990s (Statistics South Africa and UNDP 2003). Stunting also rose from 22.9 per cent of children aged 1–6 in 1994 to 23.3 per cent in 1999 (Bradshaw, Masiteng and Nannan 2000). This inability of many South Africans, especially children, to secure their recommended dietary requirements is further corroborated by available data pertaining to subjective measures of food insecurity.[9] Despite inconsistent phrasing hampering comparability over time, certain patterns can be discerned. Between one-quarter and one-third of households are unable to purchase food to meet the dietary requirements of children at any given time. This phenomenon is more acutely felt amongst rural households and in poorer provinces, especially the Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga (Roberts 2004).

Perceived household food insecurity, expressed as those who disagreed with the statement that 'my household is able to get enough food for its needs', was reported by 29 per cent of SASAS respondents. This figure rises to a staggering 64 per cent for the self-defined poor, but also afflicts the unemployed (especially those seeking work) and casual workers, black people, those never married, and men. In common with official statistics, food insecurity was more commonly reported by respondents in Mpumalanga (45 per cent) and the Eastern Cape. High levels of food insecurity were also observed amongst those located in Limpopo, the Free State, North West and the Northern Cape (30 per cent), and in rural areas (41 per cent).

Attitudes to services

Access to basic services, such as water, electricity and sanitation, is an important indicator of well-being as it has a direct and positive impact on quality of life, resulting in improvements ranging from health to productivity (Klasen 1997). In order to address the disparity in living conditions and access to services between the poor and the non-poor, a sizeable share of government's spending after 1994 has been devoted to improving public services for all, including health care, education, electricity, water, sanitation and housing. The result has been notable progress in the provision of social services over the last decade (PCAS 2003). However, inequalities in access to services persist, especially between provinces, urban–rural locations and population groups (Bhorat, Poswell and Naidoo 2004). A series of questions was included in the survey in order to gauge the public's levels of satisfaction with the manner in which government has been addressing the challenge of service delivery, as well as other national priorities such as crime prevention and employment creation.

Table 6.3 *Satisfaction with public service provision, by poverty status*

Mean score	Wealthy/comfortable	Just getting by	Very poor/poor	All
Water and sanitation	3.6	3.3	**2.9**	3.3
Electricity	3.8	3.4	3.0	3.4
Refuse removal	3.8	3.5	3.3	3.5
Affordable housing	3.1	**2.8**	**2.5**	**2.8**
Health care	3.1	**2.7**	**2.6**	**2.8**
Treatment for sexually transmitted infections (STIs) including HIV/AIDS	3.1	**2.6**	**2.8**	**2.8**
Crime prevention	**2.3**	**2.2**	**2.3**	**2.3**
Job creation	**1.9**	**1.8**	**1.6**	**1.7**
Land reform	3.3	**2.8**	**2.9**	3.0

Note: The mean scores presented in this table are based on 'very dissatisfied' = 1, 'dissatisfied' = 2, 'neither nor' = 3, 'satisfied' = 4 and 'very satisfied' = 5. Discrete missing values were assigned to 'do not know' responses. Values in bold indicate those scores falling below the mean.
Source: SASAS (2003)

As Table 6.3 shows, respondents were generally contented with refuse removal, electricity, water and sanitation, and land reform (means ranging between 3.0 and 3.5), but were slightly dissatisfied with housing and health care (including treatment for sexually transmitted infections [STI]). However, in relation to job creation and crime prevention there was broad-based dissatisfaction (means of 1.7 and 2.3 respectively). The self-assessed poor were generally less contented with social services than those just getting by and the better-off. The only services in relation to which the poor expressed neutral attitudes or modest levels of satisfaction were refuse removal and electricity. The better-off were only dissatisfied with job creation and crime prevention efforts.

In terms of satisfaction by population group, there is a clearly discernible trend in relation to refuse removal, electricity, water and sanitation, affordable housing, health care and STI treatment (results not shown). Black African respondents appear the least satisfied and white respondents the most satisfied, with coloured and Indian respondents falling in-between. For these services, the mean satisfaction scores are all above the midpoint of 3.0 (neutral), with the exception of black respondents in respect of affordable housing, health care and STI treatment. In contrast, there was widespread discontent amongst all population groups in relation to the government's efforts in the areas of employment creation and crime prevention. Black African respondents were the most dissatisfied with employment creation (mean = 1.7), with white respondents the least dissatisfied (mean = 2.1). As for crime prevention, Indian/Asian respondents were the least satisfied (mean = 1.7) and black African respondents the least dissatisfied (mean = 2.3).

Life satisfaction and happiness

In Table 6.4 satisfaction with life in general, happiness and four different 'domains' of life are disaggregated by population group and self-assessed poverty status. The results quite starkly portray both the race and class divide that characterises contemporary South Africa.

The mean score for South Africans on life satisfaction was 3.08 (on the positive side, just over the neutral point of 3) and 3.28 on happiness. Of the four population groups, only black people have a negative score on life satisfaction (M = 2.91). Conversely, white people are the most satisfied with life as a whole (M = 3.94), while coloured and Indian/Asian people fall in-between black and white people and are modestly contented with life. Life satisfaction decreases uniformly from the wealthy/comfortable to those just getting by to the poor, a trend that holds constant when disaggregating self-assessed poverty status by population group. Irrespective of poverty status, black people generally have the lowest average life satisfaction and white people the highest life satisfaction, with coloured and Indian/Asian people falling in-between. The only exception is for the poor group, with Indians/Asians on average the most discontented with life in general and white people reporting a score that is positive.

The progression for happiness from lowest to highest scores follows a broadly consistent pattern. The mean happiness score for all population groups falls on the positive side, ranging from a low of 3.11 for black people to a high of 4.01 for white people. Both the wealthy/comfortable and those 'just getting by' report positive happiness scores, a trend that holds true for all population groups. Nonetheless, the poor cohort are generally unhappy (M = 2.49), the only exception being the poor among the white populace.

Table 6.4 *Differences in satisfaction domains, by self-defined poverty status and population group (mean score of a five-point scale)*

	Life satisfaction	Happiness	Income satisfaction	Dwelling satisfaction	Work availability	Paid holidays
Wealthy/comfortable						
Black African	3.68	3.62	**2.94**	3.35	**2.83**	**2.78**
Coloured	3.83	3.94	3.62	3.89	3.34	3.26
Indian/Asian	3.94	4.13	3.68	3.99	3.44	3.64
White	4.08	4.06	3.96	4.19	3.40	3.59
Total	3.82	3.81	3.35	3.68	3.09	3.12
Just getting by						
Black African	3.01	3.29	**2.40**	**2.80**	**2.33**	**2.31**
Coloured	3.46	3.79	**2.70**	3.33	**2.61**	**2.85**
Indian/Asian	3.31	3.56	**2.79**	3.65	**2.64**	**2.88**
White	3.51	3.80	**2.75**	3.69	**2.88**	3.14
Total	3.07	3.36	**2.45**	**2.91**	**2.39**	**2.41**
Very poor/poor						
Black African	**2.13**	**2.45**	**1.75**	**2.15**	**1.85**	**1.84**
Coloured	**2.32**	**2.84**	**1.84**	**2.31**	**1.86**	**2.22**
Indian/Asian	**1.92**	**2.59**	**1.43**	**2.56**	**1.74**	**1.88**
White	3.22	3.94	**2.25**	3.26	**2.04**	**2.56**
Total	**2.16**	**2.49**	**1.76**	**2.18**	**1.85**	**1.88**
South Africa						
Black African	**2.91**	3.11	**2.33**	**2.74**	**2.30**	**2.31**
Coloured	3.25	3.59	**2.80**	3.24	**2.69**	**2.90**
Indian/Asian	3.62	3.85	3.25	3.80	3.10	3.33
White	3.94	4.01	3.67	4.07	3.27	3.47
Total	3.08	3.28	**2.56**	**2.97**	**2.47**	**2.54**

Note: The mean scores presented in this table are based on 'very dissatisfied' = 1, 'dissatisfied' = 2, 'neither nor' = 3, 'satisfied' = 4 and 'very satisfied' = 5. Discrete missing values were assigned to 'do not know' responses. Values in bold indicate those scores falling below the group mean.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Overall, the mean satisfaction ratings for income, job availability and paid holidays, and housing domains fall on the negative (dissatisfied) side. The adult black population is dissatisfied in all four specific domains, especially those that pertain to employment and income. Coloured people are similarly discontented, though they provide a more favourable assessment of housing. In contrast, Indian/Asian and white people are on average satisfied in all the domains, with employment opportunities showing the lowest satisfaction levels (M = 2.21 and 2.22 respectively). Those describing themselves as wealthy/comfortable present positive attitudes in all four domains (lowest = employment opportunities; highest = housing), whereas those stipulating that they are 'just getting by' or poor have negative attitudes in all four domains. Within the three categories of self-assessed poverty status, black people who are wealthy or just getting by have consistently lower mean scores than the other three population groups, but poor Indians/Asians are the least contented with their income and, by a negligible margin, with the availability of work. Within all four population groups, domain satisfaction decreases uniformly from the wealthy/comfortable to those 'just getting by' to the poor.

Past tense, future (im)perfect

To what extent are these differentials in satisfaction and happiness mirrored in attitudes to change over the past five years and in the prognosis for the next five years? Table 6.5 reveals that the mean score on changes in life since 1999 is 2.03, which indicates that on the whole South Africans have a slightly optimistic view of changes during the period of President Mbeki's first term of office. Nonetheless, this aggregate masks important group-based differentials. In fact, only black people positively assessed changes since 1999, with all other groups appearing to believe that overall, life had got worse for them. The same pattern emerges in relation to black African cohorts who are wealthy or just getting by, when compared with other population groups falling in these two poverty status categories. The poor, on the whole, tend to be marginally more pessimistic about improvements in their lives over the past five years. While the black African poor appear to be relatively neutral, the other population groups indicate a slight worsening over the period. It should, however, be noted that the coloured and Indian/Asian poor have slightly higher mean scores than coloured and Indian/Asian people who are just getting by, though the difference is not that large. Interestingly, poor white people, while negative about improvements to their lives, still have higher ratings than those in the other two poverty categories (with well-off white people being the most disenchanted with life change).

In terms of the outlook for the next five years, South Africans appear somewhat more optimistic, with a mean score of 2.22. This more sanguine prognosis is most evident for black, followed by coloured and Indian/Asian people. For all three groups, there is a greater tendency to view the next five years in a more favourable light compared with their assessment of the past, and for Indian/Asian and coloured people the mean

score has actually shifted from being negative to being positive overall. In contrast, white South Africans hold a generally pessimistic view of life during the next five years (M = 1.60), to the extent that the view of the future is as bleak as the evaluation of the past. While the mean scores for the three poverty status categories are modestly positive within a small range (2.21–2.23), better-off white South Africans, vulnerable coloured, Indian/Asian and white people, and poor Indian/Asian and white people foresee negative prospects over the next five-year term.

Table 6.5 *Assessing past and future progress, by population group and self-assessed poverty status (mean score of a three-point scale)*

	Life change since 1999	Life change next 5 years
Wealthy/comfortable		
Black African	2.22	2.48
Coloured	**1.98**	2.25
Indian/Asian	**1.84**	2.24
White	**1.66**	**1.66**
Total	2.02	2.21
Just getting by		
Black African	2.15	2.31
Coloured	**1.76**	**1.96**
Indian/Asian	**1.53**	**1.79**
White	**1.57**	**1.41**
Total	2.08	2.22
Very poor/poor		
Black African	**2.00**	2.25
Coloured	**1.83**	2.14
Indian/Asian	**1.58**	**1.86**
White	**1.74**	**1.42**
Total	**1.98**	2.23
South Africa		
Black African	2.12	2.33
Coloured	**1.86**	2.11
Indian/Asian	**1.72**	2.07
White	**1.64**	**1.60**
Total	2.03	2.22

Note: The mean scores presented in this table are based on 'gotten worse' = 1, 'stayed the same' = 2 and 'improved' = 3. Discrete missing values were assigned to 'do not know' responses. Values in bold indicate those scores falling below the group mean.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Combining the results on current individual life satisfaction presented in Table 6.4 with the assessment of past and future group-based progress in Table 6.5, it becomes apparent that black South Africans are generally dissatisfied with their personal situation, but believe that their group has benefited during the past five years. Furthermore, it appears that this assessment has in turn served to nurture hope for the future, and an expectation that some day they will enjoy such improvements themselves. In contrast, while white South Africans seem to feel relatively satisfied with their personal situation, the results also suggest that they perceive that their group may have been excluded from socio-economic gains secured during the past five years, thus raising fears of a decline in social status in the near future.

The reality that poor black and coloured South Africans continue to demonstrate a resilient and resolute optimism about the next five years, despite being unhappy and dissatisfied with income, housing, employment opportunities, paid leave and life in general, is of particular political significance. It underlines the importance of the government using the electoral mandate it was afforded in the April 2004 general elections to drastically scale up delivery and ensure that the poor are adequately provided for. The bubble of optimism amongst poor black and coloured South Africans cannot be taken for granted. If the range of policies and programmes fails to deliver substantively on the electoral promises over the next term of office of the government, then in all likelihood the threshold of patience may be crossed and the optimism replaced by increased disaffection.

Materialism

Research conducted largely in the United States has revealed, interestingly, that materialistic goals and values are inimical to high subjective well-being (Richins and Dawson 1992; Sirgy 1997; Diener and Biswas-Diener 2002). According to this research, people who view money as critical to meeting their goals or aspirations tend to be less satisfied with life than those who place more of an emphasis on other values. In the SASAS study, each of the respondents was asked about the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that 'the best things in life cannot be bought with money'. The responses were captured using a five-point scale, ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'. Those responding 'disagree' or 'strongly disagree' are considered to be materialists or have high material values, while those stating that they 'agree' or 'strongly agree' are seen as non-materialists with low material values.

For nearly a third of South Africans, material values predominate over post-material concerns. As one would expect, this is particularly true of those groupings that do not have much money, such as the poor and those just getting by, the unemployed, the youth, black people, those never married, casual workers and the self-employed, and women. Similarly, poorer provinces such as KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga and Limpopo, as well as rural localities, are enclaves of

materialist sentiment. Conversely, those less concerned about income matters (post-materialists) appear to be those whose basic needs and security have been satisfied, including white and Indian/Asian South Africans, the wealthy, those residing in the Western and Northern Cape and urbanites.

Figure 6.1 presents the relation between self-assessed poverty status and life satisfaction for participants with less and more materialistic values. As can be seen, materialistic people were much less satisfied with their lives if they considered themselves poor. If materialists were well-off, their life satisfaction tended to be somewhat closer to that of the non-materialists. Although directly measured income is not used, the results do provide some indication that in South Africa the lack of fulfilment of material desires is one of the potential reasons for discontent among materialistic people.

Figure 6.1 *Poverty status, materialism and life satisfaction*



Note: The mean life satisfaction scores are based on 'very dissatisfied' = 1, 'dissatisfied' = 2, 'neither nor' = 3, 'satisfied' = 4 and 'very satisfied' = 5. Discrete missing values were assigned to 'do not know' responses. Material values were determined from reported levels of agreement with the statement 'the best things in life cannot be bought with money'. High material values were assigned to those that disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, while low material values were assigned to those that agreed or strongly agreed.
Source: SASAS (2003)

South Africans' priorities for well-being therefore reflect the gap between material and post-material values. While black South Africans appear to be more concerned about basic fulfilment of needs, white South Africans focus more on other societal issues. This provides some resonance with the South African Quality of Life Trends Project and supports Inglehart's (1990) post-materialist theory, which argues that people in developed countries are currently less concerned about income matters than about non-material issues. It also provides some support for Maslow's (1970) classical theory of a hierarchy of values, according to which higher values only become salient after lower-level values such as basic needs have been satisfied (Møller 2001: 44).

Confronting the divide: Attitudes to inequality

The extent to which the political and economic transformation that accompanied South Africa's transition to democracy has benefited those that were previously disadvantaged is subject to much debate. Given that this is one of the world's most inequitable societies, much attention has been devoted to measuring changes in people's incomes and income inequality during the first decade of freedom. Despite a resolute commitment by the government to addressing the pervasive poverty and inequality in the country, and the diverse package of policy responses adopted over the decade, empirical evidence suggests that poverty may have increased. Inequality may also be stagnating due to worsening intra-racial inequality (the gap between rich and poor black South Africans is widening) and only a marginal decline in interracial inequality. This section attempts to provide some insight into people's attitudes towards the changed circumstances brought about by the post-apartheid period.

Perceptions of income inequality

SASAS contains a set of measures that allow us to explore respondents' attitudes to inequality in a reasonably direct manner. In particular, the statement 'In South Africa incomes are too unequal' represents an attempt to establish how South Africans assess the perceived amount of inequality in the country. Figure 6.2 shows that there exists a high level of dissatisfaction with the level of income inequality in the country, with 87 per cent of respondents strongly agreeing or agreeing that incomes are too unequal. Thus, South Africans appear to be generally intolerant of the level of inequality in society, a situation that is more acutely felt by black African compared with white respondents.[10] Furthermore, those that self-identify with being vulnerable or 'just getting by' are significantly more likely to express an aversion to income inequality than those that consider themselves poor or better-off.

Figure 6.2 *Incomes are too unequal in South Africa (percentage that strongly agree and agree)*



Note: Missing values have been excluded from analysis.
Source: SASAS (2003)

There are a number of plausible explanations for these negative views on inequality. Attitudinal differences to inequality are undoubtedly likely to reflect the enduring apartheid legacy of pronounced income and wealth inequality. However, the situation could also be partly attributable to a perceived growth in social inequalities over the decade, a sense of personal material loss for certain respondents, especially as a result of rising unemployment, and a sense of unfairness in the post-apartheid transformation process. The second round of the Afrobarometer Survey[11] provides supporting evidence for this, with 64 per cent of South Africans asserting that the gap between the rich and the poor had widened over the last few years, 53 per cent saying that their standard of living had worsened over the last few years, and 85 per cent indicating that the availability of jobs had worsened (see Table 6.A1 in the Appendix to this chapter). Moreover, approximately two-thirds of South Africans believe that the government's economic policies have hurt most people (see Table 6.A2 in the Appendix to this chapter). That those who are 'just getting by' express the highest level of aversion to inequality is unsurprising. The kinds of market reforms and trade liberalisation that South Africa has embarked upon under the Growth, Employment and Redistribution macroeconomic strategy have been shown to create opportunities but also new vulnerabilities, especially for the near-poor or middle strata (Graham 2002).

Perceived class conflict

The egalitarian view also expresses itself in terms of concern over conflict between different societal groupings. SASAS included a set of items that was intended to determine whether, after a decade of democracy, the South African public perceived conflicts between rich and poor, between employed and unemployed, between managers and workers, between young and old and between different race groups (Table 6.6). While perceived tensions along race lines continue to predominate, more than 40 per cent of South Africans mention strong tension between the poor and the rich. Round 2 of Afrobarometer affirms this unease with large wealth differentials, with the majority expressing the sentiment that such inequality needs to be avoided on the grounds that it fosters 'jealousy and conflict'. More moderate conflict is perceived between employed and unemployed, and between managers and workers, while even fewer see much tension between generations.

A majority (ranging between 48 per cent and 61 per cent) sees each of these five conflicts as in the middle categories, either 'some tension' or 'not much tension', rather than at the extremes. Nonetheless, the perceived conflicts are more intense than those in more advanced industrial countries, where moderate levels of conflict have been reported (Kelley, Evans and Castles 2001).[12] Therefore, South Africans do not see social relations within the country as being tranquil and consensual; nor do they see them as extremely conflictual. Instead, evidence points towards a situation where modest to moderately high levels of conflict prevail.

Table 6.6 *Attitudes to class conflict in South Africa*

		Strong tension	Some tension	Not much tension	No tension	Total*	*N*	DK
Different races	%	46	36	12	6	100	*2 381*	5
Poor and rich	%	43	37	12	8	100	*2 369*	5
Employed and unemployed	%	35	43	14	8	100	*2 383*	5
Management and workers	%	32	45	16	6	100	*2 262*	9
Young and old	%	22	35	24	19	100	*2 371*	5

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Specific sub-groups are more likely to view society as conflict-ridden. Correlation analysis points toward some important individual-level differences in perceptions of conflict (see Table 6.A3 in the Appendix to this chapter). Respondents who are better educated, white, married or have higher personal incomes appear to see less conflict. Female respondents are less likely to perceive tension between management

and workers, a situation that may be related to lower labour market participation. Coloured respondents are less likely to see conflict between the unemployed and the employed and between race groups. In contrast, respondents who subjectively identify with the poorer classes, are rurally-based or are black African are more likely to see conflict. Being older and female is also associated with higher perceived tension between the young and old and between race groups.

Attitudes toward government responsibility

Over the past decade, South Africa's adoption of a progressive, rights-based Constitution together with other important legislation has served to eliminate the discriminatory legal basis for unequal wealth ownership. This has been coupled with public programmes of land reform, housing, education, small-, medium- and micro-enterprise (SMME) development and black economic empowerment (BEE), all of which have directly attempted to redistribute wealth. Yet despite these substantive state-led endeavours, scant attention has been devoted to mapping attitudinal differences towards the government's role in public service provision and in equalising opportunities and outcomes.

With regard to attitudes towards the role of government, especially in terms of the redistribution of income, one would expect that the low levels of tolerance of inequality in society would produce an equally strong desire for governmental redistribution. Indeed, this appears to be the case, with 90 per cent of respondents believing that government should take more responsibility for ensuring that everyone is provided for (Table 6.7). In terms of cross-country comparison, this is exceptionally high relative to the perceived aversion to inequality previously outlined. As Table 6.A4 (in the Appendix to this chapter) demonstrates, while dissatisfaction with the level of income inequality in South Africa approximates that of more developed countries such as Great Britain, and is somewhat lower than countries in central and eastern Europe, this country expresses the highest levels of agreement with regard to government's responsibility for social justice.

Table 6.7 also includes responses to a set of statements directed at eliciting levels of support for forms of public action that could serve to redress income differences, including land reform, BEE, and affirmative action. One would anticipate that individuals who consider themselves better-off or rich would oppose redistributive measures, since they are not benefiting directly. However, fear of becoming poor may prompt them to support such measures as a means of insuring against future potential misfortunes. The poor should favour redistribution since they gain from it, on the whole (Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch 2003). The dynamics of the past decade may further complicate this picture, since the new elite, particularly the black middle class, may generally be more altruistic than self-interested and therefore encourage redistribution.

Table 6.7 *Attitudes to government responsibility and redistributive measures*

Statement presented to respondents	All	Black African	Coloured	Indian/ Asian	White	Wealthy	Vulnerable	Poor
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
'Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.' (strongly agree and agree)	90	92	88	85	84	89	93	93
'Government's duty is to provide employment.' (strongly agree and agree)	90	92	87	78	83	87	94	92
'Government should… redistribute land to black South Africans.' (strongly agree and agree)	67	81	27	28	17	59	75	84
'There should be preferential hiring and promotion of black South Africans in employment.' (strongly agree and agree)	66	80	17	31	15	54	75	81
'Government should… give preferential contracts and tax breaks to black businesses.' (strongly agree and agree)	60	72	20	26	13	50	71	74

Source: SASAS (2003)

An interesting pattern appears to develop, especially when analysing attitudes to such reforms by population group. Despite the uniformly strong sentiment expressed in favour of the role of the state in meeting the inequality challenge, there appears to be less agreement as to the preferred means of achieving these gains. While 90 per cent of respondents believe that government has a responsibility to provide employment, only an estimated two-thirds believe that there should be preferential hiring and promotion of black South Africans. This can be ascribed to the fact that most population groups support government-driven employment creation, ranging from 92 per cent of black African to 78 per cent of Indian/Asian people, but affirmative action only receives mass support from black South Africans. Amongst the other population groups, the level of support for such reform is less than half the national average. There is even less support for BEE, whereby government provides preferential contracts and tax breaks to black businesses. Attitudes to land reform exhibit a similar trend, with sizeable support from black African respondents relative to other population groups.

What are the possible reasons for this paradox between widespread aversion to inequality and polarised support for different forms of redistributive measures along race and class lines? One feasible rationale may be self-interest among South Africa's elites. For these individuals, inequality may be seen to breed crime and pose threats to property rights, hence the strong concern about the extreme income inequality in the country. Social consciousness among elites could also explain this phenomenon, but the research conducted by Kalati and Manor (1999) suggests that this social solidarity is poorly developed in most elites in South Africa, a situation complicated by the geographical, social, educational, economic, and psychological distances that exist between elites and the impoverished masses. The perception of poverty may negatively affect the welfare of the rich and their sense of fairness. Resistance to redistributive policies may come from the fact that most elites have not benefited from such interventions, but may also be a consequence of the fact that the redistribution process has been tainted by poor delivery, corruption, nepotism (and possibly a fear of Zimbabwe-type redistribution of assets). These assertions remain mostly speculative for now, and subsequent rounds of SASAS will need to begin to examine the competing reasons for the complex attitudes to redistribution in South Africa.

Legitimate bases of reward

A number of normative statements were presented to respondents about the factors that should determine earnings from employment, as opposed to the actual situation and the factors that are influencing whether or not people get ahead (Table 6.8). These largely relate to principles of meritocracy, such as level of responsibility, education and skills, work experience, supervision of others, hard work, performance and family responsibility. There is strong support for these more 'objective' criteria in determining earnings. While attitudes remain relatively homogeneous when disaggregating by population group, the level of agreement is marginally higher for Indian/Asian and white respondents. Therefore, the general picture emerging is one of widespread support for transformation, but with employment decisions premised ideally on individual merit rather than membership of a racial or ethnic group. One possible explanation for this is disillusionment with BEE policies, especially in a context of rising unemployment and a perceived worsening of job opportunities. Other contending and contributing factors could also include fear of Zimbabwe-type redistribution of assets (Southall 2003), as well as a growing reaction against corruption as a means of getting ahead. With regard to the latter, there is a relatively low level of agreement that 'to get all the way to the top of business in South Africa today, you have to be corrupt'.

Table 6.8 *Attitudes to determinants of earnings in South Africa by population group*

Statement presented to respondents	All	Black African	Coloured	Indian/ Asian	White
	%	%	%	%	%
'The amount of responsibility that goes with the job' (very important and important)	92	91	88	98	96
'Their skills or qualifications' (very important and important)	91	90	89	98	99
'Their work experience' (very important and important)	88	88	82	93	95
'How well he or she does the job' (very important and important)	87	86	86	93	95
'How hard he or she works at the job' (very important and important)	87	86	84	94	91
'Whether the job requires supervising others' (very important and important)	76	76	71	85	76
'Whether the person has children to support' (very important and important)	68	74	58	72	41
'To get all the way to the top of business in South Africa today, you have to be corrupt' (strongly agree and agree)	21	21	14	21	23

Source: SASAS (2003)

Gross national happiness: from attitudes to policy choices

While the analysis of subjective well-being in a given context makes for interesting reading, an obvious question is how to apply such assessments to policy questions. What tentative policy implications can be extrapolated from such research? While international evidence suggests that a significant proportion of individual differences in life satisfaction can be attributed to genetic and constitutional factors, numerous social, economic and institutional factors have also been found to exert a considerable influence on well-being. By extension, certain core government activities are likely to have direct impacts on individual well-being. Therefore, attitudinal research may help governments frame the longer-term social protection policies that aim to address chronic and transient poverty. The greater the financial constraints on redistribution, the more likely it is that attitudes about who requires assistance will play a role. There is some evidence that policy-makers are beginning to take attitudes to well-being seriously. For instance, in 2002 the United Kingdom (UK) Cabinet Office held a seminar on life satisfaction and the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit published a set of policy recommendations concerning steps that might increase the country's happiness (Donovan, Halpern and Sargeant 2002). The government of Bhutan has even gone as far as declaring gross national happiness a more important objective than gross national product (Priesner 1999).

Understanding social attitudes may help policy-makers to assess, frame and navigate their political economy contexts as they attempt to craft social policies that are part of a fiscally sustainable social contract (Graham 2002: 6). The observed attitudinal differences towards the government's role in public service provision and in equalising opportunities and outcomes are important. It has been shown that such differences can develop into patterns of political and economic behaviour. They are particularly relevant to the extent of political support for redistribution or other types of public assistance (Graham 2002). Differences in attitudes towards redistribution affect the design of social welfare structures, which in turn yields insights into what social policies are likely to be successful and politically sustainable in a particular context. Dismissing or neglecting public attitudes is likely to result in unsustainable programmes. Strategies for implementing reform must attempt to navigate the constraints posed by public attitudes, as well as recognise windows of opportunity. For example, the debate about redistribution in South Africa cannot be deferred any longer. The country's income distribution remains among the most unequal in the world and redistribution, on a far greater scale than has been attempted to date in South Africa, is required if the twin challenges of poverty and inequality are to be surmounted. It seems fairly certain, based on the SASAS results, that such redistributive efforts, if attempted, will be resisted. Government therefore needs to find innovative ways of minimising resistance to redistribution while improving the targeting of social spending and the gains from growth towards the lower end of the income distribution.

In order for policy-makers to take cognisance of social attitudes when designing, implementing or refining policies and programmatic interventions, there is a need to further develop the tools with which to assess public attitudes in South Africa. Nationally representative social attitudes surveys (such as SASAS) are fundamentally important, particularly since attitudes about social welfare spending can be a fairly accurate predictor of political support for policies or proposed changes in policies (Graham 2002). Furthermore, national surveys should as a matter of necessity re-introduce subjective questions that attempt to assess how the target population feels about policies executed in their name (Meth 2003). This would facilitate more detailed analysis that links reported subjective states and objective economic conditions in the households in which respondents reside. Ensuring that such research is conducted in a co-ordinated, reliable and regular manner is paramount if policy-makers are to systematically monitor and evaluate attitudinal shifts. On a positive note, the Government Communication and Information System has started a continuous process of monitoring public attitudes on select issues to gauge 'the mood of the nation'. However, these results are not placed in the public domain and there is insufficient clarity on the extent to which attitudes on specific policies are elicited.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to combine data on life satisfaction, happiness, domain satisfaction and relative deprivation with select objective and subjective socio-economic measures. Since SASAS intends to regularly monitor and evaluate progress and decline in attitudes, attention has been devoted to outlining pre-existing research on attitudes to subjective well-being in South Africa in order to contextualise the SASAS results appropriately. The chapter has used these data to estimate apparent quality of life in the South African adult population after a decade of democracy. This was undertaken to give some sense of the magnitude of the challenge confronting the government and other development stakeholders as it turns to the task of formulating policy interventions needed to realise the social and economic targets enshrined in the country's national vision, Vision 2014. While South Africans are on average somewhat satisfied with life and happy, this general attitude masks important sub-group differences.

Recognising that the government has endeavoured to secure, and remains committed to providing, a better life for all, this chapter has also been able to reflect critically on the policy effects of a decade of reconstruction and development. While there exists incontrovertible evidence of improvements in the quality of life of many South Africans over the last decade, and there is a resolute commitment on the part of government to meeting the poverty and inequality challenges inherited from decades of segregation and apartheid, high levels of poverty and inequality appear to have persisted. While the attitudinal scorecard of government performance is positive for certain publicly provided services such as water, sanitation and electricity, in other areas such as employment creation, crime reduction and health care the prognosis is more sobering. Furthermore, large segments of the population continue to consider themselves deprived and are exposed to various forms of risk and vulnerability.

Appendix

Table 6A.1 *Attitudes to South Africa's economic performance*

Comparing our present economic system with the economic system a few years ago, are the following things worse or better now than they used to be or about the same:

	Better/much better (%)	Same (%)	Worse/much worse (%)	Do not know (%)
People's standard of living	32	14	53	0
Availability of job opportunities	8	6	85	1
Gap between the rich and poor	13	19	64	4

Source: Afrobarometer Network (2004)

Table 6A.2 *Attitudes to economic reform and social values in South Africa and other African countries*

Statements presented to respondents	South Africa (%)	All 15 African countries (%)
The government's economic policies have helped most people; only a few have suffered	25	31
The government's economic policies have hurt most people and only benefited a few	64	61
Do not agree with either	6	4
Do not know	5	5
The costs of reforming the economy are too high; the government should therefore abandon its current economic policies	31	31
In order for the economy to get better in the future, it is necessary for us to accept some hardships now	45	57
Do not agree with either	13	5
Do not know	10	7
It is alright to have large differences of wealth because those who work hard deserve to be rewarded	35	38
We should avoid large gaps between the rich and the poor because they create jealousy and conflict	50	56
Do not agree with either	11	4
Do not know	4	2
People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own successes in life	50	48
The government should bear the main responsibility for the well-being of people	42	49
Do not agree with either	6	3
Do not know	2	1

Note: The countries included in the survey are Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
Source: Afrobarometer Network (2004)

Table 6A.3 *Correlates of attitudes to class conflict* →

Table 6A.3 *Correlates of attitudes to class conflict*

Correlations	Poor and rich	Employed and unemployed	Management and workers	Young and old	Different races
Tensions: Poor and rich	1.00				
Tensions: Employed and unemployed	0.58**	1.00			
Tensions: Management and workers	0.40**	0.42**	1.00		
Tensions: Young and old	0.28**	0.35**	0.34**	1.00	
Tensions: Different races	0.31**	0.42**	0.25**	0.26**	1.00
Dummy for female respondents	0.00	–0.03	0.09**	–0.05*	0.00
Years of education (respondent)	0.10**	0.04	0.10**	0.09**	0.02
Imputed personal monthly income	0.01	0.07**	–0.03	0.09**	0.02
Age of respondent	0.01	0.01	–0.01	–0.04*	–0.01
Subjective poverty status:	–0.11**	–0.06**	–0.08**	–0.14**	–0.03
Wealthy dummy	0.10**	0.04	0.05*	0.11	0.01
Just getting by dummy	0.01	0.06**	0.02	0.02	0.04
Poor dummy	–0.12**	–0.11**	–0.08**	–0.14**	–0.05*
Rural	–0.10**	–0.04*	–0.07**	–0.09**	–0.04*
Black African	–0.17**	–0.05*	–0.08**	–0.16**	–0.06**
Coloured	0.03	0.04*	0.00	0.09**	0.11**
Indian/Asian	0.02	–0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
White	0.19**	0.04	0.10**	0.13**	–0.02
Married	0.03	0.05*	0.01	0.05*	0.02
Never married	–0.05*	–0.04	–0.02	–0.01	–0.01
Widowed, separated or divorced	0.02	–0.02	0.02	–0.05*	–0.02

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Source: SASAS (2003)

Table 6A.4 *Respondents expressing egalitarian attitudes, by country*

Country	Differences in income in your country are too large (%)	It is the responsibility of government to reduce differences in income (%)
Bulgaria	96.9	85.0
Russia	95.5	86.2
Portugal	96.0	89.9
Hungary	93.1	80.1
Slovenia	91.0	84.8
Slovakia	93.7	74.5
Latvia	96.7	78.7
Poland	89.1	84.9
Austria	86.2	72.5

Country	Differences in income in your country are too large (%)	It is the responsibility of government to reduce differences in income (%)
Spain	89.3	79.3
Czech Republic	87.8	71.9
France	87.4	67.5
South Africa	**82.7**	**90.1***
Great Britain	82.4	68.7
Germany	82.2	61.2
Norway	72.5	61.9
Sweden	71.1	59.5
Japan	69.2	52.6
Canada	70.6	47.5
New Zealand	73.2	49.4
Australia	70.9	49.7
USA	66.2	35.3
Average	92.3	80.7

* Note that the phrasing in the SASAS and International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) modules was somewhat different, which may partially explain the observed differentials in relation to government responsibility.
Source: Redmond et al. (2002) using ISSP 1999 data

Notes

1 The analysis relies on a half sample of 2 497 individuals.

2 These include the multi-purpose October Household Survey (OHS) series undertaken annually between 1994 and 1999, the 1995 and 2000 Income and Expenditure Surveys (IES) which provided rich information about household consumption and income sources, and the biannual Labour Force Survey (LFS) series introduced in March 2000 primarily to measure labour-market dynamics. More recently, pressure for a regular survey to monitor development trends and performance of government programmes resulted in the development of a General Household Survey (GHS), the first round of which was conducted in 2002.

3 The survey was undertaken by the Southern African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town with technical assistance from the World Bank. Henceforth, this study will be referred to as the SALDRU survey.

4 This was achieved by developing a deprivation index using 12 measures, including income, health, education, household wealth (asset ownership), access to services, transportation, and perceptions of well-being. A household's ranking by income poverty was compared to its score on the deprivation index, enabling Klasen to determine the extent to which the different definitions of welfare identified the same households.

5 The project was launched by a consortium consisting of the HSRC and university scholars, and is currently run by the Institute for Social and Economic Research at Rhodes University.

6 The 'poor' category was derived by grouping together those who declared that they were 'poor' or 'very poor'. The 'just getting by' category corresponds to the original 'just getting

along' response. The term 'the vulnerable' will be used interchangeably for this group of individuals, indicating that they are at risk of becoming poor. Finally, the 'better-off/wealthy' category represents a collapsing together of those who identified themselves as 'wealthy', 'very comfortable' or 'reasonably comfortable'.

7 This is based on provincial estimates of the Human Development Index (HDI) included in the 2003 Human Development Report for South Africa (Statistics South Africa and United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2003). The HDI is a composite index of life expectancy, educational attainment and gross domestic product that measures economic and social well-being.

8 This term refers to those individuals who are unemployed and are no longer searching for employment.

9 The October Household Surveys (1994–1999) and the General Household Survey (2002) each contained a question on the ability of households to feed children as an indicator of food insecurity.

10 Analyses of variance determined the statistical significance of differences between the groups (race groups, self-assessed poverty status groupings) regarding attitudes to inequality. Differences were regarded as significant at $p < 0.05$. Scheffé tests were performed to determine the specific nature of significant differences where a p value of less than 0.05 was found. In the case of population group differentials, the mean aversion to inequality scores for Indians/Asians and coloured people were not significantly different from those of the other two race groups.

11 The Afrobarometer Survey is a periodic series of nationally representative sample surveys on the attitudes of citizens in selected African countries towards democracy, markets, civil society and other aspects of development. Round 1 was completed in September 2001, whereas Round 2 was conducted in the 15 selected African countries between 2002 and 2003. In South Africa, Round 2 was conducted between September and October 2002 and consists of a sample of 2 400 respondents.

12 In the 11 countries included in Kelley et al.'s (2001) analysis, more than 80 per cent of respondents saw conflict between rich and poor, management and workers, and the working class and middle class as being in the middle categories rather than at the extremes.

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7 *Slipping through the Net: Digital and other communication divides within South Africa*

Zakes Langa, Pieter Conradie and Benjamin Roberts

Even in a developing country such as South Africa, there are clear signs of an emerging globally networked society (Castells 1996, 1997 and 1998). In all the major towns and cities there are Internet cafés, everywhere businesses and individuals are advertising their websites, and terms such as e-commerce, e-learning and e-democracy have become buzzwords among South African business leaders, academics and policy-makers. There is a generally pervasive optimistic view that the increased uses of digital technologies and applications will contribute to the well-being of the country. Nonetheless, recognising that technologies are often highly unevenly distributed, concerns have also been expressed about the emergence of a widening 'digital divide',[1] a reference to disparities in access to computers and the Internet, including those that occur along racial, gender, and income lines.

Although South Africa is classified as a middle-income country, the post-apartheid democratic government has inherited a society characterised by a huge range of developmental levels. As a result, the country remains, even a decade after the advent of democracy, one of the world's most inequitable societies, with extensive disparities between rich and poor people. It is therefore unsurprising that existing evidence suggests the existence of notable digital inequalities in the country. For instance, Jensen (2002) and Goldstuck (2002) have found that Internet access in South Africa is largely confined to urban areas, and that Internet users are predominantly white city-dwellers who are relatively affluent and well-educated. Rural areas in the country unfortunately lag behind not only with regard to Internet access, but also in relation to the factors that could contribute to bridging the divide (such as literacy, computer skills and higher incomes). A 1999 study (Webchek 1999 in Bridges Organisation 2000) revealed racial divisions in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) use. Only 0.1 per cent of black African men and women interviewed had Internet access at home and 1 per cent had Internet access at work. In addition, only 1 per cent of black African men and women had a computer at home, and 5 per cent of black African men and 3 per cent of black African women used a computer at work. Since the overall South African Internet-user population was 1.8 million in 1999 (roughly 4 per cent of the population), a considerable gap existed between black South Africans and white South Africans, who constituted 77 per cent and 11 per cent of the population respectively (Acuity Media Africa 2000).[2] In terms of income, the 1993 Living Standards Measurement Survey indicated that the wealthiest 20 per cent of households in South Africa were

125 times more likely to have private telephones than the poorest 20 per cent (Grace, Charles, Qiang, Jia and Taylor 2001). In terms of geographic location, 10 per cent of urban South African homes had private telephone access compared to a meagre 0.1 per cent in rural areas (Grace et al. 2001).

Why is the digital divide of such concern? At the heart of this debate is the argument that the poor could become further marginalised, given that basic computer skills are increasingly becoming 'essential for economic success and personal advancement, entry to a good career and educational opportunities, full access to social networks, and opportunities for civic engagement' (Norris 2001: 68). Therefore, as computers and the Internet increasingly proliferate and penetrate our lives, work and leisure, it becomes even more significant if certain groups are systematically excluded, such as poorer neighbourhoods or households, or peripheral rural communities.

The South African government and private-sector bodies have responded to these digital disparities by launching a range of policy and programmatic interventions (see Conradie 1998; James 2001). These have mostly been attempts to increase access to digital ICTs in rural areas, including the provision of email/Internet access to schools, and installation of infrastructure at centres that serve previously disadvantaged communities. A number of the initiatives have also incorporated elements of computer training, as well as actions aimed at using ICTs to promote some type of education or information provision in rural areas. Some specific examples of government-initiated or -supported projects include:

- telecentres launched by the Universal Service Agency in rural areas. More recently these have been supplemented by the establishment of 'cyberlabs' (laboratories with digital equipment) at rural schools;
- the 'I-community', established by Hewlett-Packard Compaq in Mogalakwena district, Limpopo;
- the Department of Communication's Web Internet Laboratories (DoC-WIL) project at previously disadvantaged tertiary education institutions;
- the Department of Communication's Info.com series of projects, for example the 'Public Information Terminal' initiative. Public Internet Terminals (PITs) are located in post offices and other access sites around the country and are intended to provide the public with access to government forms and information, email facilities, the Internet and education services;
- the Department of Education's support of the Schoolnet SA project that aims to provide schools with Internet access;
- the Multi-Purpose Community Centres (MPCCs) of the Government Communication and Information System (Universal Service Agency 1997; Mahlangu 2001; Riordon 2001; Schoolnet SA 2001; GCIS 2002; Conradie, Morris and Jacobs 2003).

Research has unfortunately demonstrated that many of these development initiatives have not yet produced the desired results. For example, the Telecentre 2000 study found that most of the telecentre interventions by the Universal Service Agency had

failed, with the major problem being their lack of long-term economic sustainability (Stavrou, Benjamin, Burton and McCarthy 2000). The access-provision projects at established educational institutions mentioned earlier have been more focused and sustainable, but also somewhat limited; there are many deep-rural communities that are experiencing even more basic problems such as a lack of electricity and other basic services, and here digital access has a low priority. The MPCCs are more promising, but they are relatively new and by the end of 2004, there were only about 60 centres in operation throughout the country.

This chapter begins by examining the nature of the digital divide in the South African context in late 2003. More specifically, the existence of at least three types of digital divide will be investigated, focusing in particular on imbalances in access to computers and the Internet, as well as on actual Internet usage.[3] A profile of each of these three types of digital divide will be constructed, addressing the extent to which unequal access to and use of digital technologies are based on geographic and other biographical variables, such as gender, age, race and educational attainment. This will be followed by an attempt to address the question of whether relative disparities in computer and Internet access and use represent new inequalities or, alternatively, are a reflection of existing divisions in the spread of other, generally older information and communication media and technologies. This is achieved firstly by outlining the nature of divides with regard to television, radio and newspaper usage, landline and cellular telephone access, as well as cellular phone usage; and secondly by comparing and contrasting these disparities with those identified in relation to computers and the Internet. The concluding section of the chapter presents an initial investigation of the relationship between access to digital technologies and two aspects of civic engagement, namely political trust and political participation.

The nature of the digital divide

In the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), we asked respondents whether they 'have access to a computer', and 'have access to the Internet'. For those that responded affirmatively to the latter, we asked how many hours they spend using the Internet during the average weekday. In each of these instances, we took a broad definition that allows for access to both a computer and the Internet either at work, home or at some other facility or institution (see Appendix 1 at the end of this chapter for full details of both the questions and the recoding schemes used). Fifteen per cent of South Africans aged 16 years and older (or 4.25 million) reported that they had access to a computer in late 2003, while 11 per cent (or 3.03 million) had access to the Internet. Furthermore, 14 per cent (or 3.96 million) reported that they use the Internet.[4] While these figures designate South Africa as one of the largest consumers of computers and the Internet in Africa, at the same time they reflect that between 85 and 90 per cent of the population remains excluded. Between 1999 and 2003, there were modest signs of growth in the share of the adult population (18 years and older) that was computerised and logged on (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1 *Trends in computer and Internet access, by province* (percentage of individuals aged 18+)*

	EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NC	NW	WC	Total
Computer at home/business										
1999	4	6	17	9	1	6	8	6	17	10
2001	7	5	16	5	1	10	5	4	24	9
2003	9	10	23	14	5	8	10	8	35	16
Internet access at home/business/other facility										
1999	6	5	10	5	1	3	3	4	18	7
2003	6	9	20	9	3	5	4	4	23	11

* See Acronyms (page xiv) for province abbreviations.
Note: Questions on the Internet were not included in the 2001 survey.
Sources: HSRC EPOP Survey (1999, 2001); SASAS (2003)

Access to computers and the Internet, and use of the World Wide Web, are not evenly spread throughout the country (Table 7.2). Sizeable differences between urban and rural environments are immediately apparent.[5] This means that there is a significant urban–rural digital divide in the country in relation to accessing and using these digital technologies. Race features prominently in all three types of digital divide, with coloured and black South Africans having significantly lower computer access, Internet access and Internet usage than their white or Indian/Asian counterparts. There is also an association with age, with those 50 years and older displaying significantly less computer access, Internet access and Internet usage than younger South Africans. Similarly, women were found to have significantly lower levels of computer access, Internet access and Internet usage than men. Education has a pronounced effect, especially for those who have either matriculated or received tertiary instruction. Almost two-thirds of South Africans with tertiary education have access to a computer at home or at work and nearly half have access to and log on to the Internet. At the other extreme, almost none of those with either no schooling or primary schooling have access to a computer or the Internet.

We can take this analysis further by using multivariate techniques, which allow us to take a number of different (demographic, resource and geographic) factors into account at the same time. The full details of this analysis are shown in Appendix 2 at the end of this chapter.[6] Seven predictor or independent variables – gender, race, age, environmental milieu, income, education and province – were included.

With regard to computer access, we find that race, age, income and education were the most important predictors (see Model A in Appendix 2). More specifically, being white or Indian/Asian, younger than 50 years of age, earning a monthly income in excess of R5 000, having Grade 12 or tertiary education, and living in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, North West or Gauteng were all significant predictors of having access to a computer. Gender did not remain as a significant predictor of computer access, but there were real differences in access by gender

Table 7.2 *Computer and Internet access and usage, by urban–rural location, race, age and educational attainment*

	% with access to a computer	% with access to the Internet	% who use the Internet	*Base*
Location				
Urban	22	14	17	*1 691*
Rural	3	2	3	*792*
Race				
White	54	39	41	*316*
Indian/Asian	33	16	19	*231*
Coloured	11	5	9	*407*
Black African	6	5	6	*1 525*
Age				
16–24 years	15	10	13	*529*
25–34 years	17	11	13	*603*
35–49 years	19	13	14	*758*
50+ years	10	5	8	*585*
Gender				
Male	18	13	15	*988*
Female	14	8	10	*1 493*
Educational attainment				
Tertiary	61	46	46	*216*
Matric/Grade 12	29	18	21	*578*
Grades 8–11	9	4	7	*871*
Primary	1	0	2	*570*
No schooling	0	0	2	*200*
Total	**16**	**12**	**14**	

Note: The apparent anomaly of there being more Internet users than people with regular Internet access can be explained by the fact that only people who had never used the Internet were classified as non-users of the Internet. The classification category of Internet users could therefore include those without regular Internet access, but who did on occasion use the Internet when offered the opportunity.
Source: SASAS (2003)

within certain provinces. The effect of the urban–rural divide was obscured, possibly through the effect of the province variable, and the effect of race was also reduced when adjusting for other variables in the model.

The significant predictor variables for Internet access were found to be gender, age, and education. More specifically, it was found that being male, being younger than 50 years, and having passed Grade 12 or obtained tertiary education were the most significant predictors of having access to the Internet. The significant

predictor variables for Internet use were age, education (only the category tertiary qualification – the other categories within education were not significant), and race (where only the white category was significantly different from the black reference category). Using the Internet was therefore predicted best by being younger than 50 years, having a tertiary education and being white.

The nature of other media divides

The existence of social inequalities in access to computers and the Internet in South Africa is relatively unsurprising. A more interesting question remains the extent to which these disparities reflect existing patterns of access to more traditional forms of mass media, such as television, newspapers and radios, and to other technologies such as household telephones and cellphones (mobiles). In order to begin to provide an answer to this question, this section explores disparities in other forms of ICT.

Radio, television and newspaper use

Table 7.3 provides a social profile of radio listeners, television watchers and newspaper readers. It reveals significant differences in television and newspaper use by location, with usage much higher in urban areas than in rural areas. However, there is no significant difference in relation to radio use. While this is likely to be linked to the income and education effects, the pattern persists when these factors are taken into account (model not shown).[7] Similarly, there was no difference in radio usage across the four major population groups in the country. However, significant racial divides were found with regard to television and newspaper use, with a greater share of white and Indian/Asian respondents watching television and reading newspapers than black African and coloured respondents. There is a significant generational difference in newspaper readership, with those aged 50 and older reading less than younger groups. However, the observed age differences in radio use or television use were not significant.

Gender-based differences in the use of traditional mass media follow a similar pattern. While there exists a significant gender gap in terms of newspaper use, with a higher percentage of men than women reading newspapers, these disparities are not reflected in television and radio usage. Nonetheless, multivariate analysis shows that significant gender differences remain when other factors (such as income and education) are taken into account (model not shown).[8] Finally, those with relatively little education (no schooling or primary education) used radio, television and newspapers substantially less than those who were better educated. These educational differences persist even when other factors are taken into account, and those with no schooling remain significantly less likely to be listening to the radio, watching television or reading the paper than those with Grade 12 or higher.

Table 7.3 *Radio, television and newspaper usage, by urban–rural location, race, age, gender and educational attainment*

	Radio usage (%)	Television usage (%)	Newspaper usage (%)	*Base*
Location				
Urban	89	86	68	*1 691*
Rural	87	53	32	*792*
Race				
White	89	96	83	*316*
Indian/Asian	90	96	86	*231*
Coloured	90	83	68	*407*
Black African	88	66	44	*1 525*
Age				
16–24 years	90	78	55	*529*
25–34 years	90	77	62	*603*
35–49 years	89	75	59	*758*
50+ years	86	72	50	*585*
Gender				
Male	90	77	64	*988*
Female	88	75	52	*1 493*
Educational attainment				
Tertiary	92	95	93	*216*
Matric/Grade 12	93	90	78	*578*
Grades 8–11	90	79	62	*871*
Primary	86	56	31	*570*
No schooling	78	48	7	*200*

Source: SASAS (2003)

Telephone access, cellphone access and cellphone use

Focusing now on the various forms of telephony in South Africa, Table 7.4 indicates that there has been exponential growth in access to cellphones in the past five years alongside stagnant growth in the proportion of people with landline telephones at home. These trends are generally consistent with those presented in Telkom annual reports, which indicate that total fixed-line telephone lines declined from just above 12 per 100 inhabitants in 1999 to 11 per 100 in 2003 (Gillwald 2004). In contrast, total cellphone subscribers increased from a much lower base of 6 per 100 inhabitants in 1999 to 30 per 100 in 2003. The decline in landline telephones is also associated with the increase in telephone tariffs from 1997 to 2004, where the average residential monthly telephone rental increased by 65 per cent from R50 to R82.

Table 7.4 *Access to landline telephones and cellphones, by province* (percentage of individuals aged 18+)*

	EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NC	NW	WC	Total
Landline telephone at home										
1999	17	30	46	22	7	17	25	11	51	28
2001	14	28	36	21	4	16	26	20	58	26
2003	17	27	25	31	8	19	21	18	56	26
Cellphone at home/business										
1999	7	5	15	6	5	6	4	5	13	8
2001	10	14	33	9	8	12	15	14	38	28
2003	29	32	45	34	32	29	20	38	47	36

* See Acronyms on page xiv for province abbreviations.
Sources: HSRC EPOP Survey (1999, 2001); SASAS (2003)

The slight decline in landline telephones shown by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) surveys between 1999 and 2001 could be partly attributable to the privatisation of the telecommuni-cations sector during this period and after. For example, Gillwald (2004) notes that whilst the South African telecommunications sector, largely represented by the Telkom monopoly, grew from R7 billion in 1992 to over R50 billion in 2001, there have been marked policy failures. She notes that the network did not double to six million, as envisaged by obligations imposed by the Universal Service Agency, but instead two million fixed-line subscribers were disconnected over the period. This was largely the result of an average increase of 24 per cent per annum in local tariffs, despite efficiency gains which included the loss of 30 000 jobs within the same period. In contrast, cellular subscriber statistics released by the International Telecommunications Union (2004) indicated that in 2002 about 30 per 100 inhabi-tants were cellular phone subscribers, and in 2003 this figure grew to 36 per 100 inhabitants.

As with the digital divides discussed earlier, Table 7.5 shows that there remain significant urban–rural divides in the country with regard to landline telephone access, personal cellphone access, and cellphone usage. This means that a higher percentage of urban respondents than rural respondents (a) had a working landline telephone in their dwelling, (b) had personal and regular access to a cellphone for private and/or business purposes, and (c) had used any cellular phone (not necessarily their own) in some way (for example sending or receiving either calls or SMSs) during the previous week.

There were also significant racial differences with regard to landline telephone access, personal cellphone access, and cellular phone usage. In all three cases white people and Indians/Asians reported more access and usage than black and coloured respondents. Moreover, there are clear indications of age divides with regard to

Table 7.5 *Telephone and cellphone access and use, by urban–rural location, race, age, gender and educational attainment*

	Telephone access (%)	Personal cell-phone access (%)	Cellphone usage (%)	*Base*
Location				
Urban	37	40	48	*1 691*
Rural	5	18	23	*792*
Race				
White	67	75	82	*316*
Indian/Asian	70	49	60	*231*
Coloured	34	22	29	*407*
Black African	10	25	31	*1 525*
Age				
16–24 years	19	29	39	*529*
25–34 years	19	38	45	*603*
35–49 years	30	38	44	*758*
50+ years	37	24	31	*585*
Gender				
Male	28	36	42	*988*
Female	27	31	39	*1 493*
Educational attainment				
Tertiary	60	80	82	*216*
Matric/Grade 12	39	56	66	*578*
Grades 8–11	26	26	36	*871*
Primary	12	10	14	*570*
No schooling	4	9	11	*200*

Source: SASAS (2003)

landline telephone access, personal cellphone access, and cellphone usage. It is, however, interesting to note that the age difference found for landline telephone access (where respondents aged 16–34 years had significantly less landline telephone access than older respondents) was in a different direction from those found for cellphone access and usage (where older respondents, especially those over 50 years of age, tended to display relatively less such access and usage than younger people). It was further found that although there were some significant differences between men and women with regard to their percentage of landline telephone access and personal cellphone access or cellphone usage, these were not significant on the 0.01 level of statistical probability. On the other hand, the higher the respondents' education was, the higher their level of telephone access, personal cellphone access and cellphone usage was.

Significant impacts on landline telephone access were made by the predictors urban–rural environment (most access in urban areas), race (least access amongst black respondents), education (most access amongst those with tertiary education qualifications) and income (most access amongst those in the higher income categories).[9] Gender did not significantly predict landline telephone access.

