Asymmetric allocation of men and women across occupations had been widely considered as a main factor that could explain gender wage differentials, especially at the top of the distri- bution of wages. Whether this difference in the occupation structure between the two genders is essentially due to differences in productive characteristics, to self-selection or to employer’s discrimination is still an unaccomplished debate. We propose in this paper a dynamic model of statistical discrimination in job assignment and promotion which takes into account the endogeneity of investment in human capital and where employer’s prior beliefs are self-fulfilling in equilibrium. Building on Lazear and Rosen (1990)’s model we show how, under certain conditions, discrimination/self-selection at the hiring stage may change standard equilibrium’s results by altering employer’s beliefs about expected quit rates and ability of workers. We test the hypotheses of our model using a multivariate simulated maximum likelihood. The inequality in job promotion is analysed by applying a generalised residuals approach. Our Main results seem to confirm the model’s assumption. That is, when adversity against women is significant dur-
ing the hiring process, the group who overcomes this initial discrimination becomes as likely as promoted as their male colleagues.