In general elections are seen as the key instrument in the democratization process even in postconflict
countries. On one hand there is the suggestion that the more repetitive and uninterrupted
the electoral process is, the better are the chances for democracy to consolidate. On the other
hand there is stream of literature that criticizes the “electoralism” paradigm. In that respect
elections are portrayed as a gate way for further polarization in the society, and as such the
electoral competition supports further instability, rather than aiding the democratization of the
country.
The question is then whether post-conflict elections contribute or impede the democratization in
post-conflict countries? The question has been addressed by analyzing the effects of various
electoral designs in post-conflict countries. Also the role of international actors in post-conflict
elections and democracy building has been extensively analyzed. However, little attention is
given to the political parties as the main actors in post-conflict elections.
I claim that the prolongation or continuation of the conflict is function of the electoral strategy of
the political parties. Parties can choose a strategy of symbolical extension of the conflict, as an
efficient electoral strategy. I call this ‘electoral militarism’. However this is not necessarily
detrimental for the stabilization and democratization of the country. On the contrary, it can
structure the political competition making the elections and parties more stable.
The paper follows case oriented research methods. The electoral process and outcomes in
Macedonia, Bulgaria and Croatia are compared. This design holds constant most institutional
factors, as well as historical legacies, while the main difference is the presence (Macedonia,
Croatia) and absence (Bulgaria) of internal armed conflict. Also there is a differentiation in terms
of sequence of events, whether the conflict preceded (Croatia) or interrupted (Macedonia) the
democratization process. The paper is based on cross national comparison of electoral data (i.e
volatility, patterns of party support) and a case study of Croatia, where process tracing is used in
a longitudinal analysis of several election cycles.