In the case of personal cellphone access, significant predictors were gender (males having more access than females), race (with black African respondents having significantly less access than white people or Indians/Asians), education (most access amongst those with tertiary or matric education qualifications) and income (most access amongst those in the higher-income categories). Finally, cellphone usage was significantly predicted by gender (males more usage than females), urban–rural environment (more usage in urban areas), race (most usage amongst white respondents), education (most usage amongst those with tertiary, matric or Grade 8 qualifications) and income (most usage amongst those in the higher-income categories).

Comparing digital and other media divides

From the preceding analysis, it is apparent that access to digital technologies such as the computer and the Internet in South Africa is informed by similar socio-economic, demographic and geographic cleavages to those characteristic of many other, older information and communication media and technologies. Race-based and, to a lesser extent, gender-based inequalities are notable biographic variables influencing access. Since access to computers and the Internet generally requires financial resources, basic literacy and technical skills, it is understandable that there should be a particularly sharp divide in terms of educational attainment and income. The barriers also emerge in relation to the other media, since many consumer durables such as televisions, radios, hi-fis and cellphones are likely to be owned by those with higher social status. Such assets are dependent on having disposable income, which in turn is influenced by one's education and occupation. Table 7.6 clearly shows that those with computer and Internet access are more greatly predisposed than the general public towards having access to a television, hi-fi, radio, landline telephone and cellphone. Reflecting the aforementioned disparities in socio-economic status, geography also plays a role, with poorer, less urbanised provinces generally worse off in relation to digital and other media divides.

Table 7.6 *Access to communication technologies, by computer and Internet access*

	No computer access (%)	Computer access (%)	No Internet access (%)	Internet access (%)
Computer access	–	–	6	91
Internet access	1	65	–	–
Television in household	64	98	66	97
Radio in household	71	87	72	89
Hi-fi in household	41	90	44	89
Landline phone	19	65	21	62
Access to cellphone	27	84	29	89
Grid electricity	70	95	72	90
Scaled Base	*4 138*	*742*	*4 344*	*530*

Source: SASAS (2003)

Civic engagement

A commonly discussed theme in the literature on access to digital technologies relates to the opportunities that access to a computer and the World Wide Web potentially presents for encouraging civic engagement. Norris (2001) categorises 'civic engagement' into three distinct dimensions. These are (i) political knowledge, which relates to what people learn about public affairs; (ii) political trust, which addresses the public's level of support for the political system; and (iii) political participation, which is concerned with involvement in activities intended to influence government and the decision-making process. The focus of this section is on a preliminary analysis of the latter two dimensions.

With regard to political trust, those who have access to computers and the Internet are consistently less trusting towards a range of social and political institutions (Table 7.7). These include institutions dealing with traditional news media, such as the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), in addition to institutions of representative government, such as Parliament, the national government, provincial government, local government and the courts. With regard to satisfaction with the way democracy is working in South Africa, there is not a significant difference between those with and those without computer and Internet access. For the digitally connected and the general public alike, modest levels of satisfaction were observed, with between 46 and 49 per cent either satisfied or very satisfied with democracy.

As for political participation, two indicators were examined, namely the frequency with which politics is discussed and voter participation in national elections. Compared with the general public, those with computer and Internet access more commonly discussed politics (Table 7.8). It is possible that this result reflects the fact that for those people with access to them, computers and the Internet increase the ability to source and compare multiple news reports on a given issue, to share articles

with family, friends and colleagues, to discuss politics online, and to access official documents and information. However, on further investigation, it was found that 80 per cent of those with computers and 84 per cent of those with Internet access rely on the television as their main source of national news, with the remainder split between radio and newspapers.[10] Surprisingly, the Internet was almost never mentioned as a main source of news about the country. There was an even greater reliance on television for international news among those with access (90 per cent for those with computer access; 91 per cent for those with Internet access), with the Internet featuring as the main source for only between 1 and 2 per cent of those with access. Therefore, it seems more likely that computer and Internet users are more conversant about political issues because their higher socio-economic status enables them to more readily afford televisions, radios/hi-fis and newspapers rather than because of the range of information at their disposal via the Internet.

Table 7.7 *Trust in institutions, by computer and Internet access*

	Percentage of respondents who 'strongly trust' or 'trust' institutions				
	No computer access	Computer access	No Internet access	Internet access	All
Churches	84	79	84	81	83
SABC	79	56	77	57	75
IEC	65	53	64	56	63
Defence force	64	53	63	57	63
National government	59	43	59	46	57
Parliament	61	38	60	39	57
Big business	57	53	57	52	57
Provincial government	54	42	54	43	52
Courts	50	46	50	49	50
Local government	47	37	46	39	45
Police	43	38	43	38	42
Scaled Base	*3 956*	*714*	*4 162*	*512*	*4 980*

IEC = Independent Electoral Commission
Source: SASAS (2003)

To what extent is a particular communication medium such as computers or the Internet likely to impact on the public's intention to vote? Obviously this is strongly determined by factors such as the content of election media campaigns and the context in which this content is received, but Table 7.9 gives a general indication of the association between computer and Internet access and voting behaviour in South Africa. Despite the greater likelihood of discussing politics, those with computer and Internet access were less likely to have voted in the 1999 general elections or to express an intention to vote in the April 2004 election. These differences were significant,[11]

with the exception of voting patterns by Internet access in 1999. Furthermore, those with access to either a computer or the Internet were proportionally more uncertain than the general public regarding their 2004 voting intentions.

Table 7.8 *Talk about politics, by computer and Internet access*

How often do you talk about politics?	No computer access	Computer access	No Internet access	Internet access	All
	%	%	%	%	%
Very often	4	9	5	7	5
Often	9	13	9	12	9
Occasionally	18	23	18	28	19
Very seldom	29	31	29	34	29
Never	40	23	40	19	38
Total*	100	100	100	100	100
Scaled Base	*4 058*	*731*	*4 272*	*524*	*4 858*

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Table 7.9 *Participation in national elections, by computer and Internet access*

National election voting participation 1999–2004	No computer access	Computer access	No Internet access	Internet access	All
Percentage participation in 1999 elections (23 years+)					
Voted in 1999	78	65	77	73	76
Did not vote	11	18	12	12	12
Uncertain/Don't know	2	3	2	2	2
Refused	9	14	10	13	10
Total*	100	100	100	100	100
Percentage intended participation in 2004 election (18 years+)					
Intend to vote	64	46	62	52	61
Will not vote	7	13	8	9	8
Uncertain/Don't know	19	27	19	26	20
Refused	10	14	11	13	11
Total*	100	100	100	100	100

Note: For voter participation in the 1999 elections, those aged 23 or older at the time of interview were selected in order to ensure that they were eligible to vote in 1999.
* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

To provide further insight into these patterns of voter participation, responses to a set of statements regarding the importance ascribed to voting were examined (Table 7.10).

The results reveal, firstly, that there is broad-based agreement on the duty of South Africans to vote. Those without computer access are moderately more likely to support this principle, though there is no significant difference between those with and those without Internet access. Secondly, those with computer or Internet access are less likely to find politics too complicated to understand relative to those without access to such digital technologies. Finally, while both those with and those without access tend to disagree with the statement that whether or not they vote makes a difference, those with computer/Internet access are slightly more likely to believe that voting makes a difference. These results portray computer and Internet users as a group that is politically aware and believes in the importance of the vote. This seems to suggest that the uncertainty surrounding the intention to vote in 2004 was not due to apathy.

Table 7.10 *Attitudes on the importance of voting, by computer and Internet access (mean score on a five-point scale)*

	No computer access	Computer access	No Internet access	Internet access	All
It is the duty of all citizens to vote.	4.09	3.99*	4.09	4.07	4.08
Politics is too complicated these days for people like me to understand.	3.24	2.51*	3.21	2.41*	3.12
Whether I vote or not makes no difference.	2.70	2.41*	2.67	2.41*	2.65
Scaled Base	*4 139*	*741*	*4 345*	*530*	*4 980*

* Indicates that the responses to the statements for those with computer/Internet access are significantly different from the responses for those without access ($p > 0.01$).
Note: The mean scores in the table are based on 'strongly disagree' = 1, 'disagree' = 2, 'neither/nor' = 3, 'agree' = 4 and 'strongly agree' = 5. Discrete missing values were assigned to 'do not know' responses.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Do these statistics mean that computer and Internet users, by virtue of their higher levels of access and exposure to both new and older information and communication technologies, are more politically informed and consequently less certain about their political choices and which party best represents their interests? The 2003 data unfortunately cannot provide us with a decisive answer to this question. One complicating factor is that the 2004 electoral campaign was not yet in full swing in the August to October 2003 period when the survey was conducted. New alliances, the emergence of new parties (such as the Independent Democrats) and floor-crossing legislation enabling party representatives to change allegiance also raised questions of government accountability and representation in the lead-up to the election (Southall 2004). The 2004 SASAS results should hopefully give us a better indication of whether the undecided users of computers and the Internet turned out on election day or whether various factors ultimately influenced the decision not to vote.

Conclusion

The evidence provided in this chapter appears to suggest that the digital divide in South Africa – whether based on computer access, Internet access or Internet usage – reflects wider social inequalities in the country, notably along race, geographic, income, education and, to a lesser extent, gender lines. It is evident that, for the most part, those who have adopted computer technology and the Internet are typically from groups with higher socio-economic status. Their higher levels of education, literacy and social status equip them with the necessary financial and information resources to be able to effectively and flexibly adapt to such innovative technologies. The chapter has also shown that the patterns of income, race, education and geographic inequalities observed in relation to access to and use of digital technologies are relatively similar to those observed in other, older forms of ICTs. This again implies that deeply entrenched patterns of social stratification in the country explain the disparities in access to and use of the newer digital technologies. Respondents with computer and Internet access were shown to be more likely to live in households that possess multiple consumer durables for entertainment and communication, for example televisions, cellphones, hi-fis, and so on.

Finally, the chapter has provided an initial examination of whether having access to a computer or the Internet in South Africa exerts an influence on political trust and participation. We found that users more frequently discussed politics than the general public and recognised the importance of the vote. Yet they were less trusting of government and other institutions, less likely to vote in the 1999 national elections, and more uncertain about their voting intentions in advance of the 2004 general election.

Active interventions and programmes initiated by the state and other stakeholders, which have focused primarily on wiring schools and classrooms, training, and providing community access in poorer geographic localities, are important in trying to broaden technological access and bridge the divide. Nonetheless, most initiatives are still in their relative infancy and there is a need to improve their reach in the coming years. Given the deep socio-economic barriers to access that have been shown to exist (even in relation to some of the older media and technologies), the digital divide is likely to remain with us in the medium to long term, thus reinforcing the gap between the included and the excluded.

Appendix 1: Questions and recoding schemes used

A. Do you have access to a computer? (1) Yes, at home; (2) Yes, at work/educational institution; (3) Yes, both at home and at work; (4) None.

Responses were recoded into 'computer access' and 'no computer access'.

B. Do you have access to the Internet? (1) Yes, at home; (2) Yes, at work/educational institution; (3) Yes, both at home and at work; (4) Yes, at an Internet café; (5) Yes, at community centre; (6) None.

Responses were recoded into 'Internet access' and 'no Internet access'.

C. Could you estimate how many hours on an average working day (that is, from Monday to Friday) you spend using the Internet? (1) Less than one hour; (2) 1–2 hours; (3) 2–3 hours; (4) 3–4 hours; (5) More than four hours, and (5) Never use the Internet.

Hours of use were recoded as 'Internet use' and the option of having never used the Internet was recoded as 'not used the Internet'.

D. Could you estimate how many hours on an average working day (that is, from Monday to Friday) you spend watching TV or listening to the radio? (1) Less than one hour; (2) 1–2 hours; (3) 2–3 hours; (4) 3–4 hours; (5) More than four hours, and (6) Never listen to the radio/watch television.

Hours spent listening to the radio or watching television were recoded as either 'radio use' or 'television use'.

E. Could you estimate how many hours on an average working day (that is, from Monday to Friday) you spend reading a daily newspaper? (1) Less than one hour; (2) 1–2 hours; (3) 2–3 hours; (4) 3–4 hours; (5) More than four hours, and (6) Never read the newspaper.

Hours spent reading newspapers were recoded as 'newspaper use' and the category of 'never read newspapers' was recoded as 'no newspaper use'.

F. Do you personally have a cellphone for personal or business use? (1) Personal use; (2) Business use; (3) Both; (4) None.

The options 'personal use', 'business use' and 'both' were all recoded as 'cellphone access' and the 'none' option was recoded as 'no cellphone access'.

G. In the past week have you: (1) used a cellphone to make an outgoing call; (2) received a call on a cellphone; (3) used a cellphone to send a text message (SMS); and (4) received a text message on a cellphone?

Respondents who answered in the affirmative that they used a cellphone in any of the options were given a score of 1 and their responses were recoded as 'cellphone users' and those who answered 'no' in all of the options had a score of zero, which was recoded as 'no cellphone use'.

H. Do you have a working landline telephone in your dwelling? (1) Yes; (2) No.

Appendix 2

Table 7A2.1: *Multivariate analysis of independent factors for computer and Internet access and Internet use*

Variable	Model A: Computer access OR (95% CI)	Model B: Internet access OR (95% CI)	Model C: Internet usage OR (95% CI)
Gender			
Male	1.26 (0.94 – 1.70)	2.05 (1.26 – 3.33)**	
Female	1	1	

Race			
White	4.21 (2.75 – 6.45)**		3.56 (2.03 – 6.22)**
Indian/Asian	4.44 (2.25 – 8.75)**		1.45 (0.60 – 3.48)
Coloured			2.03 (0.82 – 5.01)
Black African	1		1
Age			
16–24 years	1.85 (1.08 – 3. 17)*	2.39 (1.07 – 5.31)*	5.41 (2.30 – 12.69)**
25–34 years	2.45 (1.41 – 4.26)**	2.68 (1.18 – 6.07)*	3.29 (1.38 – 7.86)**
35–49 years	2.29 (1.36 – 3.88)**	4.60 (2.07 – 10.22)**	2.53 (1.14 – 5.62)*
50+	1	1	1
Monthly income			
R1–R500	0.35 (0.13 – 0.94)*		
R501–R1 500	0.26 (0.13 – 0.55)**		
R5 000+	2.75 (1.38 – 5.46)**		
No income	1		
Education			
Tertiary	89.40 (7.12 – > 999.99)**	4. 00 (2. 03 – 7. 91)**	4.03 (2.04 – 7.95)**
Matric or equiv.	28.20 (2.27 – 350.98)**	2.09 (1.11 – 3.94)*	1.14 (0.59 – 2.21)
No schooling	1	1	1
Province			
Western Cape	3.44 (1.57 – 7.56)**		
Eastern Cape	2.59 (1.12 – 5.97)*		
KwaZulu-Natal	3.00 (1.41 – 6.38)**		
North West	3.08 (1.29 – 7.39)*		
Gauteng	3.58 (1.76 – 7.31)**		
Limpopo	1		

OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval.
Significance is shown as follows: ** Significant at the 1 per cent level; * Significant at the 5 per cent level.

Notes

1 The term 'digital divide' is usually used to refer to differences in access to the different types of digital media, particularly the newer forms of media such as computers and especially the Internet.

2 The Internet use numbers for other ethnic groups were not available.

3 The notion of the 'digital divide' used in the context of this chapter is therefore somewhat broader than the norm, incorporating use of digital technologies in addition to the standard focus on access.

4 These are comparable with estimates published in the 2004 Goldstuck Report, which indicates that 3.1 million South Africans had access to the Internet at the end of 2002,

with 3.28 million expected to have access by the end of 2003. This is marginally up from 2.9 million (1 in 15) at the end of 2001 (Goldstuck 2004).

5 Chi-Square ($\chi 2$) tests reveal that the observed differences in computer access, and Internet access and usage, between those residing in urban and rural locations are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level ($p < 0.01$).

6 Multivariate logistic regression based on the likelihood ratio test was conducted for the three types of digital divide being considered. The Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test was used to find a model that fitted the data. The significant model that fitted the data best contained independent variables or predictors that could explain 59 per cent of the variance of the dependent measure (computer access). The table in Appendix 2 shows the findings: the 95 per cent confidence intervals are reported.

7 The tables containing the detailed data of these multivariate analyses are obtainable from the authors on request.

8 The tables containing the detailed data of these multivariate analyses are obtainable from the authors on request.

9 Three multivariate logistic regression models were produced, with landline telephone access, personal cellphone access, and cellphone usage as the dependent variables. Again, the impact of a number of predictor or independent variables (such as gender, race, environmental milieu, income, education and province) was calculated. The tables containing the detailed data of these multivariate analyses are obtainable from the authors on request.

10 Those without access to a computer or the Internet were more heavily reliant on radio, which almost equals television as the main source of national news. The tables containing the detailed frequencies for this analysis are obtainable from the authors on request.

11 Chi-Square ($\chi 2$) tests reveal that the observed differences with respect to computer use and actual voter participation in 1999 and intended voting in 2004 are statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). Similarly, the observed differences in Internet access and intended voting in 2004 are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level ($p < 0.01$), though the differences in voter participation in 1999 are not significant.

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8 *The 'vexed question': Interruptions, cut-offs and water services in South Africa*

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Water delivery and operations in South Africa are undergoing a critical transition, as the centre of delivery and management is shifting with increasing rapidity from national government to municipalities. This is spelt out in legislation and the actual transfer has been anticipated for some time. However, as in all transitions, there are issues which are still unclear, responsibilities which are still not clearly accepted and outstanding questions of funding. As policy has been confirmed in the *Strategic Framework for Water Services* (DWAF 2003), this transfer is taking place simultaneously with a review of accomplishments during the ten years of democracy. Central to the debate about service delivery is the extent to which previously excluded black people are now gaining access to an uninterrupted supply of safe drinking water.

While there are important issues relating to the sustainability of rural water services, the sharpest controversies involve questions of equity, most crucially surrounding the rate of the cut-off of water services for non-payment. This issue is not only raised by critics of the post-apartheid government; many of the poor have used the various *imbizos* (community meetings) held by the president in the course of the 2004 election campaign to make direct complaints about cut-offs and poor levels of service. There is no doubt about the salience of the issue of domestic connections to the poor in the townships. The South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO), which is closely associated with the ruling party, also lists cut-offs as one of the major problems of its members.[1]

Controversies relate partly to the phenomenon itself, as cut-offs raise at least three major issues in terms of social policy. Firstly, it is generally acknowledged by all sides that the phenomenon of cut-offs is linked to inequality; that there is the issue of the continuing and even deepening poverty among the black African majority, and the problem is located directly amongst this majority and also relates to unemployment and impoverishment. Cut-offs are evidence of a socio-economic problem. Secondly, the phenomenon is also a political issue, polarising relationships between councillors, council officials and poor residents, and preoccupying national policy. Thirdly, it is related to the problem of providing sustainable (in this context, uninterrupted) service to the poor, as is clear in the reference to the 'vexed' question in the June 2004 water budget speech.[2]

On such contested terrain it is necessary to give exemplary attention to words, concepts, and their defined meanings. The language of sustainable water services includes its contraries, *inter alia* (although not exclusively) stoppage, disconnection, cut-off, breakdown, disruption and interruption. This list is not exhaustive, and in common usage each word brings with it a direct meaning and an overlapping association. In the interests of precision two concepts are given pre-eminence and will be used extensively in this chapter – these are 'interruption' and 'cut-off'. The former refers to the entire range of possible reasons, incidental or intentional, for services not being sustained and water not coming out of a tap: a breakdown in services (for example, by a pump running out of diesel), stoppages because of repairs or when engineers are extending water reticulation to new areas, and problems at the water source (such as drought). 'Cut-off' refers to the deliberate termination of supply for reasons of non-payment.[3] The General Household Survey (GHS) includes the following wide range of intrusive, intentional, accidental and incidental issues in the category of 'interruptions': burst pipes, pump not working, general maintenance or interrupted for repairs, not enough water in the system (demand too high), water only delivered at fixed times, cut-off for non-payment of services, vandalism, drought, 'other, specify', 'just stopped/don't know'.

A common approach and the implicit hypothesis among those critically examining the phenomenon is that cut-offs result from the predominant commitment of government to conservative economic and fiscal policies with an emphasis on cost recovery in the water sector (Habib 2004). It is argued that this creates enormous hardships for low-income families and jeopardises the potential for millions of low-income families to lead healthy and productive lives (McDonald 2002: 162). Similar criticism also comes from the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), which holds that the emphasis within the Municipal Systems Act on the recovery of debt contradicts provisions of the Constitution 'because it means households will have their water cut off because of arrears either from rates or electricity', and draws attention to high unemployment rates which lead to the poorest of the poor being vulnerable to having their water cut off (SAHRC 2003: 412). The SAHRC explicitly criticises the management of water services for excluding households from access to services 'through projects that require connection fees and full cost recovery in tariffs' (SAHRC 2003: 412). Both sources argue that cost recovery operates to the disadvantage of the poor and negates the stated pro-poor policy in municipal services.

The severity of cut-offs is evidenced not only in the event itself (the loss of water to the household) but also in the consequences which could lead to the household becoming dispossessed of a house through eviction. It is generally argued that it is poorer households (although not necessarily the poorest) that find it more difficult to pay water bills, and that poverty and the inability to pay, rather than a 'culture of non-payment', explain the phenomenon (McDonald 2002: 168). It is also argued that poorer families are considerably larger than the average family size, and that

cut-offs afflict a large proportion of the poor. An 'ideal type' of family affected by cut-offs would appear to be one connected to the mains supply, with a large number of members, poorer than most, with more unemployed members, and likely to experience other forms of social exclusion such as electricity cut-offs and evictions.

These issues are currently being furiously debated, as they tend to raise critical issues of both rights and current economic and social policy. A considerable effort is being made to accelerate delivery of basic services to the people and to end apartheid backlogs. It thus appears as a contradiction, or at least an unforeseen consequence of some order, for municipal authorities to cut off those historically disadvantaged who have just reached a higher level of access to services. The issue raises questions of equity and constitutional rights, but also wider issues of poverty alleviation and employment, as those who are cut off argue that they do not have the means to pay. It also brings into focus the question of indigent municipal policy, an undeveloped aspect of local government.

Although there is some general agreement about its social (although not its political) basis, the issue of cut-offs generates great controversy in relation to the question of its magnitude. Is it a relatively small and manageable problem or are millions of poor black people being forcibly denied access to water by a government bent on cost recovery?

The first preoccupation of policy-makers and planners is that the system of delivery to satisfy key constitutional guarantees for essential services, such as access to water and sanitation, is not only being extended to the people, but is working in practice. Everyone has the right to have access to sufficient water,[4] and sanitation is guaranteed in terms of environmental rights. While there are complaints about cut-offs in urban areas, there are also stated difficulties in ensuring the sustainability of rural water facilities; thus rural people cannot effectively exercise their right to adequate and continuous water services.

This chapter is an exploration of method in survey analysis, at the level of drafting and fielding questions, linking attitudes to conditions and assessing the significance of responses. The South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) carries data not only linked to attitudes but, with re-weighting to households, also geared to provide comprehensive data on the nature of household services, in the present case on water services and the beneficiaries' attitudes to these services. The public perception of the government's performance in service delivery is taken as a starting point. The proportion of people satisfied or dissatisfied, their profile, where they are located, and the associated reason for their dissatisfaction are explored and mapped. Data on service provision and on attitudes towards this provision run concurrently through this chapter and the quality of key aspects of water service management is measured in the experience of the households represented by respondents within the survey.

The chapter begins by linking the data on attitudes and on water service conditions. It then focuses on the location of dissatisfaction and respondents' experience

of interruptions of supply for all the possible reasons mentioned earlier. Two approaches are taken in examining the crucial question of cut-offs: the first uses a direct question only about cut-offs and the second places cut-offs within the spectrum of all possible interruptions. The data for each question are presented and evaluated, and the issues relating to the methodology in survey questions are explored. Approaches to inconsistencies in data and the effects on scaling up from a representative sample to national population statistics are examined. The contrast between the two approaches is then made and extrapolations to the national population are undertaken. Two surveys are used here: the first, the SASAS conducted in 2003 which is in turn checked against the second, that of the earlier re-weighted Evaluation of Public Opinions Programme (EPOP) of 2001, which was the first survey of the issue. The substantive hypotheses associated with cut-offs – that the phenomenon is associated with a 'culture of non-payment'; that 'poor' as well as 'poorest' families are involved; and that larger families are most vulnerable and most exposed – are examined.

Attitudes point to realities

The SASAS survey, which measures both attitudes and household conditions, is a useful instrument for gauging opinions and comparing these to the underlying conditions. In a number of questions the survey provides indications of points of satisfaction and dissatisfaction across the country. These are a guide to where problems are, and also help to locate the scale of these problems as perceived by the public. In Table 8.1 the perceptions of respondents are presented in relation to government's handling of water and sanitation services, across the wide range of environmental milieux.

Table 8.1 *Government handling of water and sanitation, by geographic type*

	Urban formal	Urban informal	Rural informal	Rural formal	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Satisfied	77	39	32	51	60
Dissatisfied	19	56	63	44	36
Neither nor/do not know	4	5	5	5	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Base	*2 868*	*397*	*1 400*	*262*	*4 980*

Source: SASAS (2003), 'How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way that the government is handling the following matters in your neighbourhood: Supply of water and sanitation'

The high proportion of respondents in rural informal areas who are dissatisfied with the government's handling of water and sanitation services, 63 per cent, can be compared to the much reduced 19 per cent dissatisfied in the urban formal

milieu. On the whole 60 per cent of the respondents in the survey are satisfied with the government's efforts to provide clean drinking water and sanitation, a sizeable majority nationally. The question does not, however, allow for provision of reasons for dissatisfaction on the part of the remaining 36 per cent concentrated in rural informal, urban informal and formal rural areas.

What are the causes of satisfaction and dissatisfaction? Table 8.2 provides a cross-tabulation of attitudes to government's handling of water services by level of service, i.e. whether the source of water is piped, communal, or non-piped.

Table 8.2 *Government handling of water and sanitation, by level of service*

	Piped tap water in dwelling and on site/yard	Communal/public tap water	Non-piped water	Total
	%	%	%	%
Satisfied	74	37	10	60
Dissatisfied	22	59	83	36
Neither/nor	3	3	2	3
Do not know	1	1	5	1
Total	100	100	100	100
Base	*3 417*	*882*	*476*	*4 980*

Note: 'Satisfied' includes those who reported that they were either satisfied or very satisfied, whereas 'dissatisfied' is a combination of dissatisfied and very dissatisfied responses.
Source: SASAS (2003), 'How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way that the government is handling the following matters in your neighbourhood: Supply of water and sanitation'

It is clear that the highest levels of satisfaction are recorded by those with the highest level of service, including 74 per cent of those with piped water in the dwelling or on site. A minority of those accessing communal taps is satisfied (37 per cent), and for those who still await the benefit of piped water there is, not surprisingly, only a small minority (10 per cent) that is satisfied.

What this exploration makes clear is that perceptions are linked to conditions – particularly of levels of service and those of the urban/rural divide. The dissatisfied are located geographically, but what explanation can be offered for their attitudes, and in what specific way is attitude linked to service? In Table 8.3 interruptions in service are cross-tabulated with attitudes to government handling of water and sanitation.

Table 8.3 *Government handling of water and sanitation, by incidence of interruptions of longer than one day*

	Never %	Sometimes %	Often %	Uncertain/do not know %	Total %
Satisfied	68	57	40	63	60
Dissatisfied	28	41	57	26	36
Neither/nor	3	1	3	10	3
Do not know	1	1	0	1	1
Total*	100	100	100	100	100
Base	*2 878*	*686*	*876*	*133*	*4 980*

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Note: 'Satisfied' includes those who reported that they were either satisfied or very satisfied, whereas 'dissatisfied' is a combination of dissatisfied and very dissatisfied responses. With regard to the incidence of interruptions, 'sometimes' consists of those who reported having experienced an interruption of longer than a day either once or twice in the past year, while 'often' combines those that said it had happened several times, at least once a month, or at least once a week in the last year.
Source: SASAS (2003), 'How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way that the government is handling the following matters in your neighbourhood: Supply of water and sanitation'

Again, as one might expect, those with no interruptions or occasional interruptions are relatively satisfied (68 per cent and 57 per cent respectively) while those experiencing interruptions 'often' are not satisfied (57 per cent of this category). Dissatisfaction rises with the frequency of interruptions. Along with geographic location and level of service, the quality of service in terms of effective management (i.e. in achieving sustained and uninterrupted service) is registered in public attitude.

To get a measure of the incidence of interruptions in the experience of households, Table 8.4 presents two of the questions from the SASAS data, the first relating to the experience of interruptions of whatever length over the past year generally and the second to those interruptions lasting longer than a day. Taken together, these give a fair reflection of the quality of service received by customers.

Table 8.4 *Incidence of interruptions in the past year*

Water service	Past year (2002)			Longer than one day		
	No. of households	% of households	*Base*	No. of households	% of households	*Base*
No interruptions	6 344 120	63	*2 819*	6 386 248	62	*2 838*
Interruptions	3 407 660	34	*1 514*	3 594 816	35	*1 598*
Uncertain/Do not know	314 898	3	*140*	297 180	3	*132*
Total	10 066 678	100	*4 474*	10 278 244	100	*4 568*
No response	1 139 027		*506*	927 461		*412*
Total	11 205 705		*4 980*	11 205 705		*4 980*

Note: This table employs household weights rather than individual-level weights. This allows us to make inferences about households in South Africa as opposed to the adult population (aged 16+).
Source: SASAS (2003)

The proportion of those experiencing interruptions in the past year of longer than a day, depending on the question, is between 34 per cent and 35 per cent or between 3.4 and 3.6 million households. Scaled up to the national population this amounts to between 13.3 and 14.0 million people. This is a sizeable share (about 30 per cent) of the estimated population of 46.6 million,[5] and establishes that interruptions, which are a measure of the quality of management, are a problem of some magnitude. Among the dissatisfied are those who are experiencing real problems of service.

If there is this scale of interruptions, how severe are these and in what way can they be said to explain attitude? These questions are examined by first establishing some measure of the incidence of interruptions longer than a day.

Table 8.5 *Incidence of interruptions longer than a day for those reporting an interruption in the last year*

Interruptions	No. of households	% of total	*Base*
Never as long as a day	587 474	17	*261*
Once or twice	1 172 232	35	*521*
Several times	1 376 941	41	*612*
At least once a month	136 150	4	*61*
At least once a week	42 881	1	*19*
Uncertain/do not know	60 712	2	*27*
Total	3 376 390	100	*1 501*
Missing	31 269		*14*
Total (N)	3 407 659		*1 514*

Note: This table employs household weights rather than individual-level weights. This allows us to make inferences about households in South Africa as opposed to the adult population (aged 16+).
Source: SASAS (2003), 'In the past year, how often did you experience interruptions of longer than one day to your water service?'

Of those respondents reporting interruptions of water service in the past year (between 2002 and 2003), a considerable proportion (41 per cent or 1.4 million households) experienced interruptions of longer than a day on several occasions. Only 17 per cent or 0.6 million households did not experience interruptions longer than one day, while 35 per cent did so once or twice.

It appears that those who experience interruptions generally face the risk of multiple interruptions. While 17 per cent state that they have had an interruption but not for as long as a day, the largest proportion has interruptions which can be regarded as 'often' (i.e. more than twice); this adds up to 46 per cent, including a small group

(1 per cent) which states it has interruptions 'at least once a week'. These figures provide evidence of the proportion of water services operating at a very poor level, affecting some 1.6 million households or 6.1 million people.

It is important to explore the reasons for these interruptions. If interruptions are for the purpose of upgrading services or carrying out necessary repairs, they may be a sign of healthy management. But lack of clarity about the reasons for interruptions, breakdowns in service because of poor management, and the question of cut-offs all point to problematic aspects of water service management. In Table 8.6, the reasons for interruption are presented on the basis of two surveys, namely the Human Sciences Research Council's (HSRC's) SASAS (2003) and Statistics South Africa's GHS of 2002.

Table 8.6 *Main reason for water service interruption*

Main reason for interruption	GHS (2002)	SASAS (2003)
	%	%
Burst pipes	37	–
Pump not working	9	–
General maintenance/interrupted for repairs	29	39
Not enough water in the system (Demand too high)*	12	1
Water only delivered at fixed times **	2	3
Cut off for non-payment of services	3	8
Vandalism	1	–
Drought	–	3
Other, specify	1	4
Just stopped/Don't know	6	42
Total***	100	100

* Corresponding category in HSRC survey (2003) is 'Others use too much water, left none'.
** Corresponding category in HSRC survey (2003) is 'Water being sent to other communities'.
*** Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Note: The SASAS figures presented in the table employ household weights rather than individual-level weights. This allows us to make inferences about households in South Africa as opposed to the adult population (aged 16+). Note also that the 8 per cent reporting cut-off for non-payment are a proportion of those reporting reasons for interruptions and not of the population sampled.
Sources: SASAS (2003); Statistics South Africa (2002)

Table 8.6 shows the complexity of responses possible in probing the question of interruptions, and a high level of uncertainty about the reasons for interruptions. More than one-third (39 per cent) of the respondents in the HSRC survey (SASAS

2003) who have access to piped tap water cited 'interruption for repairs' as the main reason for water service interruptions. These may indicate active municipal intervention to improve services, but 'burst pipes' and 'pump not working', which were given as reasons for interruptions in the GHS (2002) data by 46 per cent of those reporting interruptions, also indicate a range of issues for which municipalities have to take responsibility.

The data do show certain inconsistencies, such as the high level of 'don't knows' in the SASAS survey; this can be partially explained by the lack of sufficient alternative coded responses which could be used in comparison with the GHS, but also by the fact that the reasons for breakdowns in water supply may be fuzzy in the memory of respondents. It may not be clear, for example, whether it was a burst pipe or repairs or possibly a combination of both that caused an interruption. It is also important to note that although the primary reason for interruptions is sought, the secondary reason for interruptions is not recorded and it is possible that in areas where there are high levels of interruptions generally, there are specifically high levels of cut-offs for non-payment. This interpretation is, however, strongly contested by engineers who argue that cut-offs are an indication of a high level of competence in water management rather than of poor service.

In an attempt to zero in on the reasons for dissatisfaction with the way government is handling water services, and to explore the relationship between interruptions and cut-offs, a cross-tabulation was undertaken of those expressing dissatisfaction in urban areas, to exclude those rural people dissatisfied with lack of delivery, and to focus on the problem of service. Although the number of respondents combining these attributes is small, and a table focusing on this question is not reproduced here, an interesting pattern emerges. Of those dissatisfied in the lowest-income category, 75 per cent had experienced an interruption as a cut-off for non-payment, in the middle-income category 57 per cent experienced interruptions as repairs, and in the highest-income category the reasons for interruption were not known. In these circumstances, the poorest residents in urban areas are likely to be preoccupied with the question of cut-offs and the better-off residents with the lesser problems of repairs and insufficient information about water services.

Methodological issues

Clearly, interruptions are a critically important gauge of the quality of service received by South African citizens. If water is flowing, services are operating; if not, then there is likely to be feedback in the form of negative attitudes expressed by citizens and challenges to the authorities from locally-based civic organisations. A crucial 'interruption' for many citizens is that produced by cut-offs.

Cut-offs have become a major issue in public debate, but given the generally high levels of satisfaction among those with higher levels of service and in urban areas,

what are its dimensions and who are the people affected? In the HSRC's nationally representative EPOP survey of 2001, it appeared that the households most affected by cut-offs were those in the poor rather than poorest income categories (McDonald 2002: 172). Clearly, the question of cut-offs is important for the very poor and in social policy, but what is the scale of the problem? The controversy starts in part with the definition of the phenomenon itself, and with methods of measuring it.

Cut-offs are a general phenomenon and not one affecting water services alone. In the 2001 EPOP study, 13 per cent of respondents stated that their electricity had been disconnected, and high proportions of disconnections from Telkom services were mentioned. Using one approach, which relied on complex adjustments to scale up individual-level responses to reach a national figure for cut-offs in water services over the previous ten years, a final statistic of 'just under 10 million' was generated by McDonald (2002: 170). This figure has been contested but has also gained general credence in the international media.

The direct questions 'Has your household had its water cut off for non-payment in the last year?' and 'Has your household ever experienced any of the following: Having your water cut off for non-payment?', asked in the SASAS and EPOP surveys, record statements from between 11 and 13 per cent of those questioned that their households had been cut off for non-payment.

Departmental officials propose a different approach to the issue, arguing that the direct question invites an inappropriate and inaccurate response. This alternative method, actively proposed by senior officials in the government's Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), is to pose the question more broadly in terms of the whole range of problems with water services. The method here is first to ask whether there have been interruptions of all kinds, and then to ask what form these interruptions have taken. This is the approach which has been taken in the GHS. When the question of cut-offs for non-payment is asked in this context, the figures are considerably lower – a single-digit percentage not of the population, but of people affected by interruptions. The question first put is 'Have you experienced an interruption over the past year?' and the reasons for this are then probed. For reasons of economy, the first question, 'Has your household had its water cut off for non-payment in the last year?', will henceforth be referred to as the 'direct' question, and the second question, which asks for reasons for interruptions, as the 'indirect' question.

There are very considerable differences between the two approaches. To what extent are these intrinsic to the drafting of questions, i.e. does a question asked after a broad introductory question always attract fewer responses than the same question put directly to respondents without an introduction? To encapsulate the issue in an example, does the question 'Do you want a beer?' always score more positive responses than the dichotomous questions, 'Do you want a drink?' followed by

'Do you want a beer?' as one of many alternatives? It would seem that the second question would always register a lower figure, as a person would probably prefer one of a number of alternatives to a single proposition. Does this make one question better than another? The SASAS survey carried both the 'direct' question in relation to cut-offs and the 'indirect' question, in which cut-offs are just one type of interruption. This offers the unique opportunity for comparing both approaches and the resultant differences. Comparison with the EPOP survey also allows for analysis across the two data sets.

There are thus two major areas of dispute: firstly, how to obtain a proportion of the national population from the respondents surveyed, and secondly, how to undertake logical and transparent calculations to determine the frequencies – the numbers of people involved. Both matters are keenly contested: the proportion of the population represented by respondents is a significant question, as mentioned above; and, since cut-offs are regarded as affecting poor people most dramatically, the size of the family in each household is at issue in calculating the numbers of people involved. The approach adopted in this chapter is to study the phenomenon by evaluating the reliability of the different questions, and then to examine the number of people involved.

Undoubtedly, getting finality on the population affected by cut-offs is a difficult task, made more problematic by the fact that there are very few published statistics from the municipalities themselves or from the Department of Provincial and Local Government. Such statistics, which are maintained by Project Viability, would lay a number of controversies to rest. Since few statistics are publicly available, researchers have extrapolated percentage responses from surveys to get the numbers of people affected. The SASAS survey is concerned with the attitudes of adults (more accurately those aged 16 years and over) and is thus weighted to the proportion of this group in the population. It is a survey of attitudes, not of households, but the question of a cut-off is fundamentally a household and not an individual event. Cut-offs are a social fact rather than an attitude. Drawing household data from surveys of adults may be more or less representative, but may also show significant divergences from data of households. The matter has been satisfactorily resolved only through the exercise of re-weighting of the SASAS sample to households, a facility not available to McDonald in the 2001 EPOP survey. Since the debate started on the basis of statistics drawn from the EPOP survey, this survey has also been re-weighted to households. The re-weighting distributes households nationally by province, race, locality and other key criteria.

From a common-sense perspective, it may appear that the best approach to the problem is to put a direct question and get a direct answer. This is what was undertaken in the both the HSRC EPOP and SASAS surveys. In the SASAS 2003 survey, however, the alternative approach spelt out earlier was also used, and the

survey data thus provide a test of both questions. The first step has been to examine the characteristics of respondents to both questions. The second step involves getting a sense of the numbers relative to the overall population, to understand whether this is a minor or a major phenomenon and to get an idea of the total number of interruptions (including all types of disruptions, breakdowns and cut-offs); that is, every kind of problem experienced with water services.

In Table 8.7 the data from the direct question are presented.

Table 8.7 *Have you been cut off for non-payment over the past year? (Direct question)*

	No. of households	Percentage	*Base*
Yes	1 019 491	11	*453*
No	7 896 156	88	*3 509*
Do not know	103 005	1	*46*
Total	9 018 652	100	*4 008*
No response	2 187 052		*972*
Total N	11 205 704		*4 980*

Note: This table employs household weights rather than individual-level weights. This allows us to make inferences about households in South Africa as opposed to the adult population (aged 16+).
Source: SASAS (2003)

The number which did report cut-offs is 1.0 million households or 11 per cent of the total number of households. These are considerable numbers and amount to about a third of households reporting interruptions over the past year. The EPOP survey of 2001 gauged responses over a different period: 'ever'(see Table 8.8).

Table 8.8 *Has your household ever experienced having your water cut off for non-payment?*

	No. of households	Percentage	*Base*
Yes	1 359 164	13	*307*
No	8 314 962	81	*1 877*
Do not know	661 252	6	*149*
Total	10 335 378	100	*2 333*
No response	870 327		*197*
Total N	11 205 705		*2 530*

Source: HSRC EPOP survey (2001), Q51.1. Data re-weighted to households.

In Table 8.8, although it covers a different time period, it is perhaps significant that there are more 'Don't knows', at 6 per cent of all households, but considerably fewer non-responses, at 870 327 compared to 2 187 052 in the SASAS survey.

The difficulty with the SASAS data is that there are contradictory responses to the direct question. Respondents, who may well not have been heads of household, provided high levels of non-responses and 'do not know' values: there are some 2.2 million household non-responses, which is more than double the positive responses.

In Table 8.9 some important inconsistencies are also evident. Of those reporting cut-offs, 308 000 make use of communal facilities and altogether 365 000 households not having an appropriate level of service (at the level of connection to the premises) report being cut off.

Table 8.9 *Has your household had its water cut off for non-payment in the past year?*

	No. of households	Percentage	*Base*
Domestic connection	398 765	39	*177*
Yard connection	248 545	24	*110*
Communal tap	307 800	30	*137*
Unpiped	57 192	6	*25*
Other	4 703	1	*2*
Total	1 017 005	100	*452*
No response	2 486		*1*
Total	1 019 491		*453*

Note: This table employs household weights rather than individual-level weights. This allows us to make inferences about households in South Africa as opposed to the adult population (aged 16+).
Source: SASAS (2003)

In Table 8.9 the first two levels of service include a direct house or yard connection; in the following two there is either no connection but access to a public service, or no municipal service at all. It is surprising that more cut-offs are being reported from communal facilities than from yard connections. While the largest proportion of people reporting cut-offs are those with direct house connections, there is also a significant number of people stating that they have been cut off from free communal taps, boreholes, streams and rivers. This is not easily explained and seems to be something more than the odd contradictory responses which can be associated with surveys.

The mental picture one has of cut-offs for non-payment is of desperately poor families protesting against cut-offs from yard or household connections in the established townships of South Africa. Although the proportion of respondents reporting cut-offs for non-payment is highest in the urban formal areas, the figure for rural informal areas, when compared with that for urban informal settlements, is significantly high.[6] These figures could indicate that a significant number of rural people feel they are losing their access to water services because they have not paid. These households are most often accessing water through communal taps, and the matter is generally a group or village problem rather than that of a single household.

There may be explanations for this: the trend could be explained by the fact that there are times when taps run dry, when whole communities state that their service has been suspended for reasons of non-payment; in the rural areas this may imply that services have broken down because the community has not paid contributions towards operations and maintenance. There may, for instance, be no funds to pay the electricity bill for the pump or to buy diesel (Hemson 2003).

Table 8.10 *Has your household had its water cut off for non-payment in the past year? (Direct question)*

Level of service	Frequency	Percentage	*Base*
Piped tap water in dwelling – with meter	384 344	38	*171*
Piped tap water in dwelling – pre-paid meter	14 421	1	*6*
Piped tap water on site/yard – with meter	129 685	13	*58*
Piped tap water on site/yard – pre-paid meter	22 535	2	*10*
Piped tap water on site/yard – no meter	96 326	10	*43*
Public or communal tap – free	267 664	26	*119*
Public or communal tap – paid for	40 135	4	*18*
Water carrier/tanker	16 237	2	*7*
Borehole on site	8 176	1	*4*
Borehole off site/communal	9 593	1	*4*
Flowing river/stream	20 115	2	*9*
Stagnant pond	1 928	0	*1*
Spring	1 141	0	*1*
Other, specify	4 703	0	*2*
Total	1 017 003	100	*453*
No response	2 486		*1*
Total N	1 019 489		*454*

Note: This table employs household weights rather than individual-level weights. This allows us to make inferences about households in South Africa as opposed to the adult population (aged 16+).
Source: SASAS (2003)

A detailed examination of water sources shows a large number of cut-offs from households also reporting access to free supplies and where there is no meter. These visible anomalies were not evident in the EPOP survey of 2001 and those households responding that they had 'ever' had cut-offs were generally those with metered connections. In Table 8.11 the overwhelming majority (71 per cent) of households reporting cut-offs in EPOP were in these categories, those with access to communal taps a minority (9 per cent), and an insignificant number (4 per cent) in the categories of flowing rivers, dams and other sources.

Table 8.11 *Level of service of those reporting cut-offs 'ever', EPOP 2001*

Level of service	Households affected	Percentage	*Base*
Piped – internal with meter	621 722	46	*140*
Piped – internal with pre-paid meter	107 162	8	*24*
Piped – yard tap with meter	336 067	25	*76*
Piped – yard tap with pre-paid meter	34 652	3	*8*
Piped – yard tap with no meter	88 807	6	*20*
Piped – free communal tap	35 537	3	*8*
Piped – paid for communal tap	77 645	6	*18*
Borehole/well	19 678	1	*4*
Flowing river/stream	8 544	1	*2*
Dam	11 375	1	*3*
Other (specify)	17 348	1	*4*
Total*	1 358 537	100	*307*

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: HSRC EPOP survey (2001), respondents reporting cut-offs selected.

The troubling sizeable anomalies in the SASAS survey were not to be found in the EPOP survey and the data appear much more consistent.

To pursue the discussion: it can be seen from Table 8.10 that the SASAS direct question produces anomalies such as respondents with no metered yard connections (96 326 households), free communal taps (267 664 households), and water carriers such as rivers and unimproved sources generally reporting cut-offs. There is also the disconcerting fact that a considerable proportion of the households reporting cut-offs also report that their usual source of water is a free communal tap or unmetered yard connection.

The direct question therefore does create a series of anomalies. This question appears to have been understood by some respondents as referring to any form of interruption; that is, to a general problem with their water services.

The most rigorous test of consistency comes from a comparison of the 'indirect' and the 'direct' question. The contrast between the two methods of putting the question is shown most graphically in a cross-tabulation between the direct question 'Has your household had its water cut off for non-payment in the last year?' and the same question posed as a subset of a question on interruptions. Asking the question in two different ways provided an opportunity for comparing results and testing consistency.

The two sets of questions were addressed to all respondents and the results can therefore be compared.

Table 8.12 *Reasons for interruptions among those cut off for non-payment*

	Households	Percentage	*Base*
Just stopped/do not know	269 049	33	*120*
Cut off for non-payment	161 913	20	*72*
Interrupted for repairs	267 948	32	*119*
Others used too much water, left none	26 083	3	*12*
Water being sent to other communities	47 528	6	*21*
Drought	35 347	4	*16*
Other (specify)	18 964	2	*8*
Total*	826 832	100	*368*
Never interrupted	49 264		*22*
No response	143 395		*64*
Total	1 019 491		*45 414*

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Note: This table employs household weights rather than individual-level weights. This allows us to make inferences about households in South Africa as opposed to the adult population (aged 16+). Note that the 20 per cent reporting cut-offs in response to both the 'direct' and the 'indirect' question is a percentage of those reporting reasons for interruptions, and not a percentage of the population surveyed.
Source: SASAS (2003), 'Has your household had its water cut off for non-payment in the past year?' cross-tabulated with 'If you experienced water interruptions in the past year, what do you think was the main reason for these water interruptions?'

A large proportion of respondents stated that they had been cut off for non-payment in response to one question and yet in response to another question said that they did not know what had caused their interruption. If there was consistency there would be a full coincidence between responses to the two questions in relation to being cut off for non-payment, but when the responses to the two questions are compared the difference in results is startling. For those who responded to both the direct question on non-payment and the subsequent question on reasons for interruptions (a smaller figure than the total number responding to the 'direct' question), a surprising number responded very differently when the reason for interruptions was probed.

The data indicate that a high proportion of those reporting that they had been cut off for non-payment on the first question did not take the option of recording the same view on the second. Unless there was an extraordinarily high number of respondents who had cut-offs for non-payment as a second reason for interruptions, this seems to indicate mixed views on the part of those reporting that they had been cut off for non-payment, and possible confusion about choosing from all the available reasons for interrupted services.

Among those who responded 'yes' to the question 'Has your household had its water cut off for non-payment in the past year?', it appears that a considerable number of households (49 000) felt they had not been interrupted; most who had had their service interrupted felt the water 'just stopped' (33 per cent), followed by those who thought the reason was for repairs (32 per cent), and only 20 per cent

responded by providing cut-offs as the main reason for interruptions. There is a major inconsistency here which is difficult to explain. There could be a group that is experiencing interruptions of other kinds as the main reason, as well as being cut off for non-payment. It is likely, however, that households would remember a 'deliberate' intrusive intervention such as being cut off (with municipal employees coming to the premises and stopping the flow of water) rather than the other 'passive' forms of interruption which affect the whole area without a clearly visible reason.[7]

There are major differences between the total number of households reporting cut-offs in one 'direct' question and the number providing the same response to the question on reasons for interruptions. The total number of respondents reporting cut-offs who do not have direct connections is almost equal to those reporting cut-offs from piped supply to dwellings. There are clearly anomalies of a considerable proportion here which are not reflected in the 'indirect' question.[8]

As has been explained, the alternative approach to the direct question is to pose a general question about interruptions before proceeding to ask for the reasons. The proponents of this method argue that the direct question invites a positive response and that the respondent may in fact be answering in the same way whether there have been interruptions or a problem with water delivery. Certainly the direct question appears to suffer from these difficulties, and in the analysis that follows the 'indirect' question is pursued.

The context of cut-offs

The analysis on the question of cut-offs is related to interruptions. What is the nature of the problem and where are the households who experience cut-offs located?

Cut-offs are indicated in the indirect question as located amongst the poorest families; the frequency declines in the higher-income categories.

Table 8.13 *Household income among those reporting an interruption as cut-offs (Indirect question)*

	Frequency	Percentage	*Base*
R0–R500	93 262	36	*41*
R501–R1 500	83 514	32	*37*
R1 501–R5 000	31 558	12	*14*
R5 001+	22 883	9	*10*
Refuse to answer/Don't know	28 444	11	*13*
Total*	259 661	100	*115*
Missing	17 832		*8*
Total N	277 493		*123*

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Note: This table employs household weights rather than individual-level weights. This allows us to make inferences about households in South Africa as opposed to the adult population (aged 16+).
Source: SASAS (2003)

In Table 8.13, among those in the lowest-income category (R0–R500), 36 per cent report the main reason for interruptions as cut-offs; this declines to 9 per cent in the highest-income category. Yet this group is a minority within the wider grouping of interruptions.

Table 8.14 *If you experienced water interruptions in the past year: What do you think was the main reason for these water interruptions? (Indirect question)*

	Frequency	Percentage	*Base*
Just stopped/do not know	1 455 456	39	*647*
Cut off for non-payment	277 510	8	*123*
Interrupted for repairs	1 441 413	39	*641*
Others used too much water, left none	52 661	1	*23*
Water being sent to other communities	102 600	3	*46*
Drought	198 162	5	*88*
Other (specify)	175 087	5	*78*
Total	3 702 889	100	*1 646*
Not interrupted in past year	6 586 246		*2 927*
No response	916 569		*407*
Total N	11 205 704		*4 980*

Note: This table employs household weights rather than individual-level weights. This allows us to make inferences about households in South Africa as opposed to the adult population (aged 16+). Note that the 8 per cent reporting cut-offs is a percentage of households who have experienced interruptions and not of the total population sampled.
Source: SASAS (2003)

In Table 8.14, most of the interruptions appear to be for no specific reason (1.5 million) followed by repairs (1.4 million) and only then do cut-offs appear (0.3 million or 8 per cent of those reporting interruptions).

In Table 8.15 the households are located at a provincial level. The cut-off phenomenon is located largely within two provinces, KwaZulu-Natal and the Free State, which amount to 52 per cent of the total.

The ranking of provinces is significant; most surveys (including the HSRC EPOP) rank KwaZulu-Natal as the province with the most cut-offs, with the Free State in second position. Table 8.15 supports this finding: the highest proportion of respondents cut off for non-payment is in KwaZulu-Natal (30 per cent), followed by the Free State (22 per cent). The incidence of cut-offs for non-payment is lowest in the Western Cape (2 per cent). Curiously, despite considerable social mobilisation around water services in Soweto, the cut-offs for non-payment in Gauteng are a small fraction of the total.

Table 8.15 *Location of households reporting cut-offs*

	Indirect question		
	N	**Percentage**	***Base***
KZN*	83 881	30	*37*
FS	61 126	22	*27*
NW	47 664	17	*21*
GT	21 512	8	*10*
MP	18 820	7	*8*
LP	17 381	6	*8*
EC	16 289	6	*7*
NC	5 898	2	*3*
WC	4 938	2	*2*
Total**	277 509	100	*123*

* See Acronyms on page xiv for province abbreviations.
** Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Note: This table employs household weights rather than individual-level weights. This allows us to make inferences about households in South Africa as opposed to the adult population (aged 16+).
Source: SASAS (2003)

An aspect of the debate in relation to cut-offs is the relating of their incidence to their frequency or duration. If cut-offs are a minor experience producing annoyance rather than desperation (as is often expressed by well-paid professional people who say they have also had cut-offs, which were quickly sorted out), then we are dealing with a different order of problem. In Table 8.16 those who reported interruption for longer than a day are tabulated against the number of times that the interruption occurred.

Table 8.16 *Incidence of cut-offs for non-payment over the past year*

	'Past year' indirect question 2003 (%)
Never longer than a day	1
Once or twice	52
Several times	43
At least once a month	2
At least once a week	1
Uncertain	1
Total*	100
Base	*121*

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Note: The relevant question here is 'Have you experienced interruptions in the past year?' This table employs household weights rather than individual-level weights. This allows us to make inferences about households in South Africa as opposed to the adult population (aged 16+).
Source: SASAS (2003)

Again the respondents reporting cut-offs as an interruption report considerable severity in their effects; fewer than 1 per cent report that cut-offs do not last longer than a day, 43 per cent experienced 'several' interruptions over the previous year and a small proportion had had a series of severe interruptions over the previous year.

In computations from the survey, the incidence of cut-offs for non-payment in most provinces is 'once or twice' over the year – a time of tension and strain but not lasting for a long time. There are, however, some provinces such as Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal and the Free State where cut-offs are reported by respondents to occur in their households 'several times', an indication of a high level of vulnerability. In the Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga there are instances of cut-offs for non-payment at the level of 'at least once a month'.

'Scaling up' to population

The controversies about cut-offs have centred on the global number of people affected rather than on the specific aspects of the phenomenon, such as where it is found, its severity, and its relationship to poverty and the equitable management of water services. The difficulties in making clear estimates have been compounded by the surveys employed. Firstly, the HSRC EPOP survey in 2001 and secondly, the SASAS survey in 2003 have been surveys of the attitudes of adults (defined in the first case as those over 18 and in the second case as those over 16). How can the percentage of adults surveyed (a percentage of respondents) be reflected as the number of people affected by the problem? Since not many people regard the number of adults, rather than people, affected as a meaningful notion sociologically in an event that affects households in general and, crucially, children, the task of extrapolation from sample to population has been the central source of controversy.

But first we must deal with the percentage of respondents reporting cut-offs. Policy-makers and people generally are most interested in knowing the number of people affected, and in finding out what the dimension of the problem is by estimating this as a percentage of the national population. The difficulties in working from responses given by a sample of 4 980 adults[9] to reach a figure that applies to the national population have only been finally resolved with the re-weighting of the sample to households.

In his work on the subject, McDonald uses the 'direct' question with an open-ended time period: 'Has your household ever experienced any of the following: Having your water cut off for non-payment?' Altogether 13 per cent of respondents in the HSRC EPOP survey 2001 reported that they had. McDonald calculated that 3.25 million affected adults corresponded to 2.25 million children. However, while thinking of poorer households, he then further assumed an extra 3 persons in total (including children) in each affected household. This would amount to an additional 3.9 million people if he assumed there were approximately 10 million households in

South Africa at the time, of which 13 per cent were affected. In Table 8.17 the row accordingly shows 2.3 children plus 3.9 affected others, giving a total of 6.2, and could more accurately be labelled 'Affected children and further persons'. On this basis the figure of 10 million people cut off for non-payment has been calculated.

