A bargaining game between elite groups has the potential to explain a macro
phenomena such as a civil war. Literature on civil conflicts has equated the presence
of conflict with exclusion of ethnic elites from the distribution of political
participation, social services and economic assets –Horizontal inequality
arguments-. Elites in conflict prone countries also bargain and exchange assets and
goods through patronage networks which can be understood as informal
institutions. This paper argues that although these research findings have been
robustly accepted, there is still a lack of insight into the role and importance of
informal institutions as plausible and effective channels for redistribution. By using
Process Tracing, this paper will show that in the provinces of Pattani, Yala and
Narathiwat within the South of Thailand; the patronage networks provided a
stabilizing effect in controlling the use of violence by Malays as a means of
achieving demands. The significant change in the patronage network between the
governments of General Prem Tinsulanonda and Thaksin Shinawatra ultimately
meant that the poorest Malay population which is the one holding arms, was not
able to receive any redistribution of economic assets, political participation or social
services. Formal inclusionary deals between the elites cannot solely account for the
pacifying effect during the government of General Prem Tinsulanonda as most
scholars have argued.