|Type||Thesis or Dissertation|
|Title||Local Elections and Corruption during Democratization: Evidence from Indonesia|
We develop a conáict model linking conáict intensity to the distribution of the population over an arbitrary number of groups. We extend the pure contest version of the model by Esteban and Ray (1999: "Conáict and Distribution", Journal of Economic Theory, 87(2): 379-415) to include a mixed public-private good. We analyze how the level of dissipation changes as the population distribution and the share of publicness of the prize change. In contrast to Esteban and Ray (2011: "Linking Conáict to Inequality and Polarization", American Economic Review, 101(4): 1345ñ74), we do not assume that the
probability of winning equals group size. First, we characterize how the global maximum varies with the degree of publicness of the prize. Second, we Önd that, in case of pure private goods, the conáict-distribution relationship resembles the fractionalization index. Finally, we Önd that smaller groups always contribute more and so the fractionalization index underestimates their weight. Indeed, we Önd that the fractionalization index underestimates
the true level of conáict.
|»||Indonesia - Village Potential Survey 1996|
|»||Indonesia - Village Potential Survey 2005|