Table 8.17 *Scaling up, assuming three extra persons per affected household*

Reported cut-offs, %	13.0
Affected adults, 18 and over, millions	3.3
Affected children and other persons, millions	6.2
Scaled up population, millions	9.4

Source: McDonald (2002: 170)

Working with the advantage of the survey re-weighted to the 2001 Census, it is now possible to avoid extrapolation and to directly compute the number of households involved by summing all members of these households. On this basis, from the EPOP survey there are 1 318 000 households with 4.97 million people reporting cut-offs 'ever'. Evidently, assuming substantially larger families among those affected doubled the estimate of people affected.

In what way does the SASAS survey shed light on the numbers affected over the past ten years? In respect of the question 'Have you been cut off for non-payment since 1994?' the number of households involved over the past ten years is available. This is a crucial question corresponding to the question posed in the EPOP survey 'direct' question: 'Has your household ever experienced any of the following: Having your water cut off for non-payment?' In response to this question in the SASAS survey, 1 313 404 households with a mean household size of 4.36, representing 5 721 065 people, responded that they had. This can be compared to Table 8.18, which reflects a similar question posed in EPOP.

Table 8.18 *Has your household ever experienced having your water cut off for non-payment? (EPOP 2001)*

	EPOP survey
Number of households	1 317 944
Mean size of household	3.77
Sum of size of households	4 966 118

Note: N = 307
Source: HSRC EPOP survey (2001)

The two surveys provide a figure of approximately five to six million people affected, a number which can be related to that of approximately one million over the 'past

year' which, in the case of the SASAS survey, was 2003. As has been discussed, a number of households had interruptions for reasons of non-payment on more than one occasion during that year; in addition, it is likely that the numbers experiencing cut-offs would fluctuate yearly.

And what of the levels of cut-offs for non-payment over the course of a year? From the SASAS survey it has been argued that the 'indirect question' is reliable. Through direct computation household size is captured, making the calculation of the number of people affected possible by using the sum of the members of these households. The results are presented in Table 8.19.

Table 8.19 *Size of household and numbers affected (Indirect question)*

	Indirect question
Number of households	277 494
Mean size of household	4.25
Sum of size of households	1 180 000

Source: SASAS (2003)

In the indirect question, 278 000 households with 1.18 million people report cut-offs for non-payment as the reason for their experience of an interruption. This figure can be compared to the figure of 331 699 households in the GHS who access water through neighbours and may be assumed to have been cut off.[10] With a household size assumed to be equal to that established in the 2001 Census for black African people of 3.9 (Statistics South Africa 2003), this amounts to 1.3 million people affected.

A feature of great importance in assessing the magnitude of the problem is the average size of affected families. Cut-offs should affect larger families disproportionately, as these families tend both to have the lowest household income and to manifest a much greater demand for water. Despite the logic of this argument, the mean size of the family is just slightly larger than the national average of 3.9 in black African families in the 2001 Census, with a size of 4.25 members in the households responding to the 'indirect' question and 4.03 in those responding to the 'direct' question. When compared with the mean in the entire survey of 4.04, there is no statistically significant difference between affected and unaffected households in terms of household size.[11] These data tend to indicate that although the size of households affected annually is smaller than the national average, these households suffer more frequent hardships. The question of average size of family is still open, however, as a sample study of households unable to meet their water bills in Ethekwini Municipality showed that these were indeed larger (at 6.9 members per household).[12] This question evidently needs further investigation.

Conclusion

The method followed in this chapter, to link attitudes to 'real' conditions, appears to work successfully; where there are high levels of satisfaction households are generally at a higher level of stable service, and *vice versa*. Interruptions are associated with greater dissatisfaction. Generally attitudes are associated with conditions; and conditions affect consciousness. In this chapter the levels of dissatisfaction clearly expressed in rural communities are not explored although they have been analysed elsewhere (Hemson and Owusu-Ampomah 2004).

There have been two methods compared in this chapter to get to the heart of the numbers involved in the cut-off issue: the use of the indirect and the direct question. The indirect question starts with the question of interruptions and follows up with exploration of the reasons for the interruptions. The two questions ('Have you experienced an interruption over the past year for longer than a day?' and 'What were the reasons for the interruption?'), among others, were added to the previous questions posed in EPOP relating to problems of service and cut-offs.

Coupled with the question on government handling of water services, this meant that an array of data was available to test the various ways of understanding the controversial problem of cut-offs. Running the two sets of responses in parallel was perhaps confusing for respondents, but did mean that the responses could be compared and contrasted. The methodological issues raised by the 'direct' question could be seen to result from posing an oversimplified dichotomy between being connected or not connected on the basis of non-payment alone, without opening up the possibility of a range of other reasons. All surveys demonstrate that there is a *much higher number* of interruptions reported than of cut-offs, however measured. Since cut-offs invariably involve a considerable interruption in service it is reasonable to measure cut-offs as a type of interruption, that is, to pose the question of interruptions first and thereafter to examine the reasons. This provides a measure of the entire range of problems of water service provision, reflecting the quality of municipal service as well as the management of non-payment. The indirect question has the advantage of reducing possible misunderstanding about links between the range of reasons for water not flowing from taps and the specific issue of non-payment.

In terms of the 'indirect question', the number of people affected demonstrates that a serious social problem exists, with 1 180 000 people reported to be affected annually. There is strong evidence from the SASAS survey that a number of affected households are cut off more than once, which reinforces the notion that there is a group of households which are particularly vulnerable. Such repeated cut-offs among the poorest are indicative of the fact that the cost-recovery approach followed in local government has put greatest pressure on those least likely to be able to pay their bills, and has, in the eyes of those affected, negated the policy of free basic water. This poses the question of the management of water services for such

families, and poses further questions about indigence policy which is very unevenly applied in different municipalities.

The repeated cut-off of poor households counters the hypothesis that there is a substantial culture of non-payment in relation to water services, as the very poorest are identified as most vulnerable in the 'indirect' question and are also the most likely to be affected more often than higher-income groups. The indirect question shows the prevalence of poverty associated with cut-offs. A culture of non-payment would be associated with evidence of cut-offs at higher levels of income, i.e. a disregard and non-compliance with municipal regulations among the somewhat better-off. This is not confirmed by the evidence presented. In addition to analysis of the incidence of cut-offs, McDonald (2002) undertakes a review of the consequences in terms of coping strategies (such as people turning to neighbours or unsafe sources), and relates cut-offs in one sector to cut-offs in other sectors. The SASAS survey did provide data for a more extensive analysis of these strategies, not by direct reference to questions, but by reported events associated with cut-offs.[13]

Both questions demonstrate that cut-offs occur very unevenly throughout the country. There is evidence of different municipal practices in various provinces, which certainly has affected the attitude towards non-payment in different centres.

It can be concluded that cut-offs are a social phenomenon which impacts on those black households that have managed to get a higher level of service than communal taps. Those responding to the 'indirect' question are, in a sense, more characteristic of the poorest. It involves a large proportion of the poorest of the poor, whose hitherto deplorable quality of life is worsened by water service deprivation through cut-offs for non-payment. The right of access to water services is guaranteed in the Constitution, but conflicts with conditions in which cost recovery is also prioritised.

These policies have been reviewed in the *Strategic Framework for Water Services* (DWAF 2003) where goals are set to provide affordable water and sanitation services, implying that no one should be excluded from access to basic services because of their cost. This is made explicit by an extended series of principles which municipalities are instructed to incorporate into their credit control policy, including compassion, communication, fair process, warning, restriction rather than a complete withdrawal of supply, and so on (DWAF 2003: 36–37). This shows a concern that there should be no loss of constitutional rights, a point raised in a number of SAHRC reports. In the latest report it is stated that '[most] municipalities are still interfering with people's access to water through disconnecting their water supply where payment for water cannot be realised' (South African Human Rights Commission 2004: 55). The prescriptions of the *Strategic Framework* appear to be a response to this criticism.

It is also clear from the *Strategic Framework* (DWAF 2003: 36–37) that the complete disconnection of households is being phased out as civic groups demand continuous

access to water and the Constitution and municipal policy provide for all households to have access to water. Instead, there is increasing evidence that municipalities are changing over to the use of flow restrictors and to pre-paid meters; the restrictors are intended to provide 200 litres per household per day, and the pre-paid meters place the primary responsibility for payment on the customer and minimise the direct intervention of municipalities. The 'new rules' of cost management and connection are as follows:

> In the first instance, and after following due process (including a warning), domestic water supply connections must be restricted and not disconnected, ensuring that at least a basic supply of water is available (DWAF 2003: 34).

It is perhaps these new principles which have caused some uncertainty among those reporting cut-offs as a number of municipal interventions are now taking place; for example, some municipalities are providing the 200 litres per household free on yard connections, or directly implementing flow restrictors before making cut-offs.

From the evidence of the responses of citizens in the *imbizos* (community meetings) conducted before and after the 2004 election, the problem of payment is still alive, and most directly affects a section of the poorest of the urban poor. From the SASAS survey it is possible to measure the dimensions of this 'vexing problem' and to assess its significance within the range of other questions which arise in debates about managing water services to the poor on a sustainable basis.

Notes

1 SANCO has had representatives at the national Water Forum and in the Ethekwini Water Forum who have put forward grievances about cut-offs as their main difficulty with water services.

2 The Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, Buyelwa Sonjica, used the term 'vexed question' in relation to cut-offs in her first budget speech on 17 June 2004.

3 It is also, incidentally, used by researchers to refer to pre-paid metered supply in which there is not continuous delivery to a household, and to forms of delivery in which water is supplied to communities at specific hours only, eg. in rural communities either early in the morning or in the early evening or, with water restrictors, only in the early hours of the morning.

4 Bill of Rights, Constitution of South Africa, Section 27 (1) (b)

5 The estimate of population on 21 January 2005, accessed from the StatsSA website on that date.

6 In another table not presented here there is a high proportion of rural people reporting disconnection, almost as high as those in the urban areas.

7 In a study undertaken by an HSRC team in a peri-urban area of KwaZulu-Natal most households were not clear exactly why interruptions take place as the service is generally irregular.

8 The problem is that unreliability at one level of service may also be present in unreliability at another; there may also be problems among those reporting disconnections from direct connections.

9 Actually a sample of the population 16 years and over.

10 General Household Survey, 2003, Q412WATR

11 The EPOP survey established an average household size of 3.77 in affected families.

12 David Hemson and Jane Kvalsvig, December 2004, Ethekwini Water Services Project, unpublished report conducted for Ethekwini Water Services.

13 Unfortunately in this chapter it is not possible to examine these strategies.

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9 What do South Africans think about education?

Mbithi wa Kivilu and Seán Morrow

Introduction

Education, including training, is a large and diverse area with which every citizen interacts, often repeatedly and in different roles. The range of educational issues concerning citizens is correspondingly extensive. Nevertheless, given that education has been a highly contested area in South Africa, with education often taking a central place in the struggle for freedom (Kallaway 2002), it is surprising that there is a dearth of material on attitudes to education. For example, the 2001 Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) public attitudes survey, which the current survey succeeds, does not include questions on education.

Much of the substantial scholarly literature on South African education therefore exists in an attitudinal vacuum, where it is difficult to know how the findings of specific studies measure up against the actual state of public opinion. Nevertheless, a survey such as the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) should be seen in relation to existing literature that may to some extent reflect, and is generally intended to inform, public attitudes. We will therefore try to give a sense of the literature that provides an important background to this survey, concentrating on a few of the topics covered by the SASAS questions.

In the early 1990s, in the context of the changes of the time, writers began to focus on the policy challenges of the emerging new dispensation (as in Unterhalter, Wolpe and Botha 1991). As the new regime consolidated and began to put its stamp on many spheres of social policy, writers continued to focus on questions of educational transformation, but with increasing attention to 'reality' as well as 'vision' (see also Kallaway, Kruss, Fataar and Donn 1997; Morrow and King 1998). However, as the intractability of the problems became clearer, there was an increased focus on the legacy that continued to determine educational experience and set the parameters of feasible change (Hyslop 1999; Kraak and Young 2001; Kallaway 2002; Chisholm 2004). Within this broad discussion, various sub-themes have preoccupied educationists and the South African public.

An important example, probed in the SASAS survey, is the integration of schools and other educational institutions. In South African conditions this is generally taken to mean the process that followed the ending of apartheid categorisation of schools by race, though it could also refer to integration by class, language, gender or other categories. Amongst the empirical and analytical studies that deal

with race and schooling are studies by Dekker and Lemmer (1993), Zafar (1998), Naidoo (1996), Soudien (1998), Vally and Dalamba (1999), Sekete, Shilubane and Moila (2001), Soudien and Sayed (2003) and Nkomo, McKinney and Chisholm (2004). An important recent discussion argues that assimilation to the pre-existing school culture is the dominant mode of integration, and that, in the case of black African children, movement has been entirely from ex-Department of Education and Training (and ex-homeland) schools to the former white, coloured and Indian/Asian schools, and never in the other direction (Soudien 2004). SASAS adds important dimensions to the discussion of how school integration is perceived by the South African population.

Linked to race, but not reducible to it, is language. In the South African context, this question has been obscured by the apartheid balkanisation of black African societies, politically, culturally and linguistically. The attempt to force black Africans into ethnic boxes gave own-tongue education a bad name. Nonetheless, with these ulterior motives removed, the research consensus is that first-language instruction at junior levels is the pedagogically correct route. There is also official commitment to this strategy. Even so, there is a substantial public commitment to English, though considerably less so amongst Afrikaans-speakers. Thobeka Mda has recently neatly summarised the arguments in this sphere (Mda 2004), and the issue can be traced back in, amongst others, works by the Department of Education (DoE 1997, 2002), Mda (1997), Heugh (1998) and PRAESA (1998).

While questions of race and language are generally acknowledged as central to South African life, the question of gender is arguably equally significant, but receives less attention. Even in a volume as sensitive to gender issues as the recent collection edited by Chisholm (2004), no single chapter focuses on gender in education, and this is the general pattern in surveys of South African education. To give it a positive spin, this may in fact be because, educationally, South African girls appear to be increasingly successful in school (DoE 2003; Perry 2003; Subotsky 2003), as in many parts of the world. However, there are worrying issues such as sexual violence against girls, and correspondingly problematic constructions of masculinity, that make it necessary to not simply subsume issues in female education in considerations of education as a whole (HSRC, CYFD 2001). It remains important to monitor public attitudes to the education of girls and women. These are only a few of the areas involving education that are covered in the questionnaire. We turn now to the results of the survey.

Results

Questions on education were designed to elicit a range of responses measured across a range of categories, among them: environmental milieu, province, race, household monthly income, personal monthly income, age and gender. It became apparent when examining the data that in very few cases does gender make a significant

difference to responses and, perhaps surprisingly given that education tends directly to concern young people in particular, neither does age.

Level of commitment to schooling

The first question, 'Up to what level do you believe it should be compulsory for all learners to attend school?' was intended to probe the commitment of South Africans to education as measured by how long they feel children should be obliged to attend school.

Provincially, the substantially urban provinces of Western Cape and Gauteng show greatest commitment to extended compulsory education, with nearly 90 per cent of respondents in the Western Cape and only slightly fewer in Gauteng believing that school attendance should be compulsory to matriculation level. Rural provinces are less committed to compulsory education, particularly KwaZulu-Natal where, even though it encompasses the large city of Durban, nearly 30 per cent responded that school attendance should not be compulsory at all. The pattern is similar though not so pronounced elsewhere. The results show that there are statistically significant differences (Chi-square = 40.6, df = 5, $p \leq 0.05$) between urban and rural environments, with 82 per cent of urban and 74 per cent of rural respondents indicating that school attendance should be made compulsory up to and including Grade 12. It is interesting to note that a sizeable percentage (16 per cent) of the rural respondents, compared to 12 per cent of the urban, do not think school attendance should be made compulsory at all. Details of these results are provided in Table 9.1. It seems that the urban–rural divide, which can perhaps also be interpreted as an economic divide, makes a considerable difference in terms of levels of commitment to schooling.

Table 9.1 *Level to which it should be compulsory for all learners to attend school, by environmental milieu*

Level of education	Urban	Rural	Total*
	%	%	%
School attendance should not be compulsory	12	16	13
Up to and including Grade 3 (Std 1)	1	1	1
Up to and including Grade 7 (Std 5)	1	2	1
Up to and including Grade 9 (Std 7)	3	4	4
Up to and including Grade 12 (Matriculation)	83	77	81

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Race, which to some extent mirrors the rural–urban and rich–poor divides – given South African demographics – also has an impact on commitment to schooling.

There are statistically significant differences (Chi-square = 214.4, df = 15, $p \leq 0.05$) among the race groups regarding their attitude towards compulsory school attendance. Coloured, white and Indian/Asian respondents are highly committed to compulsory education to matriculation level, with over 93 per cent expressing this commitment in the case of Indians/Asians, and slightly fewer for white and coloured respondents. Nearly three-quarters of black Africans felt similarly, yet more than 18 per cent felt that school attendance should not be compulsory at all. Details of these results are provided in Table 9.2.

Table 9.2 *Level to which it should be compulsory for all learners to attend school, by race group*

Level of education	Black African	Coloured	Indian/ Asian	White	Total*
	%	%	%	%	%
Up to and including Grade 3	2	1	1	0	2
Up to and including Grade 7	1	1	0	0	1
Up to and including Grade 9	3	6	1	6	3
Up to and including Grade 12	74	86	93	88	77
School attendance should not be compulsory	18	4	3	3	15
Do not know	2	2	2	4	2

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

On the whole, the higher the income amongst respondents, the more commitment they have to education. The higher the level of educational attainment, the higher is this commitment. However, it should be emphasised that irrespective of how the population is divided – whether by race, gender or province – the commitment to compulsory education to matriculation level is above 70 per cent, with the sole exception of KwaZulu-Natal as a province.

A regression analysis using binary logistic techniques with compulsory schooling (1 = Yes, 0 = No) as the dependent variable shows race as the only significant predictor (see Model 9.4 in the Appendix to this chapter). The Wald coefficients are significant for both black African and coloured people when compared to white people (the reference group), with the odds ratios indicating that both groups are less likely than white people to recommend compulsory schooling for all learners. However, Indians/Asians are more likely than white people to recommend compulsory schooling. Although age is not a significant predictor, it is interesting to note that the 16–34-year-olds are more likely than those aged 50 and above to recommend compulsory schooling, while the 35–49-year-old group has almost equal probability of recommending the same.

Education and social integration and separation

The second question consists of a number of statements structured to elicit attitudes to educational integration and separation. Respondents were asked about mixing in school of children of different races, languages, religions (or no religion), genders, and the well-off and poor. This question produced many fascinating responses, only some of which can be examined here.

The first thing to say is that the majority of all South Africans, by region, race, age and all other categories, believe that schools should be racially mixed. In terms of provinces, here, as with many questions, there is a particularly marked difference between the Western Cape and other provinces. This tends to bear out the perception that the Western Cape has characteristics in some ways setting it apart from other regions of the country. For example, while the majority in all provinces agree that schools should contain children of different races, only in the Western Cape do less than 84 per cent agree or agree strongly. In the Western Cape, 58 per cent agree or agree strongly, more than 15 per cent (the largest group in any province) neither agree nor disagree, and nearly 23 per cent disagree or disagree strongly. Though we have seen that urban life tends to indicate commitment to schooling *per se*, it does not in itself seem to determine a high level of commitment to school integration. Among the respondents in the rural areas, for instance, nearly 88 per cent, compared to 84 per cent in urban areas, agree or strongly agree that schools should contain children of different races. There are statistically significant (Chi-square = 24.8, df = 4, $p \leq 0.05$) differences between urban and rural respondents in their support for race integration in schools, with about 13 per cent in urban areas opposed compared to 11 per cent in rural areas.

There are significant differences in attitudes among the race groups with regard to mixing of different races in schools. Nearly 91 per cent of black Africans believe (51 per cent strongly) that schools should be racially mixed. Coloured and Indian/Asian respondents agree, though somewhat less emphatically. Only 53 per cent of white respondents, however, agree or strongly agree – more the former than the latter – and nearly 33 per cent actively disagree. Nevertheless, a majority of white respondents, in spite of this group's history of educational privilege, are in favour of racial integration in education. Details of these results are presented in Table 9.3.

Statistically significant differences are also found when respondents are compared by age category (Chi-square = 39.3, df = 12, $p \leq 0.05$), personal total monthly income (Chi-square = 72, df = 16, $p \leq 0.05$) and highest qualification attained (Chi-square = 65.6, df = 16, $p \leq 0.05$). Younger respondents and those at the lower end of the income scale believe in racially-mixed education more than those who are better-off, but more than 71 per cent of those earning more than R5 001 per month think this way too, so economic status is not highly significant in this sphere. Again, respondents of all levels of education agree with racial mixing in schools, though this is true of a slightly smaller proportion of those with no formal schooling or

Table 9.3 *Attitudes on whether all schools should contain children of different races, by race*

	Black African	Coloured	Indian/ Asian	White	Total*
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly agree	51	31	41	18	45
Agree	40	46	42	35	40
Neither/nor	1	10	7	11	3
Disagree	6	9	10	29	9
Strongly disagree	2	2	1	4	2
Do not know	1	2	1	4	2

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

with tertiary education. One can speculate that those with no education may find it difficult to conceive of a system where the races are mixed, and that those with tertiary education include a large proportion of white people. These groups, as we have seen, are somewhat less positive about racial mixing. Multiple regression analysis indicates that, apart from race, other variables such as personal monthly income, age category and highest qualification attained make significant contributions to the prediction of respondents' level of support for race mixing in schools (see Model 9.1 in the Appendix to this chapter). Respondents who have low personal monthly income, are younger and have a low level of education tend to support the mixing of children of different races in school.

Responses to questions about language tend to mirror those on race. This raises the question of whether acceptance of, and resistance to, social mixing of this type is about pigmentation or however else race may be defined, or whether it is a 'cultural' question that relates more to issues clustered around language. The issue of race and language mixing in schools will be worth tracking over further surveys.

Again, statistically significant differences exist between rural and urban respondents (Chi-square = 34.3,df = 4, $p \leq 0.05$) with 85 per cent in rural areas compared to 80 per cent in urban areas supporting the idea of mixing of children of different languages. Multiple regression analysis identified personal monthly income, age category and highest qualification attained as the main predictors of level of support for mixing of children of different languages in schools (see Model 9.2 in the Appendix). It should be noted that race is not included as a predictor in these models because it is such a strong predictor that its inclusion in the regression model would affect the estimation of the effects of other variables. As is the case with race mixing, respondents who have low personal monthly income, are younger and have a low education level tend to support the mixing of children of different languages in schools. Some of these results are presented in Tables 9.4 and 9.5.

Table 9.4 *Attitudes on whether schools should contain children of different languages, by race*

	Black African	Coloured	Indian/ Asian	White	Other	Total*
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly agree	48	27	37	14	20	42
Agree	42	42	38	31	47	40
Neither/nor	2	15	9	13	33	5
Disagree	6	12	16	32	0	10
Strongly disagree	2	2	0	5	0	2
Do not know	1	2	0	5	0	2

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Table 9.5 *Attitudes on whether all schools should contain children of different languages, by personal total monthly income*

	No income	R1– R500	R501– R1 500	R1 501– R5 000	R5 001+	Refuse/ uncertain/ don't know	Total*
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly agree	47	49	44	38	27	23	41
Agree	38	39	42	37	33	51	41
Neither/ nor	4	1	4	7	13	7	5
Disagree	8	8	8	11	24	15	10
Strongly disagree	2	2	1	5	3	2	2
Do not know	2	1	1	2	0	3	2

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Provincially, it is difficult to discern consistent patterns in responses to the question as to whether different religious groups should be educated separately. The Western Cape, however, provides interesting responses. While overall only 21 per cent of respondents agree or strongly agree that different religious groups should be educated separately – fewer, for instance, than the 41 per cent in the Free State or the more than 38 per cent in Mpumalanga – more than 21 per cent in the Western Cape chose the response of neither agreeing nor disagreeing, which is far above the level in any other province. It is difficult to attribute this tendency to indecision or fence-sitting in the Western Cape, but it may conceivably be related to reactions to the growing movement towards Islamic education in some areas.

When analysed according to racial groups, the majority in all categories believe that children should not be separated by religion in school, or are neutral on the issue. Race does not seem to be a major determinant of attitudes in this area. The same is true when respondents are categorised by income and level of education – no one category seems to believe in separation by religion more than another. It is surprising that a significantly (Chi-square = 11, df = 4, $p \leq 0.05$) larger proportion (33 per cent) of respondents who do not belong to a religious organisation than those who do (30 per cent) believe in the separation of children of different religions.

The great majority of South Africans believe in co-education, that is, the educating of girls and boys together, though most of the more rural provinces, like Limpopo, Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal, have a substantial minority who do not (respectively 24 per cent, 31 per cent and 21 per cent). This is supported by the statistically significant differences (Chi-square = 89, df = 4, $p \leq 0.05$) between rural and urban respondents on the issue. A larger proportion (26 per cent) of the rural respondents, compared to 17 per cent of the urban respondents, agrees or strongly agrees that boys and girls should be educated separately. Respondents who belong to any religion are more likely to disagree with the separation of boys and girls than those who do not belong to any religion.

Multiple regression analysis indicates that support for mixing of boys and girls in schools increases with the increase in level of education and personal monthly income. Respondents who are males or belong to any religion are more likely to support the mixing of boys and girls in schools (see Model 9.3 in the Appendix). Economically poorer respondents, and the less educated, do not favour co-education as much as others, perhaps because of the perceived possibility of girls falling pregnant, though even so the majority in such categories are in favour of it.

Issues of social class, race and region overlap with the question of whether respondents feel that economically well-off and poor children should be educated together. Regionally, the Western Cape is again out of line with other parts of the country. In this province, more than 20 per cent of respondents do not feel that well-off and poor children should be educated together, and 45 per cent feel that they should. Strikingly, 27 per cent in this province are undecided on the matter, and nearly 8 per cent 'do not know', which in both cases are by far the largest proportions to choose these modes of response. In all other provinces, around 80 per cent of respondents feel children at different economic levels should be educated together – more than 85 per cent in Gauteng. Racially, Indians/Asians, at more than 86 per cent, and black Africans, at 80 per cent, are most accepting of the idea, and white repondents least so, though even in this case more than 64 per cent agree that well-off and poor children should be educated together. Perhaps unexpectedly, the level of acceptance of this idea is reasonably similar, at about 80 per cent, across all the income groups measured, though those earning between R1 500 and R5 000, where a little more than 69 per cent agree or agree strongly that the poor and the better-off

should be educated together, are not quite so enthusiastic. It is difficult to hazard an explanation for this apparent inconsistency.

Perceived aims of education

The third question probes understanding of the aims of education. Respondents were asked to react to a number of statements that posited different reasons for becoming educated. The first was that education was important because it would improve the chances of getting a good job. The overwhelming majority agree, in whatever categories the population is divided. Respondents also agree that education should enable children to think critically and independently, and that it keeps children off the street and out of harm's way, though there is a significant minority that dissents on this point, particularly in the Western Cape, where more than 20 per cent are neutral or actively disagree. The great majority think that education should help children to become better citizens of South Africa, with the nearly 71 per cent in KwaZulu-Natal and the more than 72 per cent of Indians/Asians who think that this is 'very important' particularly striking. The educational aim of helping children of different backgrounds to get along together is also approved of by the overwhelming majority, with the replies becoming more emphatic the higher the level of education: nearly 65 per cent of respondents with tertiary education consider this aim 'very important'.

Attitude towards teachers

Teachers have been much criticised in recent years. Many teachers have left the profession and the training of teachers has been in a state of flux and traumatic change. The fourth question was designed to elicit the attitudes of the public towards teachers.

Though it has sometimes been stated that the teaching profession, especially in predominantly black African schools, has lost the respect that it is once supposed to have had, there seems little sign of this in the responses. The question was framed in terms of attitudes to the teaching profession in general, and reactions, positive or negative, may not apply to individual teachers or groups of teachers. In all provinces the overwhelming majority – more than 90 per cent – say that they respect teachers for their dedicated service to children, and in some provinces a large proportion, more than 60 per cent in KwaZulu-Natal and 58 per cent in Mpumalanga, say they 'strongly agree'. Urban Gauteng is more measured, with 36 per cent strongly agreeing and over 60 per cent simply agreeing. Age, interestingly, is not a big discriminator – respondents of all ages have similar responses to this question. In ethnic terms, Indians/Asians have the most respect for teachers, with 53 per cent strongly agreeing that they respect teachers for their dedicated service to children. However, amongst this community there is also the largest – though still small – minority, at nearly 10 per cent, who disagree, and say that they do not respect teachers. Level of income in

respondents does not seem to have any implications for levels of respect, and the same is generally true of those at all levels of education, though those with tertiary education include the greatest proportion of those who are very respectful, and also the largest group, though at 10 per cent still very small, of those who are neutral on the issue, or actively disagree.

The second part of this question, which asked respondents to react to the statement that teachers should not be allowed to take actions that damage their teaching role, like going on strike, was intended to investigate public attitudes to teachers both as workers and as educational professionals. While the majority in all provinces feel that teachers should not damage their professional roles by going on strike and in other ways, the people of many – but not all – rural provinces, like the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, North West, Mpumalanga and Limpopo, seem the most willing to countenance such actions by teachers. Possibly, in provinces where educational administration is often perceived as weak, there may be more sympathy for teacher militancy. With nearly 65 per cent of respondents answering that they agree or strongly agree that teachers should not damage their teaching roles by striking and the like, Gauteng is the province most opposed to such action. With increasing age, people become slightly less willing to countenance teacher militancy; white and Indian/Asian respondents disagree with it the most. Levels of educational qualification seem to play little role in determining whether respondents approve or not of such militancy. Figures are surprisingly varied when it comes to responses according to level of income of respondents. However, it would appear that, though still a minority within this category, those who are best paid are also the most willing to countenance teacher militancy.

Preferred language of instruction in schools

There are long-standing and continuing debates in multilingual countries like South Africa about the language of instruction in schools. The scholarly consensus, as pointed out earlier, is that first-language instruction is desirable in the initial stages of schooling. The fifth question focused on this issue, asking respondents to say what they thought should be the language of instruction from Grades 1 to 3, 4 to 9, 10 to 12, and in higher education.

Though English is the home language for quite a small minority of South Africans, it is notable that even for Grades 1 to 3, in all except the predominantly, though by no means exclusively, Afrikaans-speaking provinces of the Western and Northern Cape, a majority favours the use of English at this level. However, in the Western Cape just under a quarter of respondents favour English, and just over 38 per cent in the Northern Cape. In Limpopo, no less than 70 per cent favour English at this elementary level in school. It is worth emphasising that in the provinces where most speak African languages other than Afrikaans, still only a minority favours their use in school, even at the lowest grades – for instance, just over 41 per cent in the

Xhosa-speaking Eastern Cape, and 44 per cent in KwaZulu-Natal, where the population is supposed to be particularly assertive of Xhosa and Zulu culture and language respectively. Afrikaans, however, which has been historically privileged, and has been enabled to develop as a medium of modern communication far more than other African languages, retains favour with many where it is predominant.

This is one of the few areas where age seems to make a significant difference to responses. The younger the respondents, the more they favour English as the language of instruction. More than 59 per cent of 16–24-year-olds favour English as the language of instruction for children in Grades 1 to 3, but just over 48 per cent of those of 50 years and older do so. Responses arranged by racial category are interesting: Indians/Asians (in South Africa, an almost exclusively first-language English-speaking community) are over 94 per cent in favour of English at this level; black Africans, however, few of whom speak English as their home language, are 58 per cent in favour of teaching in English at this junior school level. This is true of less than a quarter of the coloured respondents, who favour the home language, which would in most cases be Afrikaans, and of just over 40 per cent of white respondents. Once again, it is clear that African languages are considerably less favoured than English and Afrikaans, and that the hegemony of these two historically-dominant languages remains. English, though, seems to be the real linguistic winner. Income makes comparatively little difference to attitudes here, with a half or more favouring English, and 60 per cent in the highest income category; the same pattern applies to respondents divided by educational qualification, where again about half favour English, but more than 60 per cent in the case of those with matriculation and tertiary qualifications.

As might be expected, the number committing themselves to English rises in all cases as respondents are asked about Grades 4 to 9, 10 to 12, and higher education. However, the partial exception remains the Western Cape, and to a lesser extent the Northern Cape. Only at tertiary level does a bare majority – below 56 per cent – of Western Cape respondents choose English as the language of instruction. Clearly, this atypical response represents the strength of Afrikaans in this province. In other provinces, apart from the Northern Cape, already by Grades 4 to 9 commitment to English is 82 per cent or above, with regard to teaching and learning.

The same pattern occurs when the other variables of race, educational qualifications and income levels are examined. Commitment to English rises as the question is asked in relation to the higher levels of education. The question of language in relation to income is worth examining a little further in this context. While commitment to English rises fast amongst the poorer income groups, it does so much more slowly amongst the better-off. For example, while more than 80 per cent of those with no income or below R1 500 per month believe that English should be utilised in Grades 4 to 9, approximately 70 per cent of those with incomes over R1 501 feel the same way, and the same differential of approximately 10 per cent

is maintained for Grades 10 to 12, even widening to 12 per cent or 13 per cent in relation to higher education.

When all this is combined with similar patterns regarding race, where black Africans and Indians/Asians favour English, and coloured and white people do so somewhat less (for instance, at tertiary level, 95 per cent, 97 per cent, 56 per cent and 65 per cent respectively), it is clear that there is a complex relationship between wealth and poverty, race, and language. English is the language of perceived potential upward educational mobility amongst almost all black Africans; Afrikaans maintains some strength at all levels of the educational system amongst the better-off, a group that comprises, amongst others, many white and some coloured people; and African languages, even at the lowest levels in the system, are considered as having a subsidiary role that diminishes yet further as the black African child climbs through the system. This is an ironic commentary on declarations that the role of African languages should increase. It is an area that will repay close examination over successive years in longitudinal studies.

Binary logistic regression of the dependent variable main language of instruction in Grades 1–3, English, identifies only three significant predictors, namely, race, personal monthly income, and education level (see Model 9.5 in the Appendix to this chapter). The results indicate that Indians/Asians, followed by black Africans, are more likely than white South Africans to select English as the main language for instruction in the formative phase of schooling. Those with no income are more likely than better-off individuals to select English as the main language of instruction. But this trend decreases with significant increases in income. Those with lower levels of education are less likely than those with tertiary education to select English. The pattern is similar with regard to the other levels of the education system.

It is interesting to see how different the results are when the dependent variable of main language of instruction is recoded as (1 = mother tongue, 0 = others). Those who are most likely to select mother tongue as the language of instruction are either white people, or those with high personal income, or those with low education. This same pattern is evident when the other levels of education are considered (see Model 9.6 in the Appendix for details). This reflects complex, cross-cutting patterns of class, ethnicity, education and language.

Attitudes towards modes of punishment

Overall, reasoning and discussion with the learner (89 per cent), as well as administering additional learning tasks like doing extra homework or writing essays (76 per cent), are supported as methods of discipline or punishment by the highest proportion of respondents. Limpopo has the highest proportion of respondents who support the first method while Western Cape (81 per cent) and Eastern Cape (79 per cent) are particularly in support of the second method.

Corporal punishment is only supported by one-third of respondents. Other forms of punishment that involve some form of physical work or discomfort are disapproved of by 40 per cent of respondents. The Free State has the highest proportion of those who support the use of corporal punishment, physical labour or retaining learners after school as forms of punishment. However, a large proportion of respondents from the predominantly rural provinces of North West (65 per cent) and Limpopo (73 per cent) do not support the use of corporal punishment. About a quarter of the respondents from KwaZulu-Natal do not support the administration of additional learning tasks like doing extra homework or writing essays as a form of punishment.

There are statistically significant differences among black African (Chi-square = 64.4.4, df = 5, $p \leq 0.05$), coloured (Chi-square = 11.4, df = 5, $p \leq 0.05$), and white respondents (Chi-square = 14.4, df = 5, $p \leq 0.05$), when compared by environmental milieu. A significantly higher proportion of both rural black African (45 per cent) and coloured respondents (50 per cent) supports the use of corporal punishment while the converse is true of white respondents. A higher proportion of urban respondents (57 per cent) compared to those domiciled in rural areas supports this form of punishment. There are differences across age groups in the attitudes people have towards methods of punishment. As may be expected, the youth (16–24 years) tends to support less traditional methods, with 91 per cent supporting reasoning and discussion and 76 per cent supporting the administration of additional learning tasks like extra homework or the writing of essays.

The results also show that the proportion of black African and coloured people that is opposed to corporal punishment increases with increase in household monthly income, personal monthly income and education level, but decreases with increase in age.

Racial differences are glaring, with the great majority of Indians/Asians (98 per cent) favouring reasoning and discussion with the learner and the administration of additional learning tasks like extra homework or the writing of essays as the recommended form of punishment. On the other hand, Indians/Asians are vehemently opposed to the use of either corporal or physical labour as a form of punishment. Black Africans are not entirely opposed to the use of corporal punishment by the teacher (50 per cent), or by the principal (64 per cent). Comparing the racial groups, white respondents have the highest proportion supporting the use of corporal punishment by either the teachers or the principal (53 per cent and 45 per cent respectively) and physical labour (37 per cent) while coloured respondents favour the detention of learners in school after official hours.

Disciplinary options such as corporal punishment by both the teacher and the principal are favoured by those with no schooling, while the more liberal methods of giving learners additional learning tasks, such as extra homework or the writing of essays, are supported by the majority of those with tertiary education.

Spending priorities in schools

Respondents were given a number of choices as to how they felt extra resources should be used in a local high school. Overall, the three top priorities when spending money on local high schools are science and technology equipment (34 per cent), a library and library books (30 per cent), and extra teachers (17 per cent). Comparison by province indicates that science and technology equipment is ranked highest by one-third or more of the respondents in three provinces: Eastern Cape (33 per cent), Northern Cape (33 per cent) and Gauteng (47 per cent). A library and library books are the top priority in five of the provinces – Free State (37 per cent), KwaZulu-Natal (34 per cent), North West (43 per cent), Mpumalanga (34 per cent) and Limpopo (38 per cent) – while extra teachers are a priority in the Western Cape (31 per cent). The urban–rural divide is evident amongst black Africans (Chi-square = 25.3.4, df = 4, $p \leq 0.05$) with the urban (33 per cent) indicating science and technology equipment as the priority while the rural (37 per cent) prefer a library and library books. This should probably not be interpreted as implying that rural schools do not require scientific equipment, but rather that being so under-resourced, it is books that are seen as a first priority.

Science and technology equipment is the top priority across the age categories. However, the proportion that favours this decreases with age, with 37 per cent of the 16–24-year group and 30 per cent of those of 50 and over selecting this priority. A similar pattern is evident with the library and library books. Extra teachers are seen as a priority by a higher proportion of those aged 35 and above than those in the other age categories.

There are notable differences across racial groups regarding the top priority when spending money on local high schools. White respondents (45 per cent) and Indians/Asians (29 per cent) chose extra teachers; black Africans (38 per cent) chose science and technology equipment and coloured respondents (26 per cent) chose libraries and library books. It is surprising that not many considered free school meals a priority, even among poor rural respondents. Details are provided in Table 9.6.

Table 9.6 *Top priority when spending money on local high schools, by race*

Priority	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Total*
	%	%	%	%	%
Library and library books	32	26	22	20	30
Science and technology equipment	38	20	23	23	34
Sports and recreation	8	14	7	7	9
Extra teachers	11	26	29	45	17
Free school meals	11	15	19	5	11

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Extra teachers are the priority for the middle- to high-income groups, with 29 per cent and 32 per cent of the R1 501–R5 000 and R5 001+ groups respectively. Results shown in Table 9.7 indicate that those with no income prefer to consider spending on a library and library books, while those earning R1–R1 500 prefer science and technology equipment. Proportions indicating free school meals as a priority are highest amongst the R1–R1 500 group but decrease with monthly income. Only 10 per cent of those with no income indicate school meals as a high priority.

Table 9.7 *Top priority when spending money on local high schools, by personal total monthly income*

	No income	R1–R500	R501–R1 500	R1 501–R5 000	R5 001+	Refuse/don't know	Total*
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Library and library books	35	30	27	18	19	27	30
Science and technology equipment	33	40	36	34	32	32	35
Sports and recreation	10	6	10	11	9	7	9
Extra teachers	12	11	15	29	32	26	17
Free school meals	10	13	13	8	7	9	11

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Science and technology equipment remains the highest priority amongst those with Grade 8, matriculation or tertiary qualifications (35 per cent, 36 per cent and 42 per cent respectively), with an increasing commitment the higher the educational qualification. Libraries and library books are a priority amongst those with no education (38 per cent) and primary qualifications (30 per cent). Provision of free school meals is a priority for a higher proportion of those with no education (18 per cent) and the lowest priority for those with tertiary education (5.4 per cent).

Attitudes towards religious observance in school

The question asked was whether compulsory religious observance should have a place in schools. This evoked divided opinions, with about 50 per cent being in favour, 15 per cent indifferent and 35 per cent opposed to it. At 61 per cent, the Western Cape had the highest proportion in favour, while the Free State led those against religious observance in schools, with 56 per cent opposed.

There are statistically significant differences (Chi-square = 33.3, df = 4, $p \leq 0.05$) in responses to this issue when interrogated against the question of whether the respondent was religious or not. A higher proportion of those who consider themselves as belonging to a religious faith (51 per cent) than of those who do not

(47 per cent), disagree or strongly disagree with the proposition that compulsory religious sessions have no place in schools. However, 40 per cent of those who do not consider themselves as belonging to any religious group agree with the statement.

Black Africans, at 38 per cent, have the highest proportion of those opposed to compulsory religious observation, while white respondents have the highest proportion in favour, at 65 per cent. Indians/Asians and coloured respondents have the largest proportions that are undecided.

When compared by income levels, 38 per cent of the group with no income feel that religious observance should not be allowed in schools while the majority of those earning between R1 and R500 (53 per cent) favour it. The proportion of respondents who do not care about the issue tends to increase with the increase in monthly income.

Table 9.8 *Compulsory religious sessions have no place at school, by highest qualification you have ever completed*

	No schooling	Primary	Grade 8–11	Matric	Tertiary	Other/ don't know	Total*
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly agree	12	12	15	13	15	9	14
Agree	27	28	20	17	12	19	21
Neither/nor	16	15	14	15	26	7	15
Disagree	28	34	37	36	30	50	35
Strongly disagree	17	12	14	19	18	16	15

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

A large proportion of those with low education (no schooling 39 per cent, primary education 40 per cent) agrees that compulsory religious observance has no place in schools, while the majority of those with matriculation or the equivalent level of education (55 per cent) is in favour of it. Approximately one in four of those with tertiary qualifications is neither for nor against compulsory religious observance in schools (Table 9.8).

Attitudes towards education for girls

There is general disagreement, however respondents are categorised, with the idea that 'educating girls to a high level is of no use'. Comparison of responses by province is presented in Table 9.9.

Table 9.9 *Educating girls to a high level is of no use, by province**

	WC	EC	NC	FS	KZN	NW	GT	MP	LP	Total**
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly agree	3	5	2	6	4	6	2	5	4	4
Agree	6	8	8	7	2	8	5	4	5	5
Neither/nor	7	2	7	2	1	3	3	1	0	3
Disagree	24	41	39	42	39	50	57	42	52	44
Strongly disagree	58	43	42	43	54	33	32	48	39	43
Do not know	3	1	2	0	1	2	0	1	0	1

* See Acronyms (page xiv) for province abbreviations.
** Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Most respondents in all provinces (88 per cent overall) disagree with the statement that educating girls to a high level is of no use, though small proportions in two provinces which are predominantly rural, Eastern Cape (13 per cent) and North West (13 per cent) concur with the statement. Respondents in two other predominantly rural provinces, KwaZulu-Natal (92 per cent) and Limpopo (91 per cent) disagree or strongly disagree with the statement.

A slightly higher proportion of females (89 per cent) than males (86 per cent) disagrees with the statement, and those in the age categories 25–34 years (89 per cent) and 35–49 years (90 per cent) either strongly disagree or disagree. About one in ten of the 16–24-year group and the older group (50+ years) seems to agree, however. A higher proportion of white people (93 per cent) and Indians/Asians (94 per cent) than any other race either strongly disagrees or disagrees, and about one in ten of the black African respondents agrees with the statement.

Although the majority of respondents across income levels either strongly disagrees or disagrees with the statement, there is a slightly higher proportion that feels this way among the middle-income group (R1 501–R5 000) than any other group. About one in ten of those with no income and those with R5 001 and over either strongly agrees or agrees with the statement.

The majority of respondents at all levels of educational qualification either strongly disagrees or disagrees with the statement. However, a slightly higher proportion of those with tertiary qualifications feels this way than those in any other category. About 12 per cent of those with no schooling and 10 per cent of those with either primary or Grade 8 qualifications either strongly agree or simply agree with the statement.

There is general agreement by the majority (about 90 per cent) across all categories that 'Girls should be educated to operate on equal terms with boys'. However,

though still a small minority, it is surprising to find that it is amongst youth aged 16–24 years that the largest number disagreeing with the statement is to be found. Equal proportions of about 8 per cent of both males and females in this age group disagree with the statement. Thus no gender differences are evident.

Among the racial groups, the proportion of coloured people who say they believe in equal educational opportunities for boys and girls is slightly lower (80 per cent) than for any other race group. White people and Indians/Asians have the highest proportion agreeing with gender equality in education. It is also the coloured group that has the highest proportion of those who neither agree nor disagree (10 per cent).

However, it should be emphasised that the great majority in all racial groups, at all levels of education and of both genders, believe in equality of educational opportunity for both sexes.

Aspirations in schooling

Respondents were asked to react to a number of alternative paths for young people leaving school. While continuing studies at university is acceptable to the majority in the various provinces as the path a child should take after matriculation (56 per cent), provincial comparisons indicate that people in the Free State (72 per cent) have the greatest commitment to this option while those in the Northern Cape (a province, it might be noted, without a university) have the least commitment to it. While this may be the case, university is still the first choice in the Northern Cape with 42 per cent of respondents choosing this option; 33 per cent of respondents in that province consider getting a job as the second most appropriate choice, making them the highest proportion by far in this category. A higher proportion of respondents from the Western Cape than other provinces recommends that learners should take time off to travel or do voluntary work, perhaps reflecting the relative prosperity of this province compared with others.

In terms of racial groups, 56 per cent of respondents feel that children should be encouraged to continue studies at university, with Indians/Asians, at 67 per cent, being most committed to this option. Twenty-three per cent feel that they should be encouraged to study at technikons, with the greatest commitment, at 25 per cent, coming from black Africans. The greatest commitment to the attempt to get a job at this stage, at 11 per cent, is shown by coloured people.

The R1 501–R5 000 income group has the highest proportion (66 per cent) of those wanting learners to continue their studies at university, while the R501–R1 500 group prefers learners to get a job. A higher proportion of those with tertiary education (67 per cent) would prefer their children to go on to university than any other education category, while those with no schooling (21 per cent) lead other groups in terms of the proportion that prefers their children to try to get a job.

Conclusion

The main aim of this chapter is to record the attitudes of South Africans to a range of educational issues. Attitudes are by their nature changeable, mirroring a multitude of social factors. Education in particular has been subjected to many changes and stresses in South Africa which do not seem to be coming to an end. It will be fascinating and instructive to track changes and continuities in social attitudes in this sphere as future surveys accumulate. This survey will be a baseline against which changing educational attitudes will be measured.

The reader will draw his or her own conclusions from the data presented here. In the opinion of the authors, the general conclusion that can be drawn from the material is that there is a substantial reservoir of educational good sense, apparent in whatever way the respondents are bundled, whether by race, region, or socio-economic or educational level. In particular, the opportunity that the survey gives to register opinion in ways that bypass the racial categories into which the population is still so often divided, makes it possible to see some surprising commonalities and differences in this sphere. A homogenised South African educational system is certainly not coming into existence in the minds of the citizens, and neither is race a dead issue, but most South Africans are positive about and committed to education. The results of the survey are, broadly speaking, positive in their messages for the country's educational future. Policy-makers would do well to take note of such findings.

Appendix

The independent variables used in the following regression analyses were:

Personal monthly income
1. No income
2. R1–R500
3. R501–R1 500
4. R1 501–R5 000
5. R5 001

Highest qualification attained
1. No schooling
2. Primary
3. Grade 8–11 or equivalent
4. Matric or equivalent
5. Tertiary

Age
1. 16–24
2. 25–34
3. 35–49
4. 50+

Sex
0. Women
1. Men

Belong to any religion
0. No
1. Yes

Race

1. Black African
2. Coloured
3. Indian/Asian
4. White

Model 9.1 *Correlates of supporting mixing of children of different races in all schools*
Multiple regression
Dependent variable: All schools should contain children of different races
(1 – Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 – Neither agree nor disagree, 4 – Agree , 5 – Strongly agree)
Independent variables: Age category, personal total monthly income and highest qualification attained.

	Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.	95% Conf Interval for B	
	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
(Constant)		63.752	.000	4.411	4.691
Personal monthly income	–.060	–3.355	.001	–.076	–.020
Age	–.066	–3.635	.000	–.095	–.028
Highest qualification	–.045	–2.493	.013	–.075	–.009

Source: SASAS (2003)

Model 9.2 *Correlates of supporting mixing of children of different languages in all schools*
Multiple regression
Dependent variable: All schools should contain children of different languages
(1 – Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 – Neither agree nor disagree, 4 – Agree , 5 – Strongly agree)
Independent variables: Age category, personal total monthly income and highest qualification attained.

	Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.	95% Conf Interval for B	
	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
(Constant)		61.982	.000	4.422	4.711
Personal monthly income	–.088	–4.978	.000	–.103	–.045
Age	–.071	–3.926	.000	–.103	–.034
Highest qualification	–.046	–2.583	.010	–.079	–.011

Source: SASAS (2003)

Model 9.3 *Correlates of supporting mixing of girls and boys in all schools*
Multiple regression
Dependent variable: All schools should contain children of different languages
(1 – Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 – Neither agree nor disagree, 4 – Agree , 5 – Strongly agree)
Independent variables: Age category, personal total monthly income, belonging to a religion, highest qualification attained and gender.

	Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.	95% Conf Interval for B	
	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
(Constant)		36.318	.000	3.373	3.758
Highest qualification	.078	4.723	.000	.053	.127
Personal total monthly income	.045	2.682	.007	.012	.077
Belong to any religion	.039	2.396	.017	.029	.286
Gender	.034	2.063	.039	.004	.169

Source: SASAS (2003)

Model 9.4 *Binary logistic regression of compulsory schooling as dependent variable, and age and race as predictors*

Individual characteristics (Comparison group in brackets)	**B**	**S.E.**	**Wald**	**Sig.**	**Odds ratio (Exp(B))**
Age (50+ years)					
16–24 years	.018	.130	.019	.890	1.018
25–34 years	.187	.131	2.060	.151	1.206
35–49 years	–.008	.122	.005	.946	.992
Race (White)					
Black African	–1.466	.198	54.954	.000	.231
Coloured	–.391	.237	2.725	.099	.676
Indian/Asian	.079	.293	.073	.787	1.083
Constant	2.957	.202	215.129	.000	19.233

Source: SASAS (2003)

Model 9.5 *Logistic regression of language of instruction (1 = English, 0 = others) at Grade 1–3 with race, personal monthly income and education level*

Individual characteristics (Comparison group in brackets)	**B**	**S.E.**	**Wald**	**Sig.**	**Odds Ratio (Exp(B))**
Race (White)			356.4	.000	
Black African	1.03	.14	54.4	.000	2.807
Coloured	–.41	.16	6.7	.010	.661
Indian/Asian	3.28	.25	168.3	.000	26.615

Individual characteristics (Comparison group in brackets)	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Odds Ratio (Exp(B))
Personal income (R5 000+)			10.7	.031	
No income	.16	.20	0.7	.417	1.179
R1–500	.39	.20	3.744	.053	1.480
R501–R1 500	.20	.19	1.046	.306	1.217
R1 501–R5 000	–.078	.190	.168	.682	.925
Qualification (Tertiary)			45.146	.000	
No schooling	–.930	.196	22.429	.000	.395
Primary	–.674	.169	15.931	.000	.510
Grade 8–11	–.344	.158	4.730	.030	.709
Matric	–.043	.157	.075	.784	.958
Constant	–.442	.211	4.397	.036	.643

Source: SASAS (2003)

Model 9.6 *Logistic regression of language of instruction (1 = Mother tongue, 0 = others) at Grade 1–3 with race, personal monthly income and education level*

Individual characteristics (Comparison group in brackets)	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Odds ratio (Exp(B))
Race (White)					
Black African	–.693	.136	25.971	.000	.500
Coloured	–.068	.150	.203	.652	.935
Indian/Asian	–2.955	.251	138.956	.000	.052
Personal income (R5 000+)					
No income	–.290	.197	2.160	.142	.748
R1–R500	–.595	.198	9.078	.003	.551
R501–R1 500	–.318	.186	2.908	.088	.728
R1 501–R5 000	–.006	.184	.001	.973	.994
Qualification (Tertiary)					
No schooling	.567	.192	8.724	.003	1.762
Primary	.469	.166	8.032	.005	1.599
Grade 8–11	.233	.155	2.271	.132	1.263
Matric	.032	.154	.043	.835	1.032
Constant	.327	.206	2.518	.113	1.386

Source: SASAS (2003)

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10 *A healthy attitude?*

Chris Desmond and Gerard Boyce

Introduction

It's an ironic sight: people crammed into a bar or shebeen, a beer in one hand and a cigarette in the other, watching sport. They admire the fitness, skill and dedication of their heroes and after the game they plan a *braai* to celebrate, but nobody brings salad. South Africans, like people in many other parts of the world, have a mixed attitude towards health. Many are aware of the benefits of a healthy lifestyle or the dangers of risky behaviour; some choose to act on this knowledge, others do not. Everyone is entitled to their preferences, but when it is not preference but lack of choice that leads to differences in behaviour, there is cause for concern. We may choose to go or not to go to gym, but the car guard who stands outside and watches the cars until the gym closes does not 'choose' not to go there.

Health is a key component of people's well-being. In addition to being an end in itself, health improves the ability to meet and enjoy other ends. For example, good health improves individuals' ability to work and to earn, while at the same time improving their ability to enjoy their earnings. So who is enjoying these benefits? Who is healthy in South Africa and what determines this? How do preferences and abilities to choose differ? This chapter seeks to examine these questions, discussing health behaviours and knowledge, and the influence of various factors on how healthy individuals say they feel.

The discussions in this chapter should be considered in the context of the South African health profile, which is complex and saddening. If causes of death and years of life lost are examined, one sees that the primary killer is HIV/AIDS, followed by homicide and violence-related causes, with TB in third place (Bradshaw and Nannan 2004). Homicide and violence are not indicators of individual health but rather of societal health. HIV/AIDS and TB, however, clearly indicate the important role of infectious and communicable diseases in determining health in South Africa. Therefore, while this chapter focuses on only a few health behaviours and attitudes, it should be remembered that there are many other behaviours and circumstances that affect people's health, not the least of which is risky sexual behaviour – a topic not covered in this chapter.

Health behaviours

An individual's health is determined by a variety of factors, some of which are partially or completely beyond their control, from genetics to environmental influences and accidents. Individuals do, however, have control over some health-determining factors. People can choose to exercise or eat better, to smoke and drink or abstain, and they can consider different options in relation to risky sexual behaviour. Not all individuals, however, have equal control over or even knowledge of what they are able to do. A person can only eat a healthy diet, for example, if they can afford it; they can only exercise if they have time for it; they can only limit risky sexual behaviours if they have power in their relationships. Moreover, knowledge of the influence of different factors on health is not uniform and may vary, particularly with differences in education and access to information. For these reasons of control and knowledge, one would expect that individuals have different attitudes towards factors that influence their actions and, as a result, their health. This chapter deals with one particular set of health-determining factors: health behaviours. These differ from other factors that, while they may have health impacts and are at least partially subject to control, are more environmental and circumstantial than behavioural – one example would be housing.

