Democracy promises intrastate peace therefore post-civil war societies are often prescribed
democratization. However, in ethnically divided societies building democratic
institutions where all former warring parties operate is tantamount to an impertinent
demand. In many cases at least one of the conflict parties refuses to be a single demos
together with the other party and coexist with it in the same political community. There
can, however, be no success in building or remodeling democratic institutions as long as
one of the conflicting parties rejects the state, its borders or internal structures. Likewise,
an absence of common democratic institutions prevents all the conflicting parties from
accepting the state as their own. In the context of these considerations the present report
discusses whether democratization in Macedonia has succeeded in making progress after
the fighting in 2001 and fulfilling the promise of peace through democracy.
In 2001 the (Albanian) National Liberation Army (UÇK) attacked the Macedonian security
forces. Initially, it also promoted secessionist objectives but later it restricted itself
to demands for empowerment of Albanians in Macedonia. The fighting came to an end
with the Ohrid Agreement between the largest Macedonian and Albanian parties. The
peace agreement required the dissolution of the UÇK and promised comprehensive reforms
of state institutions in return.
Macedonia enjoyed initially a relatively favorable environment for democratization
because the government institutions where Macedonian and Albanian parties shared
power had persisted even during the fighting. Hence the subsequent democratization only
required a remodeling of common institutions rather than having to set up new ones
from scratch. A large majority of Albanians accepted the Republic of Macedonia but not
its old structures. Even so, Albanian politicians avoided showing their loyalty to Macedonia.
The majority of Macedonian citizens wanted Macedonia to be their nation-state
and rejected the reforms envisaged in the Ohrid Agreement. Therefore it appeared questionable
that the formula of “peace for more rights” could work.