The origins of many conflicts in parts of the developing world can be traced to disputes over land –
over land ownership, rights, access, use and degradation. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that
information asymmetries among various principals in land tenure and market systems have caused the
marginalisation of some principals by others, leading to confrontation and, frequently, violent
clashes. We begin by observing the interdependencies among the various principals in the Narok
district in Kenya, which has been the scene for prolonged social unrest over the last decade. A PASIR
(Pressure, Activity, State, Impact, Response) framework is developed to model the causality links
among the principals in the district that may provide an explanation for these conflicts. Preliminary
results suggest that a lack of understanding of new institutions for land tenure, land use and market
exchange by some groups in the area often lead to their exploitation and marginalisation by the
rational choices of other groups who are more informed. The drop in social welfare levels together
with widening equity gaps and degradation of the resource base they depend on for their livelihood
may provide a more rational answer to the conflicts than just ethnic differences.