Loosely speaking, health behaviours include a variety of activities related to the lifestyle that people engage in and that have long-term health effects. Such behaviours need not all be beneficial; indeed some, such as smoking, have a negative impact on health. In the survey analysed here, respondents were asked a number of questions that related to health behaviours: from questions about their use of substances, such as alcohol and drugs, to questions relating to other behaviours, such as exercise. In addition, the survey covered issues of knowledge of the health benefits of different actions and behaviours. Linking the responses to these two sets of questions helps to show the role of information, as opposed to control or preference, in determining behaviours.

It is not possible in a single chapter to cover all the health behaviour questions. Three key questions were therefore selected for consideration. These relate to the most prevalent of the health behaviours covered in the survey, namely, drinking, smoking and exercise. For each behaviour, three broad areas are examined: the identification and extent of these activities; how the prevalence of behaviours varies across groups; and how people's awareness of effects of behaviours differs.

Alcohol consumption

Alcohol consumption has been linked to a variety of social ills, not exclusively to health. With regard to health, identified links have been both causal, such as cirrhosis, and associative, such as violence and car accidents (National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 2000). Alcohol consumption is, however, very varied. Given the possible damaging effects of alcohol, understanding variations in

consumption among individuals and groups can be useful in developing a response to this behaviour. Such a detailed analysis of the factors shaping drinking patterns is beyond the scope of this chapter. Some discussion on the issue is possible, however, as the survey asked respondents how frequently they drank. Their weighted responses are presented in Table 10.1.

Table 10.1 *Drinking patterns*

Respondents		Frequency of drinking			
		Never	Sometimes	Often	*Base*
Black African	%	67	25	8	*3 792*
Coloured	%	55	37	8	*436*
Indian/Asian	%	67	30	3	*140*
White	%	29	59	12	*577*
Male	%	45	41	14	*2 317*
Female	%	76	20	4	*2 644*
Total	%	62	30	8	*4 961*

Source: SASAS (2003)

Before discussing the results, it is important to highlight the limitations of the question. The responses are largely subjective, as asking people whether they drink 'sometimes, often or never' left the definition of 'often' and 'sometimes' to the respondent. Different people and groups are likely to have different perceptions about what is considered 'often' or 'sometimes'; the only objective category is 'never' and even then people may lie. Given the wording of the question, the results cannot be used to make inferences about the quantities of alcohol that different groups consume, but can only really be used to report on the incidences of alcohol consumption, against non-consumption, among different groups.

Overall, the data suggest that 62 per cent of the South African population say that they never drink, with 30 per cent saying they drink sometimes and the balance classifying themselves as frequent drinkers. The distribution across the categories varies by both race and sex. The figures suggest that the incidence of alcohol consumption is most predominant amongst the white population group, which has the lowest percentage of non-drinkers. Black Africans and Indians/Asians responded that they 'never drank' more frequently than both white and coloured respondents. The patterns of alcohol consumption among the race groups were, from a statistical point of view, significantly different.[1]

A number of factors could underlie the observed differences. Firstly, there could be an income factor at work, with higher incidences of white drinking reflecting higher average incomes amongst white South Africans. When alcohol consumption is broken down by income category (not shown), the data do suggest such a pattern.

It is difficult, however, to attribute causation, as the income pattern may be a result of the presence of more white people in the high-income groups, as opposed to the race pattern being a result of income differences. What is interesting is that there is also an upward trend in terms of income in consumption versus non-consumption within race groups, although the differences are not statistically significant.

Secondly, a relevant factor could simply be different attitudes to, and preferences for, alcohol across different groups. Different attitudes towards consumption may also have led to differences in the truthfulness of reporting. In communities where consumption is frowned upon, there are likely to be more non-drinkers, as well as more people reporting that they do not drink when they actually do.

The results also suggest that there is a significant difference in the incidence of alcohol consumption between men and women. As with the race variations, this may be a result of both preferences and societal norms. Again, it may also be that women are more likely to under-report consumption because of societal attitudes towards women drinkers.

Smoking

The adverse health effects of smoking have long been established (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2004) and these harmful effects have been widely publicised in the popular media. Despite warnings appearing on cigarette packets, increased taxes, and smoking in public places no longer being allowed, many people still continue to smoke. The results shown in Table 10.2 suggest that close to a quarter of adults in South Africa smoke at least sometimes.

Table 10.2 *Smoking patterns*

Respondents		Frequency of smoking			
		Never	Sometimes	Often	*Base*
Black African	%	80	9	11	*3 789*
Coloured	%	56	12	32	*436*
Indian/Asian	%	75	14	11	*139*
White	%	64	10	26	*576*
Male	%	61	16	23	*2 315*
Female	%	89	3	8	*2 643*
Total	%	76	9	15	*4 956*

Source: SASAS (2003)

Unlike the pattern of drinking, which has the highest proportion of responses in the 'never' category, followed by the 'sometimes' response, with the lowest numbers in the 'often' category, smoking has more 'often' category responses than 'sometimes'.

The question on smoking suffers from similar limitations to that on alcohol consumption. The responses concerning frequency are subjective, with each respondent determining the difference between 'sometimes' and 'often'. The data suggest that the incidence of smoking is highest amongst the coloured population group and lowest amongst black Africans, with the differences between race groups being significant. The survey also found that men are more likely to smoke than women.

Smoking and drinking

It has often been observed that heavier smoking is associated with higher alcohol consumption. This association should not be taken as implying any causal relationship between smoking and drinking. Rather, a variety of common influences have been suggested as underlying this link, related to both initiation to substance abuse and dependency behaviours. Among the influences suggested have been genetic traits, personality characteristics and conditions such as stress (Bierut, Schuckit, Hesselbrock and Reich 2000; Little 2000). Table 10.3, which presents drinking patterns across smoking responses, explores this association between the smoking and alcohol habits of survey respondents.

Table 10.3 *Drinking by smoking frequency*

Smoking patterns	Drinking patterns			
	Never	Sometimes	Often	Total
	%	%	%	%
Never	90	56	36	76
Sometimes	4	22	7	9
Often	6	22	57	15
Base	*3 057*	*1 474*	*426*	*4 957*

Source: SASAS (2003)

Respondents who never drink were more likely to report 'never smoking' than all other groups, whereas those respondents who reported drinking incidence as 'often' are far more likely than other groups to report smoking 'often'. These results are similar to those identified in previous studies. What is interesting is the distribution of smoking behaviour in the 'often' drinkers group. Individuals who reported drinking 'often' fell, largely, into either the non-smoking or the 'often' smoking categories, suggesting that if you drink often you either smoke often or not at all; smoking sometimes is not a common option. The distributions of smoking behaviour across the drinking categories were all significantly different.

Given the limited exploration of these health behaviours in the survey, this chapter is unable to speculate on the underlying causes of this association. It could be a result of one of the factors identified in more in-depth studies (eg. Miller 1997; Murray et

al. 2002; Saules et al. 2004), or a combination of a variety of influences. Alternatively, there could be a medical reason underlying this association, in the case of non-smokers and teetotallers at least. Since the survey does not ask about lifetime drinking and smoking habits, the responses do not identify those respondents who report not smoking and not drinking for medical reasons. In the case of abstention from both smoking and drinking for medical reasons, there is a confounding medical condition underlying the observed relationship between smoking and drinking habits.

Exercise

The beneficial health effects of exercise are well-established, having been demonstrated on numerous occasions. In addition, participation in sport (a form of exercise) is argued to have a number of beneficial effects beyond the physical, including psycho-social (Hopkins 2002) and societal benefits, especially in terms of social cohesion (Colman 2000; Galley 2000). Table 10.4 reports on respondents' responses to a question on exercise habits. Before examining the results, it is worth noting the broad classification of exercise in the survey questionnaire. Exercise is classified as 'physical activity for 15 minutes or more three times or more a week for at least a year'. This broad definition encompasses such a wide range of activities that one is unable to make inferences about the intensity of exercise engaged in by different groups. Further, it is broader than the definition employed in other comparable surveys (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1999).

Table 10.4 *Exercise patterns*

Respondents		**Do you exercise?**		
		Yes	**No**	***Base***
Black African	%	31	69	*3 767*
Coloured	%	27	73	*434*
Indian/Asian	%	55	45	*139*
White	%	51	49	*574*
No school	%	18	82	*385*
Primary	%	20	80	*953*
Grades 8–11	%	34	66	*1 846*
Matric	%	40	60	*1 190*
Tertiary	%	56	44	*466*
Male	%	43	57	*2 310*
Female	%	26	74	*2 620*
Total	%	34	66	*4 930*

Source: SASAS (2003)

Even with such a broad definition of exercise, the results imply that only 34 per cent of adults exercise. The results are significantly different by race, with Indians/Asians and

white people appearing to be the most likely to exercise.[2] This could reflect higher per capita income levels among the Indian/Asian and white population groups, or simply different preferences. The income effect is difficult to distinguish from educational variations.

A significant difference was identified with regard to education level. The results suggest an upward trend with education, with those having a tertiary level education most likely to report exercising. The explanation for this outcome is likely to be a combination of several factors.

Firstly, as demonstrated in other studies assessing levels of physical activity and education level, more highly educated people are likely to be more aware of the beneficial effects of exercising (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1999). Secondly, given the correlation between higher income and higher pay, more highly educated people are likely to be able to afford costly exercising activities, such as taking out gym contracts, purchasing running shoes, etc.

Thirdly, tertiary-educated people are more likely to be employed in sedentary occupations, leading them to engage in exercise in order to compensate for the low physical demands of their occupations. Conversely, more poorly educated people are more likely to be employed in manual labour. Given the nature of their work, manual labourers are probably less likely to exercise, as a distinct activity, since they are either too tired or see no need to compensate for the lack of physical exertion at work. One need only go to the suburbs in the morning to see wealthy, well-educated joggers running past working-class people on their way to work. This, however, links to another possible reason for the variation. It could be that people may classify the same activity as being or not being exercise, depending on their education or viewpoint. Some wealthier people may say they walk to work for exercise, while some others may walk to work each day but not consider this as exercise. The issue of choice again seems important. As Sen (1999) has argued, it is a very different thing to starve than to fast, even though the outcomes are similar.

Exercise patterns were also found to be significantly different between males and females. This could be the result of numerous factors. For instance, females could have a greater fear of crime, leading to fewer women walking or jogging. There could also be a household division of labour effect involved. Traditionally, the burden of housekeeping duties has fallen on women. This translates into women having less free time available than men to spend on exercise.

The patterns relating to exercise provide a good example of how choices and preferences are shaped by circumstances. While individuals may have control over many of the behaviours that influence their health, this control is not always at the same level. Individuals may have the same preferences concerning exercise, but live in different circumstances that lead to different capacities to translate these preferences into action.

Advice and knowledge

While control and preference play a role in shaping health behaviours, and therefore health, information is also an important factor. The following discussion examines responses to questions relating to the advice people would give to others in order to improve their (i.e. these others') health. The responses to these questions highlight to some extent the role of information.

The first of the advice questions concerns whether or not respondents thought that it was important to give up drinking if one wanted to improve one's health. Overwhelmingly, people said that this was an important or even very important step to take for improving health. Given the earlier results on incidence of drinking, however, it is interesting to break down the responses according to individuals' earlier classification of their drinking.

Table 10.5 *Drinking advice*

Frequency of drinking		Importance of giving up drinking			
		Important	Not important	Neither*	*Base*
Never	%	95	2	3	*3 056*
Sometimes	%	87	6	7	*1 473*
Often	%	80	11	9	*426*
Total	%	91	5	4	*4 955*

* Includes the 'don't know' responses.
Source: SASAS (2003)

The results are significantly different across different drinking classes. This suggests that people who classify themselves as people who drink 'sometimes' or 'often' advise others in favour of abstention from alcohol consumption slightly less often than those who never drink.

Although non-drinkers are more likely to advise against drinking, those who drink also do so. For example, 50 per cent of adults from the 'drink often' category ranked the advice in favour of abstaining to improve health as 'very important', with a further 30 per cent saying it was 'important'. It may be that people felt that while they drank 'often' this was not an unhealthy amount, that the harmful effects would not affect them or simply that their health did not need improving.

The second of the advice questions concerns whether or not respondents thought it was important to give up smoking if one wanted to improve one's health. Responses are broken down similarly to the previous table, but this time by smoking patterns.

Table 10.6 *Smoking advice*

Frequency of smoking		Importance of giving up smoking			
		Important	Not important	Neither*	*Base*
Never	%	96	3	1	*3 755*
Sometimes	%	88	6	6	*460*
Often	%	84	8	8	*734*
Total	%	93	4	3	*4 949*

* Includes the 'don't know' responses.
Source: SASAS (2003)

The results of this cross-tabulation are similar to those regarding drinking advice. In this case, 58 per cent of respondents who smoked 'often' would rank the advice that others give up smoking if they wanted to improve their health as 'very important' and a further 26 per cent ranked it as 'important'.

The addictive nature of smoking may be evident here. People who smoke may well know that giving up smoking benefits health, but they themselves are unable to quit. What is also of interest, however, is that a not inconsequential proportion of smokers (16 per cent) believed that giving up was either 'not important' or 'neither important nor not important'. Whether or not this reflects a genuine lack of knowledge is difficult to say. What is clear is that those who smoke 'sometimes' or 'often' are more likely to give such a response. This view may have led to them smoking or may be a result of their smoking habit.

The previous two examples have focused on health-damaging behaviours; this next advice question concerns whether or not respondents will advise others to take up exercise in order to improve their health, which is a positive health behaviour. As a comparator to the above, results are reported by whether or not respondents engaged in physical activity.

Table 10.7 *Exercise advice*

Exercise		Importance of exercising			
		Important	Not important	Neither*	*Base*
Yes	%	97	2	1	*1 666*
No	%	95	1	4	*3 251*
Total	%	96	1	3	*4 917*

* Includes the 'don't know' responses.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Only 4 per cent of adults did not think that to suggest exercise was important advice. People who exercised did, on average, rank the advice as 'important' more often but,

unlike the previous two examples, no significant difference between those who are involved in the behaviour and those who are not was observed. This result suggests that people are aware of the health-enhancing effects of exercise, regardless of whether they engage in exercise or not. This overall high level of knowledge of the benefits of exercise suggests that the difference, across groups, in exercise patterns is a result of something other than basic knowledge of the benefits. It may be a result of more detailed knowledge or differences in preferences or, as discussed previously, the circumstances in which individuals live and under which they make decisions may play a role.

Linked to issues of health behaviours is the question of stress. The links between stress and a variety of adverse health effects have been demonstrated in the literature (Anisman and Merali 1999; National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 2004). Stress can lead to ill health either via physiological pathways (Anisman and Merali 1999) or through its association with certain negative health behaviours such as drug or alcohol abuse (Brady and Sonne 1999). Advising others against increasing stress levels illustrates an awareness of the dangers of stress. Stress is often portrayed in the media as a problem of the wealthier sector of the population, with work pressures and deadlines being key determinants. It is interesting, then, to examine whether the wealthier respondents rank reducing stress more highly than do the poor. The rankings of stress broken down by income category are presented in Table 10.8.

Table 10.8 *Importance of reducing stress, by income category*

Personal income		Reducing stress			
		Important	Not important	Neither*	*Base*
No income	%	95	2	3	*1 907*
R1–R500	%	93	3	4	*640*
R501–R1 500	%	92	1	7	*966*
R1 501–R5 000	%	94	1	5	*400*
R5 001+	%	97	1	2	*202*
Total	%	94	1	5	*4 805*

* Includes the 'don't know' responses.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Overall, a very low percentage of adults ranks stress as 'not important'. The slight differences across income groups presented in the table are not statistically significant. People across all income groups reveal similar anxieties about stress levels. There was clearly a common understanding among respondents that stress was harmful. This would suggest that they all have some experience or exposure, and therefore view it as a problem and rank its reduction as important. While receiving a similar ranking, the sources of stress that prompt such rankings are likely to differ

across groups. The popular media's presentation of stress would seem to cover only some of the causes. Not knowing where your child's next meal will come from is, one would imagine, also stressful.

The preceding discussions have highlighted a number of differences between groups relating to both health behaviours and knowledge. They have raised the possible importance of income and education, as well as preferences and circumstances, in shaping the behaviours and therefore the health of individuals. The discussions have, however, focused on one behaviour at a time and one influence at a time; furthermore, they have been dealing with intermediary outcomes, that is, health behaviours and not health itself. While health is arguably both an intermediary outcome and an end in itself, it is interesting to examine how the variations already discussed collectively influence overall health.

The discussions thus far have also focused on differences across race groups. At times it has been mentioned that these differences may be related to such things as education and income, which are closely related. The following section attempts to analyse the different factors at work and thereby examine whether or not the comparison by race is still useful.

Self-assessed health

There is no simple means to rank the health of different individuals. It is not possible to conduct a single test and conclude that this person is 80 per cent healthy while this other person is 50 per cent healthy. A number of tests could be used in combination to give some idea of people's overall health: measuring heart rates, blood pressure, body fat, etc. Even then it would still be difficult to rank health status. Moreover, conducting multiple tests would be costly and intrusive. There is, however, an alternative to testing: simply ask people to rank their own health status. This was the approach taken, and its results are presented here.

While it is difficult to rank an individual's health by means of tests, people rank their own health all the time, saying that they don't feel so good, that they are feeling great, or that they are 'not 100 per cent'. But how useful are such rankings? Do we really know our own health status – is how we feel an accurate measure? While there are obviously exceptions, in general, self-assessed health has been found to be a good predictor of actual health status (Idler and Kasl 1991; Idler and Benyamini 1997). Studies that asked respondents how they rated their own health found that those who assessed it as poor were likely to die sooner than those who ranked it highly. This is, however, at the aggregate level; there may well be many individual cases where people felt that they were in good health and were suddenly 'struck down' by some serious illness that they might have already had and were not aware of. In the analysis of groups, however, it would seem valid to say that those people who rank their health as good, as opposed to those who rank it as poor, are indeed, on average, healthier.

In the survey, respondents were asked how they would rank their health at present and were asked to choose from the options very poor, poor, average, good and excellent. The results obtained from this question are shown in Table 10.9, broken down by race and gender.

Table 10.9 *Self-assessed health, by race and gender*

Respondents		Self-assessed health					
		Excellent	Good	Average	Poor	Very poor	*Base*
Black African	%	18	43	20	15	4	*3 789*
Coloured	%	16	51	23	7	3	*435*
Indian/Asian	%	28	47	16	6	3	*141*
White	%	40	49	9	1	1	*578*
Male	%	23	45	18	10	4	*2 316*
Female	%	18	45	20	14	3	*2 642*
Total	%	20	45	19	12	4	*4 957*

Source: SASAS (2003)

The results suggest that the majority (65 per cent) of South Africans feel that they are in good or even excellent health. There are, however, more than one in six who feel they are in poor or very poor health. This would imply that people generally feel healthy, though it is worth examining what the factors are that are linked to higher self-reported health and, by association, actual health.

According to the data, the distribution of self-reported health across categories varies by race groups. White people, on average, ranked their health higher than did the other race groups. The distribution across categories is significantly different for white people when compared to all the other groups – collectively or individually. The lowest rankings of health occurred among black African respondents. The distribution across rankings for black African and Indian/Asian respondents was significantly different, with responses for coloured persons falling in-between the two.[3] While slightly more male respondents ranked their health as excellent than did females, the overall distributions were very similar and not significantly different.

The results shown in Table 10.9 do not mean that white South Africans are healthier, or even rank themselves as healthier, than everyone else because they are white. Indeed, there may be many factors associated with being white which lead to better health. For example, white people are, on average, better educated, have higher incomes and live in better housing. One would expect, given these factors, that their health would be better. Examining the role of different factors in determining health requires more sophisticated analysis than simple tables. Multivariate analysis was conducted to examine the associations between a number of possible influential

factors and reported health. The technical details of this analysis are contained in the Appendix to this chapter; the key findings are discussed below.

The age of respondents was negatively associated with their report of health and the association was significant, that is, the older the respondents the lower, on average, they rated their health. This result would be expected, as younger people should, generally, feel healthier. What was interesting was that the square of the respondents' age was also significantly associated with reported health. In this instance, however, the association was positive. If a variable and its square are both significantly related to an outcome, but with opposite influences, it suggests that the initial effect (that associated with the variable, in this case age) diminishes or is reversed as that variable increases (that is, the older a person gets the slower the deterioration in their reported health status). This result may mean that people get less negative about the impacts of age on their health as they get older, or that people whose health deteriorates rapidly when they are young die earlier, leaving behind those whose health is failing more slowly.

Respondents' education was strongly and positively associated with their report of health. The higher the level of completed education, once the effects of age had been removed, the higher the average ranking of health. As with age, this result is to be expected, as education is commonly associated with better health. The primary link to health is seen as occurring through increased knowledge of health-benefiting behaviours. Education is also highly correlated with income and it is often difficult to disentangle the influences of one from the other.

Income was also included in the analysis; however, a significant relationship was not found. Although income has long been associated with health, this insignificant result is not that surprising. As already mentioned, income and education are highly correlated and finding an independent relationship to both in the same model can be difficult. If education is not included, income is significantly and positively related with reported health. In addition to its correlation with education, income is also highly correlated with a number of other variables which were included in the model, including employment status, asset ownership and race variables. If these are excluded from the model, income again exhibits a positive significant relationship to health, even with education included. These correlations and the relationship of these variables to health provide some room for discussions relating to the pathways through which income influences health.

While there may be some health benefits associated simply with having more income, increased earnings and access to income are more typically associated with better health through what they can buy. If income is excluded, respondents living in informal urban areas reported on average lower health status. If income is controlled for, then the significance of this relation is reduced.[4] Similarly, if the variable indicating residence in an informal setting is removed, the association between income and health status appears stronger. This suggests that one pathway

through which income affects health is access to better housing. This association can be further developed with an examination of access to clean piped water. Access to piped water in the household is only significantly related to reported health status when residency in an informal area is not included in the model. Again, this suggests ways in which income and housing influence health and thereby influence self-reported health.

Another interesting variable to discuss is employment status. Being employed was associated with better reported health. Employment status and income are obviously strongly related. But what was interesting was the strength of the relationship between being employed and self-reported health, and the implications of the inclusion of this factor for the relationship between self-reported health and income. The inclusion of employment status in the model dramatically reduces the influence of income. While income and employment status are correlated, there are substantial variations in income within the employed group. The results, however, suggest that the variations of income amongst the employed are far less important than the variations in income between those who have employment and those who don't. This in turn would suggest that, insofar as income has an influence on reported health, access to any income is more important than access to more. In economics this is referred to as diminishing marginal returns. The relationship may, however, also operate in the opposite direction. That is, those in poor health are less likely to work. This situation may be exacerbated in the context of HIV/AIDS, where serious illness leading to the loss of employment or the ability to work becomes more common.

The survey asked a number of questions relating to the ownership of household assets. While the ownership of a television or a radio may not have direct impact on health, their presence in a household is an indication of wealth. A count of household assets was included in the model and showed a positive relationship to health. This means that people who had more assets in their homes, on average, reported better health. As far as causation is concerned, this result supports the assertion that wealth improves health.

In addition to factors associated with income and wealth, a number of variables linked to attitudes also exhibited a positive association. Both individuals' outlook for the country and their satisfaction with the new democracy were significantly related to self-assessed health. Those who were more positive about the outlook for the country and were satisfied with the democracy rated their health better. This association, as in the case of others, is a statistical relationship and does not necessarily show that negative attitudes lead to poor health. It simply shows that individuals in the sample, who were otherwise the same, rated their health more poorly the more dissatisfied they were with the democracy and the more negative they were about the country's future.

Likewise, those individuals who were in a good mood on the day they were asked the questionnaire tended to rate their health more highly. Attributing the direction

of causation is difficult in this example. It could just as easily be argued that those who were in a good mood would rate their health more highly, as it could that those who rated their health more highly were more likely to be in a good mood as a result. Whichever it is, the data suggest that mood and self-assessed health are positively associated with each other.

The relationships between health behaviours, such as exercise, alcohol consumption and smoking, and self-assessed health were also examined. Interestingly, only exercise exhibited a positive relationship. The results showed that people who reported exercising tended to rate their health higher than those who did not. Smoking and alcohol consumption showed no significant relationship to self-assessed health, even for those who reported that they smoked and drank frequently. When considered carefully, however, this result may not be as surprising as it first appears. The questions on health behaviours related to the current situation, as opposed to lifetime habits. People who smoke and drink frequently at present may be doing damage to their health but may not yet have felt that damage; so they rate their health the same as those who don't have the same behaviours. Moreover, those individuals who may have felt the impact of smoking and drinking could well have stopped and are therefore included in the 'no drinking' and 'no smoking' group, and rate their health poorly. A more detailed understanding of the impact of health behaviours on self-assessed health would require more in-depth questions about past behaviours.

Once the variations in all of the above-mentioned factors were controlled for, the differences in self-assessed health between race groups were less stark. In the final model no significant difference was found between black African, Indian/Asian and coloured people's assessment of health. The table on race and self-assessed health presented earlier (Table 10.9) shows that there is a significant difference between Indians/Asians and black Africans. What the analysis generated from these results suggests is that the bulk of this difference is a result of differences in education, income, and wealth. Being white, however, even after controlling for the factors discussed, was still associated with better-ranked health. The magnitude of the higher ranking was, however, smaller once the influence of income, education, and so on had been removed. Explaining why being white is still associated with better-ranked health is difficult. There may well be other lifestyle issues that were not captured in the questionnaire, or possibly white people may have a more positive attitude towards their own health.

There is also a substantial racial variation in HIV prevalence. Some of this is accounted for by differences in income and education, but some of it relates to sexual networks, the effect of which may be captured in the race variable.

The factors analysed and discussed thus far relate to the current situation, that is, this is a cross-sectional analysis. It should be borne in mind that such an approach has its limitations, as many of the effects associated with certain factors that affect health,

those associated either with lifestyle or with the surrounding environment, are of a long-term nature. Either the consequences or symptoms of the initial incident or exposure manifest themselves in later life, or there is a cumulative element associated with prolonged engagement in an activity incrementally detrimental to one's health, such as smoking. For instance, studies have linked indoor air pollution to numerous respiratory complaints, primarily among at-risk populations such as children and the aged (Bruce, Perez-Padilla and Albalak 2002), while a recent New Zealand study (Hancox 2004) has linked childhood television watching to obesity in later life. Additionally, the long-term effects of childhood malnutrition have been well-documented.

The preceding discussions have raised a number of issues in relation to the determination of health. The differences in health outcomes appear to be a result of individual choice, preference and circumstance, highlighting the role of broader influences and therefore the need for broader responses. The importance of education, wealth, employment and housing further emphasises the role of considerations other than preferences in the determination of health. Clearly, the analysis provides additional evidence of the role of information (and understanding of it) as well as circumstances in shaping both preferences and the ability to translate choice into action.

No chapter discussing health and attitudes in South Africa can afford not to consider HIV/AIDS. While the discussion in the following section differs somewhat from the rest of the chapter, it is appropriate, given the scale of the problem, to give these issues special attention.

HIV/AIDS and stigma

South Africans see the HIV/AIDS epidemic as the greatest challenge facing the country. Close to half of respondents in the survey rated it as the greatest challenge. There is some debate as to what the prevalence of HIV is in the country and at what stage of the epidemic we are. Very few, however, would argue anything other than that the scale of the problem is enormous; the debates relate only to how enormous it is.

A comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS involves a range of activities that includes prevention efforts, mitigation of impact and treatment. All these responses are, however, frustrated by the stigmatisation associated with the disease. Running prevention campaigns and providing treatment are difficult in situations where misunderstandings and judgements are rife. This section of the chapter examines the levels of stigmatisation, and to some extent knowledge, evident in the sample.

Respondents were read a number of statements and were asked whether or not they agreed with the content of each one. The results are presented in Table 10.10, broken down by race and gender.

Table 10.10 *Respondents who agreed or strongly agreed with the following statements on HIV/AIDS*

Respondents	Statement							
	Would not get infected if in the same room as an infected person		Would sleep in the same room as someone with HIV/AIDS		Would share a meal with someone who is HIV+		Would talk to someone with HIV/AIDS	
	%	*Base*	%	*Base*	%	*Base*	%	*Base*
Black African	86	*3 787*	85	*3 783*	77	*3 787*	95	*3 787*
Coloured	69	*437*	62	*436*	63	*437*	81	*435*
Indian/Asian	88	*139*	62	*140*	68	*141*	93	*140*
White	80	*571*	59	*573*	64	*574*	84	*575*
Male	84	*2 315*	80	*2 310*	75	*2 315*	93	*2 315*
Female	82	*2 636*	80	*2 638*	74	*2 638*	92	*2 636*
Total	83	*4 950*	80	*4 949*	74	*4 953*	92	*4 951*

Source: SASAS (2003)

The first statement, 'would not get infected if in the same room as an infected person', is more a measure of knowledge than of stigma. The results show that overall 83 per cent agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. While this is a high level of agreement, the statement is evidence only of very basic knowledge. That 17 per cent did not know or even disagreed with the statement is of some concern. Responses did not significantly differ for males and females, although white and coloured respondents did agree or strongly agree significantly less often than black African and Indian/Asian respondents.

The other three statements reflect a mixture of understanding and knowledge. Overall, black respondents more frequently agreed with the statements, suggesting greater knowledge and lower levels of stigma. Across all the statements, the responses among men and women were very similar with no significant differences.

The overall responses to the other three statements show that the results were not uniform. Almost all participants said that they would talk to an HIV-positive person, but many would not sleep in the same room or share a meal. One result that could highlight a question of knowledge is that there were those who would sleep in the same room with, but not share a meal with, an HIV-positive person.

What is interesting to examine is the difference within particular groups in response to different statements. While 80 per cent of white and 88 per cent of Indian/Asian respondents agreed that you cannot get infected by being in the same room, only 59 per cent and 62 per cent respectively would sleep in the same room as an HIV-positive person.[5] For coloured respondents the difference in response to these two statements is small and for black Africans it is negligible. While not providing proof, the results do seem to suggest that a more substantial proportion of stigma for

white and Indian/Asian people arises despite knowledge, whereas in the coloured community the cause may well be lack of knowledge.

The differences between race groups may be partly caused by the nature of awareness campaigns, and possibly also by different degrees of exposure to the disease.

Given the important part stigma plays in frustrating responses to HIV/AIDS, it is useful to ask what might change people's perceptions. While there are many possible influences, one that can be investigated here is exposure to the disease, which was raised as a possible cause of the racial variations examined earlier. Being personally faced with HIV/AIDS, or knowing someone who was/is exposed, may well shape one's views. According to the survey results, some 36 per cent of adults admit to knowing someone who has died of AIDS. The following discussion examines whether this experience may have changed their views on the disease. The results in Table 10.11 are responses to statements on HIV/AIDS broken down by those who had known a person who died of AIDS and those who had not.

Table 10.11 *Impact of knowing someone who has died of AIDS*

Statement	Response	Know someone who has died of AIDS			
		Yes		No	
		%	*Base*	%	*Base*
Would sleep in the same room as someone with HIV/AIDS	Agree / Strongly agree	88	*1 776*	75	*3 158*
Would share a meal with someone who is HIV+	Agree / Strongly agree	80	*1 784*	71	*3 156*
Would talk to someone with HIV/AIDS	Agree / Strongly agree	96	*1 785*	90	*3 152*
Would treat a family member with HIV/AIDS	Agree / Strongly agree	96	*1 783*	89	*3 146*
Would not get infected if in the same room as an infected person	Agree / Strongly agree	92	*1 784*	79	*3 151*

Source: SASAS (2003)

Knowledge levels were significantly higher in the group who said that they knew someone who had died of AIDS. Similarly, responses to statements regarding stigma were more positive, indicating lower levels of stigma, for this group. The differences between the groups were significant for all statements and for some groups were fairly substantial. The results imply that being exposed to the disease reduces stigma. Of course, this may be a misstatement of the direction of the relationship. Those who view the disease as having less stigma may be more likely to admit to knowing a person who has died from it.

Conclusion

Individuals have different attitudes, knowledge and control over their health. As a result, the health of South African adults is very varied. While it is extremely difficult to disentangle the multiple factors shaping health, this chapter has sought to highlight just a few of them.

What seems to be clear is that, while preferences for different health behaviours may differ across individuals and groups, the role of circumstance in shaping both preferences and ability to translate preference into choice is also a critical issue. People are indeed entitled to different preferences, but when health-promoting behaviours are limited by lack of choice, steps should be taken.

Not only is there the issue of constrained choices regarding behaviours, but there is also the question of varied access to information and differential ability to interpret that information. In some ways this is also a question of control. Those with more access to information have more control over the determination of their health.

Circumstances, and individuals' control over them, influence health even more broadly than they influence health behaviours. Where individuals live, their access to income and wealth are all issues relating to circumstance and choice that also play a role in determining health.

Health is an end in itself; individuals derive a direct benefit from being healthy. Health, however, is also a means to a number of other ends. The ability to work and earn an income is influenced by health, as is the capacity to enjoy the fruits of such labour. Health status affects one's ability to achieve in and enjoy life. That people's health is constrained by their environments and their lack of control over their decisions is a serious concern. Indeed, HIV/AIDS is not a separate issue in this regard. The high risks of infection experienced by many South Africans are, at least in part, a result of the constrained choices they face and the difficult environments in which they live. HIV/AIDS has merely highlighted the existing class, wealth and racial divisions in our society, divides that were already there.

Fighting against HIV/AIDS, and improving health in general, will take more than information. While information on how to protect oneself or on what behaviours are healthy is important and may help shape healthy preferences, if these healthy preferences cannot be translated into healthy choices the benefit of the information is not realised. Fundamental social change is required in order to place people in situations where they can implement their preferences. Some people will still choose risky and unhealthy lifestyles, but at least the consequences for them will arise from their choices, and not from our lack of action.

Appendix: Regression results

Survey Ordered probit
Dependent variable: Self-assessed health (1–5)

Number of observations: 3 483
Stratification: Province (9)
Clustered: Enumerator area (469)
F(14, 447) = 28.96 p = 0.000

Explanatory variable	Coefficient	P value
Coloured*	0.054	0.602
Indian/Asian*	0.175	0.219
White*	0.605	0.000
Age[1]	–0.045	0.000
Age^2	0.0003	0.004
Education[2]	0.104	0.034
Exercise*	0.170	0.011
Employed*	0.457	0.000
Live in informal*	–0.144	0.123
Good mood on day*	0.302	0.005
Bad mood on day*	–0.351	0.000
Neg. outlook*	–0.134	0.002
Asset count[3]	0.068	0.001
Income access[4]	–9.4e–6	0.178

* Dummy variables 0 – false 1 – true
1 Age in completed years
2 Years of completed education
3 Count of household assets (0–8)
4 Income in rands (personal income or per capita household income, whichever is greater)

Regression estimated with Stata version 8

Notes

1 For the purposes of this chapter a difference is considered from the 5 per cent level; if another level is used this will be indicated in a note.

2 The confidence intervals are very large for the Indian/Asian group as the number of respondents was low.

3 While the responses from black Africans were significantly different from those of Indians/Asians at the 5 per cent level, they were significantly different from coloured people only at the 10 per cent level. Similarly, the coloured/Indian/Asian comparison was significantly different only at the 10 per cent level.

4 Living in an informal urban area, compared to living anywhere else, is negatively associated with self-reported health at the 5 per cent level if income is not controlled for. If income is introduced into the model the relationship is only significant at the 10 per cent level.

5 It may also be that there are different understandings of statements across groups.

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Societal values

11 *Partner violence*

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Introduction

It is well-known that South Africa has appallingly high levels of reported criminal violence against women (including rape). However, while some regional community prevalence studies have been conducted amongst women (for example Jewkes, Penn-Kekana, Levin, Ratsaka and Schreiber 1999), until the present study there have been no national data on the scale of violence against women in the domestic sphere.

Current gaps in our knowledge have compromised our ability to understand domestic violence, and are likely to weaken efforts to create viable intervention strategies. The South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) is the first national study of domestic violence in which the behaviour of both men and women is measured. In addition to reporting on the extent and severity of the problem, the study permits explorations of some of the predictors of violence amongst couples.

In the present study we concentrate on physical violence only, and for present purposes, violence is defined as:

> an act carried out with the intention or perceived intention of causing physical pain or injury to another person (Hotaling and Straus 1990: 336).

We define partner violence as:

> the use of violence between two persons who are either married (in terms of the civil law or custom), or unmarried and cohabiting, and consider themselves to be a couple.

The chapter commences with a review of relevant literature. A discussion of the study's methodology follows, with information pertaining to the sample, procedure and research instruments. In the results section, we report the prevalence of adult partner violence and then proceed to examine some predictors. The chapter concludes with an overview of the findings and recommendations.

What do we know about the scale of partner violence in South Africa?

Although rates of domestic violence in South Africa are believed to be very high, official police statistics under-represent the problem (Vetten and Bhana 2001), and

only a few studies have attempted to assess the prevalence of partner violence. None are representative of the adult population.

A summary of recent surveys is reported in Table 11.1. We have only included those that specifically focus on partner violence and that allow for aggregated data. Clinical and case studies are excluded (for example Artz 1999; Bollen, Artz, Vetten and Louw 1999; Mafokane and Du Preez 2000).

Table 11.1 *Summary of South African partner violence studies*

Reference	Population	Measure	Key findings
Jewkes, Penn-Kekana, Levin, Ratsaka & Schreiber (1999); Jewkes, Levin, & Penn-Kekana (2002).	Random sample household survey based on the South African Demographic & Health Survey (1998). 1 306 women aged 18–49 living in three predominantly rural provinces (EC, MP & LP).	Individual interviews using a questionnaire based on a Zimbabwean study; also informed by focus groups. Physical partner violence defined as: *being kicked, bitten, slapped, hit with a fist, having something thrown at her, being choked, strangled, intentionally burnt or assaulted or threatened with a gun or other dangerous weapon.*	*Life prevalence*: 26.8% (EC); 28.4% (MP); 19.1% (LP). *Past year*: 10.9% (EC); 11.9% (MP); 4.5% (LP). *Belief that women should obey husband:* 90.3% (EC); 85.3% (MP); 76.5% (LP). *Belief that husband has right to punish partner:* 50.8% (EC); 35.3% (MP); 37.5% (LP).
Abrahams, Jewkes & Laubsher (1999)	Random sample of (mainly low SES) **male** employees in three municipalities in Cape Town. N = 1 394	Individual interviews. Abusers defined as those who admitted perpetrating one or more of the following on a partner: *hitting, hitting with object, slapping, smacking, grabbing, pushing, rape, attempted rape.*	*Life prevalence:* 43.6% perpetrated physical abuse. *Past year:* 8.7% perpetrated physical abuse. *Past 10 years*: 41% perpetrated physical abuse. *Male assault on women acceptable?* Yes: 73% of those who report abusing; 25% of those who do not report abusing. *Abuser profile:* abusers are young, low education, witnessed mother abuse during childhood, exposed to violence at work and in their neighbourhoods.
Mbokota & Moodley (2003)	Random sample survey of low SES **women** attending ante-natal clinics. N = 570	Individual interviews. Abuse included *economic, emotional, physical, sexual, verbal, psychological abuse*. Operational definitions in paper.	*Life prevalence:* 38% *During pregnancy:* 35%
Singh (2003)	Sample of **male and female** Technikon employees. N = 230	Structured self-administered 21-item domestic violence questionnaire.	25% females victims 20% males perpetrators

Note: EC = Eastern Cape, MP = Mpumalanga, LP = Limpopo; SES = socio-economic status

It will be evident from Table 11.1 that a variety of populations has been used and that varying ways of capturing partner violence have been employed. Both factors create problems for cross-study comparisons. The present study attempts to address this limitation.

Factors associated with partner violence

In order to understand the causes of intimate partner violence, two key issues need to be addressed. Firstly, it must be recognised that the perpetrators of partner violence do not fit into a homogeneous category. Secondly, there are multiple pathways leading to partner violence. In what follows, we explore these pathways using an ecological framework that is based on a synthesis of the work of Tolan and Guerra (1998) and that of Becker and Kaplan (Becker 1994). According to this approach, the multiple influences on intimate partner violence are best understood as operating at three different levels: socio-cultural and economic, interpersonal, and individual. The review commences with a discussion of literature that addresses risks for intimate partner violence at the wider cultural/socio-economic level, and proceeds downward to the individual level.

Socio-cultural and economic context risk factors for partner violence

Peacock (2002) argues that domestic assaults, levels of violence in the wider society and tolerance for violence are interrelated. In this regard, Jewkes and her colleagues usefully remark that any model which attempts to understand partner violence 'needs to present it as a web of associated and mediating factors and processes which are centrally influenced by ideas about masculinity and the position of women in a society and ideas about the use of violence' (2002: 1615).

Acceptance of a patriarchal ideology in the domestic sphere has been hypothesised to be a significant risk factor behind intimate partner violence and child abuse in South Africa (for example Campbell 1995; Dunkle, Jewkes, Brown, Gray, McIntyre and Harlow 2004; Townsend and Dawes 2004). Minimally, it would appear that the risk of domestic violence is amplified when it is coupled to a belief that men can assault their partners (viewed as their property), when the partners are seen to be failing in their roles and duties (Vogelman and Eagle 1991; Van der Hoven 2001).

There is some empirical evidence. A study of South African farm-worker communities showed that men justified violence to their partners by referring to their status as head of the household (Paranzee and Smythe 2003). Perhaps most disturbing are women's views on partner violence. Jewkes et al. report that 75 per cent of the women in their three-province community prevalence study of partner violence believed that it was 'sometimes or always acceptable for an adult to hit another adult' (2002: 1609).

Poverty may undermine culturally accepted male roles so that further risk of partner violence occurs (Comas-Díaz 1995). The link between partner violence, unemployment and financial hardship is explained as follows: where the social expectation is that men should be providers, unemployment is experienced as a deep failure both at a personal and a social level. In essence, a dislodgement of masculinity as well as a loss of the power and control that is associated with male identity and status occur (Vogelman and Eagle 1991). Unemployed men who feel they cannot measure up to their expected roles are likely to feel frustration, guilt and rage, which may be displaced through violence towards vulnerable intimates which at the same time restores their sense of power (Olivier 2000). This is particularly likely where men have a history of violence in their own families of origin (Patterson, DeBaryshe and Ramsey 1989). Individual personality characteristics and the availability of social support also influence how individuals cope with the stress associated with poverty.

In summary, socio-cultural predictors of partner abuse include the co-occurrence of low male socio-economic status (SES), male approval of violence as a mode of conflict resolution, and support for male power over women. The interpersonal relationship factors we shall note next are associated with partner violence in their own right, and when these are combined with the ideological and structural factors we have just discussed, the risks of partner violence are likely to be amplified.

Interpersonal context risks for partner violence

Interpersonal relationships

Family members tend to have similar interests, engage in common activities, and are likely to spend large amounts of time with each other. All things being equal, this leads to greater opportunities to engage in violence with each other. The extent to which neighbours and kin can assist family members in coping with disputes is limited because of the private nature of the family. In addition, the relatively small size of the family unit may prevent families from adequately coping with stress, and thereby increase the likelihood that violence will be used as a coping mechanism. Gender and age gaps within the family, as well as the failure to achieve societal expectations and norms, may contribute to stress (Straus 1977).

In studies conducted in the United States of America (USA), low marital satisfaction and stress have been shown to correlate with partner violence (Straus 1990). The only published South African studies on marital satisfaction and violence have been conducted by Singh (2003). Similar numbers of women (39 per cent) and men (32 per cent) stated that men resort to domestic violence because they are unhappy in the relationship.

Cohabitation versus marriage

Dixon and Browne (2003) argue that the factors behind intimate partner violence differ according to interactions between the individuals in the context of a marital or cohabiting partnership. Individual attachment styles influence the way that individuals interact, which in turn determines the extent to which violence features in this context. It should be noted that cohabiting and marriage patterns are likely to vary cross-culturally and across social classes.

In the 1970s, Straus and his colleagues stated that in the USA, their data indicated that marriage appeared to provide a license for domestic violence (Straus 1977). More recent studies in the same country have shown that the rate of violence for couples who are not married, but live together (cohabiters), significantly exceeds that of those who are married (Brownridge and Halli 2000; Hines and Malley-Morrison 2001). Stets and Straus (1989) argue that cohabiting men are less invested in their relationships and therefore the cost of the loss of the relationship because of violence is lower than for married couples. However, as Brownridge and Halli (2000) show, the evidence for these arguments is inconclusive. Furthermore, it is unclear whether or not commitment is the issue. Cohabitation rather than marriage may be as committed a choice as marriage. It would be necessary to tease out this factor in order to investigate the role of cohabitation more thoroughly.

Child maltreatment

Child maltreatment is not in itself a risk factor for partner violence. However, the literature indicates that the two co-occur. Where there is violence between the adult couple, the children are at risk of physical abuse (Giles-Sims 1985; Bowker, Arbitell and McFerron 1988; O'Keefe 1995; McCloskey 1997; Browne and Hamilton 1998; Hester, Pearson and Harwin 2000; Tajima 2000; Guille 2003). A recent review reports 42 studies that found a co-occurrence of spousal and physical child abuse (Appel and Holden 1998). In representative community samples, the base rate of co-occurrence was approximately 6 per cent, but in clinical studies of either battered women or physically abused children the rate of co-occurrence was much higher, ranging from 20 per cent to 100 per cent.

According to Browne and Hamilton (1998), in cases where there is an overlap of child and spousal abuse, domestic violence increases in severity. The relationship is, however, highly complex and not well understood. No studies have been undertaken in South Africa.

Individual characteristics and partner violence

Psychological functioning and temperament

Early research attempted to profile the personality characteristics of abusive men (Guille 2003). Perpetrators were generally characterised by low assertiveness, low self-esteem, poor impulse control, cognitive distortions and poor social skills.[1]

Antisocial, narcissistic, dependent personality disorders and mood disturbances such as depression and anxiety were also common (Dixon and Browne 2003; Hotaling and Straus 1990). Despite such observations, attempts to discover personality groupings in the perpetrator population have been fraught with methodological problems. Often, clinical populations are studied, samples are small and commonly there are no control group comparisons.

While clinical studies have contributed to an understanding of domestic violence perpetrated by men who have psychological disorders, they are very limited in explaining wider patterns of partner violence in the general population. South African studies on this issue are very limited. Abused women studied by Dissel and Ngubeni (2003) attributed the causes of the violence to the individual temperamental characteristics of their partners. Similar results were reported by Singh (2003). There have been no studies of note that have attempted to provide psychological profiles of abusive men.

The role of gender: Do both men and women perpetrate partner violence?

The vast majority of studies have focused on male perpetrators or female victims (Dixon and Browne 2003). However, recent studies have shown that in the USA both men and women are involved in partner violence (Straus 1997), with Hines and Malley-Morrison (2001) reporting approximately equal rates of partner assaults by men and women partners. These are controversial findings. Critics have argued that scales often used to measure partner violence, Straus' Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS2) in particular (Straus, Hamby, Boney-McCoy and Sugarman 1996), do not allow for an assessment of the context of the violence, and of who initiated the conflict. These are appropriate criticisms. Women are much more likely to respond defensively to male violence than to instigate aggression. In addition, women consistently face greater physical and psychological injuries from partner violence (Dobash, Dobash, Daly and Wilson 1992).

Research on domestic violence in South Africa suggests that the perpetrators are overwhelmingly male; however, as Bollen et al. (1999) reveal, perpetrators may also be female. Fourteen of the perpetrators in their study were females under the age of 17. In Singh's (2003) study, 35 per cent of female and 40 per cent of male participants abused their intimate partners when provoked.

Some women in conflictual relationships evidently do use violence. Whether this is a defensive pattern or not is not always clear. However, in most instances the violence perpetrated by women on men is likely to be in response to male assault.

Educational level and age

The evidence suggests that couples with higher levels of education are less likely to engage in conflictual and negative interactions (Brownridge and Halli 2000; Tajima 2000; Hines and Malley-Morrison 2001; Guille 2003). Abrahams et al. (1999) have

identified low educational level as a risk factor for partner violence in South Africa. These findings may be a function of a third variable, namely poverty. Less educated spouses are likely to be poor and face greater levels of stress (which may spill over into the marital relationship). Clearly, low education, like all other individual factors, cannot be seen out of context.

Age disparities of more than six years (older man and younger woman) are a further risk factor (Kistner 2003). A South African study of abused women found that younger couples are most at risk of serious abuse (Bollen et al. 1999).

Alcohol and drug dependency

Several studies have identified alcohol and drug misuse as a factor in intimate partner violence (Kaufman and Straus 1987; Dixon and Browne 2003). Excessive alcohol intake lowers inhibitions, alters judgement and may act directly to stimulate aggression in some people. Alcohol and substance abuse is normally not a direct cause of violence, but an amplifier of already conflictual situations (Hotaling and Straus 1990; Padayachee 2003).

Taken alone, however, a narrow focus on intoxication ignores other contextual factors such as the symbolic meaning attached to alcohol use and the contexts within which it is imbibed (Guille 2003; Paranzee and Smythe 2003). At a cultural level, for example, excess drinking may be regarded as acceptable and indeed appropriate masculine behaviour, and as a means of asserting men's power and control in a relationship.

South African studies that have investigated this issue report that the majority of women questioned were assaulted by a drunken partner (Abrahams et al. 1999; Singh 2003).

Violence in the family of origin

Male perpetrators of domestic violence are likely to have experienced violence in their families of origin, including witnessing violence between their parents or experiencing regular harsh punishment or abuse as children (Patterson 1982; Patterson et al. 1989; Straus 1990; Osofsky 1995; Hester, Pearson and Harwin 2000; Olivier 2000; Dixon and Browne 2003; Guille 2003). The cycle of violence is particular to males. In essence, children who grow up in violent homes model their behaviour on significant others such as caregivers and older siblings. In addition, children who observe intimate partner violence in their families tend to be desensitised to the consequences of aggression and are likely to regard violence as legitimate, as a means of achieving one's goals or resolving disputes. The legitimacy of violent behaviour is further reinforced when children see a parent's violent action going unpunished.

Again, there are few South African studies. In their study of low-SES males in Cape Town, Abrahams et al. (1999) found that men who had witnessed the abuse of their mothers or sisters during their childhood were significantly more likely to beat

their partners than men for whom this had not occurred. Eighty-two percent of the abused women in Singh's (2003) study of female technikon employees believed that their male partners had experienced violence and abuse in their homes whilst growing up.

Summary of risk factors for partner violence

The incidence of intimate partner violence is associated with a complex interplay of risk factors at macro-, micro- and individual levels. Cultural/socio-economic-level predictors include the co-occurrence of low male SES, male approval of violence as a form of conflict resolution and support for male power over women. Some studies (particularly in the USA and Latin America) indicate that ethnicity may be a risk factor. However, it is often difficult to separate out the effects of SES from ethnicity, and in some instances at least, the association is more likely to be a reflection of the harmful effects of socio-economic deprivation on minority groups.

Relationships characterised by low levels of marital satisfaction become manifest in intimate partner violence in the presence of severe or distressing stressors and the absence of formal and informal social controls. Evidence as to whether cohabitation is a risk factor is inconclusive. However, low male economic status, patriarchal beliefs and the social isolation which often accompanies cohabiting relationships may constitute risk factors behind intimate partner violence.

Individual proclivities include mental disorders and mood disturbances, alcohol and drug dependency, low levels of educational attainment, and experiencing violence in the family of origin. The findings regarding gender are both inconclusive and controversial; although women may use violence against their partners, it is likely that this is a response to male violence.

Clearly, risk factors at various levels interact in a complex manner to increase or decrease the likelihood of partner violence in relationships. There is a dearth of information on how they operate in the South African context. However, where they exist, the findings, as highlighted earlier, tend to be supported by the international literature.

Methodology

Only brief points about the survey method and sample are made here. Technical aspects are included in an Appendix to this chapter (Appendix 3). The SASAS sample consisted of 2 497 participants, from which it was necessary to extract groups for further analysis. In order to examine partner violence, a sample defined as 'participants with partners' was created, based on all participants who identified themselves as either cohabiting or married (having children was not a criterion for inclusion). The number of participants with partners who completed the CTS2 Physical Assault Scale was 1 198 (married = 998 [83 per cent]; cohabiting = 200

[17 per cent]). The refusal rate was 4 per cent. This gives us confidence that the results are representative of the people with partners who participated in the SASAS. In addition, we believe that the sample is representative of South African couples who are married or cohabiting, because our partner violence sample constitutes 48 per cent of the SASAS nationally representative sample, which is very similar to the married and cohabiting proportion of the South African population, which was 45 per cent in the 1996 Census.

The questions used to tap partner violence are contained in Appendix 2 at the end of this chapter. The Conflict Tactics Scales (CTS) were developed by Straus (1979) and modified as the CTS2 (Straus et al. 1996). The purpose of the scales is to obtain the participants' statements and claims about the partner's approach to dealing with conflict. Due to certain constraints posed by a multi-module survey, we only used items from the physical violence CTS2 scale. This is acceptable procedure (Straus et al. 1996). As will be evident in Appendix 2 at the end of this chapter, the CTS2 has two questions per physical assault item. One refers to violence that the participant admits to having perpetrated against his or her partner, while the other is the participant's account of his or her partner's violent behaviour. Two measures of partner violence were selected. The first of these is lifetime prevalence and refers to violence in the current year and before. The second is past year prevalence, which refers to events in the current year.

Partner violence

In the results for partner violence reported below, prevalence rates are based on the weighted scores of participants (as is appropriate for prevalence calculations). Subsequent statistical analyses to test for significant relationships between variables employed unweighted scores.

On the basis of their responses to the CTS2, participants were labelled 'perpetrators' (those who report assaulting a partner) or 'victims' (those who report being assaulted). Many female 'perpetrators' are likely to have been responding to the violence of their partners. As partners were not interviewed in order to ascertain such details, we cannot know who initiated the violence.

Prevalence

Lifetime and past year prevalence of partner violence is reported in Table 11.2. The results show that 20 per cent of South Africans, both men and women, have experienced violent physical assault in their domestic relationship, as either perpetrators, victims or both, in the lifetime of their relationship with that partner. That is higher than the USA (prevalence of 16 per cent) using the same method (Straus and Gelles 1990).

Seventeen per cent of the married or cohabiting individuals who answered the CTS2, report having assaulted their partners, and 15 per cent report being assaulted. Women are much more likely to be victims than men. Nine per cent of the women who answered the CTS2 reported lifetime domestic assaults, and 7 per cent reported assaults by their current partner in the past year.

Table 11.2 *Past year and lifetime prevalence of partner violence (using weighted data)*

		Lifetime prevalence	Past year prevalence
Couples*		20%	13%
Perpetrators**	Total	17%	11%
	Male	9%	5%
	Female	8%	6%
Victims***	Total	15%	10%
	Male	6%	3%
	Female	9%	7%

* Scores for *couples* are derived from the CTS2 scores of each participant: what *he or she reported concerning his or her own or their partner's violent behaviour* (clearly a potentially larger group than either the perpetrators or victims).
** Scores for *perpetrators* are based on respondents' statements that *he or she assaulted his or her partner at least once.*
*** Scores for *victims* are based on respondents' statements that *he or she was assaulted by his or her partner at least once.*

While the methods and the questions are different, the results of the current study are perhaps most usefully compared with the only substantial community survey of partner violence to be conducted in South Africa, that of Jewkes et al. (2002), who studied the lifetime and past year prevalence of abuse of women aged 18–49 in three provinces (Eastern Cape, Limpopo and Mpumalanga). The study was conducted parallel to the 1998 South African Demographic and Health Survey. There was a 90 per cent response rate and the final sample contained 1 306 women.

Jewkes and her colleagues did not use the CTS2 (they used a similar approach though). They focused on women only, and asked participants whether they 'had been threatened with violence, had been slapped, punched or beaten (one question), had been kicked, bitten, choked or burnt, and whether they had been threatened with or injured by a weapon or object' (Jewkes et al. 2002: 1606). They therefore used a broader definition of violence than the CTS2 physical violence measure (i.e. they included threats), a broader definition of 'partner', and included reports of assaults by current and past partners in their measure of lifetime prevalence. Using this approach, they found a lifetime prevalence of assault for women of 24.6 per cent, which is higher than that found in the present study. Their past year prevalence finding of 9.5 per cent for assaults on women can be considered identical to that of the current study. The closeness of this finding is remarkable, even given some differences in method and population.

At least as far as past year prevalence is concerned, and remembering that past year memories are more accurate than longer-term recall, we can say with some confidence that at least 10 per cent of South African women in marriage or cohabiting relationships are abused each year.

