This dissertation addresses the relationship between domestic and international
institutions in the context of the politics of trade. The dissertation identifies specific
instances of how international institutions modify the effects of domestic
institutions, and it shows how domestic institutions affect government behavior
in international institutions. The first chapter focuses on the domestic politics of
trade. A prominent literature argues that electoral institutions favoring narrow
interest groups result in higher average tariff rates. The chapter argues that this
literature has largely ignored the role of exporter interests and shows that, in the
presence of trade agreements, this omission results in a biased understanding of
trade politics. The second chapter expands on these issues, turning to electoral
campaigns. Narrow interest institutions are not only associated with more support
for protectionist trade policies in campaign statements, as would be expected from
standard accounts, but also with more support for free trade. The finding further
underscores the contemporaneous influence of protectionist and free trade interest
groups in trade politics. The third chapter turns to government behavior in international
institutions. It shows that domestic institutions can provide an explanation
for differences in government engagement with dispute settlement procedures.
Governments under institutions that are more prone to support narrow interest
groups are more active in filing trade disputes against other governments. The final
chapter addresses the question of why many international agreements lack strong
enforcement and commitment mechanisms, even where agreements are used as
hands-tying mechanisms by governments. The chapter emphasizes an incompatibility
between institutions that tie the hands of governments, and thereby lock in
policies, and international cooperation that is driven by domestic pro-cooperation
groups. Agreements which lock in policies take an issue off the table, such that
a government can no longer leverage it in political campaigns. Anticipating this,
governments may be reluctant to lock in policies through international agreements.