This study analyzes the persistent electoral volatility in Turkey in terms
of party-system institutionalization, mainly during the 1961-2002 period. To
distinguish the different vote swings underlying the electoral volatility, the study
divides electoral volatility into: (1) cleavage-type volatilities based on social
cleavages and (2) retrospective-type volatilities based on voter punishment of the
incumbent. The two types of volatilities are analyzed using separate regression
models. The unit of analyusis for the former is the province and for the latter the
nation. The results demonstrate, first, that deep social cleavages once increased
electoral volatility but that since the 1990s, they have begun to stabilize voting
behavior. The party system in Turkey has thus recently become anchored to its major
social cleavages. Second, electoral volatility as a whole nonetheless remains high
because of a growing trend toward retrospective voting. Low economic growth and
high unemployment are the major reasons for this. In sum, the apparent instability in
the party system stems not from a lack of representation in parliament of major social
groups but rather from poor government performance. Persistently high electoral
volatility thus does not necessarily indicate an absence of party system
institutionalization. This current phenomenon in Turkey appears to be analogous with
the world trend toward declining trust in government and growing trust in democratic
and party systems.