Socio-economic status and population group

The distribution of lifetime and past year prevalence of partner violence across socio-economic and population groups for both men and women was examined, because these factors are known to be associated with domestic violence. The findings are presented in the figures that follow.

They must be examined cautiously because unweighted data were used, the number of respondents declines when we stratify the data in this way, and the participants classified into the socio-economic groups indicated are unlikely to be an accurate representation of the South Africans who earn in those income bands.[2] The same problem attends the population group data. If we look, for example, at population groups in relation to the income bands, we can see that black African participants make up 50 per cent of the low- and low-middle-income brackets (< R3 000 per month) while white South Africans make up 37 per cent of the high-middle- and high-income brackets. Nonetheless, a good idea of the distribution of domestic violence across SES (based on income) and population group is discernible from this data.

Lifetime partner violence and past year partner violence

Which socio-economic groups are most vulnerable? Using lifetime prevalence (the results are very similar for past year prevalence), Figure 11.1 shows, as expected, that more men in the lowest income bracket (< R1 000 per month) assault their partners than any other group. Also, more women in this group are likely to assault their partners and be assaulted. Double the number of low-income women relative to men are assaulted. If one combines the two lowest income bands (all persons earning < R3 000 per month), it is clear that the vast majority of male perpetrators and female victims fall within these income bands.

Which communities are most vulnerable to intimate partner violence? The lifetime prevalence of physical assaults in different South African communities (stratified by population group) is shown in Figure 11.2.

Figure 11.1 *Lifetime prevalence of partner violence by gender and socio-economic status*



Figure 11.2 *Lifetime prevalence of partner violence by gender and population group*



Proportionally higher numbers of black African and coloured women report assaults by partners, and more men in the same communities assault their partners than in others. It is essential to note that black African and coloured people in South Africa are far more likely than others to be in the lower income groups, and we know that being poor increases the risk of being in a violent relationship. Therefore it is not appropriate to attribute a causal role to some factor associated with population

group membership. It may be a factor, but what we are seeing in these figures is as likely to be a consequence of poverty (or another variable) as it is a function of ethnic grouping. We could not examine this question statistically as there were too few white participants in the lower income categories to permit an analysis of income bands by population group. We can say, though, that those perpetrators and victims in the lower income bands were overwhelmingly coloured and black African.

We did not investigate the influence of cultural factors associated with population group membership in this study. However, in our literature review, we did note the role of socio-cultural attitudes to women as risk factors for partner violence (for example entrenched patriarchal values). We cannot rule out the possibility of patriarchal attitudes operating in this study. Such attitudes can interact with the stresses of poverty, amplifying the risk of violence (Jewkes et al. 2002).

Chronicity/annual frequency

In keeping with the methodology as outlined in Straus et al. (1996), chronicity scores were calculated. Chronicity refers to how frequently the person was assaulted in the reference period (in our case the past year) for each of the types of assault in the CTS2 (see Appendix 3 at the end of this chapter for a list of all the items). However, sample sizes became too small and therefore only annual frequencies of so-called minor and severe assaults were examined (see Appendix 2 at the end of this chapter). Clearly, the distributions are highly skewed, as one would expect with the vast majority of respondents reporting few incidents. Figure 11.3 is based on the scores of respondents who claimed that their partners had assaulted them, or who stated that they had assaulted their partners, in the past year. Where this occurs, the average rate of assaults in the relationship in the past year is 24 occasions. However, care should be taken when interpreting these results as the standard deviations are quite large, ranging from 25 to 41.

Predictors of partner violence

The descriptive results presented thus far tell only part of the story. It is important to attempt to gain an understanding of the extent to which a particular factor influences the occurrence of intimate partner violence. As is evident in the literature review, the primary factors associated with partner violence are: poverty (low income), ethnicity, low educational level, cohabitation rather than marriage, and age. Younger adults in relationships are more at risk. In order to examine the contributions of these variables to partner violence in South Africa, we conducted two logistic regression analyses using the unweighted data (see Appendix 3 at the end of this chapter for technical details). These allow us to determine the relative contribution of each of the following factors: SES, educational level, marital status, age and gender.

Figure 11.3 *Annual frequency of all forms of assault*



The first regression focused on couples and examined the factors that contribute to lifetime prevalence of partner violence regardless of gender. The second regression, which dealt more narrowly with women as victims, examined the factors that contribute to their being assaulted by their partners over the lifetime of their relationship.

Ethnicity was excluded. The reason is that black South Africans are also most likely to be in the poorest group. If the black African population group rather than the income bands had been used in the analysis, there is no doubt that it would have been a predictor. However, it would be misleading to see this as an ethnic influence rather than a class influence because the two are confounded and this violates one of the conditions for the regression analysis to follow.

What was found? Of all the variables considered, the most powerful influences on partner violence for the two groups were as follows:

Couples: lesser-educated, younger participants and those who have previously been married but are cohabiting are most at risk of being involved in a relationship characterised by partner violence.

Women victims: younger, less-educated women are most at risk of being involved in a relationship where they would be victims of partner violence.

In the most comparable South African study to ours, Jewkes et al. (2002) found that women most likely to be abused (past year prevalence) were black African, of low SES,

and cohabiting rather than married. The results we have found for South Africa are the same as those found in countries such as the USA.

Conclusions and recommendations: What do our results suggest for intervention?

Partner violence summary of findings

Violence is a major public health problem, and as we noted in our discussion of the literature, violence has come to be regarded as acceptable in the South African context (Jewkes et al. 2002).

Recall that in Jewkes's research, 75 per cent of women in three provinces believed that it was sometimes acceptable for adults to hit each other. Of equal, if not more, concern are findings from a recent national cross-sectional survey of beliefs about sexual violence in male and female learners aged 10–19 years, conducted by Andersson et al. (2004). Amongst other beliefs, they found that 58 per cent of the sample believed that forcing sex on someone you know is not sexual violence. More than 50 per cent of girls held this view. With attitudes such as these among the young, it is not surprising at all that rates of rape and non-sexual intimate violence amongst adults in South Africa are so high.

There are a few prevalence studies of partner violence in South Africa, and most have involved women victims of violence rather than community studies. Recall that the Jewkes et al. (2002) three-province community study found a lifetime prevalence of partner physical abuse of women aged 18–48 years of 26.8 per cent in the Eastern Cape, 28.4 per cent in Mpumalanga and 19.1 per cent in Limpopo. In contrast to the present study, they did not use the CTS2, they did not include men, and the lower age cut-off was 18 rather than 16, as was the case in the present study.

The results of the SASAS study for past year prevalence are identical to those of Jewkes and her colleagues. Regardless of the period, the SASAS study found that women are twice as likely to be domestic assault victims as their male partners.

Bollen et al. (1999) found that violence against women in South Africa cuts across the division of the employed and the unemployed, with 67.5 per cent of the abusers in their study being employed. However, employment does not rule out poverty.

Poverty and intimate partner violence have been found to be strongly correlated in many countries. In the SASAS, the results are clear: the poor are at greater risk of partner violence than other groups, confirming the international evidence. And regardless of the reporting period, proportionally higher numbers of black African and coloured women report assaults by partners, and more men in these groups assault their partners than in others. Given the co-occurrence of race and class in South Africa, this suggests further that poverty is a significant risk factor for domestic violence in South Africa.

Indeed, our analyses show without doubt that a cluster of characteristics predicts partner violence: men and women of low education who are young, and are cohabiting and living in poverty, are most at risk of being involved in a relationship characterised by partner violence.

Change is a challenge: prevention-targeting

It is beyond the scope of this report to develop a strategy for changing prevailing attitudes and practices in South Africa. The attitudes that surround relationships between men and women are both powerfully entrenched in individuals, and supported by local norms and the behaviour of others in the community. Changing attitudes and behaviour under such conditions is very difficult and takes time.

Single strategy interventions that focus on changing individual attitudes and behaviour are unlikely to meet with success. This is because the predictors of partner violence contain a mix of influences and because both attitudes and behaviour are strongly shaped by prevailing norms and local practices. Efforts to change attitudes and behaviour must be undertaken with an understanding of local embedded attitudes and everyday practices.

In the case of partner violence, it is clear from the results that interventions aimed at changing the collective norms, attitudes and behaviour of men are essential. They are the main perpetrators, and women are the victims. Where women participate in violence, they are likely to be respondents rather than initiators. At the same time, Jewkes's work warns us that many women are complicit in their own violence, believing that men have the right to assault them under certain circumstances.

In addition, our data also suggest that support for families and couples who are living in poverty is essential to reduce the risk of partner violence.

Partner violence can also be addressed in the life-orientation sections of the National Curriculum. Education interventions focusing on parent–child and gender relations, starting in school and including positive, non-violent male role models, constitute possible important universal intervention strategies. The focus should be on men as much as on women.

However, education at school will not be enough. It is assisting communities to change their ordinary everyday behaviour toward their partners that is most likely to make a difference over time.

Most importantly, we have a body of law designed to prosecute those who perpetrate domestic violence. The legislation can have significant effects in protecting victims, but only if effectively implemented.[3]

Appendix 1: Limitations

All studies have limitations and a finite scope. The current study is no exception. It is important to be aware of the limitations of this research so that inaccurate conclusions are not drawn from the results.

The first is that the interview schedules were not translated into all South African languages, and in many cases, the interviewer translated the questions into the participant's home language. While rigorous training was given to all the field staff, it was not possible to control the translations used by the fieldworkers in the field. It is probable that speakers of the various languages would have interpreted the meaning of certain questions differently from one another and this would have affected the results in ways that are not possible to detect. While this sort of problem is to some extent inevitable in a multilingual country, it does impact on the results and they need to be considered in this light.

The second possible limitation concerns sampling. The participants in the SASAS are representative of the South African population as they were drawn from a representative household survey. However, it is important to note that the universe for sampling participants from households was individuals and not couples. However, the profile of married, single and cohabiting people who participated in this study is very similar to the profile in the 1996 Census. We can therefore be reasonably confident that the prevalence data are representative of the South African population.

The third limitation concerns the very subject of this enquiry – the challenges in measuring partner violence by survey.

Partner violence is never easy to assess. The CTS developed by Straus (1979) (and modified as the CTS2 in Straus et al. 1996), have been used in many studies of partner violence and child punishment. Notwithstanding its wide use, the instrument is not without its critics.

Firstly, the CTS2 relies on recollections to gather data. For example, estimates of chronicity (how often abuse occurs in a particular period) may be affected, as participants may not remember how many times they were assaulted or assaulted their partner, especially if conflict is taken for granted (Giles-Sims, Straus and Sugarman 1995; Dietz 2000; Benjet and Kazdin 2003).

Secondly, one also needs to question whether accounts are truthful. What is reported may not match actual behaviour, particularly if it is socially undesirable and sensitive (Locke and Prinz 2002). For example, a husband may not admit to hitting his wife or may not admit to being hit by his wife, and a parent is unlikely to disclose hitting an infant or a teenager. Moreover, men tend to under-report instances of their own aggression as compared to the accounts provided by their wives (Cano and Vivian 2001). In general, then, the results provided by the CTS2 must be regarded as minimum estimates of intimate partner abuse.

Finally, the use of the CTS2 does not help us to grasp fully the complex nature of partner violence and the context within which it occurs. Preferably, contextual variables need to be included (Straus and Mathur 1995; Locke and Prinz 2002). However, this is not a simple matter. It is often not practical to include the range of variables that would be needed to undertake a thorough appraisal of all the factors. Indeed, this was the case in the SASAS. Partner violence constituted one small module of an extensive interview schedule. We were not able to investigate a range of issues such as patriarchal orientations, individual psychological dispositions and other important variables. These are matters for future inquiry.

Appendix 2: Interview schedule items

Marital status and cohabitation

1. 'What is your current marital status?'

Married	1
Widower/widow	2
Divorced	3
Separated	4
Never married	5

2. 'Do you live together with a partner?'

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable (living together with spouse)	3

Partner violence (adapted from the CTS2)

Statement to interviewee:

'No matter how well a couple gets along there are times when they disagree, get annoyed with each other, fight because they are in a bad mood or tired. Couples have many different ways of trying to settle their differences.

Please circle how many times you did each of the following things in the past year, and how many times your partner did them to you in the past year.

If you or your partner did not do one of these things in the past year but it happened before that, circle "7". (If no partner, skip to Q.)'

	Physical assault scale item	Once	Twice	3–5 times	6–10 times	11–20 times	More than 20 times	Not in past year, but happened before	Never happened
1	I threw something at my partner that could hurt.*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2	My partner did this to me.*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
3	I twisted my partner's arm or hair.*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
4	My partner did this to me.*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
5	I pushed or shoved my partner.*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
6	My partner did this to me.*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
7	I used a knife or a gun on my partner.**	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

	Physical assault scale item	Once	Twice	3–5 times	6–10 times	11–20 times	More than 20 times	Not in past year, but happened before	Never happened
8	My partner did this to me.**	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	I punched or hit my partner with something that could hurt.**	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
10	My partner did this to me.**	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
11	I slammed my partner against the wall.**	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
12	My partner did this to me.**	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
13	I slapped my partner.*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
14	My partner did this to me.*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
15	I burned or scalded my partner on purpose.**	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
16	My partner did this to me.**	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
17	I kicked my partner.**	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
18	My partner did this to me.**	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

* Minor assault
** Severe assault

Appendix 3: Technical details

Construction of the sample for analysis of the partner violence items

Not all those who were interviewed for the SASAS had partners. It was therefore necessary to create a sub-sample from the original total described earlier in order to take the analysis further. The main groups created were as follows:

1. A sample of all participants who said they had partners was created.
2. From this group further sub-groups were created as follows:
   - those who said they were *not* married, but were cohabiting (the **cohabiting** group);
   - the **cohabiting** group was further stratified into those who had previously been married and those who had never been married;
   - we then assessed the proportion of the total sample who were ***people with partners*** and the proportion of this group who answered the CTS2. The proportion that did not answer these questions constituted ***refusals***. These data tell us how representative the people with partners group is;

- we then assessed the proportions of refusals who were ***married***, and what proportion were ***cohabiters***.

The above were stratified by age, sex, population group and SES when necessary for various analyses.

Definition of socio-economic status as ***income band***

There are a number of ways of determining SES. Normally, occupation, education and income are utilised for this purpose to form a composite variable. At the time this report was completed, the composite analysis was not available. Therefore, income band was used as a proxy for SES as follows:

Level 1: No income – R1 000 per month

Level 2: R1 001 per month – R3 000 per month

Level 3: R3 001 per month – R10 000 per month

Level 4: R10 001 per month – R30 000+ per month

The measurement of partner violence

Creation of a sample to measure partner violence

The CTS2 has a range of highly sensitive questions. Feedback from fieldworkers suggested that responses to the module on interpersonal violence ranged from complete candidness to blatant refusal to answer the questions.

In order to investigate partner violence, a sub-sample of married and cohabiting participants (regardless of whether or not they had children) was created.

This group contained 1 244 participants (533 men and 711 women); 1 024 (82.3 per cent) were *married* and 220 (17.7 per cent) were *cohabiting*.

1 198 (96 per cent) completed the CTS2 (refusal rate of 4 per cent). These 1 198 participants thus formed the sample for whom analysis on the CTS2 was to be conducted.

The proportion of CTS2 respondents who were married was 83.3 per cent (N = 998) whilst cohabiting participants accounted for 16.7 per cent (N = 200) of the group.

CTS2 items: The physical assault scale

It is important to note that for the current study, and due to constraints on the number of items that could be included in the survey module, the number of items in the physical assault scale was reduced from the original 12 devised by Straus and his colleagues, to 9 paired items. Apart from cost considerations, an omnibus multi-module survey such as the SASAS involves time-consuming interviews, and there is a real risk of participant fatigue, which leads to inaccurate responses and refusals – particularly where sensitive items are concerned. Straus et al. (1996) note that it is acceptable for the most crucial scales to be selected, as was the case here. However, he and his colleagues do not comment on the exclusion of scale items. The three excluded items are as follows:

- 'Grabbed my partner' (rated as minor physical assault): excluded because of the possibility of misinterpretation of the word 'grabbed' in the local context when the scale was administered in a range of languages. The other three minor items used were regarded as more appropriate and able to capture 'minor assaults'.
- 'Beat up my partner' (rated as severe physical assault).
- 'Choked my partner' (rated as severe physical assault).

It was difficult to exclude items. However, these two severe items were eventually excluded as other items that were included had similar reliability coefficients in the original psychometric investigation conducted by Straus et al. (1996).

The exclusion of these items means that there is a chance that some physically violent couples would be missed in the survey (and prevalence reduced) because they were not given an opportunity to endorse these items. However, this seems unlikely given the range of mild and severe items included and the manner in which the CTS2 is scored. Endorsement of any of the items on the scale constitutes a score for physical assault.

As far as possible, the analyses were stratified by male and female, by SES and by population group. Prior to commencing the analysis of the CTS2, responses to the '*Never happened*' column of the SASAS version of the CTS2 were recoded as zero.

Assessing lifetime and past year prevalence of partner violence.

- **Lifetime prevalence of committing partner assault** was measured as the proportion of ***all people with partners*** **who answered the CTS2** and who say they did this at any time in the past (even items score 1–7).
- **Lifetime prevalence of being assaulted by one's partner** was measured as the proportion of ***all people with partners*** **who answered the CTS2** who say they were assaulted by their partners at any time in the past (odd items score 1–7).
- **Lifetime prevalence for both partners** (a couple score) was assessed from responses to the CTS2 that covered the reported behaviour of either the respondent or the partner (both were taken into account in assessing prevalence).
- **Past year prevalence** was assessed as above for those who reported that the assault happened *in the past year* (scores 1–6 on each item).

Logistic regression analyses: Partner violence

Regression analysis: Lifetime prevalence respondent and partner

Method: Stepwise (Likelihood Ratio)
Application used: SPSS

Model 1

Individual characteristics (comparison group in brackets)	**B**	**S.E.**	**Wald**	**Odds ratio Exp(B)**	**Sig.**
Highest educational attainment (no schooling)			18.418		**
Grade 0–7	.212	.279	.574	1.236	
Grade 8–11	–.242	.277	.766	.785	
Grade 12 to Diploma with < Grade 12	–.669	.298	5.050	.512	*
Diploma with Grade 12 to Postgraduate	–.387	.341	1.288	.679	
Other	–1.090	1.077	1.024	.336	
Constant	–1.213	.243	24.953	.297	

Note: Age, marital status, gender and socio-economic status (income) were used as control variables in the model.
Number of cases in model: 1 165
* = significant at 5% level; ** = significant at 1% level

Model 2

Individual characteristics (comparison group in brackets)	B	S.E.	Wald	Odds ratio Exp(B)	Sig.
Highest educational attainment (no schooling)			16.071		**
Grade 0–7	.222	.280	.624	1.248	
Grade 8–11	–.226	.279	.659	.798	
Grade 12 to Diploma with < Grade 12	–.614	.301	4.160	.541	*
Diploma with Grade 12 to Postgraduate	–.314	.345	.829	.731	
Other	–1.139	1.094	1.084	.320	
Marital status (married)			8.276		*
Previously married	1.198	.588	4.153	3.313	*
Never married	.413	.193	4.576	1.511	*
Constant	–1.329	.251	28.156	.265	

Note: Age, gender and socio-economic status (income) were used as control variables in the model.
Number of cases in model: 1 165
* = significant at 5% level; ** = significant at 1% level

Model 3

Individual characteristics (comparison group in brackets)	B	S.E.	Wald	Odds ratio Exp(B)	Sig.
Age (16–24)			6.617		*
25–35	.609	.365	2.794	1.839	
> 35	.201	.360	.312	1.223	
Highest educational attainment (no schooling)			17.797		**
Grade 0–7	.203	.282	.521	1.226	
Grade 8–11	–.259	.284	.836	.772	
Grade 12 to Diploma with < Grade 12	–.702	.309	5.163	.496	*
Diploma with Grade 12 to Postgraduate	–.386	.348	1.231	.680	
Other	–1.178	1.095	1.158	.308	
Marital status (married)			7.353		*
Previously married	1.263	.592	4.559	3.537	*
Never married	.354	.204	3.016	1.425	
Constant	–1.580	.447	12.500	.206	

Note: Gender and socio-economic status (income) were used as control variables in the model.
Number of cases in model: 1 165
* = significant at 5% level; ** = significant at 1% level

Logistic regression analysis: Female victim lifetime prevalence

Method: Stepwise (Likelihood Ratio)
Application used: SPSS

Model 1

Individual characteristics (comparison group in brackets)	**B**	**S.E.**	**Wald**	**Odds ratio Exp(B)**	**Sig.**
Highest educational attainment (no schooling)			14.685		*
Grade 0–7	.045	.382	.014	1.046	
Grade 8–11	–.457	.377	1.468	.633	
Grade 12 to Diploma with < Grade 12	–.787	.402	3.829	.455	
Diploma with Grade 12 to Postgraduate	–1.504	.614	5.998	.222	*
Other	–5.047	9.085	.309	.006	
Constant	–1.153	.331	12.117	.316	

Note: Age, marital status and socio-economic status (income) were used as control variables in the model.
Number of cases in model: 663
* = significant at 5% level; ** = significant at 1% level

Model 2

Individual characteristics (comparison group in brackets)	**B**	**S.E.**	**Wald**	**Odds ratio Exp(B)**	**Sig.**
Age (16–24)			12.239		**
25–35	.435	.432	1.018	1.545	
> 35	–.385	.425	.822	.680	
Highest educational attainment (no schooling)			18.912		**
Grade 0–7	–.028	.386	.005	.972	
Grade 8–11	–.627	.388	2.612	.534	
Grade 12 to Diploma with < Grade 12	–1.059	.418	6.430	.347	*
Diploma with Grade 12 to Postgraduate	–1.697	.622	7.444	.183	**
Other	–5.088	9.012	.319	.006	
Constant	–.902	.534	2.853	.406	

Note: Gender and socio-economic status (income) were used as control variables in the model.
Number of cases in model: 663
* = significant at 5% level; ** = significant at 1% level

Notes

1 These are in addition to neuropsychological risk factors.

2 Refer to Appendix 3 of this chapter for information on the income bands.

3 We wish to express sincere gratitude to Save the Children Sweden which provided funds to support this study, the first of its kind to be conducted in South Africa.

A number of colleagues provided advice and support along the way, in particular, colleagues in the Child, Youth and Family Development Research Programme: Professors Leslie Swartz and Yaw Amoateng, Riashnee Pather (initial statistical analysis), and Gerard Boyce (for assistance with the logistic regression analysis). Dr Cathy Ward of the Department of Psychiatry and Mental Health at the University of Cape Town advised on the use of the CTS.

The authors wish to thank the SASAS fieldworkers and management team in the Surveys, Analyses, Modelling and Mapping Research Programme at the HSRC for providing us with the opportunity to be part of the SASAS initiative.

Finally, we thank Professor Murray Straus of the Family Research Laboratory at the University of New Hampshire for permission to use the CTS.

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12 *Rights or wrongs? An exploration of moral values*

Stephen Rule and Bongiwe Mncwango

Introduction

Successive National Party (NP) governments during the period from 1948 to 1994, like their predecessors, were opposed to the termination of pregnancies except under restricted circumstances. A similar moral conservatism dictated that heterosexual sexual relations between legally married couples were the only acceptable form of sexual relations, and the practice of homosexual activity was accordingly criminalised. In respect of criminal justice, individuals convicted of murder and other serious offences were subject to capital punishment.

These were some of the interpersonal spheres of activity affected by apartheid policies, founded as they were on theological principles (De Klerk 1975; Bosch 1986; Morphew 1986; Cassidy 1989). It can be argued that white Afrikaner personal morality as propagated by the Dutch Reformed Church, and Christian National Education, the state-sponsored mechanism for its implementation in civil society, worked in tandem to focus the attention of white South Africans on individual and restricted community moralities, thus freeing the NP government to implement its racially restrictive and socially inequitable and immoral apartheid policies in respect of issues such as housing, labour and education on 'other' components of the population.

Informed by the international human rights activism of the late twentieth century, the post-1994 African National Congress (ANC) government has made far-reaching legal interventions in the sphere of individual human rights. The 1996 Constitution enshrines everyone's right to make decisions concerning reproduction; to security in and control over one's body; to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion; and to equality, equal protection and equal benefit under the law. Discrimination by the state or by any person against any other person on the grounds of race, gender, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language or birth is outlawed (Republic of South Africa 1996). The Constitution has been widely hailed as one of the most progressive in the world. Koelble (2003: 169) even argues that it stands as a potential instrument for the 're-orientation of public culture away from the laagers of the past to a multi-cultural interaction that provides for both equality and difference'. In essence, the Constitution constitutes a comprehensive

response to the use of Judaeo-Christian moral principles to justify the apartheid system. Part of this response has consisted of the conferral on South Africans of the right to abortion and to same-sex relationships. For similar reasons, the death penalty is no longer a punitive measure at the disposal of the country's judiciary.

Nevertheless, high proportions of the population consider themselves as adherents of a religion (86 per cent in 2003, 96 per cent of whom identify with a Christian denomination) and claim to attend religious meetings on a regular basis (71 per cent, at least once a month). Additionally, the South African government realises the importance of the church as a social institution (Richardson 2004) and regularly calls upon it to assist with social policy implementation in respect of care for victims of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and registration of beneficiaries for social grants. Although many South Africans hold views that do not conform to biblical fundamentals (Rule 2002), they are generally conscientised to refrain from premarital sexual relations; to shun homosexual activity; not to consider abortion as an option; and, in many cases, to view the death penalty for murder as a just form of punishment in biblical terms. New policies thus contradict accepted norms of the past and understandably result in resistance, mostly of a passive nature.

Recent research in the United States of America (USA) (Cnaan, Gelles and Sinha 2004: 197) has suggested that religion 'serves as a tool for social cohesion and reduced anomie' and that black teenagers and female teenagers are significantly more religious than their white or male counterparts. A surprising and perhaps counter-intuitive finding of the same study was that the higher the levels of education and income of the parent/s, the more likely were their teenage children to participate in church services and other forms of religion-based social activity. It has been speculated that there will be an increase in church attendance, especially in respect of the non-mainline Christian denominations (Lodge 1999), amongst members of South Africa's black middle class. This would reflect the trend in the USA.

A further perspective is provided by studies of political intolerance, a phenomenon that has been demonstrated to correlate with religion and with strongly-held group identity. Conversely, tolerance correlates with high levels of education and self-esteem (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1982; Gibson and Gouws 2003; Gouws 2003). Groups with stronger religious or ethnic identities and low levels of education are more likely to be intolerant of other groups and of attempts to promote consensus and liberal democratic values. The implication is thus that if people are socialised into thinking that certain practices such as abortion, homosexuality or capital punishment are morally wrong, it is likely (although certainly not inevitable) that such beliefs might manifest themselves in demonstrations of intolerance towards persons or systems that approve or propagate such practices.

This chapter will test the hypothesis that government policy on 'moral' issues is more 'progressive' than the attitudes of the electorate. A series of five questions on attitudes towards these important moral issues was included in the South African

Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2003. The way in which a question about moral attitudes is asked, and the context in which it is placed, can influence the response (Rosenthal 2003); the questions in this case were phrased in the same way as those that have previously been used in European, British and other social attitudes surveys. The first four questions were:

- Do you think it is wrong or not wrong if a man and a woman have sexual relations before marriage?
- Do you think it is wrong or not wrong for two adults of the same sex to have sexual relations?
- Do you personally think it is wrong or not wrong for a woman to have an abortion if there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby?
- Do you personally think it is wrong or not wrong for a woman to have an abortion if the family has a low income and cannot afford any more children?

In the above four questions, respondents were presented with a show card and asked to select one of five possible responses, namely 'Not wrong at all', 'Wrong only sometimes', 'Almost always wrong', 'Always wrong', or 'Cannot choose'.

The fifth moral question asked was:

- People convicted of murder should be subject to the death penalty. Do you 'Strongly agree', 'Agree', 'Neither agree nor disagree', 'Disagree', 'Strongly disagree', or 'Do not know'?

Pressure groups, including political parties, exist within civil society and campaign vigorously either for or against the 'old' or the 'new' principles. Even the choice of labels for the different groups of principles is charged with value judgement. As expressed by Koelble (2003: 148), drawing on the work of Toynbee (2000), whereas for one analyst, the advent of 'Western values, vices and virtues' means 'liberation and emancipation', another might see them as a means of weakening 'authority, morality and accustomed ways of life'. Thus 'traditional', 'biblical', 'conservative' and 'authoritarian' are interchangeable on the side of the 'old' values, depending on one's viewpoint. Similarly, on the side of the 'new' values, terms such as 'progressive', 'permissive', 'liberal' and 'left-wing' are used by the various pressure groups, depending on whom they are describing. For the purposes of this study the terms 'traditional' and 'progressive' will be used, both of which are intended to convey a relatively positive connotation for the particular position held.[1]

Same-sex relationships

Most societies categorise sexually appropriate and inappropriate roles according to a person's age, gender, social status and other criteria (Clinard 1974). As a result of profound social changes fostered by the growth of secularisation, mass communication and education, simultaneous with a decline in religion, there has been a substantive departure from 'traditional' views (Clinard 1974). Authors such as Ellis (1968: 18) argue that all this has made it difficult for 'traditional-

conservative views' of any type, including sexual views, to hold. Nevertheless, there is ongoing debate concerning the morality and acceptance of homosexual behaviour. Conflicting perspectives have polarised around two sets of views known as essentialism and social constructionism. Essentialists regard sexuality as a fixed entity in every human being. They argue that human behaviour is natural and pre-determined by hormonal or genetic mechanisms, and thus not subject to change or in need of any correction. This approach advocates biological determinism. Essentialists thus argue that homosexuality cannot be seen as a defect (Germond and De Gruchy 1997). In contrast, the social constructionist approach sees sexuality as a social construct which is subjectively defined in terms of cultural and historical context. Each cultural group decides what is or is not sexual in nature (Germond and De Gruchy 1997). They thus argue that homosexuality is a socially-constructed phenomenon.

Within the worldwide Christian community, as well as among most other religious groups, the social constructionist approach is the prevailing orthodoxy. They interpret the Bible as a text that condemns homosexuality, and see it as tearing apart the moral fabric of society. The issue is addressed in both the Old (Leviticus 20:13) and New Testaments (Romans 1:24–32) of the Bible, where homosexual activity is portrayed as morally unacceptable. However, some Christian minorities are accepting of such behaviour. The ordination of a practising homosexual bishop in New Hampshire, USA, has fuelled debate within the Anglican Church. The majority of black African Anglicans have objected strongly to the ordination, a notable exception being Archbishop Njongonkulu Ndungane of southern Africa, who has propagated tolerance of the US decision, although he has urged clergy not to bless same-sex relationships because this would be 'the equivalent of solemnising a marriage' (Church of the Province of Southern Africa 2004).

In more than half of the countries of Africa, the practice of homosexuality is illegal for gay men and/or lesbian women (Table 12.1). Such sanction is most prevalent in the Muslim-dominated north and the Christian-dominated south. South Africa is one of the exceptions; others include Burkina Faso, Gabon, Comoros, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Eritrea, Réunion, and São Tomé and Príncipe. South Africa is thus comparable with many 'developed' countries in this regard, where intolerance of homosexual lifestyles is relatively rare, the media being utilised widely to promote acceptance thereof.

Shortly before the new South African Constitution was accepted by Parliament, a Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) national survey of public opinion produced in September 1995 found that more than half (54 per cent) of South African adults were strongly opposed and a further 10 per cent somewhat opposed to equal rights for heterosexual and homosexual marriages. In racial terms, the two levels of opposition ranged from 40 per cent amongst Indian/Asian South Africans to 63 per cent amongst coloured people, 64 per cent amongst black Africans and 72 per cent amongst white people. The survey

Table 12.1 *Legal status of homosexuality in Africa, 1998–1999*

Legal	Not mentioned/ unclear/unavailable	Illegal	
Burkina Faso	Côte d'Ivoire	Algeria	Mali
Central African Republic	Democratic Rep. Congo	Angola	Mauritania
Chad	Egypt	Benin	Mauritius
Comoros	Equatorial Guinea	Botswana*	Morocco
Congo Brazzaville	Gambia	Burundi	Mozambique*
Eritrea	Guinea-Bissau	Cameroon	Nigeria*
Gabon	Lesotho	Cape Verde	Senegal
Réunion	Madagascar	Djibouti	Sudan
São Tomé & Príncipe	Namibia	Ethiopia	Swaziland
South Africa	Niger	Ghana*	Tanzania*
	Rwanda	Guinea**	Togo
	Seychelles	Kenya*	Tunisia
	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Uganda*
	Somalia	Libya	Zambia*
		Malawi	Zimbabwe*

Pertaining to lesbians: * Not mentioned ** Not available
Source: www.afrol.com

also revealed that just over one-third (35 per cent) thought that homosexuality was 'un-African', 40 per cent that it was not and 25 per cent were unsure. Nevertheless, the Constitution (Clause 9) protects all its citizens from unfair discrimination either directly or indirectly on the basis of sexual orientation. South Africa was the first country in the world to forbid such discrimination constitutionally (Rahim 2000).

Abortion

The international liberalisation of abortion laws has similarly generated lively debate between traditional and progressive groups. Schur (1965: 11) defines abortion as the 'termination of pregnancy before the unborn child or foetus attains viability i.e. capacity for life outside the womb'. The conflict revolves around differing beliefs about the point at which a human life commences. For some, this occurs immediately on conception. For others, it happens much later during the pregnancy or even only at the point of birth. Although abortion has historically been viewed as wrong and even criminalised, it has always been used as a means of ending unwanted pregnancies.

Feminist and other groups have advanced the 'pro-choice' argument that a woman has a right to control, regulate or limit her own reproductive functions. The argument is supported by advances in medical technology, which have made it possible to determine the condition of the unborn child long before its birth, thus posing challenges to traditional restrictive abortion laws (Westmore 1977). In contrast, the 'pro-life' view is that 'to abort the foetus is to deprive it (or the

individual it will develop into) of that life' (Sumner 1981: 8). These irreconcilable standpoints, also labelled the pragmatic view and the sanctity-of-life view, reflect different interpretations of biblical injunctions against intentional killing (Proverbs 24:11; Exodus 20:13; Exodus 21:22–24).

Interpersonal relations, socio-economic status and marital status play a role in determining women's responses to pregnancy. In many societies, single/unmarried pregnant women are regarded as socially deviant. Schur (1965: 45) argues that they are perceived by such societies to have engaged in 'socially unsanctioned and discouraged acts', that is premarital sex, and are often forced to undergo abortions. Whereas women from the 'upper class' or from 'sophisticated circles' may see unplanned pregnancy as an inconvenience (Schur 1965), they are in a better position to afford clinical abortion facilities than their less wealthy counterparts. 'Backstreet' abortions are thus more common amongst the latter (Westmore 1977: 14). In South Africa, more than three-quarters (76 per cent) of individuals convicted for criminal abortion between 1963 and 1964 were black African females (Strauss 1973).

The South African government passed the Termination of Pregnancy Act (1 February 1996) with the intention of reducing the number of deaths related to unsafe (self-induced 'backstreet') abortions. In May 2004, the Constitutional Court upheld the right of women aged younger than 18 years to undergo abortions, without the permission of their parents (*Sunday Times* 30 May 2004).[2] However, there has been an ongoing antagonism between those who believe that abortion is 'wrong' (the 'pro-life' group) and those who say that it is neither wrong nor right, but that it is up to the pregnant woman to decide (the 'pro-choice' group). The 'pro-life' lobby has support amongst groups including Doctors for Life, Christian Lawyers, Christians for Truth and United Christian Action. The dominant political parties, the ANC, Democratic Alliance (DA), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the New National Party (NNP), have supported the liberalisation of abortion policies. A notable exception is the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP). An ACDP member of the National Assembly, Cheryllyn Dudley, has stated that many politicians are actually against abortion in principle, but supported the Termination of Pregnancy Act because 'they wanted to be politically correct' (*Sunday Times* 8 February 2004).[3]

Death penalty

Capital punishment has traditionally been used as a punishment for serious crimes. It serves at least three purposes, namely incapacitation, deterrence and retribution (Amnesty International 1989). However, since the late nineteenth century, 74 countries have abolished the death penalty for all crimes. For 'retentionists' (those wishing to retain the death penalty), it is seen as promoting fairness and justice, especially for the family of the victim. The 'score' is evened because the offender is believed to be deserving of the punishment. The death penalty can be traced

back to the Old Testament 'eye for eye, tooth for tooth' approach (Exodus 21:24), and is further corroborated in other biblical verses (Genesis 9:6; Exodus 21:12–16; Numbers 35:33; Romans 13:4). Other arguments in favour of retention are that it provides an assurance of safety to society and prevents uncontrolled vigilantism. According to the deterrent argument, the death penalty has a deterrent effect on other prospective offenders and it prevents further criminal activity (Sellin 1967). However, opponents of this argument state that there is no conclusive evidence that it is a greater deterrent than imprisonment.

The most defensible justification of capital punishment is incapacitation. It is true that the executed capital offender can never kill again. The main assumption of the incapacitation rationale is that capital offenders pose a threat to other inmates and correctional personnel while in prison, and to the general public if they are paroled (Bohm 1991). Incapacitation is thus the least controversial purpose because as much as a prison can incapacitate, the prisoner might be released or escape or commit serious crimes against prison personnel or even kill again afterwards.

Opponents of the death penalty ('abolitionists') see it as a human rights issue in terms of every individual's right to life, and argue that it is equivalent to murder. In this respect, biblical injunctions against murder (Exodus 20:13) and in favour of forgiveness (John 8:7) are used as moral justifications. Hinduism, Islam, Christianity and Judaism all hold that 'human life has an infinite worth', thus emphasising its sanctity (Devenish 1990: 11). From another angle, Seloane (1996) has argued that there is always the risk of the execution of the innocent, which in multilingual countries such as South Africa is increased by the use of interpreters who are subject to error. Abolitionists also tend to argue that the application of the death penalty compromises the judicial system of the country as it destroys the citizen's sense of justice (Devenish 1990: 11).

Much of the controversy around the death penalty focuses on the argument that it is usually imposed with class, racial and economic biases (Devenish 1990; Seloane 1996) and is still being used as a means of political repression in many countries. In the US, research has shown that the likelihood of the death sentence being imposed is higher when the offender is black and the victim is white (Radelet and Vandiver 1986). In South Africa between 1947 and 1966, 288 white people were convicted of raping black victims but none received the death penalty (Devenish 1990). Conversely, of the 844 black Africans convicted of raping white people, 122 were executed. The South African state executed in excess of 537 people convicted of murder, rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated housebreaking and treason between 1985 and mid-1988 (Amnesty International 1989). The last execution in South Africa took place in 1991. In 1995, the death penalty was abolished and formally declared unconstitutional.

Since the late nineteenth century, 74 countries have abolished the death penalty for all crimes. About half (34) of these are situated in Europe and 11 are in Africa.

According to Amnesty International (2002), as of 1 January 2002, a further 15 countries were abolitionists for 'ordinary crimes' only (i.e. excluding crimes that are subject to military law or committed under exceptional circumstances such as war). Another 22 countries are abolitionists in practice, not having executed criminals for 15 years or more. On the other hand, 84 countries retain the death penalty. Most of these are in Asia (37) or Africa (33), with some exceptions in the 'developed' world such as the US, where the law in some states retains capital punishment as a sentence for certain crimes.

In South Africa, several political parties, including the NNP, the ACDP and the Pro-Death Penalty Party campaigned in favour of capital punishment during the 2004 election period. The DA leadership argued for the return of the death penalty, while permitting individual Members of Parliament to speak on the issue in accordance with their own consciences.

The survey data

The findings of the survey reveal that the 'progressive' policies of the ANC government differ significantly from the 'traditional' attitudes towards moral issues that are held amongst the population of South Africa. More than half of the adult population expressed the opinion that heterosexual premarital sexual relations, same-sex sexual relations, abortion if there is a strong chance of a serious defect in the baby and abortion if the family has a low income and cannot afford more children, are all 'always wrong'. Additionally, almost half 'strongly agree' and a further one-quarter 'agree' with the death penalty as punishment for people convicted of murder.

Around one-fifth of respondents saw no wrong in premarital heterosexual relations or abortion in the event of a likely defect to the baby. One in ten said that it is 'not wrong at all' for a woman to have an abortion if the family concerned is not able to afford more children. Only one in 15 South Africans said same-sex sexual relations were 'not wrong at all', and one in six were in strong disagreement with regard to the death penalty being imposed on convicted murderers. Table 12.2 sets out these findings.

A preliminary examination of the survey results disaggregated by province (see Table 12.3) reveals that in respect of premarital sexual relations, Mpumalanga, Limpopo and the Eastern Cape were similarly opposed to the practice, with in excess of three-fifths of adults saying that it is 'always wrong'. Conversely, it was viewed as 'always wrong' by only 38 per cent in both Gauteng and the Western Cape and 39 per cent in the Northern Cape. The vast majority of Limpopo (90 per cent) and Eastern Cape (88 per cent) residents held the view that same-sex sexual relations were 'always wrong', whereas this was the case amongst only 64 per cent in the Free State and 68 per cent in the Western Cape.

Table 12.2 *Attitudes on moral issues*

	Premarital sexual relations between a man and a woman	Sexual relations between two adults of the same sex	Abortion if strong chance of serious defect to baby	Abortion if family has low income and can't afford more children		Death penalty for person convicted of murder
	%	%	%	%		%
Not wrong at all	22	7	21	10	Strongly disagree	7
Wrong only sometimes	13	3	11	5	Disagree	11
Cannot choose/Don't know	7	7	5	6	Neither agree nor disagree	7
Almost always wrong	8	6	7	9	Agree	25
Always wrong	51	78	56	70	Strongly agree	50
Total*	100	100	100	100		100
Base	*4 954*	*4 953*	*4 937*	*4 934*		*4 943*

* Percentage totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of the effects of rounding off.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Table 12.3 *By province, percentage of adult South Africans who agree with the following statements**

	EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NC	NW	WC	Total	*Base*
It is always wrong if a man and a woman have sexual relations before marriage.	63	58	38	55	62	64	39	45	38	51	*4 954*
It is always wrong for two adults of the same sex to have sexual relations.	88	64	72	81	90	84	73	75	68	78	*4 953*
Abortion is always wrong if there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby.	61	53	58	62	65	67	27	61	25	56	*4 937*
Abortion is always wrong if the family has a low income and cannot afford any more children.	76	66	69	75	83	79	50	69	48	70	*4 934*
They strongly agree or agree that people convicted of murder should be subject to the death penalty.	80	72	78	75	67	68	53	73	81	75	*4 943*

* See Acronyms (page xiv) for province abbreviations.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Opposition to abortion if there is a strong chance of a serious defect in the baby exceeded 60 per cent in Mpumalanga, Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal, North West and the Eastern Cape. In contrast, less than 30 per cent of adults in the Western and Northern Cape opposed birth defect-related abortion. Opposition to abortion if the family concerned has a low income and cannot afford more children amounted to more than three-quarters (75 per cent) of respondents in KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga and Limpopo. Again, residents of the Western and Northern Cape yielded the lowest levels of 'always wrong' responses at 48 per cent and 50 per cent respectively.

Pro-death penalty sentiment, that is the proportions that 'strongly agree' or 'agree' with such a sentence for convicted murderers, was strongest in the Western Cape (81 per cent), Eastern Cape (80 per cent) and Gauteng (78 per cent). However, in contrast with trends in respect of the sex and abortion issues, agreement was significantly lowest in the Northern Cape (53 per cent), although even in that province it constituted a majority.

A preliminary look at the data in respect of premarital heterosexual sexual relations from a racial perspective (see Table 12.4) shows that disapproval was strongest amongst Indians/Asians (60 per cent) and lowest amongst white people (42 per cent), with about half of black African (52 per cent) and coloured respondents (50 per cent) saying that such premarital relations are 'always wrong'. Disapproval of same-sex sexual relations was at the 64 per cent level amongst coloured, 70 per cent amongst white, 76 per cent amongst Indian/Asian and 81 per cent amongst black African respondents.

Almost two-thirds (64 per cent) of black African respondents opposed abortion in the event of a strong chance that the baby might be born with a serious defect, a much higher proportion than amongst the other races (coloured 41 per cent; Indian/Asian 37 per cent; white 23 per cent). Whereas almost three-quarters (74 per cent) of black African respondents thought that low income-related abortion is 'always wrong', this was the case with 59 per cent of Indian/Asian and 57 per cent of white and coloured respondents.

The three-quarters (75 per cent) of the national adult population that strongly agreed or agreed with the death penalty for convicted murderers masks much higher proportions of such sentiment amongst two of the smaller race groups. Agreement or strong agreement with capital punishment ranged from 72 per cent amongst black African and 76 per cent amongst coloured respondents, to 86 per cent amongst Indian/Asian and 92 per cent amongst white respondents.

Table 12.4 *By race, percentage of adult South Africans who agree with the following statements*

	Black African	White	Coloured	Indian/ Asian	Total	*Base*
It is always wrong if a man and a woman have sexual relations before marriage.	52	42	50	60	51	*4 938*
It is always wrong for two adults of the same sex to have sexual relations.	81	70	64	76	78	*4 937*
Abortion is always wrong if there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby.	64	23	41	37	56	*4 921*
Abortion is always wrong if the family has a low income and cannot afford any more children.	74	57	57	59	70	*4 918*
They strongly agree or agree that people convicted of murder should be subject to the death penalty.	72	92	76	86	75	*4 928*

Source: SASAS (2003)

A Morals Index

Using the five questions discussed, a 'Morals Index' was computed using a scale with traditional values at one extreme and progressive values at the other. Scores were computed systematically for each respondent in this study according to the following method.

Respondents indicating that it was 'always wrong' in answer to either of the two abortion questions or either of the two sex questions or that they 'strongly agreed' with the death penalty, were allocated a maximum score of 5 out of 5 in each instance. Similarly, if they felt it was 'almost always wrong' for the abortion questions or sex questions or if they 'agreed' with the death penalty, the allocated score was 4. In the case of the responses 'cannot choose', 'don't know' or 'neither agree nor disagree', the score was 3. Those who answered 'wrong only sometimes' to the abortion or sex questions and those who 'disagreed' with the death penalty scored 2. Finally, those who gave the 'not wrong at all' and 'strongly disagree' responses respectively, scored 1 out of 5. This process yielded a score for each respondent in respect of each of the five morals questions. The five scores for each respondent were then added and divided by five, to compute a Morals Index for each respondent, ranging from 1 at the most 'progressive' end of the scale, to 5 at the most 'traditional' end.

Based on computation of the index for each respondent, a comparison of mean Morals Index (M-index) scores by a selection of variables elucidates the diversities of opinion in the country. The section that follows comprises a commentary on the variations by province, environmental milieu (or 'geotype'), age, political partisanship, income, educational level, race, religiosity, sex and marital status.

Table 12.5 *Morals Index by province (mean scores)*

Province	M-index	Sexbfmr	Samesex	Abordefc	Aborinc	Deathp	*Base*
Western Cape	3.61	3.25	4.11	2.63	3.64	4.41	*536*
Eastern Cape	4.23	3.88	4.75	3.95	4.48	4.08	*654*
Northern Cape	3.56	3.26	4.47	2.81	3.75	3.51	*94*
Free State	3.99	3.89	4.15	3.69	4.26	3.94	*299*
KwaZulu-Natal	4.12	3.73	4.54	3.78	4.36	4.11	*977*
North West	3.93	3.28	4.35	3.93	4.13	3.99	*405*
Gauteng	3.85	3.04	4.34	3.69	4.15	4.00	*1 113*
Mpumalanga	4.15	3.96	4.68	3.93	4.50	3.66	*329*
Limpopo	4.11	3.77	4.72	3.86	4.54	3.66	*513*
P value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Total	3.98	3.53	4.46	3.66	4.24	4.01	*4 920*

Note: M-index = Morals Index; Sexbfmr = premarital sex; Samesex = same-sex sexual relationships; Abordefc = abortion if child likely to have physical defect; Aborinc = abortion if family cannot afford another child; Deathp = death penalty.
Source: SASAS (2003)

The mean national M-index for the 2003 survey was a relatively traditional 3.98, with the strongest contributor being highly traditional views in regard to same-sex sexual relationships (national mean 4.46) and the weakest being in regard to sex before marriage, at a still relatively high national mean of 3.53. Intermediate indices were those in respect of defect-related abortion (3.66), the death penalty (4.01) and income-related abortion (4.24).

Provincially, the range was from a minimum of 3.56 for the population of the Northern Cape to a maximum of 4.23 for those living in the Eastern Cape. At 3.61, the Western Cape was second-lowest after the Northern Cape, the population composition by race being similar in the two provinces. Similarly, Limpopo and Mpumalanga had very similar M-index means to that of the Eastern Cape, large proportions of the populations of all three provinces living in rural informal areas that previously constituted the apartheid homelands, and poorly endowed in terms of most developmental indicators. The provincial table includes indices for each of the five components of the M-index, to indicate its composition (this level of detail is omitted in subsequent tables). An apparent anomaly emerges in that, whereas the Western Cape is relatively progressive with regard to the sex and abortion questions, it is the most traditional province with regard to the death penalty.

Figure 12.1 *Morals Index by province (mean score)*



Note: Index ranges from 1–5, the extremes representing the most 'progressive' and the most 'traditional' viewpoints respectively.
Source: SASAS (2003)

Table 12.6 *Morals Index by environmental milieu or geotype (mean score)*

	Urban formal	Urban informal	Rural informal	Rural formal	P value	Total
M-index	3.82	4.10	4.27	4.10	0.00	3.98
Base	*2 848*	*394*	*1 415*	*262*		*4 919*

Source: SASAS (2003)

Examined from an environmental milieu or 'geotype' perspective, 'traditionalism' is highest in rural informal areas (4.27), reflecting the aforementioned provincial variations. M-indices emerged as intermediate in urban informal and rural formal environments (both 4.10) and lowest in urban formal areas (3.82). Acceptance of the government's position on these issues appears to have been most likely in the better-off, more developed formal urban townships and suburbs of the country, with the exception of the death penalty, where these areas emerged as the most 'traditional'.

Table 12.7 *Morals Index by age (mean scores)*

	16–24 years	25–34 years	35–49 years	50+ years	P value	Total
M-index	3.91	3.86	4.06	4.13	0.00	3.98
Base N	*1 384*	*1 207*	*1 305*	*1 018*		*4 914*

Source: SASAS (2003)

The M-index commenced at 3.91 amongst the youngest adults aged 16 to 24, decreased somewhat to 3.86 amongst the 25–34-year-olds and then increased in linear fashion to 4.06 for the 35–49-year group and 4.13 for those aged 50 years or more. This points to the prevalence of a higher level of traditional values amongst older adults than amongst the younger generation. The lowest mean index, amongst the 25–34 group, reflects the lower level of acceptance of traditional values handed down by previous generations and, arguably, greatest exposure and responsiveness to the more progressive approach to moral issues.

Table 12.8 *Morals Index by intended vote in 2004 election (mean scores)*

	ANC	DA	IFP	UDM	NNP	ID	ACDP	Will not vote	P value	Total
M-index	4.05	3.85	4.26	3.85	4.01	3.90	4.25	3.90	0.00	3.98
Base	*2 251*	*239*	*155*	*52*	*131*	*8*	*13*	*431*		*4 883*

Source: SASAS (2003)

Variations in M-indices between survey respondents who indicated that they were planning to vote for any of the seven major political parties were not huge, but were nevertheless significant ($p < 0.05$). Overall, the least traditionalist were supporters of the DA and the United Democratic Movement (UDM), both at 3.85. They were followed closely by supporters of the Independent Democrats (ID) (3.90), the NNP (4.01) and the ruling ANC (4.05). Most traditionalists were supporters of the IFP, with a mean M-index of 4.26.

The overall high level of traditionalism in respect of moral values amongst South Africans jars somewhat with the policies of the ANC. Under this party's government, abortions and same-sex sexual relationships have been legalised and the death penalty has been abolished. The ANC is 'committed to reducing levels of unexplained and unwanted pregnancy', is opposed to the death penalty, and supported the inclusion of 'sexual orientation in the equality clause of the Constitution' (Christian Action Network 2004). Nevertheless, it appears obvious that the moral views of the electorate have minimal impact on their voting behaviour. An almost 70 per cent verdict in favour of the ANC in the April 2004 national election implies that factors other than moral issues are determining votes. Material concerns such as jobs and

enhanced quality of life have previously been shown to play key roles in determining decisions about the parties for which South Africans vote (Rule 2000, 2004).

Table 12.9 *Morals Index by personal total monthly income (mean scores)*

	No income	R1–R500	R501–R1 500	R1 501–R5 000	R5 001+	Refuse/ uncertain/ don't know	P value	Total
M-index	4.06	4.06	4.04	3.87	3.39	3.90	0.00	3.99
Base	*1 883*	*636*	*968*	*398*	*204*	*687*		*4 776*

Source: SASAS (2003)

The level of personal monthly income emerged as a predictor of M-indices, with the majority income categories (those earning R1 500 or less) at around the 4.00 M-index level and the higher earners at significantly lower means of 3.87 (R1 501 to R5 000 per month) and 3.39 (R5 001 or more). The reverse trend (not shown in the table) was evident in relation to the death penalty, with higher-income earners holding more 'traditional' views than those with lower or no income.

Table 12.10 *Morals Index by highest educational qualification completed (mean scores)*

	No schooling	Primary	Gr 8–11 or equiv.	Matric or equiv.	Tertiary	P value	Total
M-index	4.31	4.14	4.08	3.84	3.44	0.00	3.99
Base	*385*	*944*	*1 895*	*1 139*	*464*		*4 861*

Source: SASAS (2003)

Highest educational qualification completed is similarly significant in relation to the M-index. Those with no formal schooling scored a mean of 4.31, with primary school-level respondents at 4.14. Those who had achieved some secondary education averaged an M-index of 4.08 and those who had passed matric, an M-index of 3.84. The lowest mean, and thus the least 'traditionalist', were those with a tertiary educational qualification (3.44). There appeared to be a direct linear relationship between highest educational qualification completed and M-index, confirmed by a strong statistical correlation (Pearson's) between the two variables ($r = -2.49$, $p = 0.000$, significance at 99 per cent level). The exception again was the death penalty, for which case those with the highest levels of formal education held more traditional views than those who had completed lesser educational qualifications.

Racial differences in M-index emerged, with black South Africans the most traditionalist (4.05), followed by Indian/Asian at 3.90, coloured at 3.80 and white South Africans at 3.68. Intuitively this makes sense, given the huge differences in

income and educational levels that still exist between black African and white groups, with intermediate levels amongst the coloured and Indian/Asian groups (Gini co-efficient = 0.635 in 2001 [United Nations Development Programme 2003]). These discrepancies were exacerbated by, and are thus attributable to, systematic social and economic discrimination against the disenfranchised groups prior to the full democratisation of the polity in 1994. White South Africans, having reaped the benefits of superior educational and career opportunities, largely at the expense of the other groups, especially black Africans, emerged as the most progressive in relation to moral attitudes. Conversely, the majority black African population held most strongly to traditional values, relatively untainted by the more progressive human-rights based agenda. White respondents, however, had the most traditional M-index value of all races in respect of the death penalty.

Table 12.11 *Morals Index by race of respondent (mean scores)*

	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	P value	Total
M-index	4.05	3.80	3.90	3.68	0.00	3.98
Base	*3 764*	*436*	*136*	*568*		*4 904*

Source: SASAS (2003)

It is also pertinent to examine variations in M-index by income groupings within each of the race groups. A general trend of lower indices amongst those with higher personal incomes emerges, this being most marked amongst the black African and Indian/Asian groups. Amongst the white and coloured groups, these gradations are less steep. The most progressive M-index value (3.21) is that amongst black Africans in the R5 001+ income category.

Table 12.12 *Morals Index by race and personal monthly income of respondent (mean scores)*

	Black African	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Total
No income	4.10	3.79	3.98	3.69	4.06
R1–R500	4.13	3.18	4.73	3.44	4.06
R501–R1 500	4.06	4.04	4.01	4.04	4.04
R1 501–R5 000	3.97	3.87	3.72	3.62	3.87
R5 001+	3.21	3.76	3.36	3.44	3.39
Refuse/ uncertain/don't know	4.00	3.84	3.87	3.79	3.90
Total	4.06	3.79	3.90	3.69	3.99
Base	*3 756*	*427*	*132*	*546*	*4 776*

Source: SASAS (2003)

Respondents who claimed to attend religious meetings or services (excluding weddings, funerals or baptisms) once or more per week emerged with the highest M-index of 4.13. This decreased in linear fashion for those who attended once in two weeks (3.97), once a month (3.94), or at least twice a year (3.48), but rose again for those who claimed to attend at least once per year. Amongst the less specific 'less often' (than once a year), 'never or practically never' and 'varies too much to say', M-indices rose slightly to 3.82, 3.86 and 3.93 respectively. The M-index was lowest (3.23) amongst the 1 per cent who refused to respond to the survey question about frequency of religious meeting attendance.

