This paper presents a survey experiment in South Africa that focuses
on the role of mobilization for demand for redistribution. Previous literature
has found that providing information on inequality raises concerns
about inequality but need not lead to a change in tax preferences. We argue
that mobilization might provide the missing link between information
and political behavior regarding demand for redistribution. We operationalize
mobilization from an individual perspective as the belief that
a decrease in inequality is feasible. If this belief is absent, information
about inequality might simply increase the pessimism of respondents and
remain inconsequential for policy preferences. We test this idea with a
survey experiment in two townships of Cape Town, which includes one
pure information and two mobilization treatments. The first mobilization
treatment informs respondents about the (much lower inequality) in neighboring
countries. The second provides elite support for redistribution via
video messages of South African leaders. Consistent with previous literature,
we find that pure information on inequality increases concern for
inequality but has no effects on tax preferences. Mobilization treatments,
in contrast, shake the belief that a decrease in inequality is feasible and
consequently lead to a change in tax preferences. While the mechanism
regarding information on lower inequality in neighboring countries is as
expected, the one for the videos is puzzling: videos make people believe
that inequality is more, instead of less, inevitable, and this leads to lower
tax preferences. We conjecture that this is due to a lack of credibility
of the leaders considered which makes viewers more pessimistic and has
a demobilizing effect. An important innovation of the survey experiment
are action outcomes where respondents are offered to send an SMS or sign
a petition to disseminate their tax preferences.