Trust plays a key role in promoting cooperation, exchanges, and interactions among individuals;
therefore it is believed to foster economic development. Sender’s behavior in the “investment
game” (Berg et al. 1995) is widely employed to measure trust among individuals, but recent
literature questioned its accuracy. We played the “investment game” with 3320 households from
200 rural villages in Cameroon. Using a triadic design, we measure participants’ altruism,
distributional preferences, and expectations of trustworthiness. We manipulate social pressure
by randomly assigning participants to two treatments with different secrecy levels, and measure
the effect of social norms on behavior in investment game. Finally, we test whether senders
behavior only measures a belief in someone else’s trustworthiness (i.e. trust), and whether
trustworthiness in turn is only based on reciprocity. Controlling for risk preferences and other
demographics, we find that senders’ behavior measures mostly trust, but it is not an accurate
measure of trust.