Table 12.13 *Morals Index by attendance at religious meetings (excluding special occasions) (mean scores)*

Frequency	M-index	*Base*
Once a week or more	4.13	*2 104*
Once in two weeks	3.97	*572*
Once a month	3.94	*758*
At least twice a year	3.48	*196*
At least once a year	3.83	*113*
Less often	3.82	*285*
Never or practically never	3.86	*274*
Varies too much to say	3.93	*105*
Refused/unwilling to answer	3.23	*50*
Not applicable	3.88	*405*
P value	0.00	
Total	3.98	*4 862*

Source: SASAS (2003)

Female respondents emerged as marginally more 'traditionalist' (4.05) than their male counterparts (3.90). Male–female differences on the issue of abortion in the event of a defect to the child were not significant at the 95 per cent level ($p = 0.473$) and differences concerning the death penalty, income-related abortion and same-sex sexual relations questions were much smaller than those concerning the premarital sex question, in which case females emerged as significantly more traditionalist than males. The slightly greater tendency towards 'traditional' values amongst females accords with research in the US, where, for example, Cnaan et al. (2004) found that religion was a more important factor in the lives of girl than boy teenagers, and Davis (1987–88) found that church involvement was a greater priority for adult females than for adult males.

Table 12.14 *Morals Index by sex of respondent*

	Male	Female	P value	Total
M-index	3.90	4.05	0.00	3.98
Base	*2 294*	*2 626*		*4 920*

Source: SASAS (2003)

Differences between persons with different marital status, although significant, were also marginal, with the most 'traditionalist' being the widow/widower category (4.21), followed by married respondents (4.07), divorcees (3.96) and separated persons (3.95). Respondents who had never been married were least traditionalist (3.90). The trend appears to be that persons most exposed to formal marriage and the associated rights, responsibilities and sanctions, were most inclined to subscribe to traditional moral values. Conversely, those with the least personal experience of marriage (that is, those never married) and those whose marriages had resulted in separation or divorce were least inclined to hold 'traditional' views.

Table 12.15 *Morals Index by current marital status*

	Married	Widowed	Divorced	Separated	Never married	P value	Total
M-index	4.07	4.21	3.96	3.95	3.90	0.00	3.98
Base	*1 768*	*345*	*113*	*87*	*2 567*		*4 880*

Source: SASAS (2003)

International comparisons

In 1998 the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) module[4] on religion was surveyed in 33 countries. The module included the two abortion questions, the same-sex relationships question and the premarital sex question. It was found that attitudes varied significantly between countries, with 'traditional' and 'progressive' extremes evident. In relation to abortion, persons living in parts of northern Europe were most likely to say that abortion was 'not wrong at all' if there was a strong chance of a serious defect in the baby. The proportions of the population in this pro-choice category were highest in Hungary (85.8 per cent), France (80.6 per cent), Russia (80.3 per cent) and Sweden (78.0 per cent). Conversely, small proportions felt that abortion was 'always wrong' under these circumstances (Hungary: 4.6 per cent; France: 6.2 per cent; Russia: 5.6 per cent; Sweden: 12.2 per cent). At the other extreme, 'traditional' attitudes were in the majority in developing countries, with 70.7 per cent of those in the Philippines and 58.5 per cent in Chile expressing the view that abortion was always wrong if there was a strong chance of a serious defect in the baby. Both of the latter have populations that are mainly Catholic

and thus, presumably, more sympathetic to the pro-life than the pro-choice philosophy. South Africa's SASAS 2003 verdict of 56.1 per cent 'always wrong' was much closer to that of the developing country sample than that of most European countries.

A similar but less unanimous trend emerged in response to abortion if the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children. Approximately half or more of the adult populations of Russia (72.0 per cent), Bulgaria (63.8 per cent), France (53.2 per cent), Hungary (50.2 per cent) and Sweden (49.1 per cent) were of the view that this was 'not wrong at all'. Opponents of abortion for these economic reasons numbered 76.5 per cent in Chile and 70.9 per cent in the Philippines, proportions very close to the South African proportion of 70.3 per cent.

In comparing attitudes between the populations of the former East and West Germany, Banaszak (1998: 546) found that whereas 23.1 per cent of West Germans thought that abortion was 'always wrong' if the couple could not afford more children, this was the case with only 16.6 per cent of East Germans. A similar but less pronounced cleavage emerged in relation to abortion in the case of a potential birth defect (West Germans: 11.7 per cent; East Germans: 9.0 per cent). The author suggested that higher levels of secularisation and women's employment in East than in West Germany might account for the differences in attitude.

Table 12.16 *Comparison of attitudes in selected countries with attitudes in South Africa*

	Chile	Philip-pines	South Africa	Poland	Portugal	Switzer-land	Nether-lands
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Abortion is always wrong if there is a strong chance of a serious defect in the baby.	59	71	56	31	14	14	8
Abortion is always wrong if the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children.	77	71	70	44	45	26	36
It is always wrong if a man and a woman have sexual relations before marriage.	32	65	51	18	23	6	7
Sexual relations between two adults of the same sex are always wrong.	88	85	78	74	74	26	16

Sources: ISSP (1998) and SASAS (2003)

In the US, where abortion on demand was first allowed as a result of the ruling in the Roe vs. Wade case, attitudes have not varied significantly during the last decade (Shaw 2003). Between 1987 and 1998, successive surveys asked whether respondents thought 'abortion is the same thing as murdering a child'. Affirmative responses

ranged from 40 to 50 per cent, with no discernible upward or downward trend. Conversely, between 35 and 47 per cent agreed that 'abortion is not murder because the foetus really isn't a child'. Three successive Gallup surveys have found majority assent to legal abortion when there is evidence that the baby may be physically impaired (1996: 53 per cent; 2000: 53 per cent; 2003: 56 per cent). The National Opinion Research Center and General Social Surveys found between 1987 and 2000 that agreement to legal abortion if the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children ranged from a low of 40 per cent in 1987 and 2000 to a peak of 49 per cent in 1994 (Shaw 2003).

Koch (2001) undertook research on the extent to which the US electorate considered candidates' views about abortion when deciding how to vote. Whereas the Republican Party espouses a pro-life policy, the Democrats take the pro-choice position in relation to abortion. However, Koch found that:

> Democratic candidates are likely to adopt anti-abortion positions in districts characterised by lower than average levels of political awareness and education, reducing the likelihood that their party-contradictory position is accurately perceived. In contrast, Republican candidates adopt a pro-choice position in districts characterised by high education and political awareness, increasing the likelihood that their position is accurately perceived (Koch 2001: 1).

Attitudes towards sexual relations between two adults of the same sex also vary considerably between countries. The 1998 ISSP study found that traditional views were again strongest in developing countries, where 87.7 per cent in Chile and 84.6 per cent in the Philippines felt that such relations were always wrong. They were followed on the scale of participating countries by Poland (74.4 per cent), Portugal (73.8 per cent), Bulgaria (70.9 per cent), Northern Ireland (67.2 per cent), Hungary (66.3 per cent) and the US (62.4 per cent). At the opposite extreme, this view was held by only 15.8 per cent in the Netherlands, 26.1 per cent in Switzerland, 29.2 per cent in the former West Germany and 29.5 per cent in Denmark. At the 78.0 per cent 'always wrong' level, South Africans in 2003 were situated near the most 'traditional' end of the attitudinal scale.

With regard to premarital sexual relations, the ISSP study showed once again that the Philippines and Chile held the strongest traditional views. In the Philippines, almost two-thirds (64.9 per cent) felt that it is always wrong if a man and a woman have sexual relations before marriage. This was the view of just under one-third (31.8 per cent) in Chile and Israel, 29.7 per cent in the US, 29.6 per cent in Ireland and 28.2 per cent in Bulgaria. In contrast, such relations were considered not wrong at all by 88.1 per cent in Sweden, 82.7 per cent in Denmark, and 78.8 per cent in both Austria and the former East Germany. At 21.7 per cent 'not wrong at all' and 50.6 per cent 'always wrong', South Africa thus emerged as relatively 'traditional'.

Reinstatement of the death penalty is favoured by 50 per cent of adults in Italy, 52 per cent in the Netherlands, 60 per cent in Britain, and over 60 per cent in Canada. South Africa, therefore, with 49.9 per cent strongly agreeing and 25.5 per cent agreeing with use of the death penalty for convicted murderers, emerged well above these developed-country examples (with a level of 75.4 per cent) in terms of reinstatement. Bohm argues that people in top occupational or socio-economic categories are likely to support the death penalty and less likely to oppose it than people in lower categories (Bohm 1991).

Conclusion

Public opinion is largely 'traditionalist' in South Africa, in the sense that most adults are of the opinion that premarital sex, same-sex sexual relations and abortion are wrong and that the death penalty is an appropriate form of punishment for a convicted murderer. The country's new Constitution and legal regime are thus at odds with the core beliefs of a large proportion of its electorate.

This chapter has shown that in terms of a 1–5 scale measuring degree of 'progressivism' (1) versus 'traditionalism' (5), the mean national score is 3.98, indicative of an overall high level of traditionalism in relation to moral values amongst South Africans. One-sixth of adults hold the strongest possible 'traditional' views on the issues concerned. Above-average concentrations of traditionalists were found to be in the eastern provinces (Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga and Limpopo); the rural informal areas; and amongst IFP or ANC supporters. They tended to be mainly black South Africans, married people, people with low incomes, people with educational qualifications lower than matric level, and regular attendees of religious meetings.

It is, however, evident that the moral issues about which they feel strongly have minimal impact on their voting behaviour, the ANC having received 60 to 70 per cent of votes in all three national elections since the country's democratisation. Clearly, in these instances, feeling that a particular practice or activity is wrong does not translate into activism for most people. This could be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand it is an indication of a remarkably high level of tolerance of change and diversity of opinion. On the other hand, it suggests apathy and lack of commitment to the principles and beliefs into which people have been socialised.

In contrast, a relative minority subscribes to more 'progressive' opinions and feels that under no circumstances is it wrong for a man and a woman to engage in sexual relations before marriage, or for sexual relations to occur between two adults of the same sex. Similarly, a small proportion indicates that abortion is never wrong in the event of there being a strong chance of serious defect in the baby or if the family has a low income and cannot afford any more children. Likewise, few disagree with capital punishment for convicted murderers.

The minorities who do support the progressive, human rights-based approach adopted by government to these issues are highly represented amongst those with a matric or tertiary qualification; those living in urban formal townships or suburbs; residents of the Western Cape or Northern Cape; those who attend religious meetings infrequently; and those who have never been married.

Apart from those holding the most extreme 'traditional' views on the one hand or the most 'progressive' views on the other, there is a degree of inconsistency amongst the 'middle group'. This takes the form of a mixture of 'traditional' views on some issues and 'progressive' views on others. Black Africans thus tend to hold the most 'traditional' views in respect of abortion (64 per cent against defect-related abortion and 74 per cent against income-related abortion) and same-sex sexual relations (81 per cent opposition), but are somewhat less, though nevertheless still fairly, 'traditional' in respect of premarital sex (52 per cent opposition) and the death penalty (72 per cent support). In contrast, white people tend to be more 'progressive' in relation to abortion (only 23 per cent against defect-related abortion and 57 per cent against income-related abortion) and premarital heterosexual sexual relations (42 per cent opposition), but the most 'traditional' in respect of the death penalty (92 per cent support). Coloured people are most 'progressive' in regard to same-sex sexual relations (only 64 per cent opposition), and Indians/Asians most 'traditional' in regard to premarital heterosexual sexual relations (60 per cent opposition).

The South African government is thus conspicuously attempting to lead rather than follow public opinion in relation to moral values. This contrasts somewhat with the US, which is responding to public sentiment against gay marriages and abortion. Indeed, significant proportions of the electorate in the USA indicated that moral issues were a critical determinant of the victory of George W Bush in the 2004 presidential election.

What does all of this imply for the government and for the country? Firstly, it is critical for policy-makers to internalise the extent to which South Africans hold traditionalist views in the areas of sexuality, abortion and the death penalty. In most instances, citizens are confronted with a set of human rights entitling them and their fellow countrymen and -women to engage in practices that are contrary to their upbringing, socialisation or religious beliefs. They will continue to hear specific values propagated within the context of their religious meetings and teachings that criticise these practices and values, and will be faced with regular dilemmas about whether to follow their beliefs and consciences or whether to abandon these in favour of the state's enshrined constitutional values.

Secondly, this will entail the exercise of a degree of compassion, tolerance and flexibility on the part of law enforcers, when citizens express opposing views with regard to the issues in question. Debate should thus be anticipated when engaging with faith-based organisations and their ubiquitous networks for the purpose of furthering the delivery of social services across the country or pursuing other

socially positive goals in the interests of the public good. Traditionalist citizens should be given the space to articulate their objections to the new set of rights, in terms of their likewise constitutionally-enshrined freedom of expression.

Thirdly, citizens with traditionalist views will need to be tolerant and understanding in respect of the newly-enshrined rights that are being exercised by relative minorities within the country. They should be encouraged to express their objections in ways that do not undermine the dignity or humanity of people who do not consider the exercise of such rights to be morally wrong.

Notes

1 In the 2003 British Social Attitudes report, Rothon and Heath (2003) refer to this range as 'authoritarian' versus 'libertarian'.

2 *Sunday Times,* Chantelle Benjamin, 'Teens have right to secret abortion', 30 May 2004

3 *Sunday Times,* Thabo Mkhize, 'ACDP to campaign on anti-abortion ticket', 8 February 2004

4 The International Social Survey Programme, entailing a questionnaire module on a different topic that is run each year in more than 40 countries.

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Conclusion

13 *Ten years into democracy: How South Africans view their world and themselves*

Mark Orkin and Roger Jowell

Introduction

Public attitudes matter. This is a truism, but an important one. Attitudes express what citizens believe, want, fear and prefer. They are difficult to measure, but democratic societies nonetheless need to try to do so if they wish to become better analysts of their own condition. For it is misleading merely to infer public attitudes from electoral choices. Party manifestos offer packages of policies that may or may not coincide with people's own perceptions and predilections. Moreover, individuals' attitudes and opinions are often unexpressed, and do not necessarily conform, even imperfectly, to any consistent ideology. On the contrary, many people legitimately hold and express politically heterodox moral, political and social positions, which may alter over time in some respects and not in others, may seem contradictory, and may even turn out to differ in significant respects from their own behaviour patterns.

So, one might ask, if people's attitudes are so volatile and 'quirky', how can they conceivably be of importance to academic analysis, still less to governance? The short answer is that a country's attitudinal profile is as much a part of its social reality as are its demographic make-up, its culture and its distinctive social patterns. None of these three aspects of a nation is either easy to measure or stable. Repeat measurements are necessary to identify shifts and underlying trends. But each of them – if soundly and regularly measured – complements the other two and helps to provide a nuanced picture of a country's circumstances, its continuities and changes, its democratic health, and how it feels to live there. Regular data of this kind also help a country to measure its progress towards the achievement of certain economic, social and political goals. And such analyses, especially social and political ones, are not complete unless they are based on the measurement of both 'objective' and 'subjective' realities, notably on the situations in which people find themselves as well as on how they interpret and act upon them.

But we must be clear about what we mean by attitude measurement here. Valuable as they are for some purposes, media opinion polls are not what we have in mind in this context. Polls are designed for the quite different purpose of charting public reactions to topical issues. They may often be important in political or electoral terms, taking the nation's pulse at critical times, but they are simply not designed to measure the longer-term constancies or changes in a society's *underlying* social values. They thrive

on the topical, concentrating their attention on fluctuations in the political weather rather than on climate shifts. The Human Sciences Research Council's (HSRC) annual South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), of which this collection reports the first year's results, tends to shun weather reports in favour of an analysis of the climate: it seeks to uncover and consider the patterns and shifts in underlying social values rather than capture public reactions to ephemeral events.

An instructive comparative example of the difference between short-term and long-term movements in public opinion was provided in Britain during the height of 'Thatcherism' in the 1980s. Margaret Thatcher's successive administrations were credited with bringing about a long-term culture shift. With the apparent consent of the majority of its electorate, Britain was thought to be abandoning its post-war welfare arrangements in favour of a brave new world of private enterprise and self-sufficiency. The media opinion polls at the time seemed to be telling the same story as the ballot boxes: that the British 'climate' was shifting from a European-style 'social' democracy towards a USA-style individualist 'liberal' democracy.

However, the British Social Attitudes Surveys were telling a different story throughout this period. They showed that underlying public attitudes were holding to their well-established patterns, rejecting the market-oriented alternative on offer and actually hardening in favour of social-democratic values.[1] Although the majority of those voting (some 44 per cent or so at the peak) chose Conservative administrations at the general elections throughout this period, we now know that this owed more to other advantages of Conservative rule at the time (in particular a lack of attraction to the main opposition parties) than it did to Mrs Thatcher's widely publicised but actually unpopular social agenda. As it turned out, the survey findings were presaging a time limit for a party whose central policy tenets had never really won the wider public's loyalty.

So democracies cannot rely either on party choice in elections or on the findings of ephemeral media polls as substitutes for long-term assessments of continuity and change in underlying public attitudes and perceptions. For this they must rely on the unique analytic and diagnostic qualities of time-series surveys, such as SASAS.

If, for these reasons, attitudes matter in all democracies, then they matter even more in a fledgling democracy like South Africa that is just entering its second decade, after decades of apartheid and centuries of colonialism in which its development was hugely distorted by political repression, social exclusion, economic exploitation and spatial segregation. Against this historical backdrop, and a mere ten years after its first non-racial and national election, how do the members of 'the rainbow nation' (in Archbishop Desmond Tutu's memorable characterisation) believe it is doing? How do the citizens regard the new institutions of democracy in South Africa? What are their perceptions of how well their government – now equipped with a wide array of post-apartheid policies and programmes – is performing in delivering services and, more generally, in undoing the ravages of apartheid?

The need to start answering such questions, and to track the answers over time, prompted the HSRC to set up SASAS as a long-term investment. As Pillay notes in his introduction to this volume, it was always likely that the monitoring of people's political attitudes would attract the particular interest of parliamentarians and political journalists looking for evidence of changes between elections. But the survey is much broader than that, also covering attitudes to social and economic issues. Aspects of it will, therefore, also interest trade unionists, leaders of civic organisations, people working in youth and women's movements, and indeed all voters who are interested in how their fellow citizens view their world – whether at work or in worship, as individuals or members of families, or as consumers of vital public services such as education, health, social grants or water.

The development of SASAS started in 2002, with the adaptation to South African circumstances of the successful model of similar surveys used in Britain, Germany and the USA. As noted in the Introduction, SASAS is based on a large and rigorous nationwide sample of individuals in up to 10 000 households. The households are located within 1 000 of the enumerator areas (EAs) defined for South Africa's five-yearly census that have been mapped by aerial photography and stored in a computerised geographical information system. The individuals are interviewed face to face for about an hour each. SASAS will be conducted annually among fresh samples of households selected in the same way from the 1 000 EAs, in order to provide evidence-based data on trends.

The chapters in this volume have presented and interpreted the data on most of the subjects covered in the survey, some of which are 'core' topics to be repeated every year, and others of which are 'rotating' topics to be replaced annually and returned to at intervals. All the topics cover aspects of how people *perceive* their world, what they *want* from it, their *preferences and concerns,* and their *beliefs.* The topics vary from public services to politics, from moral issues to the trustworthiness of institutions, from national to group identities. But in all cases it is the people's view of themselves and their world that is the vantage point of this volume, not the perspective of any prior academic or political standpoint.

In this concluding chapter we try to do no more than draw together a few themes from the book, focusing on five principal questions:

- How do South Africans of different sub-groups feel about their country and its institutions?
- How do different groups feel they are faring socially and economically?
- How do they judge the policies of post-apartheid South Africa?
- How is all this affecting the underlying 'mood' of the nation?
- Are these attitudes and perceptions different from what we might have anticipated at this stage of the new nation's development?

How South Africans feel about their (new) country

In the first place, and perhaps most importantly in a fledgling democracy, almost all South Africans are 'proud' of being South African. As Grossberg, Struwig and Pillay report in Chapter 4, this applies to some 93 per cent of the sample with relatively little variation among the race groups.[2] Some variation emerged, however, when respondents were encouraged to reflect more deeply and asked to consider whether they 'would rather be a citizen of South Africa than of any other country'. While the level of black African support was unaltered, white support fell to about two-thirds (with Indian/Asian support close to that of black Africans, and coloured support close to that of white support).

When more specific aspects of national pride were probed, the level of positive responses was somewhat lower but still encouraging. Around 70 per cent of South Africans are proud of their history and of their country's achievements in arts, literature, science and technology. Within only ten years of a dramatic shift in their country's direction, some 60 per cent are proud of South Africa's new-found commitment to fairness and equality. Respondents were, however, more ambivalent about South Africa's international standing and – perhaps perceptively at this point – about its social security arrangements (in each case around 50 per cent).[3]

These distinctions are important, suggesting an electorate that is not just patriotic about its country's overall recent achievements, but also attentive and discriminating. This suggests the emergence of a healthy democratic ethos.

In fact, we asked respondents whether they were proud about the way democracy is working in South Africa. A clear but not overwhelming majority (60 per cent) said they were. Pride in democracy tended to be highest in those provinces that have the highest rural proportions (and thus also the highest proportions of African National Congress [ANC] supporters) – Eastern Cape, Free State, North West and Limpopo, with Mpumalanga as something of an exception.[4] Elsewhere in the interview, we had posed a slightly different question (asked in many such surveys in other countries) as to whether respondents were 'satisfied' or 'dissatisfied' with democracy. A smaller proportion, 48 per cent, said they were 'satisfied'. The difference between these two sets of answers is not surprising. While the 'pride' question taps an emotional response (whether positive or negative), the 'satisfaction' question is intended to elicit a more dispassionate assessment of how things seem to be going.

Even so, satisfaction is, of course, a relative measure, its level depending on prior expectations. This needs to be borne in mind when examining the breakdown by race: 50 per cent of black Africans expressed satisfaction with democracy in South Africa, compared to only 28 per cent of white people (with the levels for coloured and Indian/Asian people falling in-between).[5] Black Africans would surely have had the highest prior expectations of the new democratic arrangements in South Africa, with white people the most fearful of them. So black Africans' expectations are likely

to have been diminished by relatively high prior expectations, while white people's expectations are likely to have been boosted by relatively low prior expectations.

Not surprisingly, perhaps, satisfaction with democracy is above the 48 per cent average amongst ANC supporters, about average amongst Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) supporters, and well below average amongst supporters of the New National Party (NNP) and the Democratic Alliance (DA). As Daniel et al. note,[6] the lower levels of satisfaction amongst supporters of the overwhelmingly white parties almost certainly reflect the loss of historical privilege that was formerly enjoyed by the white populace in South Africa's political and other domains.

As important as abstract views about democratic arrangements in general is the extent to which people trust important institutions within the democracy. The questionnaire asked about trust in a range of institutions and the answers have been compared with earlier findings in a 1999 survey.[7] Trust has risen in aggregate across the range of institutions from around 50 per cent to 55 per cent in the intervening four years, which indicates a reassuring gradual consolidation of democratic processes. As reported in the chapter by Daniel et al., the least-trusted institutions are business on the one hand and local or provincial government on the other, together with the police and the courts. But among the institutions we asked about, these were the ones of which most people would either have had some direct experience, or heard (negative) reports. Certainly, we found higher trust in institutions with which people tend to relate more intermittently or at a remove, such as Parliament, the national government, the electoral agency and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). But, as in many other countries, trust is greatest in the churches.

Once again, however, there are subtle variations by race. Overall, rough agreement exists amongst white and black South Africans about the institutions they trust the least and the most. It is with institutions accorded intermediate levels of trust – notably those most closely involved with party politics – that their views differ most sharply. Thus, black African trust of Parliament, the national government, the electoral agency and the SABC is two to three times higher than is white trust of the same institutions, and – as elsewhere in the study – coloured and Indian/Asian people fall in-between. These contrasts are not new to South Africa, reflecting as they do the distribution of power amongst the races. Thus, black sentiment was predominantly negative and white sentiment less so under apartheid, when black Africans were excluded from political power.[8] Even so, it is the case that the minority races in South Africa remain somewhat uneasy about the major institutions of state, which – despite the new Constitution – they still tend to perceive as outside of their control.

How different sub-groups feel they are faring

We have been dealing with elements of what might be called national identity – the extent to which South Africans take pride in and identify with their shared national

territory, institutions and citizenship.[9] Ethnic identity, in contrast, emphasises the differentiation of groups from one another in terms of, say, language, religion, race or perceived common descent. A key feature of apartheid was to enforce social and spatial segregation between ethnic groups both to satisfy the dominant ideology and to ensure differential access to resources and power. Apartheid legislation went to macabre lengths to distinguish groups by race, and within races by language. Now, with the demise of apartheid and its imposed ethnic differentiation at all levels, a new question arises. Will nationhood and democracy in the new South Africa be best served by fostering an emerging new national identity *instead* of, or *coexisting* with, the various language and/or racial identities that groups of people may voluntarily wish to sustain? Could it be, as Roefs hypothesises, that 'strong sub-group identification in combination with a strong superordinate national identity, is desirable in that it binds people into meaningful groups and to the larger society'?[10]

Combining several questionnaire items, she constructs an index of the extent to which respondents identify with the nation, and she correlates this in turn with three separate indices of the extent to which they identify with their own race, class or language group. Her key finding is that among black Africans a dual identity, comprising nation/race and language, is much more common than a single identity. The same applies, though with less salience, to coloured people with respect to their race and their Afrikaans language. But for English-speakers, whether white or Indian/Asian, the data confirm a familiar diffidence: they are still the least likely to have any clear identification with either their race or their language.

So it would appear in the first instance that Archbishop Tutu was on target with his vision of a 'rainbow nation', composed of and enriched by a mosaic of voluntary group identities. On the other hand, an all too frequent and invidious consequence of group differentiation, especially by race, is that those groups with access to resources tend to rationalise the exclusion of other groups by regarding and treating them as inferior. This is old-fashioned racism, and it was rampant not only for decades under apartheid regimes, but also for centuries before that under colonial rule. In different ways at different times, discrimination extended to language, religion, gender and nationality. All these forms of discrimination are now outlawed by South Africa's remarkable Constitution (as is discrimination by age, marital status and sexual preference). But they still exist in various guises and to varying degrees and will not disappear overnight from people's minds or manners.

SASAS tapped popular perceptions and experiences of changes in race relations in South Africa. Firstly, how much change in race relations does the public itself perceive? Do people believe that race relations have improved, stayed the same or deteriorated in the period since the first free election? The results are striking: nearly 90 per cent of black African, coloured and Indian/Asian people feel that race relations have improved since 1994, and around 70 per cent of white people feel the same. The proportions are close to those in an HSRC survey using the same

question that was conducted five years before SASAS, suggesting that these gains were not temporary effects of the Mandela 'honeymoon' period; and they are an improvement on proportions in a similar question on race relations posed in 1994.[11] These results are a powerful endorsement of the overall impact of change in South Africa over the past decade or so.

Moreover, the survey also asked the sample whether they had experienced or witnessed any actual recent instances of racial discrimination. Nowadays about two-thirds of black African and coloured people report no actual recent instances of discrimination, as do about half of Indian/Asian and white people. We have not found earlier HSRC surveys to provide a comparison on this question. But when one recalls the pervasive segregation and interpersonal disdain to which black African people were subjected in everyday life during the heyday of apartheid, these are encouraging results to report. (The level of white perceptions of discrimination must be seen in the context of affirmative action in recent years, which many white South Africans would probably categorise as discriminatory.)

These findings are a signal reminder of how appreciably attitudes and everyday practices have shifted following the transition from minority to majority rule in South Africa. While the transition has been perhaps most striking in government – with the majority black African racial composition of Parliament and increasingly of the top levels of government departments – it has not, of course, been confined to the political domain. The transition has also been marked, though uneven, in other domains such as the impressively mixed racial composition of schools in the wealthier suburban areas, if not in the poorer urban townships, informal settlements and rural areas. But the transition has perhaps been least apparent in the private-sector economic domain. It is true that workplaces have always been racially mixed, but a substantial shift in the racial stratification of occupations, and of control or (especially) ownership of business has been slow in coming, despite the emphasis given to black economic empowerment deals and charters. So the perceived levels of and changes in racial prejudice and discrimination must be considered in the light of these various political, social and economic contexts. Since the overall situation on the ground is still somewhat mixed, it is not surprising that public attitudes – though generally positive about the perceived changes – are somewhat ambivalent, too.

How popular are the post-apartheid solutions?

Schooling policies and achievements were given considerable attention in this first round of SASAS. We expected more consensus on this issue than we discovered. For instance, we anticipated near-unanimity on the need for compulsory schooling to matriculation level and indeed found it amongst Indian/Asian, coloured and white people (in each case more than nine out of ten), but only seven out of ten black Africans were as certain. Rural black Africans were least enthusiastic about compulsory education to matriculation level. Given the economic hardships still

being experienced among rural black Africans in particular, and the integral part played by teenagers in rural support systems in both housework and agriculture,[12] it might well have been the phrase 'to matriculation level' that gave these respondents pause for thought.

The variation is, however, more dramatic on the issue of racial mixing in schools. This was of course outlawed under apartheid, enabling white students in particular to benefit from much higher state spending per capita. The reversal of this policy receives almost unanimous support from black Africans (90 per cent agree with school integration), and overwhelming agreement too from Indians/Asians (83 per cent) and coloured people (77 per cent). But, even ten years into the new dispensation, only a narrow majority of white people (53 per cent) holds the same view. But perhaps this is not all that surprising, given the massive reduction in privilege involved; maybe we should be surprised instead that in as little as ten years, the majority of the group that largely voted for apartheid policies for over five decades has already been won over.

Wa Kivilu and Morrow present a similar pattern in support for multiple language use in schools. Many black Africans are, of course, already familiar with having to cope with languages other than their birth language, and a large majority of them (89 per cent) support the use of mixed language tuition. Smaller proportions of Indians/Asians (74 per cent), coloured (69 per cent) and white people (45 per cent) give similar support.[13] The lower levels of support among white people in particular show that there is still a powerful cultural issue at stake concerning whether the language of tuition should be English or Afrikaans, let alone an African language.

On other social and moral issues, we also find substantial variations, not only according to race but also in terms of class. For instance, a greater proportion of black Africans (around one-third) than of other groups supports the use of corporal punishment in schools. But support for this approach is higher still among those living in rural areas and among those with low incomes and little education.[14]

Similar class effects are evident in attitudes to other moral issues such as premarital sex, same-sex relations, the death penalty and abortion. Rule and Mncwango combine respondents' scores on these items to create an index of attitudes, from 'traditional' to 'progressive'. There is a fairly consistent positive relationship between income (and therefore education) on the one hand and libertarian attitudes on the other[15] – a pattern that holds generally true throughout the world.[16]

On the other hand, a more nuanced examination suggests some notable exceptions to the class pattern in South Africa. For instance, although white South Africans still tend to have the highest income and education levels, they are also much the strongest proponents of the death penalty (92 per cent support), while amongst black Africans – on average the least educated and well-off members of the population – those in favour are a smaller proportion (72 per cent), though still a majority. But this is probably a reflection of the historically racist application of

the death penalty under apartheid rather than a general reversal of the relationship between class and attitudes to moral issues.

The actual scores show that, despite South Africa's extremely progressive Constitution, the majority of South Africans are still very traditionalist on all these moral issues. Thus, approximately three out of four South Africans support the death penalty and reject same-sex relations. And approximately one half of South Africans find premarital sex unacceptable, though – as elsewhere – on this issue the young are a great deal more progressive than the old. As for attitudes to abortion, they vary according to the grounds for seeking it. So, while 75 per cent would oppose it if the grounds were poverty alone, a smaller proportion (56 per cent) would oppose it if the grounds were the likely impairment of the child.

On most of these issues of sexual morality, the SASAS survey was employing identical questions to those used in over 30 other countries as part of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), in which the HSRC is a participant. This provides a basis for international comparison, and we find that South African attitudes are much closer to the restrictive or traditional end of the ISSP scale than to the permissive or liberal end on these matters. South Africa's position is in fact just above that of the mainly Catholic and traditional Philippines, and just below that of another equally predominantly Catholic and traditional country, Poland.

Gender tends not to be significant in the comparisons we have drawn hitherto. But it comes into prominence alongside race as far as health behaviour is concerned. Thus, as Desmond and Boyce show in Chapter 10, much larger proportions of women than men do not drink (76 per cent versus 45 per cent) and do not smoke (89 per cent versus 61 per cent). While two-thirds of black Africans and Indians/Asians report never drinking, this is true of only one half of coloured and a quarter of white people. And while four-fifths of black Africans and Indians/Asians do not smoke, this applies to only two-thirds of white and one half of coloured people.[17] As any party-goer will have observed, the habits of smoking and drinking are correlated, and this is confirmed by the survey evidence: those who report frequent drinking also tend to report frequent smoking. But as far as regular exercise is concerned, education becomes the important predictor. Regular exercise as a distinct activity (as opposed to part of one's work) is now taken by as many as 56 per cent of people with tertiary education, but by only 20 per cent of those with only primary education. It is no wonder, as medical studies repeatedly show, that the middle classes are healthier and live longer.

Class matters, too, in the domain of domestic violence. In their chapter on the subject, Dawes et al.[18] note that 20 per cent of South Africans, both men and women, have experienced violent physical assault in the lifetime of their present domestic relationship, as either perpetrators or victims, or both; and the overwhelming majority of perpetrators and victims fall into the lowest socio-economic categories. The wider literature suggests that patriarchal attitudes to women (more prevalent

in certain communities than others) are the chief risk factors in relation to violence towards women. As far as SASAS data are concerned, among those respondents reporting such occurrences of domestic violence, the average frequency is, alarmingly, about once a fortnight.

The national mood?

With such wide differences in public attitudes to and perceptions of different facets of South African society, can we assess the *overall* national mood at the time of the survey? The short answer is, of course, that we cannot. Not only are there nuanced variations in the data but, as we have noted, it is up to opinion polls in the media to monitor volatile mood changes. Our purpose is quite different. Even so, there are well-established indicators of *quality of life* which surveys like SASAS tend to include, and which have proved, all over the world, to be remarkably powerful long-term measures of underlying shifts in a nation's sense of subjective well-being or – in JK Galbraith's famous phrase – its 'culture of contentment'.

SASAS accordingly asked respondents about their satisfaction with life in general and the way it is changing. The results are analysed in detail by Roberts.[19] The satisfaction question uses a five-point scale, from 1 for 'very dissatisfied' to 5 for 'very satisfied'. The answers seemed to reveal that material well-being was the biggest factor in determining overall subjective well-being. Thus, white respondents rated themselves on average at about 4 out of 5, while black Africans rated themselves at about 3 out of 5, with coloured and Indian/Asian people in between. The pattern was similar on sub-scales that dealt with satisfaction about income, employment, and so on.

But a different perspective emerged when people were asked whether their life had *improved* in the last five years, and *would improve* in the next five years. In response to these questions, around 80 per cent of black Africans were positive or neutral, compared to only one half of white respondents. Indian/Asian scores were closer to those of black Africans and coloured scores to those of white respondents.[20]

This is critically important because research from other countries has persuasively demonstrated that assessments of life satisfaction owe much more to relative than to absolute stimuli.[21] So, while people with, say, high incomes and low incomes do not tend to differ much in their measured levels of well-being, they begin to diverge sharply when they see their own position changing *relative to their peers*. The unanswered question for South Africa, therefore, is whether the reference group that people use when comparing their own condition to that of others will, for the time being, be within or between the racial groups. The evidence from our survey suggests that cross-racial comparisons are already being made and, as a result, the effects are different for different racial groups.

Daniel et al. accord with this view in suggesting that the reason for white South Africans' pessimism about their well-being may lie in their perception of the

affirmative policy measures being introduced to address historical racial inequities in opportunities and resources.[22] This view is also supported by Roberts's evidence regarding a range of policy options designed to reduce inequality: the more specific the proposal, the smaller is white support compared with that of black Africans. (Once again Indian/Asian and coloured views fall in-between.[23]) So, while nearly as many white people as black Africans can agree on the rather abstract contention that the government should 'provide' for everyone, four times the proportion of black Africans relative to white people support specific redistributive measures such as land redistribution or pro-black African promotion practices. And five times the proportion of black Africans relative to white people support preferential tax breaks and contracts for black Africans.

It will be interesting and instructive to follow these issues through successive rounds of SASAS. It appears for the moment that white South Africans – although well aware that they are still better-off than the other race groups in regard to income, access to quality education and so on – are also aware that their material advantage is being diminished in comparison with their privileged past. They also see a government determined to continue reducing inequality further. The same calculus, though rather more ambivalently, is applied by Indian/Asian and coloured South Africans. The subjective quality of life reported by different groups in South Africa may well depend on how these relative perceptions change over time.

Moving beyond levels of satisfaction with life in general, respondents were asked to indicate their satisfaction levels, again on a five-point scale, with the provision of particular services. Satisfaction levels with the provision of refuse collection, electricity, water and sanitation, and land reform were all, on average, between 3.0 and 3.5. The satisfaction scores for housing, health and sexually transmitted infections (STI) treatment were just under 3.0. Satisfaction with crime prevention was lower still at 2.3, and lowest of all was satisfaction with job creation at 1.7.

Poor and black African respondents tended to be dissatisfied with most services apart from refuse collection and electrification, while the well-off tended to be satisfied with most services apart from job creation and crime prevention. These answers suggest a certain attentiveness on the part of the public to what is and is not being achieved on the ground. But from the government's perspective, the perception of underperformance in many areas is surely daunting.

The challenge, from the social scientist's perspective, of producing sound measurements of performance is also daunting. Chapter 8 by Hemson and Owusu-Ampomah is a case study of how various methodological considerations – the form of the question, a plausible reference period, and the use of correct weights to adjust from individual answers to household estimates – are all important in attempting to estimate differential access to water services in general, and the extent of cut-offs for non-payment in particular, among the many reasons for interruption of water supply.[24]

In addition to the direct provision of services, how satisfied or dissatisfied are people with their access to information? Among rural black Africans, particularly less-educated women, access to media and communications is patchy at best. While people in rural areas are as likely as those in urban areas to have radios, their likelihood of seeing newspapers is low, landline telephones are rare, and access to the Internet is still in its infancy. Not surprisingly, those with less access to the mass media are found to be less politically knowledgeable (though, encouragingly, no less likely to vote in elections). Yet, as Langa, Conradie and Roberts warn,[25] we cannot conclude that low political knowledge is caused by lack of access to the media; both are more probably the results of low education and income.

Finally, related to the issue of satisfaction with life in South Africa, the survey asked respondents to nominate the 'most important challenges facing South Africa today'. Since a similar question had been asked in the HSRC's 1999 pre-election survey four years earlier, we can compare changes in response patterns. The chief priorities in 1999 were (in descending order): unemployment, crime, public services, housing, education, health, wages/poverty. By 2003, the list was broadly similar apart from the entry to the list of two new items. Notably, in second place now and absent four years earlier was HIV/AIDS. Lower down the list but also making its first appearance was corruption. In addition, the issue of wages/poverty had risen in prominence. We shall monitor these trends in future rounds of the survey.

How much does all this measure up to expectations?

Had one looked forward in the early 1980s, and then again in the early 1990s, to plausible versions of what South Africa might be like to live in during the early 2000s, what might have been anticipated?

In the early 1980s, President PW Botha had sought to accommodate Indians/Asians and coloured people in a tri-cameral Parliament. Popular resistance to the continuing exclusion of the black African majority helped bring the United Democratic Front into being, effectively as the above-ground wing of the ANC. White analysts within the country anticipated much the same apartheid-dominated society as hitherto, but one now riven by more violence and insurrection, and still reliant on laws and actions designed to protect a privileged white elite and its new minority allies against the economic, social and political aspirations of black Africans. They anticipated continuing expenditure on security and defence, together with increasingly damaging economic and other sanctions – both helping further to harm a faltering economy. Their gloom was exacerbated in 1985 by the onset of successive States of Emergency, aimed at containing countrywide mass popular action against the state.

So, few commentators – at least among those published within South Africa – would have predicted in the early or mid-1980s that non-racial, majority-rule democracy under an ANC-led government would be a viable option,[26] still less that by the early 2000s a new South Africa would have experienced ten years of this condition! And

few would have believed that this condition might be achieved peacefully, with the consent of the ruling white electorate obtained in a referendum.

By the early 1990s, South Africa was of course already in a state of flux. The liberation movements had been unbanned, their leaders released from gaol, exiles allowed to return, and negotiations between Mr de Klerk's National Party and Mr Mandela's ANC were already well under way. Change was palpably in the air. At the same time, widespread violence between IFP and ANC supporters, accumulating thousands of deaths, had spread from Natal to the Transvaal. Had we been looking ten years ahead at that point, we would have been much more circumspect about what might be in store.

Would the negotiations ultimately succeed or break down in acrimony? Even if they were successfully concluded, would the proposed peaceful transition to a black African-led government actually take place in the manner being adumbrated? Would exaggerated white fears of black African majority rule not soon clash headlong with exaggerated black African expectations of a new popular government?[27] Given the recent history of South Africa, was it really possible for a radical new order to replace the old order without retribution? Indeed, might there not be near or actual civil war in due course, much as other African countries had experienced in recent decades?[28] As one commentator recalled:

> All indications up to March 1994 were that to hold elections in South Africa was perhaps the country's greatest risk venture. Political violence mounted steadily. The stockpiling of tinned food by thousands of timid citizens, while eccentric, illustrated the fears that there could have been a right-wing rebellion, that there could have been civil war in KwaZulu-Natal, and that the excitement of the masses could have paralysed the country.[29]

And even if such dire predictions did not become realities, would a party without experience of government (or even of parliamentary processes) subsequently be able to cope with the complexities of governance and the vagaries of the South African economy? Would not untenable proportions of educated and skilled South Africans decide to uproot themselves, leaving the new South Africa to fend for itself? In short, despite good intentions on all sides, was not the grand plan bound to end in tears, one way or another?

These forebodings were not confined to South Africa. The world was watching South Africa in trepidation, willing its inspirational transition to succeed but not daring at that point to bank on this success. And, even if these fears were to prove largely groundless and a peaceful transition actually did take place, the consensus view was that it would take at least a generation for the legacy of the apartheid years and the era that preceded them to fade from the hearts and minds of South Africans of all races. Even the most determined optimists conceded that the early years (at least) of this fledgling democracy at the tip of a troubled continent would be, at best, difficult to negotiate and, at worst, very turbulent.

It is, of course, now a matter of record that South Africa's transformation to political democracy took place remarkably smoothly, and that social integration is advancing steadily, even if economic inequality and spatial integration are proving more intractable. But what about the hearts and minds of South Africans? What do our data say about whether and to what extent they have adapted to and embraced the new order?

We cannot, of course, reach conclusions at this stage about *changes* in South African public attitudes since its transition, because – as we noted earlier – the sort of survey questions that were conceived turn out not to be comparable, and do not provide prior benchmark data. All we can do, therefore, is to look at the patterns and texture of SASAS results and compare them impressionistically with results from similar surveys in other countries around the world. How does the new South Africa differ from more mature democracies in its attitudes and values? How divided is it in comparison with countries with a less dramatic recent past?

Certainly there is still ample evidence of persistent racial divisions in South African attitudes, as shown in this volume. Thus, while ethnic identity among black South Africans appears to improve their sense of national identity, this is not clearly so amongst white South Africans. While most people concur that race relations have improved, white people are least keen on the practical corollaries of this, such as school integration. And while white South Africans are more satisfied than black South Africans with their present circumstances, including the delivery of most services, they are much less confident of what the future will bring.

However, it is crucial to realise that these sorts of divisions – by class or race, or both – also exist in many other countries and have done so for a much longer period of time. Tensions between different economic, social or cultural groups with patently different group interests have always existed in all societies. Democracies accommodate such differences and on occasions manage to mitigate them. This perspective on the new South Africa suggests that, for the most part, South Africans of all races and ethnic groups seem to have adapted to the new order with surprising ease. So much so, in fact, that the findings of this survey are more or less indistinguishable in many important ways from those to be found in most mature democracies.

Even more encouraging perhaps is that the recently-expanded South African electorate already appears to be very much more united than divided on key aspects of nationhood. There is a palpable pride in the new nation within all sections of the population. Once again, white people are less confident than black African people about the workings of its institutions, especially the political ones. But that is hardly surprising in a multicultural nation with deep disparities of income and status. Moreover, the new-found bonding patriotism within the electorate as a whole does not prevent South Africans of all backgrounds from being healthily attentive to and critical of the way their country is being governed in certain respects, distinguishing

shrewdly between aspects of governance they applaud and those they do not. In all these ways too, the South African electorate seems to resemble the electorates of the mature European democracies much more than it does those of the developing world.

Even so, it remains evident from our attitude data that South African politics are still heavily shaped by race, even where there may be emerging modulations as a result of social class distinctions. The racial composition of the main political parties has been slow to change and coincides appreciably with racial and ethnic boundaries, and – partly as a result of this – the income composition of the parties is just as predictable. As Naidu shows,[30] although the ANC is a broad-based party, attracting appreciable minorities of the coloured and Indian/Asian voting population as well as black Africans, nearly all (94 per cent) ANC supporters are black African. Among them are more than half (60 per cent) of the large Zulu-speaking population, with most of the remainder (34 per cent) supporting the IFP, within which they provide the bulk of the party's supporters.[31] By the same token, 82 per cent of DA supporters are white, and the DA has been conspicuously unsuccessful in its attempt to attract black African voters. (Ironically, the NNP was the only other party to have attracted significant cross-racial support – from white and, in recent years, coloured people especially – and it has now been disbanded.) The well-established income inequalities among the four race groups thus ensure that ANC and IFP membership is predominantly in the lower income categories, and DA membership in the higher categories.

Does it matter, then, that the two largest parties – the ANC and the DA – still attract negligible cross-racial voting? Is a more significant amount of cross-racial voting than now occurs a prerequisite for a healthy democracy? Is there otherwise a risk that seemingly permanent party-political minorities will always feel somewhat more alienated than others from the political process, more critical of government policies and less optimistic about their country's prospects?

Well, to some extent one could argue that the answer to all these questions is 'yes'. After all, democratic theory implies that people will vote for parties or candidates that best represent their own viewpoint or interests. Of course, the theory also allows that party identification (a sort of emotional adhesive that binds people to their parties) interferes somewhat with this putatively rational process. Nevertheless, to the extent, for instance, that the ANC and the DA do represent very different political viewpoints on a range of issues, they should – according to theory – attract support for their respective viewpoints from amongst all racial and ethnic groups, just as the ANC attracts Zulu voters and the NNP attracted coloured voters.

A modest degree of such cross-ethnic and cross-racial voting certainly exists, and – as South Africa's income distribution begins to coincide less with racial boundaries than it does at present – we should expect this to grow. Then differences across class boundaries may also become more central than those empirically

identified at the margins in this volume (such as are perhaps discernible in some small towns and informal settlements, in the form of vociferous protests by the poor about inadequate service delivery, aimed at those in charge of local and provincial government). It remains to be seen whether these differences manifest themselves in forthcoming local elections and subsequently.

However, until the predominantly race-based differentiation of attitudes and political perceptions reported here begins to break down further, and until cross-cutting patterns of class and other distinctions begin to operate more substantially, it could be argued that the legacy of apartheid still casts a partial shadow over the rainbow.

Notes

1 Jowell R, Witherspoon S & Brook L (eds) (1988) Trust in the establishment. In R Jowell et al. (eds) *British Social Attitudes: The 5th Report.* Aldershot: Gower, p. 121

2 Arlene Grossberg, Jaré Struwig & Udesh Pillay, Chapter 4: Multicultural national identity and pride, p. 58

3 Grossberg, Struwig & Pillay, p. 65

4 Grossberg, Struwig & Pillay, p. 65

5 John Daniel, Roger Southall & Sarah Dippenaar, Chapter 2: Issues of democracy and governance, p. 21

6 Daniel et al., p. 22

7 Obtained from unpublished data in the HSRC's 1999 EPOP survey

8 HSRC surveys before 1994 covered dissatisfaction with the political system. In the period from 1985 to 1993, between 55 per cent and 75 per cent of black Africans, and between 40 per cent and 60 per cent of white people, expressed dissatisfaction, depending on noteworthy developments at the time. See De Kock C (1994) Movements in South African mass opinion and party support to 1993. In RW Johnson & L Schlemmer (eds) *Launching Democracy in South Africa.* New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 37 and 57

9 We have slightly rephrased the useful distinction cited by Grossberg, Struwig & Pillay on p. 56, and elaborated by Roefs, Chapter 5: Identity and race relations, on pp. 79–80.

10 Roefs p. 80

11 In the April 1994 election, an HSRC Omnibus survey question asked whether respondents felt their own relations to people of other races had changed in the past year. The proportions who reported an improvement were about two-thirds, a half, and a third among black African, coloured and Indian/Asian, and white respondents respectively.

12 Nelson Mandela Foundation (2005) *Emerging Voices: A Report on Education in South African Rural Communities*. Cape Town: HSRC Press

13 Mbithi wa Kivilu & Seán Morrow, Chapter 9: What do South Africans think about education? pp. 181–182

14 Wa Kivilu and Morrow, pp. 187–188

15 Stephen Rule & Bongiwe Mncwango, Chapter 12: Rights or wrongs? An exploration of moral values, p. 266

16 Brook L & Cape E (1995) Libertarianism in retreat. In R Jowell, J Curtice, A Park, L Brook & D Ahrendt (eds) *British Social Attitudes: The 12th Report.* Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, p. 207

17 Chris Desmond & Gerard Boyce, Chapter 10: A healthy attitude? pp. 201–204

18 Andrew Dawes, Zosa de Sas Kropiwnicki, Zuhayr Kafaar & Linda Richter, Chapter 11: Partner violence, pp. 233–237

19 We here contrast 'Worsen' with a combination of 'Improve' and 'Stay the same', and exclude 'Don't know': see the tables in Daniel et al., p. 26.

20 Daniel et al. p. 26

21 Oswald AJ (1997) Happiness and economic performance, *Economic Journal* (Royal Economic Society) 107: 1815–1831

22 Daniel et al., p. 27

23 Benjamin Roberts, Chapter 6: The happy transition? Attitudes to poverty and inequality after a decade of democracy, p. 120

24 David Hemson & Kwame Owusu-Ampomah, Chapter 8: The 'vexed question': Interruptions, cut-offs and water services in South Africa

25 Zakes Langa, Pieter Conradie & Benjamin Roberts, Chapter 7: Slipping through the Net: Digital and other communication divides within South Africa, pp. 141–2

26 Various ethnicity-based or federal versions of democracy were canvassed in, for example, Van Vuuren DJ, Kriek DJ & Booysen H (eds) (1983) *Political Alternatives for Southern Africa*. Durban: Butterworths. An exception, presenting evidence for the unitary non-racial democratic view, was Orkin M (1985) *Disinvestment, the Struggle and the Future*. Johannesburg: Ravan.

27 For example, contrast De Kock CP (1991) Violence as an option, in DJ van Vuuren, NE Wiehahn, NJ Rhoodie & M Wiechers (eds) *South Africa in the Nineties.* Pretoria: HSRC Publishers, with Schlemmer L (1994) The anatomy of expectations, *HSRC Political Update* 1.

28 See, for example, Bethlehem RW (1994) The need for change in the South African economy, and Rhoodie NJ (1994) Survey-based indicators of black and white perceptions of socio-political change in South Africa, in Van Vuuren et al. (eds) *South Africa in the Nineties*. Pretoria: HSRC Publishers.

29 Schlemmer L (1994) Birth of democracy, *Indicator SA* 11(3): 17

30 Sanusha Naidu, Chapter 3: Voting behaviour and attitudes in a post-apartheid South Africa, pp. 43–44

31 See the note to Table 3.1, which correctly warns that the statistical imputation process, to estimate the undeclared allegiance of those who did not answer the party-preference question, was misleading in the case of the Indian/Asian population, because of its small relative size.

Appendix 1: Technical details of the survey

In 2003, two versions of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) questionnaire were fielded. Each module of questions was asked either of the full sample (4 980 respondents) or of a half sample. The structures of the two versions of the questionnaire are shown at the beginning of Appendix 3.

Sample design

The South African Social Attitudes Survey has been designed to yield a representative sample of adults aged 16 and older. The sampling frame for the survey is the Human Sciences Research Council's (HSRC) Master Sample, which was designed in 2002 and consists of 1 000 primary sampling units (PSUs). The 2001 population census enumerator areas (EAs) were used as PSUs. These PSUs were drawn, with probability proportional to size, from a pre-census 2001 list of EAs provided by Statistics South Africa. The Master Sample excludes special institutions (such as hospitals, military camps, old age homes, school and university hostels), recreational areas, industrial areas and vacant EAs. It therefore focuses on dwelling units or visiting points as secondary sampling units, which have been defined as 'separate (non-vacant) residential stands, addresses, structures, flats, homesteads, etc.'. As the basis of the 2003 SASAS round of interviewing, a sub-sample of 500 PSUs was drawn from the HSRC's Master Sample. Three explicit stratification variables were used, namely province, geographic type and majority population group. The table below gives the numbers of PSUs allocated to the categories of the explicit strata.

Table A1.1 *The design of the SASAS sample*

Province	Number of PSUs
Western Cape	55
Eastern Cape	55
Northern Cape	50
Free State	50
KwaZulu-Natal	70
North West	50
Gauteng	65
Mpumalanga	50
Limpopo	55
Total	500

Geographic type	Number of PSUs
Urban formal	285
Urban informal	55
Rural formal	66
Rural informal	94

Population group	Number of PSUs
Black African	288
Coloured	79
Indian/Asian	50
White	83

Within each stratum, the allocated number of PSUs was drawn using proportional to size probability sampling. In each of these drawn PSUs, two clusters of 11 dwelling units each were drawn. These 22 dwelling units in each drawn PSU

were systematically grouped into three sub-samples of sizes seven, seven and eight respectively, to give the two SASAS samples and a client survey that was run in parallel.

Selection of individuals

Interviewers called at each visiting point selected from the HSRC Master Sample and listed all those eligible for inclusion in the sample – that is, all persons currently aged 16 or over and resident at the selected visiting point. The interviewer then selected one respondent using a random selection procedure based on a Kish grid.

Weighting

The data were weighted to take account of the fact that not all the units covered in the survey had the same probability of selection. The weighting reflected the relative selection probabilities of the individual at the three main stages of selection: visiting point (address), household and individual.

Visiting points in the Northern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal were oversampled, because of the small population size in the former and a desire to ensure a large enough Indian/Asian sample in the latter. Because of this, weights had to be applied to compensate for the greater probability of being selected.

The resulting weight is called 'benchwgt' in the half samples and 'combiwgt' in the full sample. The weights were then scaled down to make the number of weighted productive cases exactly equal to the number of unweighted productive cases (n = 4 980). All the percentages presented in this volume are based on weighted data.

Fieldwork

Interviewing was mainly carried out between August and October 2003. Fieldwork was conducted by interviewers using conventional face-to-face interviewing techniques. Interviewers attended a two-day training conference to familiarise them with the selection procedures and questionnaires.

The mean interview length was 45 minutes for version 1 of the questionnaire and 58 minutes for version 2. Interviewers achieved an overall response rate of 78 per cent. Details are shown in Table A1.2. Version 1 of the questionnaire was completed by 79 per cent of respondents to the face-to-face interview and version 2 by 78 per cent.

Table A1.2 *Response rate on SASAS 2003*

	Number	Percentage
Addresses issued	6 917	
Vacant, derelict and other out of scope	558	
In scope	6 359	100.0
Interview achieved	4 980	78.3
Interview not achieved	1 379	21.7
Refused[1]	743	11.7
Non-contacted[2]	636	10.0

1 'Refused' comprises refusals before selection of an individual at the visiting point, refusal by the selected person, and 'proxy' refusals (on behalf of the selected respondent).
2 'Non-contacted' comprises households where no one was contacted and those where the selected respondent could not be contacted.

