The sharp declines in fertility across Southern Europe between 1970 and 2000 are frequently attributed to
the structure of the labor market and institutions, but I find evidence that non-market forces may also be quite
relevant. In comparing the outcomes of immigrants by country-of-origin, the effect of Europe-specific institutions
and government policies are netted out. Using total fertility rates in Europe as a quantitative indicator of childbearing
behavior, I find that the fertility decisions of second-generation immigrants to the United States are
remarkably similar to those of Europeans from the country of ancestry, even after accounting for first-order factors
like education and income. A decline of one child per woman in Europe during this period predicts a 0.3 fall in the
observed number of children born to immigrants.
In addition, immigrants with fathers from strongly Catholic nations demonstrate large declines, much like
their European cousins, indicating a potential link between religion and preferences regarding family size. The
Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), which lead to large, unexpected theological and practical shifts among
Catholics worldwide, provides useful variation in the religiosity of European Catholics, allowing me to differentiate
the fertility behavior of Catholics from Protestants. Second-generation women from a 100% Catholic country whose
own TFR declined by one child are predicted to have their own fertility fall by 0.9 children per woman between
1970 and 2000. In contrast, European TFR has no power in predicting the fertility of women from a wholly
Protestant nation. Declining religiosity, as measured by lagged church attendance, appears to be one underlying
cause of this pan-Atlantic fertility correlation, but it does not completely explain the connection between immigrant
and European fertility.