This paper assesses indications that Russia might attempt to cultivate separatist sentiments in
Ajara as a means of putting pressure on the Georgian government. Ajaran autonomy within
Georgia is internationally recognized, although the extent of its self-rule was greatly scaled back
after the 2003 Rose Revolution led local despot Aslan Abashidze to flee to Moscow. There are
indicators that Russia might be attempting to support an Abashidze-led resistance to Tbilisi in
Ajara. While the stronger sense of Georgian identity in the region and the potential for adversely
involving Turkey are impediments to Russia achieving an Abkhazian or South Ossetian-style
secession in Ajara, such an initiative would enable Russia to further erode Georgian sovereignty
and fracture its territorial integrity.
In the wake of its August 2008 conflict with Georgia, Moscow may be reviewing the potential for
establishing a separatist regime in the Black Sea coastal region of Ajara. The recent conflict saw
Moscow drastically alter a status quo in the South Caucasus that had existed for the previous
fifteen years, imposing by force a resolution on the major issues in dispute between itself and
Georgia, and unilaterally recognizing the independence of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian
regions. However, in doing so it removed major elements previously at its disposal for pressuring
the Georgian government, other than a renewal of military conflict and the occupation of territory
universally recognized as Georgian. It is reasonable to assume that the Russian government is
examining new initiatives by which it can pressure Georgia.
Russia’s South Caucasus policy has been focused for the last few years on Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. By supporting but not recognizing the independence of their governments, Moscow was
able to modulate Georgian behavior by playing on its desire for a restoration of national integrity.
With these two regions now “independent” and South Ossetia at least far on the path toward
annexation, Russia’s new interests in the South Caucasus may have outrun its policy
preparations and on-the-ground capabilities. If this is indeed the case, Russia will be raising an
entirely new set of issues for dealing with the Georgian government.
To be sure, Russia has effectively limitless pretexts available should it choose to reopen armed
hostilities. For example, it might allege that continuing unrest in the North Caucasus (Dagestan,
Ingushetiya, and of course Chechnya) is the result of Georgian operatives infiltrating from the
Pankisi Gorge, or that Georgia is violating the terms of the EU-brokered ceasefire. An even more
ominous course was hinted at recently with the publication of police alerts alleging a Georgian
program to unleash a wave of terror bombings across Russia.[1] Russia demonstrated in the
recent conflict that it has the ability to move its forces across Georgia virtually at will. But its near
complete failure to muster international support for its actions implies that it will be looking for a
set of options more effective than its on-going economic blockade yet more indirect than force.
One means of doing this is to continue the policy previously carried out in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia—encourage separatist sentiment in Georgia’s peripheral regions, with an eye to further
fracturing the country.
This paper assesses indications that Russia might attempt to cultivate separatist sentiments in
the Georgian region of Ajara with just such a policy in mind. Properly conducted, such an initiative
might enable Russia to erode Georgian sovereignty still further and fracture its territorial integrity
by more subtle means than the use or threat of naked force. Ajara is in some ways an ideal
candidate for such a policy, as it is an autonomous republic within Georgia, and until recently was
ruled by a local despot with little interference from the national government in Tbilisi. By contrast,
an attempt to organize a separatist movement among, for example, the majority ethnic Armenians
in Javakheti district or the ethnic Azeris who comprise a significant portion of the population in
rural eastern Georgia, would find no autonomous administrative structures in place and no
tradition of local self-rule.