Analysis techniques

Regression

Regression analysis aims to summarise the relationship between a 'dependent' variable and one or more 'independent' variables. It shows how well we can estimate a respondent's score on the dependent variable from knowledge of their scores on the independent variables. It is often undertaken to support a claim that the phenomena measured by the independent variables cause the phenomenon measured by the dependent variable. However, the causal ordering, if any, between the variables cannot be verified or falsified by the technique. Causality can only be inferred through special experimental designs or through assumptions made by the analyst.

All regression analysis assumes that the relationship between the dependent and each of the independent variables takes a particular form. In *linear regression*, it is assumed that the relationship can be adequately summarised by a straight line. This means that a one percentage point increase in the value of an independent variable is assumed to have the same impact on the value of the dependent variable on average, irrespective of the previous values of those variables.

Strictly speaking, the technique assumes that both the dependent and the independent variables are measured on an interval level scale, although it may sometimes be applied even where this is not the case. For example, one can use an ordinal variable (eg. a Likert scale) as a *dependent* variable if one is willing to assume that there is an underlying interval level scale and the difference between the observed ordinal scale and the underlying interval scale is caused by random measurement error. Categorical or nominal data can be used as *independent* variables by converting them into dummy or binary variables; these are variables where the only valid scores are 0 or 1, with 1 signifying membership of a particular category and 0 otherwise.

The assumptions of linear regression cause particular difficulties where the *dependent* variable is binary. The assumption that the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables is a straight line means that it can produce estimated values for the dependent variable of less than 0 or greater than 1. In this case, it may be more appropriate to assume that the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables takes the form of an S-curve, where the impact on the dependent variable of a one-point increase in an independent variable approaches 0 or 1. *Logistic regression* is an alternative form of regression which fits such an S-curve rather than a straight line. The techniques can also be adapted to analyse multinomial non-interval level dependent variables, that is, variables which classify respondents into more than two categories.

The two statistical scores most commonly reported from the results of regression analyses are:

A measure of variance explained: This summarises how well all the independent variables combined can account for the variation in a respondent's scores in the dependent variable. The higher the measure, the more accurately we are able in general to estimate the correct value of each respondent's score on the dependent variable from knowledge of their scores on the independent variables.

A parameter estimate: This shows how much the dependent variable will change on average, given a one-unit change in the independent variable (while holding all other independent variables in the model constant). The parameter estimate has a positive sign if an increase in the value of the independent variable results in an increase in the value of the dependent variable. It has a negative sign if an increase in the value of the independent variable results in a decrease in the value of the dependent variable. If the parameter estimates are standardised, it is possible to compare the relative impact of different independent variables; those variables with the largest standardised estimates can be said to have the biggest impact on the value of the dependent variable.

Regression also tests for the statistical significance of parameter estimates. A parameter estimate is said to be significant at the 5 per cent level, if the range of the values encompassed by its 95 per cent confidence interval are either all positive or all negative. This means that there is less than a 5 per cent chance that the association we have found between the dependent variable and the independent variable is simply the result of sampling error and does not reflect a relationship that actually exists in the general population.

International Social Survey Programme

The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is run by a group of research organisations, each of which undertakes to field annually an agreed module of questions on a chosen topic area. SASAS 2003 represents the formalisation of

South Africa's inclusion in the ISSP, the intention being to include the module in one of the SASAS questionnaires in each round of interviewing. Each module is chosen for repetition at intervals to allow comparisons both between countries (membership currently stands at 40) and over time. In 2003, the chosen subject was national identity, and the module was carried in version 2 of the questionnaire (Qs.152–203).

Appendix 2: Notes on the tabulations in chapters

1. Figures in the tables are from the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey unless otherwise indicated.
2. Tables are percentaged as indicated.
3. When findings based on the responses of fewer than 100 respondents are reported in the text, reference is generally made to the small base size.
4. The bases shown in the tables (the number of respondents who answered the question) are printed in small italics.

Appendix 3: The questionnaires

SASAS Questionnaire Version 1:	SASAS Questionnaire Version 2:
Cover & Respondent selection	
Household Roster	
Democracy and Governance [q.1–q.31]	
National Identity [q.32–q.60]	
Public services (Education and Health) [q.61–q.125]	
Moral issues [q.126–q.130]	
Poverty and Inequality [q.131–q.180]	Communication [q.130–q.151]
Generational and Gender Attitudes and Family/ Household Violence [q.181–q.232]	National Identity (ISSP Module) [q.152–q.203]
Crime [q.233–q.244 in Q1; q.204–q.217 in Q2]	
Voting (short) [q.247–q.268]	Local government and Voting (long) [q.232–q.253]
Demographics and other classificatory variables [q.269–q.318 in Q1; q.254–q.305 in Q2]	
Nature of families & family authority [q.319–q.324 in Q1; q.306–q.311 in Q2]	

SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL ATTITUDES SURVEY
Questionnaire 1: August 2003

HSRC

RESPONDENTS AGED 16 YEARS +

Good (morning/afternoon/evening), I'm _____ and we are conducting a survey for the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). The HSRC regularly conducts surveys of opinion amongst the South African population. Topics include a wide range of social matters such as communications, politics, education, unemployment, the problems of the aged and inter-group relations. As a follow-up to this earlier work, we would like to ask you questions on a variety of subjects that are of national importance. To obtain reliable, scientific information we request that you answer the questions that follow as honestly as possible. Your opinion is important in this research. The area in which you live and you yourself have been selected randomly for the purpose of this survey. The fact that you have been chosen is thus quite coincidental. The information you give to us will be kept confidential. You and your household members will not be identified by name or address in any of the reports we plan to write.

PARTICULARS OF VISITS

	DAY MONTH	TIME STARTED HR	TIME STARTED MIN	TIME COMPLETED HR	TIME COMPLETED MIN	**RESPONSE	
First visit	/ / 2003						
Second visit	/ / 2003						
Third visit	/ / 2003						

**RESPONSE CODES		
Completed questionnaire	=	01
Partially completed questionnaire (specify reason)	=	02
Revisit		
Appointment made	=	03
Selected respondent not at home	=	04
No one home	=	05
Do not qualify		
Vacant house/flat/stand/not a house or flat/demolished	=	06
No person qualifies according to the survey specifications	=	07
Respondent cannot communicate with interviewer because of language	=	08
Respondent is physically/mentally not fit to be interviewed	=	09
Refusals		
Contact person refused	=	10
Interview refused by selected respondent	=	11
Interview refused by parent	=	12
Interview refused by other household member	=	13
OFFICE USE		
	=	14

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Name of Interviewer .....

Number of interviewer ☐☐☐
Checked by ☐

Signature of supervisor _____

FIELDWORK CONTROL

CONTROL	YES	NO	REMARKS
Personal	1	2	
Telephonic	1	2	
Name	SIGNATURE		
.....	DATE ...../...../.....2003		

RESPONDENT SELECTION PROCEDURE

Number of households at visiting point ☐☐

Number of persons 16 years and older at visiting point ☐☐

Please list all persons at the visiting point/on the stand who are 16 years and older and were resident 15 out of the past 30 days. Once this is completed, use the Kish grid on the next page to determine which person is to be interviewed.

Names of Persons Aged 16 and Older	
	01
	02
	03
	04
	05
	06
	07
	08
	09
	10
	11
	12
	13
	14
	15
	16
	17
	18
	19
	20
	21
	22
	23
	24
	25

NAME OF RESPONDENT:
ADDRESS OF RESPONDENT:
....
TEL NO.:

ii

GRID TO SELECT RESPONDENT

NUMBER OF QUESTION-NAIRE				NUMBER OF PERSONS FROM WHICH RESPONDENT MUST BE DRAWN																						
				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	26	51	76	1	1	1	3	2	4	1	3	5	8	6	5	12	10	1	6	8	7	19	19	13	21	13	24	25
2	27	52	77	1	2	3	4	3	1	2	2	3	4	8	3	7	2	5	14	4	15	4	8	6	16	14	22	19
3	28	53	78	1	1	2	1	4	2	7	6	9	3	5	11	2	1	3	11	7	10	16	16	10	5	2	2	3
4	29	54	79	1	2	3	2	1	3	5	8	6	2	4	2	4	8	11	10	16	6	9	10	15	11	12	11	18
5	30	55	80	1	1	1	4	5	6	3	5	7	5	9	8	14	3	2	13	5	18	1	4	1	20	11	5	24
6	31	56	81	1	2	2	2	3	5	8	7	8	7	1	4	9	14	8	2	17	17	14	12	14	22	10	3	14
7	32	57	82	1	2	1	1	4	1	4	1	4	6	3	6	5	7	13	9	2	3	13	14	8	2	7	20	4
8	33	58	83	1	1	2	3	2	5	1	4	2	1	7	10	6	5	4	15	10	5	2	13	4	17	5	17	8
9	34	59	84	1	1	3	2	5	6	2	2	1	9	10	1	10	4	6	6	1	9	10	1	5	6	9	1	12
10	35	60	85	1	2	2	4	1	3	3	6	9	10	11	12	3	9	15	7	8	11	6	3	9	4	3	10	1
11	36	61	86	1	1	1	3	1	4	5	3	1	6	2	9	13	11	14	4	11	4	15	15	17	1	1	23	2
12	37	62	87	1	2	3	1	3	2	7	5	6	5	7	7	8	6	10	3	3	1	12	20	7	13	22	12	16
13	38	63	88	1	1	2	1	5	3	6	4	3	4	6	2	11	13	12	1	15	8	7	2	12	15	21	13	7
14	39	64	89	1	2	3	2	4	1	4	7	8	2	5	6	11	12	9	16	13	16	11	18	18	14	16	18	23
15	40	65	90	1	2	1	4	2	4	3	8	7	7	11	1	3	5	7	12	14	13	8	17	20	19	20	19	11
16	41	66	91	1	1	3	3	1	6	5	1	5	9	10	3	2	11	13	8	12	12	5	6	21	8	8	4	15
17	42	67	92	1	1	2	2	3	4	2	6	2	3	2	12	5	2	10	13	5	8	18	9	16	10	17	16	20
18	43	68	93	1	2	1	4	2	6	4	1	4	8	9	10	7	9	3	12	12	9	7	20	19	9	19	21	13
19	44	69	94	1	2	2	1	3	5	2	8	9	10	4	9	8	13	1	1	14	10	19	10	11	18	15	7	6
20	45	70	95	1	1	3	2	5	4	1	3	8	1	3	8	6	6	9	5	7	13	4	15	1	7	22	15	21
21	46	71	96	1	1	1	2	5	1	7	2	3	2	1	11	4	7	5	3	2	1	3	12	18	5	19	14	9
22	47	72	97	1	2	1	3	1	3	2	6	2	1	8	7	1	4	2	11	8	2	17	4	17	21	16	3	5
23	48	73	98	1	2	3	4	2	2	6	7	7	8	3	4	9	3	6	2	11	11	16	2	8	11	23	6	22
24	49	74	99	1	1	2	1	4	6	3	5	5	3	1	5	13	1	14	8	14	6	15	9	14	3	6	9	17
25	50	75	100	1	1	2	3	3	2	4	6	4	7	5	3	12	12	12	4	6	2	17	11	2	12	4	8	10

SASAS QUESTIONNAIRE 1: 2003

Number of persons in this household
Number of persons 16 years and older in this household

INTERVIEWER: PLEASE CIRCLE APPROPRIATE CODES

Household schedule	Write in from oldest (top) to youngest (bottom)		Age in completed years	Sex M=1 F=2	Race Group	Relationship to respondent
Please list all persons in the household who eat from the same cooking pot and who were resident 15 out of the past 30 days.		01				
		02				
		03				
		04				
		05				
		06				
		07				
		08				
		09				
Note: Circle the number next to the name of the household head.		10				
		11				
		12				
		13				
		14				
		15				
		16				
		17				
		18				
		19				
		20				
		21				
		22				
		23				
		24				
		25				

Race Group codes
1 = Black African
2 = Coloured
3 = Indian/Asian
4 = White
5 = Other

Relationship to respondent codes
1 = Respondent
2 = Wife or husband or partner
3 = Son or daughter
4 = Father or mother
5 = Brother or sister
6 = Grandchild
7 = Grandparent
8 = Mother- or father-in-law
9 = Son- or daughter-in-law
10 = Brother- or sister-in-law
11 = Other relation
12 = Non-relation

DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE

1. Please tell me what you think are the 3 most important challenges facing South Africa today?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out

HIV/AIDS	01
Unemployment	02
Racism	03
Xenophobia	04
Crime and safety	05
Service provision/delivery	06
Affordable housing	07
Land reform issues	08
Human rights	09
Education	10
Economic and financial issues	11
Work-related issues	12
Family and youth issues	13
Religion and culture issues	14
Environmental issues	15
Political issues	16
Corruption	17
Poverty	18
Other (specify)	19
Do not know	20

Since the 1999 general election, has life improved, stayed the same or gotten worse for…?

		Improved	Stayed the same	Gotten worse	Do not know
2.	Most people in South Africa	1	2	3	4
3.	People like you	1	2	3	4

Do you think that life will improve, stay the same or get worse in the next 5 years for…?

		Improve	Stay the same	Get worse	Do not know
4.	Most people in South Africa	1	2	3	4
5.	People like you	1	2	3	4

6. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy is working in South Africa? [Showcard 1]

Very satisfied	1
Satisfied	2
Neither nor	3
Dissatisfied	4
Very dissatisfied	5
Do not know	6

Let's think about government in the provinces. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
7.	They stop national government from becoming too powerful.	1	2	3	4	5	6
8.	They are a waste of taxpayers' money.	1	2	3	4	5	6
9.	They bring government closer to the people.	1	2	3	4	5	6
10.	They make sure that national government distributes resources fairly around the country.	1	2	3	4	5	6

Indicate the extent to which you trust or distrust the following institutions in South Africa at present. [Showcard 8]

	Institutions	Strongly trust	Trust	Neither nor	Distrust	Strongly distrust	Do not know
11.	National government	1	2	3	4	5	6
12.	Courts	1	2	3	4	5	6
13.	The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)	1	2	3	4	5	6
14.	Your provincial government	1	2	3	4	5	6
15.	The SABC	1	2	3	4	5	6
16.	Parliament	1	2	3	4	5	6
17.	The police	1	2	3	4	5	6
18.	Defence force	1	2	3	4	5	6
19.	Big business	1	2	3	4	5	6
20.	Your local government	1	2	3	4	5	6
21.	Churches	1	2	3	4	5	6

22. Do you have a ward committee in your neighbourhood?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Yes	1
No	2
Do not know	3
Never heard of a ward committee	4

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way that the government is handling the following matters in your neighbourhood? [Showcard 1]

		Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neither nor	Dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	Do not know
23.	Supply of water and sanitation	1	2	3	4	5	6
24.	Providing electricity	1	2	3	4	5	6
25.	Removal of refuse	1	2	3	4	5	6
26.	Affordable housing	1	2	3	4	5	6
27.	Access to health care	1	2	3	4	5	6
28.	Treatment for sexually transmitted infections (STIs), including HIV/AIDS	1	2	3	4	5	6
29.	Cutting crime	1	2	3	4	5	6
30.	Creating jobs	1	2	3	4	5	6
31.	Land reform	1	2	3	4	5	6

NATIONAL IDENTITY

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
32.	People of different racial groups do not really trust or like each other.	1	2	3	4	5	6
33.	People of different racial groups will never really trust or like each other.	1	2	3	4	5	6

34. How about you? Are there any racial groups in South Africa that you do not trust or like?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Yes	1		
No	2	→	Skip to Q. 36
Do not know	3	→	Skip to Q. 36
Refused to answer	4	→	Skip to Q. 36

35. If the answer is yes, which race groups in South Africa do you not trust or like? [multiple response]

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Black African	01
White	02
Coloured	03
Indian/Asian	04
Other Asian	05
Jew	06
Sesotho	07
Setswana	08
Sepedi	09
Siswati	10
IsiNdebele	11
IsiXhosa	12
IsiZulu	13
Xitsonga	14
Tshivenda/Lemba	15
English-speaking white	16
Afrikaans-speaking white	17
Other African language	18
European language	19
Non-South African African	20
Indian language	21
Other (specify)	22
Don't know	23
Refused to answer	24

To what extent do you feel attached to the following types of people? [Showcard 5]

		Very attached	Slightly attached	Not very attached	Not at all attached	Do not know
36.	Those who speak the same language as you	1	2	3	4	5
37.	Those who belong to the same race group as you	1	2	3	4	5
38.	Those who are in the same financial position as you	1	2	3	4	5
39.	Those who live in your neighbourhood	1	2	3	4	5

40. Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Yes	1	
No	2	→ Skip to Q. 43
Do not know	3	→ Skip to Q. 43

On what grounds is your group discriminated against? PROBE: 'What other grounds?' (Circle two options – one per column)

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

	41. Option 1	**42. Option 2**
Colour or race	01	01
Nationality	02	02
Religion	03	03
Language	04	04
Age	05	05
Gender	06	06
Sexual preference	07	07
Education	08	08
Disability	09	09
Unemployed	10	10
Region or province	11	11
Other	12	12
Do not know	13	13

43. Please indicate which of the following statements applies to you? I generally welcome to South Africa...

All immigrants	1
Some immigrants	2
No immigrants	3

44. Which, if any, group would you <u>least</u> want to come and live in South Africa? (Choose one group only)

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Africans	1	
Europeans	2	
Americans	3	
Indians	4	
Other Asians	5	
Australians	6	
Returning South Africans	7	
Other (specify)	8	
None (welcome all groups)	9	→ Skip to Q. 48

5

Thinking of the group you just mentioned, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
45.	The group presents a threat in terms of job opportunities.	1	2	3	4	5	6
46.	The group presents a threat in terms of crime.	1	2	3	4	5	6
47.	The group presents a threat to my culture and lifestyle.	1	2	3	4	5	6

48. South Africa used to have apartheid by law between white, black African, coloured and Indian/Asian people. Since 1994, do you think that race relations in the country have improved, remained the same, or deteriorated?

Improved	1
Stayed the same	2
Got worse	3
Do not know	4

49. How often do you feel racially discriminated against?

Fieldworker: Read out options.

Always	1	
Often	2	
Sometimes	3	
Not at all	4	→ Skip to Q. 51
Do not know	5	→ Skip to Q. 51

50. Where has this racial discrimination happened to you most recently? (Only 1 answer)

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

At work	01
At an educational institution	02
In shops	03
On the roads or on the streets	04
When applying for a job	05
In a government department	06
In social clubs	07
In theatres	08
In restaurants	09
In sport	10
Elsewhere	11
Everywhere	12
Not applicable	13

Here are some statements about racism in South Africa. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each. [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
51.	Most white people in South Africa have racist attitudes.	1	2	3	4	5	6
52.	Most coloured people in South Africa have racist attitudes.	1	2	3	4	5	6
53.	Most black African people in South Africa have racist attitudes.	1	2	3	4	5	6
54.	Most Indian/Asian people in South Africa have racist attitudes.	1	2	3	4	5	6

Here are a few things that the government in South Africa might do to deal with the problems of black South Africans. To what extent do you agree or disagree that government should... [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
55.	Give preferential contracts and tax breaks to black businesses?	1	2	3	4	5	6
56.	Redistribute land to black South Africans?	1	2	3	4	5	6
57.	Pay money to the victims of apartheid as reparation for the history of discrimination?	1	2	3	4	5	6

Some people think black South Africans have been discriminated against, and government should help them while others are against special treatment for black South Africans. To what extent do you agree or disagree that there should be... [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
58.	Racial quotas in national sports teams?	1	2	3	4	5	6
59.	Preferential hiring and promotion of Black African South Africans in employment?	1	2	3	4	5	6
60.	Preferential hiring and promotion of women in employment?	1	2	3	4	5	6

PUBLIC SERVICES

EDUCATION

61. Up to what level do you believe it should be compulsory for all learners to attend school?

Fieldworker: Please circle ONE box only.

Up to and including grade 3 (Std.1)	1
Up to and including grade 7 (Std.5)	2
Up to and including grade 9 (Std.7)	3
Up to and including grade 12 (Matric)	4
School attendance should not be made compulsory at any level	5
Do not know	6

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
62.	All schools should contain children of different races.	1	2	3	4	5	6
63.	All schools should contain children of different languages.	1	2	3	4	5	6
64.	Children of different religions, or of no religion, should be educated separately.	1	2	3	4	5	6
65.	Girls and boys should be educated separately.	1	2	3	4	5	6
66.	The children of the economically well-off and the poor should be educated together.	1	2	3	4	5	6

How important are each of the following statements about the aims of education? [Showcard 3]

		Very important	Important	Neither nor	Not important	Very unimportant	Do not know
67.	To improve the child's chances in the search for a good job.	1	2	3	4	5	6
68.	To enable the child to think critically and independently.	1	2	3	4	5	6
69.	To keep children off the streets and out of harm's way.	1	2	3	4	5	6
70.	To help children to become better citizens of South Africa.	1	2	3	4	5	6
71.	To help children to get along with each other, however different their backgrounds may be.	1	2	3	4	5	6

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
72.	I respect teachers for their dedicated service to children and the community.	1	2	3	4	5	6
73.	Teachers should not be allowed to take actions that damage their teaching role, like going on strike.	1	2	3	4	5	6

What do you think should be the main language of instruction in…?

		English	Home language of the learner	Afrikaans	Do not know
74.	Grades 1 to 3 (Grade 1 – Std. 1)	1	2	3	3
75.	Grades 4 to 9 (Std. 2 – Std. 7)	1	2	3	3
76.	Grades 10 to 12 (Std. 8 – Matric)	1	2	3	3
77.	Higher education (university, college, technikon)	1	2	3	3

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following methods of keeping discipline in schools? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
78.	Reasoning and discussion with learner.	1	2	3	4	5	6
79.	Corporal punishment by the teacher in class.	1	2	3	4	5	6
80.	Corporal punishment by the principal only.	1	2	3	4	5	6
81.	Physical labour like digging holes or sweeping.	1	2	3	4	5	6
82.	Keeping learner in school after official hours.	1	2	3	4	5	6
83.	Additional learning tasks like doing extra homework or writing essays.	1	2	3	4	5	6

84. If you were in a position to make decisions about the spending of extra money on the local high schools around here, which one of these would be your top priority?

Fieldworker: Read out options. One response only.

Library and library books	1
Science and technology equipment	2
Sports and recreation	3
Extra teachers	4
Free school meals	5

85. Compulsory religious sessions / meetings have no place in school. [Showcard 2]

Strongly agree	1
Agree	2
Neither nor	3
Disagree	4
Strongly disagree	5

People have different views regarding the importance of education to boys as compared to girls. How much would you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
86.	Educating girls to a high level is of no use.	1	2	3	4	5	6
87.	Girls should be educated so that they can operate on equal terms with boys in the modern world.	1	2	3	4	5	6

88. If a child completes matric successfully there is a wide range of paths he/she can take. Which one of these statements comes closest to your view about the path a child should be encouraged to take?

***Fieldworker*: Read out options.**

Try to continue studies at university	1
Try to continue studies at technikon	2
Try to do other short courses	3
Try and get a job	4
Take time off to travel, do voluntary work or other activity before committing to a job or further study	5

HEALTH STATUS, HIV/AIDS AND HEALTH BEHAVIOUR

89. How would you rate your health at present?

Very poor	1
Poor	2
Average	3
Good	4
Excellent	5

Have you ever been diagnosed by a health professional to have any of the following five diseases?

		Never	During last 3 months	During last 6 months	During last year	More than one year ago
90.	Hypertension/high blood pressure	1	2	3	4	5
91.	Tuberculosis (TB)	1	2	3	4	5
92.	Malaria	1	2	3	4	5
93.	Sexually transmitted infections (including HIV/AIDS)	1	2	3	4	5
94.	Mental illness	1	2	3	4	5

95. In this household, is there anyone that is too sick or disabled to cope on their own?

Yes	1
No	2

CHANGES IN HEALTH-RELATED BEHAVIOUR

96. Have you received any nutritional supplements during the past 12 months?

Yes	1
No	2

97. Did you regularly (at least 15 minutes three times per week) do physical and fitness exercises during the past 12 months?

Yes	1
No	2

Do you do any of the following activities?

		Often	Sometimes	Never
98.	Drink alcohol	1	2	3
99.	Smoke cigarettes	1	2	3
100.	Smoke dagga (marijuana)	1	2	3
101.	Use mandrax	1	2	3
102.	Inject drugs into your body	1	2	3

Suppose you were advising a person on how to improve his or her health generally. Please tell me how important are the following to his or her health generally. [Showcard 3]

[Fieldworker: Read out]		Very important	Important	Neither nor	Not important	Very unimportant	Do not know
103.	Not to smoke	1	2	3	4	5	6
104.	Drink less/no alcohol	1	2	3	4	5	6
105.	Take more exercise	1	2	3	4	5	6
106.	Eat more fruit and vegetables	1	2	3	4	5	6
107.	Eat less fatty food	1	2	3	4	5	6
108.	Take less sugar	1	2	3	4	5	6
109.	Try to reduce stress	1	2	3	4	5	6
110.	No drugs	1	2	3	4	5	6
111.	Other (specify)	1	2	3	4	5	6

HIV/AIDS

112. Do you personally know someone who you think or know has died of AIDS?

Yes	1
No	2

113. In the past year, have you attended a funeral of a person who is said to have died of AIDS?

Yes	1
No	2

I AM NOW GOING TO ASK YOU A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR VIEWS ON PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
114.	I would sleep in the same room as someone with HIV/AIDS.	1	2	3	4	5	6
115.	I would share a meal with someone who is HIV positive.	1	2	3	4	5	6
116.	I would talk to someone with HIV/AIDS.	1	2	3	4	5	6
117.	I would treat a family member with HIV/AIDS well.	1	2	3	4	5	6
118.	I would not get infected by being in the same room as an infected person.	1	2	3	4	5	6
119.	Health workers should write in medical records that a person is HIV positive.	1	2	3	4	5	6
120.	Health workers should write on a death notification form that a person died of HIV/AIDS-related illnesses.	1	2	3	4	5	6

QUALITY OF HEALTH SERVICES

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the following aspects of government health services in your area? [Showcard 1]

	Aspect	Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neither nor	Dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	Do not know
121.	The amount of time patients wait before getting served.	1	2	3	4	5	6
122.	The way patients are treated by doctors.	1	2	3	4	5	6
123.	The way patients are treated by nurses.	1	2	3	4	5	6
124.	The availability of medicines at the hospital or clinic for both in- and out-patients.	1	2	3	4	5	6
125.	Availability of emergency services such as ambulances and emergency departments at hospitals.	1	2	3	4	5	6

MORAL ISSUES

126. Do you think it is wrong or not wrong if a man and a woman have sexual relations before marriage? [Showcard 7]

Not wrong at all	1
Wrong only sometimes	2
Almost always wrong	3
Always wrong	4
Cannot choose	5

127. Do you think it is wrong or not wrong for two adults of the same sex to have sexual relations? [Showcard 7]

Not wrong at all	1
Wrong only sometimes	2
Almost always wrong	3
Always wrong	4
Cannot choose	5

Do you personally think it is wrong or not wrong for a woman to have an abortion... [Showcard 7]

		Not wrong at all	Wrong only sometimes	Almost always wrong	Always wrong	Do not know
128.	If there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby?	1	2	3	4	5
129.	If the family has a low income and cannot afford any more children?	1	2	3	4	5

130. People convicted of murder should be subject to the death penalty. Do you... [Showcard 2]

Strongly agree	1
Agree	2
Neither nor	3
Disagree	4
Strongly disagree	5
Do not know	6

POVERTY

In the last year (i.e. since July 2002), did any of the following happen to you because of a shortage of money?

		Yes	No
131.	Could not pay clothing/furniture account on time	1	2
132.	Asked for financial help from family	1	2
133.	Asked for financial help from friends	1	2
134.	Borrowed from a *mashonisa* or moneylender	1	2

135. Suppose you had only one week to find R500 for an emergency. Which of the following best describes how hard it would be for you to get that money?

Fieldworker: Read out options.

I could easily raise the money	1	
I could raise the money, but it would be very difficult	2	
I doubt whether I could raise the money	3	
None of the above	4	→ Skip to Q. 137

136. Which is the one main source from which you would raise that money?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Use savings	1
Borrow from a relative	2
Borrow from a friend	3
Borrow from employer	4
Borrow from a bank/credit card	5
Borrow from a *mashonisa* or moneylender	6
Sell or pawn an asset	7
Steal	8
Use some other method to find the money	9

In deciding how much people ought to earn, how important should each of these things be in your opinion? [Showcard 3]

		Very important	Important	Neither nor	Not important	Very unimportant	Do not know
137.	The amount of responsibility that goes with the job	1	2	3	4	5	6
138.	Their skills or qualifications	1	2	3	4	5	6
139.	Their work experience	1	2	3	4	5	6
140.	Whether the job requires supervising others	1	2	3	4	5	6
141.	Whether the person has children to support	1	2	3	4	5	6
142.	How well he or she does the job	1	2	3	4	5	6
143.	How hard he or she works at the job	1	2	3	4	5	6

144. To get all the way to the top of business in South Africa today, you have to be corrupt. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? [Showcard 2]

Strongly agree	1
Agree	2
Neither nor	3
Disagree	4
Strongly disagree	5
Can't choose	6

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
145.	People with higher incomes can pay for better health care than people with lower incomes.	1	2	3	4	5	6
146.	People with higher incomes can pay for better education for their children than people with lower incomes.	1	2	3	4	5	6

In all countries, there are differences or even tensions between different social groups. In your opinion, how much tension is there between the following groups in South Africa?

		Strong tension	Some tension	Not much tension	No tension	Do not know
147.	Poor people and rich people	1	2	3	4	5
148.	Employed and unemployed	1	2	3	4	5
149.	Management and workers	1	2	3	4	5
150.	Young people and older people	1	2	3	4	5
151.	People of different races	1	2	3	4	5

152. Think about the area in which you live. How strong is your preference to continue living in this area?

Strong preference to stay	1
Moderate preference to stay	2
Unsure	3
Moderate preference to leave	4
Strong preference to leave	5

How often do the following things happen in your local neighbourhood?

		Never	Rarely	Often	Do not know
153.	People helping each other	1	2	3	4
154.	People doing things together	1	2	3	4
155.	People being aggressive	1	2	3	4
156.	Burglary and theft	1	2	3	4

157. Would you say that you and your family are...?

Fieldworker: Read out options.

Wealthy	1
Very comfortable	2
Reasonably comfortable	3
Just getting along	4
Poor	5
Very poor	6

How satisfied are you about the following? [Showcard 1]

		Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neither nor	Dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	Do not know
158.	The income of your household	1	2	3	4	5	6
159.	Your dwelling	1	2	3	4	5	6
160.	How much work you can get	1	2	3	4	5	6
161.	Amount of paid holidays	1	2	3	4	5	6
162.	Your life as a whole these days	1	2	3	4	5	6

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
163.	My household is able to get enough food for its needs.	1	2	3	4	5	6
164.	My household's income is adequate for our needs.	1	2	3	4	5	6
165.	The best things in life cannot be bought with money.	1	2	3	4	5	6
166.	In South Africa incomes are too unequal.	1	2	3	4	5	6
167.	Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.	1	2	3	4	5	6
168.	Government's duty is to provide employment.	1	2	3	4	5	6

Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life. [Showcard 3]

		Very important	Important	Neither nor	Not important	Very unimportant	Do not know
169.	Family	1	2	3	4	5	6
170.	Friends	1	2	3	4	5	6
171.	Income	1	2	3	4	5	6
172.	Health	1	2	3	4	5	6
173.	Leisure time	1	2	3	4	5	6
174.	Paid work	1	2	3	4	5	6
175.	Religion	1	2	3	4	5	6
176.	Politics	1	2	3	4	5	6

177. When you compare your, or your household's, income with others, who do you compare mostly with? [circle one option only]

***Fieldworker*: Do NOT read out options.**

Neighbours	01
Brothers or sisters	02
Parents	03
Other relatives	04
Others in the village	05
People in the township	06
People in rural areas	07
People in the cities	08
People in South Africa as a whole	09
Work colleagues	10
Don't know	11

178. Taking all things together, would you say you are…? [Showcard 4]

Very happy	1	→	Skip to Q. 180
Happy	2	→	Skip to Q. 180
Neither nor	3	→	Skip to Q. 180
Not happy	4		
Not at all happy	5		
Do not know	6	→	Skip to Q. 180

179. If your answer to Q178 is 'not happy' or 'not at all happy', what is the main reason?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Low income	1
Worry about making ends meet in the future	2
Ill-health	3
Family problems	4
Personal problems	5
Other	6

180. How does your household income compare with other households in your village / neighbourhood?

Fieldworker: Read out options.

Much above average income	1
Above average income	2
Average income	3
Below average income	4
Much below average income	5
Don't know	6

GENERATIONAL AND GENDER ATTITUDES AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

181. What is your current marital status?

Married	1	→	Skip to Q. 183
Widower/widow	2		
Divorced	3		
Separated	4		
Never married	5		

182. Do you live together with a partner?

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable (living together with spouse)	3

ATTITUDES TO REARING CHILDREN

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

Fieldworker: Please circle one box on each line.

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
183.	A child younger than 5 years is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.	1	2	3	4	5	6
184.	Men ought to do a larger share of childcare than they do now.	1	2	3	4	5	6
185.	One parent can bring up a child as well as two parents can.	1	2	3	4	5	6
186.	Children need the discipline that a father can give.	1	2	3	4	5	6
187.	Children who grow up with only a mother are likely to be spoilt.	1	2	3	4	5	6

188. Who usually makes/made the decisions about how to bring up your children?
(Fieldworker: If there are no children in the household, skip to question 189.)

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Mostly me	1
Mostly my spouse/partner	2
Sometimes me/sometimes my spouse/partner	3
We decide/decided together	4
Someone else	5
Not applicable (no children)	6

CHILD DISCIPLINE

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

Fieldworker: Please circle one box on each line.

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
189.	Parents will spoil their children by picking them up and comforting them when they cry.	1	2	3	4	5	6
190.	If you leave children to cope on their own, they will often grow up to be more independent.	1	2	3	4	5	6
191.	Children should never be spanked when they misbehave.	1	2	3	4	5	6
192.	Children who are crying are usually best ignored.	1	2	3	4	5	6
193.	When children do wrong, it is always better to talk to them about it than to give them a smack.	1	2	3	4	5	6
194.	Children should be forced to accept that their parents are in charge.	1	2	3	4	5	6
195.	Young children who are hugged and kissed usually grow up to be “sissies”.	1	2	3	4	5	6

196. When was the last time you or your partner smacked one of the children in your family once with a hand?

(Fieldworker: If there are no children in the household, skip to question 200.)

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

It has happened in the past week	1		
It has happened in the past month	2	→	Skip to Q. 198
It has happened in the past 6 months	3	→	Skip to Q. 198
It has happened in the past year	4	→	Skip to Q. 198
It happened longer than a year ago	5	→	Skip to Q. 198
Children in this household never get smacked	6	→	Skip to Q. 200
Not applicable (no children in family)	7	→	Skip to Q. 200

197. If it happened in the last week, how old was the child _____?

198. When was the last time you or your partner beat one of the children in your family with a strap, a belt, a stick or a similar object?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

It has happened in the past week	1		
It has happened in the past month	2	→	Skip to Q. 200
It has happened in the past 6 months	3	→	Skip to Q. 200
It has happened in the past year	4	→	Skip to Q. 200
It has only happened rarely	5	→	Skip to Q. 200
Children in this household never get smacked with such objects	6	→	Skip to Q. 200
Not applicable (no children in family)	7	→	Skip to Q. 200

199. If it happened in the last week, how old was the child _____?

GENDER ROLES

200. How often do you and your spouse/partner argue about the sharing of household work?

(Fieldworker: If the person is single, skip to question 207.)

Fieldworker: Read out options.

Several times a week	1		
Several times a month	2		
Several times a year	3		
Less often/rarely	4		
Never	5		
Do not know	6		
Not applicable (no spouse/partner)	7	→	Skip to Q. 207

When you and your spouse/partner make decisions about the following, who has the final say?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

		Mostly me	Mostly my spouse/ partner	Sometimes me/ sometimes my spouse/partner	We decide together	Someone else
201.	Choosing shared leisure activities	1	2	3	4	5
202.	Buying furniture for the home	1	2	3	4	5
203.	Buying children's clothes	1	2	3	4	5
204.	Treatment for sick family members	1	2	3	4	5
205.	Shopping for groceries	1	2	3	4	5
206.	How to discipline children	1	2	3	4	5

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
207.	A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children.	1	2	3	4	5	6
208.	Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.	1	2	3	4	5	6
209.	Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person.	1	2	3	4	5	6
210.	Both the man and woman should contribute to the household income.	1	2	3	4	5	6
211.	A woman's job is to look after the home and family rather than go out to work.	1	2	3	4	5	6
212.	A man who is not bringing money into the household is a loser.	1	2	3	4	5	6
213.	Most men spend their earnings on clothes and other things for themselves.	1	2	3	4	5	6

INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE

No matter how well a couple gets along there are times when they disagree, get annoyed with each other, fight because they are in a bad mood or tired. Couples have many different ways of trying to settle their differences.

Please circle how many times you did each of the following things in the past year, and how many times your partner did them to you in the past year.

If you or your partner did not do one of these things in the past year but it happened before that, circle '7'.

(If no partner, skip to Q. 233.)

Fieldworker: Please circle one box on each line.

		Once	Twice	3–5 times	6–10 times	11–20 times	More than 20 times	Not in past year, but happened before	Never happened
214.	I threw something at my partner that could hurt.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
215.	My partner did this to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
216.	I twisted my partner's arm or hair.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
217.	My partner did this to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
218.	I pushed or shoved my partner.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
219.	My partner did this to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
220.	I used a knife or a gun on my partner.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
221.	My partner did this to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
222.	I punched or hit my partner with something that could hurt.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
223.	My partner did this to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
224.	I slammed my partner against the wall.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
225.	My partner did this to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
226.	I slapped my partner.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
227.	My partner did this to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
228.	I burned or scalded my partner on purpose.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
229.	My partner did this to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
230.	I kicked my partner.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
231.	My partner did this to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

232. Fieldworker: Record whether this section was self-completed by the respondent or whether it was completed by means of face-to-face interview.

Completed by respondent (self-response)	1
Administered by fieldworker (face-to-face interview)	2

CRIME

In the last 6 months was this household or any member of this household a victim of the following crimes?

		Yes	No
	PROPERTY CRIME		
233.	Residential burglary (illegal entry of a home to commit a crime)	1	2
234.	Robbery with aggravating circumstances (use of a weapon, e.g. knife, gun, to obtain property/possessions)	1	2
235.	Vehicle theft (theft of a vehicle when not occupied)	1	2
236.	Theft from vehicle	1	2
237.	Stock theft (illegal obtaining of all forms of livestock)	1	2
	VIOLENT CRIME		
238.	Hijacking or attempted hijacking of vehicle (theft of a vehicle when occupied)	1	2
239.	Murder (killing of a human being with malice)	1	2
240.	Gang-related violence (a crime in which a gang member or members are the perpetrators or the victims)	1	2
241.	Attempted murder (action caused serious injury or could have caused death)	1	2
242.	Common assault (action caused injury that is not life-threatening)	1	2
243.	Rape (forced to have sex against will)	1	2
244.	Indecent assault (hurt someone [man, woman or child] in a sexual or indecent way)	1	2

In the last 6 months has any member of this household been exposed to...?

		Yes	No
245.	Corruption by public officials	1	2
246.	Drug-related crime	1	2

DEMOCRACY (PART 2)

247. For which party did you vote in the 1999 national election?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	01
African National Congress (ANC)	02
Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging (AEB)	03
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	04
Democratic Party/Alliance (DP/DA)	05
Freedom Front/Vryheidsfront (FF/VF)	06
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	07
Minority Front (MF)	08
New National Party (NNP)	09
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)	10
South African Communist Party (SACP)	11
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)	12
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	13
Other (specify)	14
Did not vote	15
Uncertain	16
Don't know	17
Refuse to answer	18

248. If you did not vote in the 1999 election, please state the main reason for your not voting.

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Too young	01
Not interested	02
Not registered	03
Disillusioned with politics	04
Too much effort required	05
Polling station too far away	06
Fear of intimidation or violence	07
Only one party could win	08
Health reasons/sick	09
Other (specify)	10

249. For which party do you plan to vote in the next national election?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	01
African National Congress (ANC)	02
Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging (AEB)	03
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	04
Democratic Party/Alliance (DA/DP)	05
Freedom Front/Vryheidsfront (FF/VF)	06
Independent Democrats (ID)	07
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	08
Minority Front (MF)	09
New National Party (NNP)	10
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)	11
South African Communist Party (SACP)	12
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)	13
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	14
Other (specify)	15
Will not vote	16
Uncertain	17
Don't know	18
Refuse to answer	19

250. If answered 16 in Q. 249: What is your main reason for thinking that you will not vote in the 2004 election?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Too young	01
Not interested	02
Not registered	03
Disillusioned with politics	04
Too much effort required	05
Polling station too far away	06
Fear of intimidation or violence	07
Only one party could win	08
Health reasons/sick	09
Other (specify)	10

251. If 1 to 15 in Q. 249: To which other party do you feel close?
(Fieldworker: This should NOT be the same party as mentioned in Q. 249.)

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	01
African National Congress (ANC)	02
Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging (AEB)	03
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	04
Democratic Party/Alliance (DA/DP)	05
Freedom Front/Vryheidsfront (FF/VF)	06
Independent Democrats (ID)	07
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	08
Minority Front (MF)	09
New National Party (NNP)	10
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)	11
South African Communist Party (SACP)	12
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)	13
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	14
Other (specify)	15
No other party	16
Refuse	17

252. If 16 to 19 in Q. 249, to which party do you feel most close?

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	01
African National Congress (ANC)	02
Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging (AEB)	03
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	04
Democratic Party/Alliance (DA/DP)	05
Freedom Front/Vryheidsfront (FF/VF)	06
Independent Democrats (ID)	07
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	08
Minority Front (MF)	09
New National Party (NNP)	10
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)	11
South African Communist Party (SACP)	12
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)	13
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	14
Other (specify)	15
No party	16
Refuse	17

253. How often do you talk about politics?

Very often	1
Often	2
Occasionally	3
Very seldom	4
Never	5

How close or distant do you feel to each of the country's four largest political parties?

Fieldworker: Read out each party name.

	Political party	Very close	Close	Neutral	Distant	Very distant	Do not know
254.	African National Congress (ANC)	1	2	3	4	5	0
255.	Democratic Party/Alliance (DA/DP)	1	2	3	4	5	0
256.	Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	1	2	3	4	5	0
257.	(New) National Party (NNP)	1	2	3	4	5	0

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
258.	Whether I vote or not makes no difference.	1	2	3	4	5	6
259.	After being elected all parties are the same, so voting is pointless.	1	2	3	4	5	6
260.	It is the duty of all citizens to vote.	1	2	3	4	5	6
261.	Voting is meaningless because no politician can be trusted.	1	2	3	4	5	6
262.	Politics is too complicated these days for people like me to understand.	1	2	3	4	5	6

The next few questions are about your views on how the country is governed. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
263.	Politicians found guilty of bribery or corruption should resign from public office immediately.	1	2	3	4	5	6
264.	Elected politicians should resign from office when they change to another political party.	1	2	3	4	5	6
265.	The government should have the authority to prevent citizens from criticising it.	1	2	3	4	5	6
266.	Citizens should have the right to form or join organisations freely, such as political parties, business associations, trade unions and other interest groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6
267.	The government should be in control of what information is given to the public.	1	2	3	4	5	6
268.	Mass action is an acceptable way for people to express their views in a democracy.	1	2	3	4	5	6

RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS

269. Sex of respondent [fieldworker observation]

Male	1
Female	2

270. Age of respondent in completed years (copy from contact sheet)

			years

271. What is the highest level of education that you have ever completed?

272. What is the highest level of education that your mother ever completed?

273. What is the highest level of education that your father ever completed?

	271. You	**272.** Mother	**273.** Father
No schooling	00	00	00
Grade 0	01	01	01
Sub A/Grade 1	02	02	02
Sub B/Grade 2	03	03	03
Grade 3/Standard 1	04	04	04
Grade 4/Standard 2	05	05	05
Grade 5/Standard 3	06	06	06
Grade 6/Standard 4	07	07	07
Grade 7/Standard 5	08	08	08
Grade 8/Standard 6/Form 1	09	09	09
Grade 9/Standard 7/Form 2	10	10	10
Grade 10/Standard 8/Form 3	11	11	11
Grade 11/Standard 9/Form 4	12	12	12
Grade 12/Standard 10/Form 5/Matric	13	13	13
NTC I	14	14	14
NTC II	15	15	15
NTC III	16	16	16
Diploma/certificate with less than Grade 12/Std 10	17	17	17
Diploma/certificate with Grade 12/Std 10	18	18	18
Degree	19	19	19
Postgraduate degree or diploma	20	20	20
Other, specify	21	21	21
Do not know	22	22	22

274. Are you a citizen of South Africa?

Yes	1
No	2

275. Are you registered as a voter of South Africa?

Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	3

276. What language do you speak mostly at home?
277. What is your mother tongue?

	276. Mostly spoken at home	**277.** Mother tongue
Sesotho	01	01
Setswana	02	02
Sepedi	03	03
Siswati	04	04
IsiNdebele	05	05
IsiXhosa	06	06
IsiZulu	07	07
Xitsonga	08	08
Tshivenda/Lemba	09	09
Afrikaans	10	10
English	11	11
Other African language	12	12
European language	13	13
Indian language	14	14
Other (specify)	15	15

278. What is your current employment status? (WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING BEST DESCRIBES YOUR PRESENT WORK SITUATION?)

Unemployed, not looking for work	01
Unemployed, looking for work	02
Pensioner (aged/retired)	03
Temporarily sick	04
Permanently disabled	05
Housewife, not working at all, not looking for work	06
Housewife, looking for work	07
Student/learner	08
Self-employed – full-time	09
Self-employed – part-time	10
Employed part-time (if none of the above)	11
Employed full-time	12
Other (specify)	13

279. If you are married or have a partner, what is his/her employment status?

Unemployed, not looking for work	01
Unemployed, looking for work	02
Pensioner (aged/retired)	03
Temporarily sick	04
Permanently disabled	05
Housewife, not working at all, not looking for work	06
Housewife, looking for work	07
Student/learner	08
Self-employed – full-time	09
Self-employed – part-time	10
Employed part-time (if none of the above)	11
Employed full-time	12
Other (specify)	13

280. What is your current occupation? [WRITE DOWN THE RESPONSE. IF NOT CURRENTLY EMPLOYED, ASK FOR MOST RECENT OCCUPATION.]

_____

281. If you are married or have a partner, what is his/her occupation? [WRITE DOWN THE RESPONSE. IF NOT CURRENTLY EMPLOYED, ASK FOR MOST RECENT OCCUPATION.]

_____

282. Think back to when you were 14. What was your father's occupation? [WRITE DOWN THE RESPONSE.]

_____

283. Think back to when you were 14. What was your mother's occupation? [WRITE DOWN THE RESPONSE.]

_____

284. Do you consider yourself as belonging to any religion?

Yes	1
No	2

285. If answer is yes, which one? Please specify denomination.

Christian (without specification)	01
African Evangelical Church	02
Anglican	03
Assemblies of God	04
Apostle Twelve	05
Baptist	06
Dutch Reformed	07
Full Gospel Church of God	08
Faith Mission	09
Church of God and Saints of Christ	10
Jehovah's Witness	11
Lutheran	12
Methodist	13
Pentecostal Holiness Church	14
Roman Catholic	15
Salvation Army	16
Seventh Day Adventist	17
St John's Apostolic	18
United Congregation Church	19
Universal Church of God	20
Nazareth	21
Zionist Christian Church	22
Other Christian	23
Islam/Muslim	24
Judaism/Jewish	25
Hinduism/Hindu	26
Buddhism/Buddhist	27
Other (specify)	28
Refused	29
Don't know	30

286. Apart from special occasions such as weddings, funerals and baptisms, how often do you attend services or meetings connected with your religion?

Once a week or more	01
Once in two weeks	02
Once a month	03
At least twice a year	04
At least once a year	05
Less often	06
Never or practically never	07
Varies too much to say	08
Refused/unwilling to answer	09
Not applicable	10

HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS

Interviewer: Record one main material used for the roof and walls of the dwelling.
[PERSONAL OBSERVATION]

Type of Material	287. Roof	288. Walls
Bricks	01	01
Cement block/concrete	02	02
Corrugated iron/zinc	03	03
Wood	04	04
Plastic	05	05
Cardboard	06	06
Mixture of mud and cement	07	07
Wattle and daub	08	08
Tile	09	09
Mud	10	10
Thatching	11	11
Asbestos	12	12

289. What is the most often used source of drinking water by this household?

Piped tap water in dwelling – with meter	01
Piped tap water in dwelling – with pre-paid meter	02
Piped tap water on site or in yard – with meter	03
Piped tap water on site or in yard – with pre-paid meter	04
Piped tap water on site or in yard – with no meter	05
Public or communal tap – Free	06
Public or communal tap – Paid for	07
Water carrier/tanker	08
Borehole on site	09
Borehole off site/communal	10
Rainwater tank on site	11
Flowing river/stream	12
Dam/pool	13
Stagnant pond	14
Well	15
Spring	16
Other (specify)	17

290. On average, how much water does your household use each day for all purposes?

Less than 25 litres (one bucket)	1
25 – 100 litres (1 – 4 buckets)	2
101 – 200 litres (4 – 8 buckets / ½ to 1 drum)	3
201 – 400 litres (8 – 16 buckets / 1 – 2 drums)	4
401 – 600 litres (16 – 24 buckets / 2 – 3 drums)	5
More than 600 litres or 3 drums	6
Specific amount of water (in kl) per month (if municipal water bill provided)	7

291. Has your household had its water cut off for non-payment since 1994?

Yes	1	
No	2	→ Skip to Q. 294
Do not know	3	

292. Has your household had its water cut off for non-payment in the past year?

Yes	1	
No	2	→ Skip to Q. 294
Do not know	3	

293. In the past year, how often did you experience disconnections of the water service?

Never	1
Once or twice	2
Several times	3
At least once a month	4
At least once a week	5
Uncertain/do not know	6

294. In the past year, how often did you experience disruptions of longer than a day to your water service?

Never	1	→ Skip to Q. 296
Once or twice	2	
Several times	3	
At least once a month	4	
At least once a week	5	
Uncertain/do not know	6	

295. If you experienced water disruptions in the past year: What do you think was the main reason for these water disruptions?

Just stopped/do not know	1
Cut-off for non-payment	2
Interrupted for repairs	3
Other people used too much water and left none for us	4
Water is being sent to other communities	5
Drought	6
Other (specify)	7

296. What kind of toilet does this household use?

Flush toilet on site	01
Flush toilet off site	02
Chemical toilet	03
Pit latrine with ventilation pipe (VIP)	04
Pit latrine without ventilation pipe	05
Bucket toilet	07
None	08
Other (specify)	09
Do not know	10

297. Do you have a working landline telephone in your dwelling?

Yes	1
No	2

298. Do you have access to a computer?

Yes, at home	1
Yes, at work/educational institution	2
Yes, both at home and work	3
None	4

299. Do you have access to the Internet?

Yes, at home	1	
Yes, at work/educational institution	2	
Yes, both at home and work	3	
Yes, at an Internet cafe	4	
Yes, at a community centre	5	
None	6	→ Skip to Q. 301

300. If you have access to the Internet, what do you use it for? [multiple response]

Entertainment	1
Business	2
Banking	3
Information	4
Other	5
All of the above	6

301. Do you personally have a cellphone for personal or business use?

Personal use	1
Business use	2
Both	3
None	4

Which of the following items, in working order, does your household have?

		Yes	No
302.	Fridge	1	2
303.	Freezer	1	2
304.	Polisher or vacuum cleaner	1	2
305.	Television	1	2
306.	Hi-fi or music centre (radio excl.)	1	2
307.	Radio	1	2
308.	Microwave oven	1	2
309.	Washing machine	1	2

Do you have the following in your home?

		Yes	No
310.	Grid electricity	1	2
311.	Hot running water	1	2
312.	Domestic worker	1	2
313.	At least one car usually working	1	2

314. In the past year, was there ever a time when children under 7 years of age in your household went hungry because there was not enough money to buy food?

Yes	1
No	2
Do not know	3
Not applicable	4

315. In the past year, was there ever a time when other members of the household went hungry because there was not enough money to buy food?

Yes	1
No	2
Do not know	3
Not applicable	4

PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME

SHOWCARD G2

316. Please give me the letter that best describes the TOTAL MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME of all the people in your household before tax and other deductions. Please include all sources of income, i.e. salaries, pensions, income from investment, etc.

317. Please give me the letter that best describes your PERSONAL TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME before tax and other deductions. Please include all sources of income, i.e. salaries, pensions, income from investment, etc.

		316. Household	**317.** Personal
	No income	01	01
K	R1 – R500	02	02
L	R501 – R750	03	03
M	R751 – R1 000	04	04
N	R1 001 – R1 500	05	05
O	R1 501 – R2 000	06	06
P	R2 001 – R3 000	07	07
Q	R3 001 – R5 000	08	08
R	R5 001 – R7 500	09	09
S	R7 501 – R10 000	10	10
T	R10 001 – R15 000	11	11
U	R15 001 – R20 000	12	12
V	R20 001 – R30 000	13	13
W	R30 000 +	14	14
	Refuse to answer	15	15
	Uncertain/Don't know	16	16

318. What monthly income level do you consider to be minimal for your household, i.e. your household could not make ends meet with less?

R _____

(Don't know = DNK)

NATURE OF FAMILIES AND FAMILY AUTHORITY

319. Who do you consider to be part of your 'family'? [multiple response]

***Fieldworker*: Do NOT read out options.**

Myself	1
Wife or husband or partner	2
Son(s) and/or daughter(s)	3
Father and/or mother	4
Brother and/or sister	5
Grandchild	6
Grandparent	7
Mother- or father-in-law	8
Son- or daughter-in-law	9
Brother- or sister-in-law	10
Nephews/nieces	11
Aunts/uncles	12
Other relation (specify)	13
Non-relation (specify)	14

320. Why do you say that these people are 'family'? [multiple response]

***Fieldworker*: Do NOT read out options.**

Close blood connection/relation/biologically related	1
More distant blood relation	2
Relation through marriage	3
Growing up or living under the same roof/sharing a yard	4
Give emotional support (love, care, moral support, etc.)	5
Give financial support	6
Other (specify)	7

321. Is there one person who holds the final position of authority in your 'family'?

***Fieldworker*: Do NOT read out options.**

Me (the respondent)	1	
Wife or husband or partner	2	
Son(s)	3	
Daughter(s)	4	
Father	5	
Mother	6	
Brother	7	
Sister	8	
Grandchild	9	
Grandmother	10	
Grandfather	11	
Mother-in-law	12	
Father-in-law	13	
Daughter-in-law	14	
Son-in-law	15	
Sister-in-law	16	
Brother-in-law	17	
Niece(s)	18	
Nephew(s)	19	
Aunt(s)	20	
Uncle(s)	21	
Other (specify)	22	
Non-relation (specify)	23	
No single person of authority	24	→ Skip to Q. 324
Do not know	25	→ Skip to Q. 324

322. If yes, what is the primary basis of their authority? [multiple response]

Overseeing rituals and important events	1
Financial support of others	2
Emotional support of others	3
Seniority/age	4
Makes the decisions	5
Other (specify)	6

323. If this person could no longer fulfil this role, who, if anyone, would fill this position?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Wife or husband or partner	1
Son(s)	2
Daughter(s)	3
Father	4
Mother	5
Brother	6
Sister	7
Grandchild	8
Grandmother	9
Grandfather	10
Mother-in-law	11
Father-in-law	12
Daughter-in-law	13
Son-in-law	14
Sister-in-law	15
Brother-in-law	16
Niece(s)	17
Nephew(s)	18
Aunt(s)	19
Uncle(s)	20
Other relation (specify)	21
Non-relation (specify)	22

324. Now consider today and the last few days. Would you say that you are...?

In a better mood than usual	1
Normal	2
In a worse mood than usual	3
Do not know	4

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION.

Note: At the request of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), the following questions were included in the questionnaire.

new289. What is the most often used source of water by this household?

Piped tap water in dwelling – with meter	01
Piped tap water in dwelling – with pre-paid meter	02
Piped tap water on site or in yard – with meter	03
Piped tap water on site or in yard – with pre-paid meter	04
Piped tap water on site or in yard –- with no meter	05
Public or communal tap less than 200 metres away – Free	06
Public or communal tap less than 200 metres away – Paid for	07
Public or communal tap more than 200 metres away – Free	08
Public or communal tap more than 200 metres away – Paid for	09
Neighbour – Free	10
Neighbour – Paid for	11
Water carrier/tanker	12
Borehole on site	13
Borehole off site/communal	14
Rainwater tank on site	15
Flowing river/stream	16
Dam/pool	17
Stagnant pond	18
Well	19
Spring	20
Other (specify)	21

new290. From what source did your household get water yesterday?

Piped tap water in dwelling – with meter	01
Piped tap water in dwelling – with pre-paid meter	02
Piped tap water on site or in yard – with meter	03
Piped tap water on site or in yard – with pre-paid meter	04
Piped tap water on site or in yard – with no meter	05
Public or communal tap less than 200 metres away – Free	06
Public or communal tap less than 200 metres away – Paid for	07
Public or communal tap more than 200 metres away – Free	08
Public or communal tap more than 200 metres away – Paid for	09
Neighbour – Free	10
Neighbour – Paid for	11
Water carrier/tanker	12
Borehole on site	13
Borehole off site/communal	14
Rainwater tank on site	15
Flowing river/stream	16
Dam/pool	17
Stagnant pond	18
Well	19
Spring	20
Other (specify)	21

new291. On average, how much water does your household use each day for all purposes?

Less than 25 litres (one bucket)	1
25 – 100 litres (1 – 4 buckets)	2
101 – 200 litres (4 – 8 buckets / ½ to 1 drum)	3
201 – 400 litres (8 – 16 buckets / 1 – 2 drums)	4
401 – 600 litres (16 – 24 buckets / 2 – 3 drums)	5
More than 600 litres or 3 drums	6
Specific amount of water (in kl) per month (if municipal water bill provided)	7

new292. In the past year, how often did you experience interruptions of the water service?

Never	1
Once or twice	2
Several times	3
At least once a month	4
At least once a week	5
Uncertain/do not know	6

new293. In the past year, how often did you experience interruptions of longer than one day to your water service?

Never	1	→ Skip to Q. 296
Once or twice	2	
Several times	3	
At least once a month	4	
At least once a week	5	
Uncertain/do not know	6	

new294. If you experienced water interruptions in the past year: What do you think was the main reason for these water interruptions?

Just stopped/do not know	1
Cut off for non-payment	2
Interrupted for repairs	3
Other people used too much water and left none for us	4
Water is being sent to other communities	5
Drought	6
Other (specify)	7

FIELD-WORKER NOTE: Question 295 is omitted

SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL ATTITUDES SURVEY
Questionnaire 2: August 2003

HSRC

RESPONDENTS AGED 16 YEARS +

Good (morning/afternoon/evening), I'm _____ and we are conducting a survey for the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). The HSRC regularly conducts surveys of opinion amongst the South African population. Topics include a wide range of social matters such as communications, politics, education, unemployment, the problems of the aged and inter-group relations. As a follow-up to this earlier work, we would like to ask you questions on a variety of subjects that are of national importance. To obtain reliable, scientific information we request that you answer the questions that follow as honestly as possible. Your opinion is important in this research. The area in which you live and you yourself have been selected randomly for the purpose of this survey. The fact that you have been chosen is thus quite coincidental. The information you give to us will be kept confidential. You and your household members will not be identified by name or address in any of the reports we plan to write.

PARTICULARS OF VISITS

	DAY MONTH	TIME STARTED HR	TIME STARTED MIN	TIME COMPLETED HR	TIME COMPLETED MIN	**RESPONSE	
First visit	/ / 2003						
Second visit	/ / 2003						
Third visit	/ / 2003						

**RESPONSE CODES		
Completed questionnaire	=	01
Partially completed questionnaire (specify reason)	=	02
Revisit		
Appointment made	=	03
Selected respondent not at home	=	04
No one home	=	05
Do not qualify		
Vacant house/flat/stand/not a house or flat/demolished	=	06
No person qualifies according to the survey specifications	=	07
Respondent cannot communicate with interviewer because of language	=	08
Respondent is physically/mentally not fit to be interviewed	=	09
Refusals		
Contact person refused	=	10
Interview refused by selected respondent	=	11
Interview refused by parent	=	12
Interview refused by other household member	=	13
OFFICE USE		
	=	14

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Name of Interviewer .....

Number of interviewer ☐☐☐
Checked by ☐

Signature of supervisor _____

FIELDWORK CONTROL

CONTROL	YES	NO	REMARKS
Personal	1	2	
Telephonic	1	2	
Name	SIGNATURE		
.....	DATE ...../...../.....2003		

RESPONDENT SELECTION PROCEDURE

Number of households at visiting point ☐☐

Number of persons 16 years and older at visiting point ☐☐

Please list all persons at the visiting point/on the stand who are 16 years and older and were resident 15 out of the past 30 days. Once this is completed, use the Kish grid on the next page to determine which person is to be interviewed.

Names of Persons Aged 16 and Older	
	01
	02
	03
	04
	05
	06
	07
	08
	09
	10
	11
	12
	13
	14
	15
	16
	17
	18
	19
	20
	21
	22
	23
	24
	25

NAME OF RESPONDENT:
ADDRESS OF RESPONDENT:
....
TEL NO.:

ii

GRID TO SELECT RESPONDENT

NUMBER OF QUESTION-NAIRE				NUMBER OF PERSONS FROM WHICH RESPONDENT MUST BE DRAWN																						
				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	26	51	76	1	1	1	3	2	4	1	3	5	8	6	5	12	10	1	6	8	7	19	19	13	21	13	24	25
2	27	52	77	1	2	3	4	3	1	2	2	3	4	8	3	7	2	5	14	4	15	4	8	6	16	14	22	19
3	28	53	78	1	1	2	1	4	2	7	6	9	3	5	11	2	1	3	11	7	10	16	16	10	5	2	2	3
4	29	54	79	1	2	3	2	1	3	5	8	6	2	4	2	4	8	11	10	16	6	9	10	15	11	12	11	18
5	30	55	80	1	1	1	4	5	6	3	5	7	5	9	8	14	3	2	13	5	18	1	4	1	20	11	5	24
6	31	56	81	1	2	2	2	3	5	8	7	8	7	1	4	9	14	8	2	17	17	14	12	14	22	10	3	14
7	32	57	82	1	2	1	1	4	1	4	1	4	6	3	6	5	7	13	9	2	3	13	14	8	2	7	20	4
8	33	58	83	1	1	2	3	2	5	1	4	2	1	7	10	6	5	4	15	10	5	2	13	4	17	5	17	8
9	34	59	84	1	1	3	2	5	6	2	2	1	9	10	1	10	4	6	6	1	9	10	1	5	6	9	1	12
10	35	60	85	1	2	2	4	1	3	3	6	9	10	11	12	3	9	15	7	8	11	6	3	9	4	3	10	1
11	36	61	86	1	1	1	3	1	4	5	3	1	6	2	9	13	11	14	4	11	4	15	15	17	1	1	23	2
12	37	62	87	1	2	3	1	3	2	7	5	6	5	7	7	8	6	10	3	3	1	12	20	7	13	22	12	16
13	38	63	88	1	1	2	1	5	3	6	4	3	4	6	2	11	13	12	1	15	8	7	2	12	15	21	13	7
14	39	64	89	1	2	3	2	4	1	4	7	8	2	5	6	11	12	9	16	13	16	11	18	18	14	16	18	23
15	40	65	90	1	2	1	4	2	4	3	8	7	7	11	1	3	5	7	12	14	13	8	17	20	19	20	19	11
16	41	66	91	1	1	3	3	1	6	5	1	5	9	10	3	2	11	13	8	12	12	5	6	21	8	8	4	15
17	42	67	92	1	1	2	2	3	4	2	6	2	3	2	12	5	2	10	13	5	8	18	9	16	10	17	16	20
18	43	68	93	1	2	1	4	2	6	4	1	4	8	9	10	7	9	3	12	12	9	7	20	19	9	19	21	13
19	44	69	94	1	2	2	1	3	5	2	8	9	10	4	9	8	13	1	1	14	10	19	10	11	18	15	7	6
20	45	70	95	1	1	3	2	5	4	1	3	8	1	3	8	6	6	9	5	7	13	4	15	1	7	22	15	21
21	46	71	96	1	1	1	2	5	1	7	2	3	2	1	11	4	7	5	3	2	1	3	12	18	5	19	14	9
22	47	72	97	1	2	1	3	1	3	2	6	2	1	8	7	1	4	2	11	8	2	17	4	17	21	16	3	5
23	48	73	98	1	2	3	4	2	2	6	7	7	8	3	4	9	3	6	2	11	11	16	2	8	11	23	6	22
24	49	74	99	1	1	2	1	4	6	3	5	5	3	1	5	13	1	14	8	14	6	15	9	14	3	6	9	17
25	50	75	100	1	1	2	3	3	2	4	6	4	7	5	3	12	12	12	4	6	2	17	11	2	12	4	8	10

SASAS QUESTIONNAIRE 2: 2003

Number of persons in this household
Number of persons 16 years and older in this household

INTERVIEWER: PLEASE CIRCLE APPROPRIATE CODES

Household schedule	Write in from oldest (top) to youngest (bottom)		Age in completed years	Sex M=1 F=2	Race Group	Relationship to respondent
Please list all persons in the household who eat from the same cooking pot and who were resident 15 out of the past 30 days.		01				
		02				
		03				
		04				
		05				
		06				
		07				
		08				
		09				
Note: Circle the number next to the name of the household head.		10				
		11				
		12				
		13				
		14				
		15				
		16				
		17				
		18				
		19				
		20				
		21				
		22				
		23				
		24				
		25				

Race Group codes
1 = Black African
2 = Coloured
3 = Indian/Asian
4 = White
5 = Other

Relationship to respondent codes
1 = Respondent
2 = Wife or husband or partner
3 = Son or daughter
4 = Father or mother
5 = Brother or sister
6 = Grandchild
7 = Grandparent
8 = Mother- or father-in-law
9 = Son- or daughter-in-law
10 = Brother- or sister-in-law
11 = Other relation
12 = Non-relation

DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE

1. Please tell me what you think are the 3 most important challenges facing South Africa today?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out

HIV/AIDS	01
Unemployment	02
Racism	03
Xenophobia	04
Crime and safety	05
Service provision/delivery	06
Affordable housing	07
Land reform issues	08
Human rights	09
Education	10
Economic and financial issues	11
Work-related issues	12
Family and youth issues	13
Religion and culture issues	14
Environmental issues	15
Political issues	16
Corruption	17
Poverty	18
Other (specify)	19
Do not know	20

Since the 1999 general election, has life improved, stayed the same or gotten worse for…?

		Improved	Stayed the same	Gotten worse	Do not know
2.	Most people in South Africa	1	2	3	4
3.	People like you	1	2	3	4

Do you think that life will improve, stay the same or get worse in the next 5 years for…?

		Improve	Stay the same	Get worse	Do not know
4.	Most people in South Africa	1	2	3	4
5.	People like you	1	2	3	4

6. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy is working in South Africa? [Showcard 1]

Very satisfied	1
Satisfied	2
Neither nor	3
Dissatisfied	4
Very dissatisfied	5
Do not know	6

Let's think about government in the provinces. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
7.	They stop national government from becoming too powerful.	1	2	3	4	5	6
8.	They are a waste of taxpayers' money.	1	2	3	4	5	6
9.	They bring government closer to the people.	1	2	3	4	5	6
10.	They make sure that national government distributes resources fairly around the country.	1	2	3	4	5	6

Indicate the extent to which you trust or distrust the following institutions in South Africa at present. [Showcard 8]

	Institutions	Strongly trust	Trust	Neither nor	Distrust	Strongly distrust	Do not know
11.	National government	1	2	3	4	5	6
12.	Courts	1	2	3	4	5	6
13.	The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)	1	2	3	4	5	6
14.	Your provincial government	1	2	3	4	5	6
15.	The SABC	1	2	3	4	5	6
16.	Parliament	1	2	3	4	5	6
17.	The police	1	2	3	4	5	6
18.	Defence force	1	2	3	4	5	6
19.	Big business	1	2	3	4	5	6
20.	Your local government	1	2	3	4	5	6
21.	Churches	1	2	3	4	5	6

22. Do you have a ward committee in your neighbourhood?

***Fieldworker*: Do NOT read out options.**

Yes	1
No	2
Do not know	3
Never heard of a ward committee	4

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way that the government is handling the following matters in your neighbourhood? [Showcard 1]

		Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neither nor	Dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	Do not know
23.	Supply of water and sanitation	1	2	3	4	5	6
24.	Providing electricity	1	2	3	4	5	6
25.	Removal of refuse	1	2	3	4	5	6
26.	Affordable housing	1	2	3	4	5	6
27.	Access to health care	1	2	3	4	5	6
28.	Treatment for sexually transmitted infections (STIs), including HIV/AIDS	1	2	3	4	5	6
29.	Cutting crime	1	2	3	4	5	6
30.	Creating jobs	1	2	3	4	5	6
31.	Land reform	1	2	3	4	5	6

NATIONAL IDENTITY

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
32.	People of different racial groups do not really trust or like each other.	1	2	3	4	5	6
33.	People of different racial groups will never really trust or like each other.	1	2	3	4	5	6

34. How about you? Are there any racial groups in South Africa that you do not trust or like?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Yes	1		
No	2	→	Skip to Q. 36
Do not know	3	→	Skip to Q. 36
Refused to answer	4	→	Skip to Q. 36

35. If the answer is yes, which race groups in South Africa do you not trust or like? [multiple response]

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Black African	01
White	02
Coloured	03
Indian/Asian	04
Other Asian	05
Jew	06
Sesotho	07
Setswana	08
Sepedi	09
Siswati	10
IsiNdebele	11
IsiXhosa	12
IsiZulu	13
Xitsonga	14
Tshivenda/Lemba	15
English-speaking white	16
Afrikaans-speaking white	17
Other African language	18
European language	19
Non-South African African	20
Indian language	21
Other (specify)	22
Don't know	23
Refused to answer	24

To what extent do you feel attached to the following types of people? [Showcard 5]

		Very attached	Slightly attached	Not very attached	Not at all attached	Do not know
36.	Those who speak the same language as you	1	2	3	4	5
37.	Those who belong to the same race group as you	1	2	3	4	5
38.	Those who are in the same financial position as you	1	2	3	4	5
39.	Those who live in your neighbourhood	1	2	3	4	5

40. Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Yes	1	
No	2	→ Skip to Q. 43
Do not know	3	→ Skip to Q. 43

On what grounds is your group discriminated against? PROBE: 'What other grounds?' [Circle two options – one per column]

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

	41. Option 1	**42. Option 2**
Colour or race	01	01
Nationality	02	02
Religion	03	03
Language	04	04
Age	05	05
Gender	06	06
Sexual preference	07	07
Education	08	08
Disability	09	09
Unemployed	10	10
Region or province	11	11
Other	12	12
Do not know	13	13

43. Please indicate which of the following statements applies to you? I generally welcome to South Africa...

All immigrants	1
Some immigrants	2
No immigrants	3

44. Which, if any, group would you <u>least</u> want to come and live in South Africa? [Choose one group only]

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Africans	1	
Europeans	2	
Americans	3	
Indians	4	
Other Asians	5	
Australians	6	
Returning South Africans	7	
Other (specify)	8	
None (welcome all groups)	9	→ Skip to Q. 48

5

Thinking of the group you just mentioned, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
45.	The group presents a threat in terms of job opportunities.	1	2	3	4	5	6
46.	The group presents a threat in terms of crime.	1	2	3	4	5	6
47.	The groups presents a threat to my culture and lifestyle.	1	2	3	4	5	6

48. South Africa used to have apartheid by law between white, black African, coloured and Indian/Asian people. Since 1994, do you think that race relations in the country have improved, remained the same, or deteriorated?

Improved	1
Stayed the same	2
Got worse	3
Do not know	4

49. How often do you feel racially discriminated against?

***Fieldworker*: Read out options.**

Always	1	
Often	2	
Sometimes	3	
Not at all	4	→ Skip to Q. 51
Do not know	5	→ Skip to Q. 51

50. Where has this racial discrimination happened to you most recently? [Only 1 answer]

***Fieldworker*: Do NOT read out options.**

At work	01
At an educational institution	02
In shops	03
On the roads or on the streets	04
When applying for a job	05
In a government department	06
In social clubs	07
In theatres	08
In restaurants	09
In sport	10
Elsewhere	11
Everywhere	12
Not applicable	13

Here are some statements about racism in South Africa. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each. [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
51.	Most white people in South Africa have racist attitudes.	1	2	3	4	5	6
52.	Most coloured people in South Africa have racist attitudes.	1	2	3	4	5	6
53.	Most black African people in South Africa have racist attitudes.	1	2	3	4	5	6
54.	Most Indian/Asian people in South Africa have racist attitudes.	1	2	3	4	5	6

Here are a few things that the government in South Africa might do to deal with the problems of black South Africans. To what extent do you agree or disagree that government should... [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
55.	Give preferential contracts and tax breaks to black businesses?	1	2	3	4	5	6
56.	Redistribute land to black South Africans?	1	2	3	4	5	6
57.	Pay money to the victims of apartheid as reparation for the history of discrimination?	1	2	3	4	5	6

Some people think black South Africans have been discriminated against, and government should help them while others are against special treatment for black South Africans. To what extent do you agree or disagree that there should be... [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
58.	Racial quotas in national sports teams?	1	2	3	4	5	6
59.	Preferential hiring and promotion of Black African South Africans in employment?	1	2	3	4	5	6
60.	Preferential hiring and promotion of women in employment?	1	2	3	4	5	6

PUBLIC SERVICES

EDUCATION

61. Up to what level do you believe it should be compulsory for all learners to attend school?

Fieldworker: Please circle ONE box only.

Up to and including grade 3 (Std.1)	1
Up to and including grade 7 (Std.5)	2
Up to and including grade 9 (Std.7)	3
Up to and including grade 12 (Matric)	4
School attendance should not be made compulsory at any level	5
Do not know	6

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
62.	All schools should contain children of different races.	1	2	3	4	5	6
63.	All schools should contain children of different languages.	1	2	3	4	5	6
64.	Children of different religions, or of no religion, should be educated separately.	1	2	3	4	5	6
65.	Girls and boys should be educated separately.	1	2	3	4	5	6
66.	The children of the economically well-off and the poor should be educated together.	1	2	3	4	5	6

How important are each of the following statements about the aims of education? [Showcard 3]

		Very important	Important	Neither nor	Not important	Very unimportant	Do not know
67.	To improve the child's chances in the search for a good job.	1	2	3	4	5	6
68.	To enable the child to think critically and independently.	1	2	3	4	5	6
69.	To keep children off the streets and out of harm's way.	1	2	3	4	5	6
70.	To help children to become better citizens of South Africa.	1	2	3	4	5	6
71.	To help children to get along with each other, however different their backgrounds may be.	1	2	3	4	5	6

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
72.	I respect teachers for their dedicated service to children and the community.	1	2	3	4	5	6
73.	Teachers should not be allowed to take actions that damage their teaching role, like going on strike.	1	2	3	4	5	6

What do you think should be the main language of instruction in...?

		English	Home language of the learner	Afrikaans	Do not know
74.	Grades 1 to 3 (Grade 1 – Std. 1)	1	2	3	3
75.	Grades 4 to 9 (Std. 2 – Std. 7)	1	2	3	3
76.	Grades 10 to 12 (Std. 8 – Matric)	1	2	3	3
77.	Higher education (university, college, technikon)	1	2	3	3

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following methods of keeping discipline in schools? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
78.	Reasoning and discussion with learner.	1	2	3	4	5	6
79.	Corporal punishment by the teacher in class.	1	2	3	4	5	6
80.	Corporal punishment by the principal only.	1	2	3	4	5	6
81.	Physical labour like digging holes or sweeping.	1	2	3	4	5	6
82.	Keeping learner in school after official hours.	1	2	3	4	5	6
83.	Additional learning tasks like doing extra homework or writing essays.	1	2	3	4	5	6

84. If you were in a position to make decisions about the spending of extra money on the local high schools around here, which one of these would be your top priority?

Fieldworker: Read out options. One response only.

Library and library books	1
Science and technology equipment	2
Sports and recreation	3
Extra teachers	4
Free school meals	5

85. Compulsory religious sessions/meetings have no place in school. [Showcard 2]

Strongly agree	1
Agree	2
Neither nor	3
Disagree	4
Strongly disagree	5

People have different views regarding the importance of education to boys as compared to girls. How much would you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
86.	Educating girls to a high level is of no use.	1	2	3	4	5	6
87.	Girls should be educated so that they can operate on equal terms with boys in the modern world.	1	2	3	4	5	6

88. If a child completes matric successfully there is a wide range of paths he/she can take. Which one of these statements comes closest to your view about the path a child should be encouraged to take?

Fieldworker: Read out options.

Try to continue studies at university	1
Try to continue studies at technikon	2
Try to do other short courses	3
Try and get a job	4
Take time off to travel, do voluntary work or other activity before committing to a job or further study	5

HEALTH STATUS, HIV/AIDS AND HEALTH BEHAVIOUR

89. How would you rate your health at present?

Very poor	1
Poor	2
Average	3
Good	4
Excellent	5

Have you ever been diagnosed by a health professional to have any of the following five diseases?

		Never	During last 3 months	During last 6 months	During last year	More than one year ago
90.	Hypertension/high blood pressure	1	2	3	4	5
91.	Tuberculosis (TB)	1	2	3	4	5
92.	Malaria	1	2	3	4	5
93.	Sexually transmitted infections (including HIV/AIDS)	1	2	3	4	5
94.	Mental illness	1	2	3	4	5

95. In this household, is there anyone that is too sick or disabled to cope on their own?

Yes	1
No	2

CHANGES IN HEALTH-RELATED BEHAVIOUR

96. Have you received any nutritional supplements during the past 12 months?

Yes	1
No	2

97. Did you regularly (at least 15 minutes three times per week) do physical and fitness exercises during the past 12 months?

Yes	1
No	2

Do you do any of the following activities?

		Often	Sometimes	Never
98.	Drink alcohol	1	2	3
99.	Smoke cigarettes	1	2	3
100.	Smoke dagga (marijuana)	1	2	3
101.	Use mandrax	1	2	3
102.	Inject drugs into your body	1	2	3

Suppose you were advising a person on how to improve his or her health generally. Please tell me how important are the following to his or her health generally. [Showcard 3]

[Fieldworker: Read out]		Very important	Important	Neither nor	Not important	Very unimportant	Do not know
103.	Not to smoke	1	2	3	4	5	6
104.	Drink less/no alcohol	1	2	3	4	5	6
105.	Take more exercise	1	2	3	4	5	6
106.	Eat more fruit and vegetables	1	2	3	4	5	6
107.	Eat less fatty food	1	2	3	4	5	6
108.	Take less sugar	1	2	3	4	5	6
109.	Try to reduce stress	1	2	3	4	5	6
110.	No drugs	1	2	3	4	5	6
111.	Other (specify)	1	2	3	4	5	6

HIV/AIDS

112. Do you personally know someone who you think or know has died of AIDS?

Yes	1
No	2

113. In the past year, have you attended a funeral of a person who is said to have died of AIDS?

Yes	1
No	2

I AM NOW GOING TO ASK YOU A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR VIEWS ON PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
114.	I would sleep in the same room as someone with HIV/AIDS.	1	2	3	4	5	6
115.	I would share a meal with someone who is HIV positive.	1	2	3	4	5	6
116.	I would talk to someone with HIV/AIDS.	1	2	3	4	5	6
117.	I would treat a family member with HIV/AIDS well.	1	2	3	4	5	6
118.	I would not get infected by being in the same room as an infected person.	1	2	3	4	5	6
119.	Health workers should write in medical records that a person is HIV positive.	1	2	3	4	5	6
120.	Health workers should write on a death notification form that a person died of HIV/AIDS-related illnesses.	1	2	3	4	5	6

QUALITY OF HEALTH SERVICES

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the following aspects of government health services in your area? [Showcard 1]

	Aspect	Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neither nor	Dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	Do not know
121.	The amount of time patients wait before getting served.	1	2	3	4	5	6
122.	The way patients are treated by doctors.	1	2	3	4	5	6
123.	The way patients are treated by nurses.	1	2	3	4	5	6
124.	The availability of medicines at the hospital or clinic for both in- and out-patients.	1	2	3	4	5	6
125.	Availability of emergency services such as ambulances and emergency departments at hospitals.	1	2	3	4	5	6

MORAL ISSUES

126. Do you think it is wrong or not wrong if a man and a woman have sexual relations before marriage? [Showcard 7]

Not wrong at all	1
Wrong only sometimes	2
Almost always wrong	3
Always wrong	4
Cannot choose	5

127. Do you think it is wrong or not wrong for two adults of the same sex to have sexual relations? [Showcard 7]

Not wrong at all	1
Wrong only sometimes	2
Almost always wrong	3
Always wrong	4
Cannot choose	5

Do you personally think it is wrong or not wrong for a woman to have an abortion... [Showcard 7]

		Not wrong at all	Wrong only sometimes	Almost always wrong	Always wrong	Do not know
128.	If there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby?	1	2	3	4	5
129.	If the family has a low income and cannot afford any more children?	1	2	3	4	5

130. People convicted of murder should be subject to the death penalty. Do you... [Showcard 2]

Strongly agree	1
Agree	2
Neither nor	3
Disagree	4
Strongly disagree	5
Do not know	6

COMMUNICATIONS

131. What is your single main source of community news?

Television	1
Radio	2
Newspapers	3
Internet	4
Other people	5
Loudspeakers	6
Pamphlets	7
Other (specify)	8

132. What is your single main source of national news?

Television	1
Radio	2
Newspapers	3
Internet	4
Other (specify)	5

133. What is your single main source of international news?

Television	1
Radio	2
Newspapers	3
Internet	4
Other (specify)	5

134. Do you prefer locally or foreign-made *entertainment* programmes on television ?

Locally-made programmes	1
Foreign-made programmes	2
Both equally	3
Uncertain/don't know	4

135. Do you prefer local or foreign news programmes on television?

Locally-made programmes	1
Foreign-made programmes	2
Both equally	3
Uncertain/don't know	4

Do you think there is too much of the following on television or are you not bothered?

		Too much	Not bothered	Do not know
136.	Sex	1	2	3
137.	Violence	1	2	3
138.	Nudity	1	2	3
139.	Swearing and blasphemy	1	2	3
140.	Prejudice	1	2	3

141. Have you read at least one whole/complete book in the last month?

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable, unable to read	3
Do not know	4

142. Do you think there are too many American-made programmes on television or are you not bothered?

Too many	1
Not bothered	2
Do not know	3

In the past week, have you:

		Yes	No
143.	Used a cellphone to make an outgoing call	1	2
144.	Received a call on a cellphone	1	2
145.	Used a cellphone to send a text message (SMS)	1	2
146.	Received a text message (SMS) on a cellphone	1	2

147. If you do not have a cellphone, is it because you cannot afford one or do not want one?

Cannot afford a cellphone	1
Do not want a cellphone	2
Uncertain/Don't know	3

Could you estimate how many hours on an average working day (that is, from Monday to Friday) you spend watching TV or listening to the radio?

	148. TV	**149. Radio**
Less than one hour	1	1
1 – 2 hours	2	2
2 – 3 hours	3	3
3 – 4 hours	4	4
More than 4 hours	5	5
Never listen to the radio/watch TV	6	6

150. Could you estimate how many hours on an average working day (that is, from Monday to Friday) you spend reading a daily newspaper?

Less than one hour	1
1 – 2 hours	2
2 – 3 hours	3
3 – 4 hours	4
More than 4 hours	5
Never read the newspaper	6

151. Could you estimate how many hours on an average working day (that is, from Monday to Friday) you spend using the Internet?

Less than one hour	1
1 – 2 hours	2
2 – 3 hours	3
3 – 4 hours	4
More than 4 hours	5
Never use Internet	6

ISSP 2003 MODULE - NATIONAL IDENTITY (II)

We are all part of different groups. Some are more important to us than others when we think of ourselves. In general, which in the following list is most important to you in describing who you are? And the second most important? And the third most important? [*Fieldworker: Mark only one in each column.*]

	152. Most important	**153.** Second most important	**154.** Third most important
Your current or previous occupation (or being a homemaker)	01	01	01
Your race/ethnic background	02	02	02
Your gender (that is, being a man/woman)	03	03	03
Your age group (that is, Young, Middle Aged, Old)	04	04	04
Your religion (or being agnostic or atheist)	05	05	05
Your preferred political party, group, or movement	06	06	06
Your nationality	07	07	07
Your family or marital status (that is, son/daughter, mother/father, grandfather/grandmother, husband/ wife, widower/widow, not married, or other similar)	08	08	08
Your social class (that is upper, middle, lower, working, or similar categories)	09	09	09
The part of South Africa that you live in	10	10	10

How attached do you feel to...? (Please circle one box on each line.) [Showcard 5]

		Very attached	Slightly attached	Not very attached	Not at all attached	Do not know
155.	Your town or city or village	1	2	3	4	5
156.	Your province	1	2	3	4	5
157.	South Africa	1	2	3	4	5
158.	Africa	1	2	3	4	5

Some people say that the following things are important for being truly South African. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is...? (Please circle one box on each line.) [Showcard 3]

		Very important	Important	Neither nor	Not important	Very unimportant	Do not know
159.	To have been born in South Africa.	1	2	3	4	5	6
160.	To have South African citizenship.	1	2	3	4	5	6
161.	To have lived in South Africa for most of one's life.	1	2	3	4	5	6
162.	To be able to speak at least one of the official languages of South Africa.	1	2	3	4	5	6
163.	To be a member of the Christian church.	1	2	3	4	5	6
164.	To respect South African political institutions and laws.	1	2	3	4	5	6
165.	To feel South African.	1	2	3	4	5	6
166.	To have South African ancestry.	1	2	3	4	5	6

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Please circle one box on each line.) [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
167.	I would rather be a citizen of South Africa than of any other country in the world.	1	2	3	4	5	6
168.	There are some things about South Africa today that make me feel ashamed of South Africa.	1	2	3	4	5	6
169.	The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like South Africans.	1	2	3	4	5	6
170.	Generally speaking, South Africa is a better country than most other countries.	1	2	3	4	5	6
171.	People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.	1	2	3	4	5	6
172.	When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be a South African.	1	2	3	4	5	6
173.	I am often less proud of South Africa than I would like to be.	1	2	3	4	5	6

How proud are you of South Africa in each of the following? (Please circle one box on each line.) [Showcard 6]

		Very proud	Somewhat proud	Not very proud	Not proud at all	Can't Choose
174.	The way democracy works	1	2	3	4	5
175.	Its political influence in the world	1	2	3	4	5
176.	South Africa's economic achievements	1	2	3	4	5
177.	Its social security system	1	2	3	4	5
178.	Its scientific and technological achievements	1	2	3	4	5
179.	Its achievements in sports	1	2	3	4	5
180.	Its achievements in the arts and literature	1	2	3	4	5
181.	South Africa's armed forces	1	2	3	4	5
182.	Its history	1	2	3	4	5
183.	Its fair and equal treatment of *all* groups in society	1	2	3	4	5

QUESTIONS ABOUT RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHER COUNTRIES

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Please circle one box on each line.) [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
184.	South Africa should limit the import of goods made in other countries in order to protect its national economy.	1	2	3	4	5	6
185.	South Africa should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations.	1	2	3	4	5	6
186.	Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in South Africa.	1	2	3	4	5	6
187.	South Africa's television should give preference to South African films and programmes.	1	2	3	4	5	6

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Please circle one box on each line.) [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
188.	Big business from other countries is doing more and more damage to local businesses in South Africa.	1	2	3	4	5	6
189.	In general, South Africa should follow the decisions of international organisations to which it belongs, even if the government does not agree with them.	1	2	3	4	5	6
190.	International organisations are taking away too much power from the South African government.	1	2	3	4	5	6
191.	Increased exposure to foreign films, music, and books is damaging our national and local cultures.	1	2	3	4	5	6
192.	A benefit of the Internet is that it makes information available to more and more people worldwide.	1	2	3	4	5	6

QUESTIONS ABOUT MINORITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Please circle one box on each line.) [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
193.	It is impossible for people who do not share South Africa's customs and traditions to become fully South African.	1	2	3	4	5	6
194.	Language and racial minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions.	1	2	3	4	5	6

195. Some people say that it is better for a country if different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Others say that it is better if these groups adapt and blend into the larger society. Which of these views comes closest to your own?

It is better for society if groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions.	1
It is better if groups adapt and blend into the larger society.	2
Do not know	3

196. At the time of your birth, were both, one or neither of your parents citizens of South Africa (or TBVC)?

Both were citizens of South Africa	1
Only father was a citizen of South Africa	2
Only mother was a citizen of South Africa	3
Neither parent was a citizen of South Africa	4
Do not know/cannot choose	5

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Please circle one box on each line.) [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
197.	Children born in South Africa of parents who are not citizens should have the right to become South African citizens.	1	2	3	4	5	6
198.	Children born abroad should have the right to become South African citizens if at least one of their parents is a South African citizen.	1	2	3	4	5	6
199.	Legal immigrants to South Africa who are not citizens should have the same rights as South African citizens.	1	2	3	4	5	6
200.	South Africa should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants.	1	2	3	4	5	6

201. How proud are you of being South African? (Please circle one box.) [Showcard 6]

Very proud	1
Somewhat proud	2
Not very proud	3
Not proud at all	4
I am not South African	5
Can't choose	6

202. Which of these two statements comes closest to your own view?

It is essential that South Africa remains one nation.	1
Parts of South Africa should be allowed to become fully separate states if they choose to.	2
Can't choose	3

203. How close do you feel to your ethnic group?

Very close	1
Close	2
Not very close	3
Not close at all	4
Can't choose	5

CRIME

In the last 6 months was this household or any member of this household a victim of the following crimes?

		Yes	No
	PROPERTY CRIME		
204.	Residential burglary (illegal entry of a home to commit a crime)	1	2
205.	Robbery with aggravating circumstances (use of a weapon, e.g. knife, gun, to obtain property/possessions)	1	2
206.	Vehicle theft (theft of a vehicle when not occupied)	1	2
207.	Theft from vehicle	1	2
208.	Stock theft (illegal obtaining of all forms of livestock)	1	2
	VIOLENT CRIME		
209.	Hijacking or attempted hijacking of vehicle (theft of a vehicle when occupied)	1	2
210.	Murder (killing of a human being with malice)	1	2
211.	Gang-related violence (a crime in which a gang member or members are the perpetrators or the victims)	1	2
212.	Attempted murder (action caused serious injury or could have caused death)	1	2
213.	Common assault (action caused injury that is not life-threatening)	1	2
214.	Rape (forced to have sex against will)	1	2
215.	Indecent assault (hurt someone [man, woman or child] in a sexual or indecent way)	1	2

In the last 6 months has any member of this household been exposed to...?

		Yes	No
216.	Corruption by public officials	1	2
217.	Drug-related crime	1	2

DEMOCRACY (PART 2)

218. Generally speaking, do you think that the living conditions in your neighbourhood will improve or get worse within five years from now?

Strongly improve	1
Improve	2
Remain the same	3
Worsen	4
Strongly worsen	5
Do not know	6

219. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way your local government or municipality is performing its job at present? [Showcard 1]

220. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way your province is performing its job at present?

221. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way South Africa is being governed at present?

	219. Local government/ municipality	**220.** Province	**221.** South Africa
Very satisfied	1	1	1
Satisfied	2	2	2
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	3	3	3
Dissatisfied	4	4	4
Very dissatisfied	5	5	5
Do not know	6	6	6

222. How easy or difficult is it for people like you to influence decisions that affect the country?

223. How easy or difficult is it for people like you to influence decisions that affect your province?

224. How easy or difficult is it for people like you to influence municipal decisions that affect your neighbourhood?

	222. South Africa	**223.** Province	**224.** Neighbourhood
Very easy	1	1	1
Easy	2	2	2
Neither nor	3	3	3
Difficult	4	4	4
Very difficult	5	5	5
Do not know	6	6	6

Are you a supporter or active member of…?

Fieldworker: If respondent is, e.g., supporter of one political party and member of another, please indicate the highest category, in this case member.

	Type of institution	Supporter	Active Member	None
225.	Political party/grouping	1	2	3
226.	Trade union	1	2	3
227.	Church or religious organisation	1	2	3
228.	Women's organisation	1	2	3
229.	Community organisation	1	2	3
230.	Sports association/club	1	2	3
231.	Youth group	1	2	3

232. For which party did you vote in the 1999 national election?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	01
African National Congress (ANC)	02
Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging (AEB)	03
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	04
Democratic Party/Alliance (DP/DA)	05
Freedom Front/Vryheidsfront (FF/VF)	06
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	07
Minority Front (MF)	08
New National Party (NNP)	09
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)	10
South African Communist Party (SACP)	11
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)	12
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	13
Other (specify)	14
Did not vote	15
Uncertain	16
Don't know	17
Refuse to answer	18

233. If you did not vote in the 1999 election, please state the main reason for your not voting.

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Too young	01
Not interested	02
Not registered	03
Disillusioned with politics	04
Too much effort required	05
Polling station too far away	06
Fear of intimidation or violence	07
Only one party could win	08
Health reasons/sick	09
Other (specify)	10

234. For which party do you plan to vote in the next national election?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	01
African National Congress (ANC)	02
Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging (AEB)	03
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	04
Democratic Party/Alliance (DA/DP)	05
Freedom Front/Vryheidsfront (FF/VF)	06
Independent Democrats (ID)	07
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	08
Minority Front (MF)	09
New National Party (NNP)	10
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)	11
South African Communist Party (SACP)	12
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)	13
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	14
Other (specify)	15
Will not vote	16
Uncertain	17
Don't know	18
Refuse to answer	19

235. If answered 16 in Q. 234: What is your main reason for thinking that you will not vote in the 2004 election?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Too young	01
Not interested	02
Not registered	03
Disillusioned with politics	04
Too much effort required	05
Polling station too far away	06
Fear of intimidation or violence	07
Only one party could win	08
Health reasons/sick	09
Other (specify)	10

236. If 1 to 15 in Q. 234: To which other party do you feel close?
(Fieldworker: This should NOT be the same party as mentioned in Q. 234.)

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	01
African National Congress (ANC)	02
Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging (AEB)	03
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	04
Democratic Party/Alliance (DA/DP)	05
Freedom Front/Vryheidsfront (FF/VF)	06
Independent Democrats (ID)	07
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	08
Minority Front (MF)	09
New National Party (NNP)	10
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)	11
South African Communist Party (SACP)	12
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)	13
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	14
Other (specify)	15
No other party	16
Refuse	17

237. If 16 to 19 in Q. 234, to which party do you feel most close?

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	01
African National Congress (ANC)	02
Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging (AEB)	03
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	04
Democratic Party/Alliance (DA/DP)	05
Freedom Front/Vryheidsfront (FF/VF)	06
Independent Democrats (ID)	07
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	08
Minority Front (MF)	09
New National Party (NNP)	10
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)	11
South African Communist Party (SACP)	12
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)	13
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	14
Other (specify)	15
No party	16
Refuse	17

238. How often do you talk about politics?

Very often	1
Often	2
Occasionally	3
Very seldom	4
Never	5

How close or distant do you feel to each of the country's four largest political parties?

Fieldworker: Read out each party name.

	Political party	Very close	Close	Neutral	Distant	Very distant	Do not know
239.	African National Congress (ANC)	1	2	3	4	5	0
240.	Democratic Party/Alliance (DA/DP)	1	2	3	4	5	0
241.	Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	1	2	3	4	5	0
242.	(New) National Party (NNP)	1	2	3	4	5	0

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
243.	Whether I vote or not makes no difference.	1	2	3	4	5	6
244.	After being elected all parties are the same, so voting is pointless.	1	2	3	4	5	6
245.	It is the duty of all citizens to vote.	1	2	3	4	5	6
246.	Voting is meaningless because no politician can be trusted.	1	2	3	4	5	6
247.	Politics is too complicated these days for people like me to understand.	1	2	3	4	5	6

The next few questions are about your views on how the country is governed. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Showcard 2]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither nor	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know
248.	Politicians found guilty of bribery or corruption should resign from public office immediately.	1	2	3	4	5	6
249.	Elected politicians should resign from office when they change to another political party.	1	2	3	4	5	6
250.	The government should have the authority to prevent citizens from criticising it.	1	2	3	4	5	6
251.	Citizens should have the right to form or join organisations freely, such as political parties, business associations, trade unions and other interest groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6
252.	The government should be in control of what information is given to the public.	1	2	3	4	5	6
253.	Mass action is an acceptable way for people to express their views in a democracy.	1	2	3	4	5	6

RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS

254. Sex of respondent [fieldworker observation]

Male	1
Female	2

255. Age of respondent in completed years (copy from contact sheet)

			years

256. What is your current marital status?

Married	1	→ Skip to Q. 258
Widower/widow	2	
Divorced	3	
Separated	4	
Never married	5	

257. Do you live together with a partner?

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable (living together with spouse)	3

258. What is the highest level of education that <u>you</u> have ever completed?

259. What is the highest level of education that <u>your mother</u> ever completed?

260. What is the highest level of education that <u>your father</u> ever completed?

	258. You	**259.** Mother	**260.** Father
No schooling	00	00	00
Grade 0	01	01	01
Sub A/Grade 1	02	02	02
Sub B/Grade 2	03	03	03
Grade 3/Standard 1	04	04	04
Grade 4/Standard 2	05	05	05
Grade 5/Standard 3	06	06	06
Grade 6/Standard 4	07	07	07
Grade 7/Standard 5	08	08	08
Grade 8/Standard 6/Form 1	09	09	09
Grade 9/Standard 7/Form 2	10	10	10
Grade 10/Standard 8/Form 3	11	11	11
Grade 11/Standard 9/Form 4	12	12	12
Grade 12/Standard 10/Form 5/Matric	13	13	13
NTC I	14	14	14
NTC II	15	15	15
NTC III	16	16	16
Diploma/certificate with less than Grade 12/Std 10	17	17	17
Diploma/certificate with Grade 12/Std 10	18	18	18
Degree	19	19	19
Postgraduate degree or diploma	20	20	20
Other, specify	21	21	21
Do not know	22	22	22

261. Are you a citizen of South Africa?

Yes	1
No	2

262. Are you registered as a voter of South Africa?

Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	3

263. What language do you speak mostly at home?
264. What is your mother tongue?

	263. Mostly spoken at home	**264.** Mother tongue
Sesotho	01	01
Setswana	02	02
Sepedi	03	03
Siswati	04	04
IsiNdebele	05	05
IsiXhosa	06	06
IsiZulu	07	07
Xitsonga	08	08
Tshivenda/Lemba	09	09
Afrikaans	10	10
English	11	11
Other African language	12	12
European language	13	13
Indian language	14	14
Other (specify)	15	15

265. What is your current employment status? (WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING BEST DESCRIBES YOUR PRESENT WORK SITUATION?)

Unemployed, not looking for work	01
Unemployed, looking for work	02
Pensioner (aged/retired)	03
Temporarily sick	04
Permanently disabled	05
Housewife, not working at all, not looking for work	06
Housewife, looking for work	07
Student/learner	08
Self-employed – full-time	09
Self-employed – part-time	10
Employed part-time (if none of the above)	11
Employed full-time	12
Other (specify)	13

266. If you are married or have a partner, what is his/her employment status?

Unemployed, not looking for work	01
Unemployed, looking for work	02
Pensioner (aged/retired)	03
Temporarily sick	04
Permanently disabled	05
Housewife, not working at all, not looking for work	06
Housewife, looking for work	07
Student/learner	08
Self-employed – full-time	09
Self-employed – part-time	10
Employed part-time (if none of the above)	11
Employed full-time	12
Other (specify)	13

267. What is your current occupation? [WRITE DOWN THE RESPONSE. IF NOT CURRENTLY EMPLOYED, ASK FOR MOST RECENT OCCUPATION.]

_____

268. If you are married or have a partner, what is his/her occupation? [WRITE DOWN THE RESPONSE. IF NOT CURRENTLY EMPLOYED, ASK FOR MOST RECENT OCCUPATION.]

_____

269. Think back to when you were 14. What was your father's occupation? [WRITE DOWN THE RESPONSE.]

_____

270. Think back to when you were 14. What was your mother's occupation? [WRITE DOWN THE RESPONSE.]

_____

271. Do you consider yourself as belonging to any religion?

Yes	1
No	2

272. If answer is yes, which one? Please specify denomination

Christian (without specification)	01
African Evangelical Church	02
Anglican	03
Assemblies of God	04
Apostle Twelve	05
Baptist	06
Dutch Reformed	07
Full Gospel Church of God	08
Faith Mission	09
Church of God and Saints of Christ	10
Jehovah's Witness	11
Lutheran	12
Methodist	13
Pentecostal Holiness Church	14
Roman Catholic	15
Salvation Army	16
Seventh Day Adventist	17
St John's Apostolic	18
United Congregation Church	19
Universal Church of God	20
Nazareth	21
Zionist Christian Church	22
Other Christian	23
Islam/Muslim	24
Judaism/Jewish	25
Hinduism/Hindu	26
Buddhism/Buddhist	27
Other (specify)	28
Refused	29
Don't know	30

273. Apart from special occasions such as weddings, funerals and baptisms, how often do you attend services or meetings connected with your religion?

Once a week or more	01
Once in two weeks	02
Once a month	03
At least twice a year	04
At least once a year	05
Less often	06
Never or practically never	07
Varies too much to say	08
Refused/unwilling to answer	09
Not applicable	10

HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS

Interviewer: Record one main material used for the roof and walls of the dwelling.
[PERSONAL OBSERVATION]

Type of Material	**274. Roof**	**275. Walls**
Bricks	01	01
Cement block/concrete	02	02
Corrugated iron/zinc	03	03
Wood	04	04
Plastic	05	05
Cardboard	06	06
Mixture of mud and cement	07	07
Wattle and daub	08	08
Tile	09	09
Mud	10	10
Thatching	11	11
Asbestos	12	12

276. What is the most often used source of drinking water by this household?

Piped tap water in dwelling – with meter	01
Piped tap water in dwelling – with pre-paid meter	02
Piped tap water on site or in yard – with meter	03
Piped tap water on site or in yard – with pre-paid meter	04
Piped tap water on site or in yard – with no meter	05
Public or communal tap – Free	06
Public or communal tap – Paid for	07
Water carrier/tanker	08
Borehole on site	09
Borehole off site/communal	10
Rainwater tank on site	11
Flowing river/stream	12
Dam/pool	13
Stagnant pond	14
Well	15
Spring	16
Other (specify)	17

277. On average, how much water does your household use each day for all purposes?

Less than 25 litres (one bucket)	1
25 – 100 litres (1 – 4 buckets)	2
101 – 200 litres (4 – 8 buckets / ½ to 1 drum)	3
201 – 400 litres (8 – 16 buckets / 1 – 2 drums)	4
401 – 600 litres (16 – 24 buckets / 2 – 3 drums)	5
More than 600 litres or 3 drums	6
Specific amount of water (in kl) per month (if municipal water bill provided)	7

278. Has your household had its water cut off for non-payment since 1994?

Yes	1	
No	2	→ Skip to Q. 281
Do not know	3	

279. Has your household had its water cut off for non-payment in the past year?

Yes	1	
No	2	→ Skip to Q. 281
Do not know	3	

280. In the past year, how often did you experience disconnections of the water service?

Never	1
Once or twice	2
Several times	3
At least once a month	4
At least once a week	5
Uncertain/do not know	6

281. In the past year, how often did you experience disruptions of longer than a day to your water service?

Never	1	→ Skip to Q. 283
Once or twice	2	
Several times	3	
At least once a month	4	
At least once a week	5	
Uncertain/do not know	6	

282. If you experienced water disruptions in the past year: What do you think was the main reason for these water disruptions?

Just stopped/do not know	1
Cut-off for non-payment	2
Interrupted for repairs	3
Other people used too much water and left none for us	4
Water is being sent to other communities	5
Drought	6
Other (specify)	7

283. What kind of toilet does this household use?

Flush toilet on site	01
Flush toilet off site	02
Chemical toilet	03
Pit latrine with ventilation pipe (VIP)	04
Pit latrine without ventilation pipe	05
Bucket toilet	07
None	08
Other (specify)	09
Do not know	10

284. Do you have a working landline telephone in your dwelling?

Yes	1
No	2

285. Do you have access to a computer?

Yes, at home	1
Yes, at work/educational institution	2
Yes, both at home and work	3
None	4

286. Do you have access to the Internet?

Yes, at home	1	
Yes, at work/educational institution	2	
Yes, both at home and work	3	
Yes, at an Internet cafe	4	
Yes, at a community centre	5	
None	6	→ Skip to Q. 288

287. If you have access to the Internet, what do you use it for? [multiple response]

Entertainment	1
Business	2
Banking	3
Information	4
Other	5
All of the above	6

288. Do you personally have a cellphone for personal or business use?

Personal use	1
Business use	2
Both	3
None	4

Which of the following items, in working order, does your household have?

		Yes	No
289.	Fridge	1	2
290.	Freezer	1	2
291.	Polisher or vacuum cleaner	1	2
292.	Television	1	2
293.	Hi-fi or music centre (radio excl.)	1	2
294.	Radio	1	2
295.	Microwave oven	1	2
296.	Washing machine	1	2

Do you have the following in your home?

		Yes	No
297.	Grid electricity	1	2
298.	Hot running water	1	2
299.	Domestic worker	1	2
300.	At least one car usually working	1	2

301. In the past year, was there ever a time when children under 7 years of age in your household went hungry because there was not enough money to buy food?

Yes	1
No	2
Do not know	3
Not applicable	4

302. In the past year, was there ever a time when other members of the household went hungry because there was not enough money to buy food?

Yes	1
No	2
Do not know	3
Not applicable	4

PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME

SHOWCARD G2

303. Please give me the letter that best describes the TOTAL MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME of all the people in your household before tax and other deductions. Please include all sources of income, i.e. salaries, pensions, income from investment, etc.

304. Please give me the letter that best describes your PERSONAL TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME before tax and other deductions. Please include all sources of income, i.e. salaries, pensions, income from investment, etc.

		303. Household	**304.** Personal
	No income	01	01
K	R1 – R500	02	02
L	R501 – R750	03	03
M	R751 – R1 000	04	04
N	R1 001– R1 500	05	05
O	R1 501 – R2 000	06	06
P	R2 001 – R3 000	07	07
Q	R3 001 – R5 000	08	08
R	R5 001 – R7 500	09	09
S	R7 501 – R10 000	10	10
T	R10 001 – R15 000	11	11
U	R15 001 – R20 000	12	12
V	R20 001 – R30 000	13	13
W	R30 000 +	14	14
	Refuse to answer	15	15
	Uncertain/Don't know	16	16

305. What monthly income level do you consider to be minimal for your household, i.e. your household could not make ends meet with less?

R _____

(Don't know = DNK)

NATURE OF FAMILIES AND FAMILY AUTHORITY

306. Who do you consider to be part of your 'family'? [multiple response]

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Myself	1
Wife or husband or partner	2
Son(s) and/or daughter(s)	3
Father and/or mother	4
Brother and/or sister	5
Grandchild	6
Grandparent	7
Mother- or father-in-law	8
Son- or daughter-in-law	9
Brother- or sister-in-law	10
Nephews/nieces	11
Aunts/uncles	12
Other relation (specify)	13
Non-relation (specify)	14

307. Why do you say that these people are 'family'? [multiple response]

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Close blood connection/relation/biologically related	1
More distant blood relation	2
Relation through marriage	3
Growing up or living under the same roof/sharing a yard	4
Give emotional support (love, care, moral support, etc.)	5
Give financial support	6
Other (specify)	7

308. Is there one person who holds the final position of authority in your 'family'?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Me (the respondent)	1	
Wife or husband or partner	2	
Son(s)	3	
Daughter(s)	4	
Father	5	
Mother	6	
Brother	7	
Sister	8	
Grandchild	9	
Grandmother	10	
Grandfather	11	
Mother-in-law	12	
Father-in-law	13	
Daughter-in-law	14	
Son-in-law	15	
Sister-in-law	16	
Brother-in-law	17	
Niece(s)	18	
Nephew(s)	19	
Aunt(s)	20	
Uncle(s)	21	
Other (specify)	22	
Non-relation (specify)	23	
No single person of authority	24	→ Skip to Q. 311
Do not know	25	→ Skip to Q. 311

309. If yes, what is the primary basis of their authority? [multiple response]

Overseeing rituals and important events	1
Financial support of others	2
Emotional support of others	3
Seniority/age	4
Makes the decisions	5
Other (specify)	6

310. If this person could no longer fulfil this role, who, if anyone, would fill this position?

Fieldworker: Do NOT read out options.

Wife or husband or partner	1
Son(s)	2
Daughter(s)	3
Father	4
Mother	5
Brother	6
Sister	7
Grandchild	8
Grandmother	9
Grandfather	10
Mother-in-law	11
Father-in-law	12
Daughter-in-law	13
Son-in-law	14
Sister-in-law	15
Brother-in-law	16
Niece(s)	17
Nephew(s)	18
Aunt(s)	19
Uncle(s)	20
Other relation (specify)	21
Non-relation (specify)	22

311. Now consider today and the last few days. Would you say that you are…?

In a better mood than usual	1
Normal	2
In a worse mood than usual	3
Do not know	4

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION.

Note: At the request of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), the following questions were included in the questionnaire.

new276. What is the most often used source of water by this household?

Piped tap water in dwelling – with meter	01
Piped tap water in dwelling – with pre-paid meter	02
Piped tap water on site or in yard – with meter	03
Piped tap water on site or in yard – with pre-paid meter	04
Piped tap water on site or in yard – with no meter	05
Public or communal tap less than 200 metres away – Free	06
Public or communal tap less than 200 metres away – Paid for	07
Public or communal tap more than 200 metres away – Free	08
Public or communal tap more than 200 metres away – Paid for	09
Neighbour – Free	10
Neighbour – Paid for	11
Water carrier/tanker	12
Borehole on site	13
Borehole off site/communal	14
Rainwater tank on site	15
Flowing river/stream	16
Dam/pool	17
Stagnant pond	18
Well	19
Spring	20
Other (specify)	21

new277. From what source did your household get water yesterday?

Piped tap water in dwelling – with meter	01
Piped tap water in dwelling – with pre-paid meter	02
Piped tap water on site or in yard – with meter	03
Piped tap water on site or in yard – with pre-paid meter	04
Piped tap water on site or in yard – with no meter	05
Public or communal tap less than 200 metres away – Free	06
Public or communal tap less than 200 metres away – Paid for	07
Public or communal tap more than 200 metres away – Free	08
Public or communal tap more than 200 metres away – Paid for	09
Neighbour – Free	10
Neighbour – Paid for	11
Water carrier/tanker	12
Borehole on site	13
Borehole off site/communal	14
Rainwater tank on site	15
Flowing river/stream	16
Dam/pool	17
Stagnant pond	18
Well	19
Spring	20
Other (specify)	21

new278. On average, how much water does your household use each day for all purposes?

Less than 25 litres (one bucket)	1
25 – 100 litres (1 – 4 buckets)	2
101 – 200 litres (4 – 8 buckets / ½ to 1 drum)	3
201 – 400 litres (8 – 16 buckets / 1 – 2 drums)	4
401 – 600 litres (16 – 24 buckets / 2 – 3 drums)	5
More than 600 litres or 3 drums	6
Specific amount of water (in kl) per month (if municipal water bill provided)	7

new279. In the past year, how often did you experience interruptions of the water service?

Never	1
Once or twice	2
Several times	3
At least once a month	4
At least once a week	5
Uncertain/do not know	6

new280. In the past year, how often did you experience interruptions of longer than one day to your water service?

Never	1	→ Skip to Q. 283
Once or twice	2	
Several times	3	
At least once a month	4	
At least once a week	5	
Uncertain/do not know	6	

new281. If you experienced water interruptions in the past year: What do you think was the main reason for these water interruptions?

Just stopped/do not know	1
Cut off for non-payment	2
Interrupted for repairs	3
Other people used too much water and left none for us	4
Water is being sent to other communities	5
Drought	6
Other (specify)	7

FIELD-WORKER NOTE: Question 282 is omitted

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Index

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